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Abstract 
 
This thesis investigates Sino-Japanese relations and the post-Cold War security order in 
Northeast Asia. In particular, it asks whether a ‘security regime’ now exists in the 
region. Security analysis of Northeast Asia has often focussed upon the likely effects of 
changes in material power. This has led to predictions of a ‘Back to the future’ scenario 
of rivalry and possible war. While acknowledging the value of this approach, I question 
whether it is sufficient; other approaches, notably an investigation of normative 
changes, are required. In considering both material and non-material factors, I follow 
the precepts of RSCT – which view RSCs as essentially social constructions. Thus, I 
employ RSCT’s eclectic posture, exploring three distinctive approaches to the 
possibility of structural change – Waltz and neorealism, Wendt and social 
constructivism, and Buzan and the English school. Thus, while not ignoring the impact 
of shifts in the balance of power on security practices, I also investigate ideational 
variables – that is the kinds of values, norms and institutions that are shared by the 
members of the East Asian RSC. I go on to ask why they are shared, how their identities 
and interests evolve over time and how these changes influence securitisation and 
desecuritisation practices. 
 
By examining these variables through societal, economic and military-political sectors, 
and locating them at domestic, regional, interregional and global levels, I conclude that, 
together with Southeast Asia, Northeast Asia has formed a single ‘East Asian security 
regime’. This conclusion is based upon my interpretation of domestic normative 
constructions in Japan and in China; the growing regional identity/society in East Asia 
(especially after the Asian financial crisis); and the increased willingness and ability of 
regional actors to deal with security challenges. But challenges remain, with recurrent 
tensions and crises as well as continuing historical mistrust. I believe that, as yet, 
ideational factors, the shared norms and institutions in the East Asian RSC, are still 
associated with acceptance of a pluralist Westphalian international society, and these are 
shared largely instrumentally rather than by genuine belief. Thus, despite enthusiasm for 
community building, progress has been limited in collective identity formation; and 
balancing behaviour is still common. This means that, while East Asia has reached at 
least the lower or middle stages of a ‘security regime’, it is still far away from becoming 
a ‘security community’.  
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1 Introduction: RSCs and Northeast Asia in Theoretical Perspective 
 
1.1  Introduction 
 
If anything, concerns about security and stability in Northeast Asia have increased 
rather than diminished in the new post-Cold War era. In particular, much attention has 
been devoted to the problems of the relationship between China and Japan in recent 
years. Whatever may have happened in Europe or elsewhere, the end of the Cold War 
has not freed this region from dispute, conflict or crisis. Unresolved territorial disputes – 
between Japan and South Korea, China and Japan, and Japan and Russia – are still far 
from solution. From time to time, tensions over sovereignty and status rivalries between 
two Koreas and between China and Taiwan have intensified and resulted in crises in 
which war became a distinct possibility. These crises included: 
• The 1993/4 crisis over the North Korean nuclear weapons programme. This came 
much closer to war than was generally realised. 
• The 1995/96 crisis over the Taiwanese presidential elections, coinciding with 
Beijing’s missile tests near Taiwan and the deployment of US aircraft carriers to the 
area. 
• The 1998 missile crisis, when the North Korean Taepodong-1 flew over Japanese 
airspace and landed in the western part of the Pacific Ocean – thus greatly alarming 
Japan, South Korea, and the United States. 
• The 1999 crisis over the Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui’s interview on German 
radio in which he referred to PRC-ROC relations as ‘state-to-state’ or at least 
‘nation-to-nation’. In response, Beijing threatened the possible use of force if 
Taiwan declared independence. 
• The 2002 crisis when Pyongyang reportedly admitted the existence of a secret 
highly enriched uranium nuclear programme. 
• The 2005 crisis over strong anti-Japanese demonstrations in China and South 
Korea. 
 
Security concerns have been further intensified both by the rapid rise of China and by 
the perceived possibility of Japanese remilitarisation. Particularly in the aftermath of the 
end of the Cold War, in the context of a declining Russia, a stagnant Japan and a 
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retreating US hegemony, the rise of China appeared to constitute the most serious 
problem (Kristof 1993; Segal 1993; and Roy 1994). Thus, in the 1990s, and to some 
extent today, debates about security in Asia and in Northeast Asia have been dominated 
by speculations about the impact of the distribution / redistribution of material power 
within the international system. The likely – in some cases the only possible – outcome 
seemed to be a ‘back to the future’ scenario. 
 
Writing in 1993/94, Friedberg argued that the most fundamental impact on Asian 
regional security resulting from the end of the Cold War had been a shift from a bipolar 
to a multipolar system. He predicted (1993/94) and reasserted (2000) that Asia’s future 
would be the same as Europe’s past; in other words, great power rivalries and major 
wars were highly likely. Roy (1994) also argued that the rapid rise of China as a major 
economic and military power would almost inevitably challenge US interests in the 
region and also provoke Japan. Roy (1994:162) portrayed China and Japan as ‘natural 
rivals’, because both saw themselves as the rightful leaders of the region. According to 
Segal (1993: 27), the root of the problem was that whereas ‘Japan and China used to 
operate primarily in different spheres (Japan in the economic and China in the 
military)’, now not only was China entering to the economic sphere but Japan was also 
moving towards the politico-military sphere. Thus, for the first time in its history, the 
region was entering a phase when, it would contain two great powers and this would 
result in competition and rivalry. This line of arguments prevailed throughout the 1990s 
and still have many adherents.  
 
Christensen (1999) argued that, in this new security environment, the logic of the 
security dilemma was still highly relevant and hence there was a strong possibility of 
spiralling tension. Faced with such an uncertain future, East Asian states had responded 
by building up their armed forces and embarking on programmes of military 
modernisation. Their reaction had been all the more predictable because their behaviour 
had still been conditioned by historic antagonisms but had not been constrained by high 
levels of economic interdependence or by mature security institutions. In a similar vein, 
Waltz (2000: 35-6) asserted that, reluctantly or not, ‘Japan and China will follow each 
other on the route to becoming great powers’. It is true that, with the waning of Russian 
power and uncertainty as to the US role in the region, both Japan and China are likely to 
identify each other as their most dangerous potential adversary. Thus, Yahuda (2002) 
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claimed that the current, reasonably stable relations between China and Japan, were 
‘only possible because of the role played by the United States’. In tune with this 
analysis, Taniguchi (2005) still described the security outlook of Northeast Asia as one 
of ‘turbulence ahead’, characterised by acute rivalry between China and Japan.  
 
But should the security dynamics of the region be understood solely in terms of the 
distribution of material power? Is there any other variable likely to affect the regional 
security order? Is the back to the future scenario the only possible outcome? The answer 
put forward in this thesis – that there is the potential for a ‘security regime’ in Northeast 
Asia – is challenging and theoretically controversial. It questions the assumption that 
acute competition and perhaps war represent the inevitable and permanent feature of the 
international system. It does so by examining possible variables both material and 
ideational. 
 
Indeed I do not deny the importance of structural conditions or of material impacts on 
the security practices. Northeast Asia has certainly faced serious security challenges in 
the post-Cold War era. Yet I contend that the realist core assumption and its over 
simplified application needs to be balanced by consideration of other factors; this is 
essential to achieve a more objective understanding of security relations. Like scholars 
such as Katzenstein and Okawara (2001/02); Buzan (1991; 2004a); Buzan and Little 
(2001); Buzan and Wæver (2003) and Alagappa (1998, 2003), I believe that the 
adoption of theoretical pluralism or analytical eclecticism facilitates understanding of 
the complexities of security relations in Northeast Asia and elsewhere. Very different 
realities are likely to emerge if the same region is viewed through different lenses. In 
short, the position in Northeast Asia is more complicated than the realists suppose.  
 
1.2  Northeast Asia: A Multidimensional and Contradictory Case 
 
The presence of China and Japan means that Northeast Asia is the only RSC that 
contains two great powers. A combination of long-standing and historically based 
antagonism and the experience of the Cold War meant that security relations between 
China and Japan and in Northeast Asia were bound to be highly complicated. But the 
effects of the ending of the Cold War and accelerated globalisation have actually 
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heightened this complexity, as evidenced in many contradictory, paradoxical and 
puzzling phenomena. 
 
First, with the end of the Cold War and the growing trend of globalisation, Northeast 
Asia has increasingly integrated into the global economic and political system. The 
effects have been particularly marked in China, as exemplified in its adoption of free 
trade and a market economy and eventual membership of the WTO in 2001. But, in 
general, the effects of the end of the Cold War are less clear-cut in Northeast Asia than 
elsewhere. Although superpower penetration, particularly Russian/Soviet influence, has 
diminished, characteristics of the Cold War period survive. Ideological divisions 
between communism and capitalism, once so important in Europe, may have largely 
disappeared from the rest of the world, but they are still present in Northeast Asia. 
Communist party rule continues in China and in North Korea, even though Communism 
in China and Communism in North Korea are now so different that the value of the term 
has become questionable. Relations between the divided Koreas and between China and 
Taiwan remain difficult, while continuing US engagement exhibits many of the features 
of Cold War containment.  
 
Nevertheless, the end of Cold War brought great changes to Sino-Japanese relations. In 
particular, the fall of the Soviet Union made the rise of China appear more threatening 
and hence complicated its relations with other powers, especially with Japan. Hitherto, 
common suspicion of the Soviet Union had provided a basis for relatively harmonious 
relations between China and Japan. Perhaps inevitably, once the common enemy 
disappeared, China and Japan became more sensitive about the other’s capabilities and 
intentions. Given the historical legacy of conflict between the two, these concerns 
became central to debates about the ‘China threat’ on the one hand and about Japan’s 
possible transition to a ‘normal’ country on the other. Yet, while their relationship has 
fluctuated, in economic terms the two great powers of East Asia have become 
increasingly interdependent.  
 
Secondly, while there have been many disputes, tensions and crises in Northeast Asia 
since the end of the Cold War, these crises never became totally out of control or 
resulted in actual war – even in the two flashpoints of the Korean peninsula and the 
Taiwan Strait. In the Korean crisis of 1993/4, tensions and the possibility of war were 
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contained by numerous negotiations and dialogues, mostly through bilateral dialogues 
and especially through talks between North Korea and the United States. Of course, the 
Agreed-Framework (1994) between the US and North Korea did not prevent subsequent 
tensions or crises. The Korean Energy Development Organisation (KEDO), established 
in 1995 (the so-called innovative experiment of multilateral cooperation in Northeast 
Asia) was set up to achieve an arms control agreement (to discontinue North Korea’s 
nuclear development), but little progress was made. The initiative for KEDO came from 
an outside power, the United States, and the organisation did not include China, the 
main regional actor. Thus, in a climate of recurrent tensions and in the absence of 
institutionalised security mechanism, the security and stability of the region appeared to 
depend entirely on the role of the United States as ring-holder. However, towards the 
new millennium, neighbouring states made increasing efforts to engage with North 
Korea. The historic North-South Summit was held in June 2000, and in July of the same 
year, Pyongyang applied for membership of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF); the 
application was accepted. The Six-Party Talks (involving the two Koreas, China, Japan, 
Russia and the US), have now become the main mechanism for dealing with Korean 
problems. Although progress is slow and huge difficulties remain – as exemplified by 
the recent crises over North Korean missile and nuclear tests –, regional actors are 
playing increasing roles in maintaining regional security. 
 
In the case of Taiwan, tensions are also high and questions of security and survival still 
remain. However, there are striking differences between the crisis of 1995/6 and 
subsequent ones. In 1995/6 China resorted to military intimidation. Yet there has been 
no Chinese military response to such things as the growth of a distinctly Taiwanese 
identity, to the passage of the Referendum Law and the general elections of 2000 and 
2004. Rather, China has confined itself to strong verbal protests. Of course, China has 
not given up its claim to be entitled to use force if necessary – that is in the event of a 
unilateral Taiwanese declaration of independence – but stresses that its real objective is 
peaceful re-unification. Although China has passed an anti-secession law, it has also 
made it clear that it looks to the US to restrain Taipei. 
 
Thirdly, the complexity does not end there. Many of the tensions and disputes in 
Northeast Asia have deep roots in the past. To take one example, the division of Korea 
cannot be attributed solely to the effects of the Cold War. Cummings (1998) argues that, 
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in part, the Korean War (1950-53) was a civil war whose roots lay in the colonial 
period. If he is right, it follows that a proper understanding of both the War itself and 
the present division requires an investigation of the years of Japanese rule.   
 
Many of the problems of Northeast Asia are not susceptible to any single explanation. 
As Cha observes (1999; 2000), the realist approach cannot provide a satisfactory 
explanation of the apparently puzzling relations between Japan and South Korea in the 
Cold War era. Even after ‘normalization’ in June 1965, relations remained at a negative 
or enmity level, despite shared threats from the Soviet Union, China, and North Korea. 
One might have expected that geographical proximity and the tense Cold War 
environment would have led Japan and South Korea to conclude at least a bilateral 
defence treaty, but this did not happen. This is not an isolated example and historically 
generated enmity relationships are common throughout Asia. Recent anti-Japanese 
demonstrations (April 2005) suggest that, in China and Korea, self-identities are still 
largely constructed in opposition to Japan. In China and in North and South Korea alike, 
nationalism is by definition anti-Japanese.  
 
Yet relations between Japan and South Korea have been improving, and even in the post 
war period they sometimes co-operated to achieve foreign policy objectives, often in 
concert with the US – in what Cha (1999) calls a ‘quasi-alliance’. Cha sees this outcome 
as a result of material factors, especially common fear of US abandonment. Cha is thus 
certainly right to point out that, while ideational influences have led Japan and South 
Korea to antagonism, material calculations have led them to a degree of cooperation. 
Yet more complex factors may be present. After its defeat in the Second World War, 
during the period of Occupation Authority, Japan accepted liberal concepts such as 
freedom, democracy and human rights. However, until the democratisation of South 
Korea and Taiwan began in the 1980s, Japan had no close neighbour sharing the same 
key values (Bessho 1999: 17). South Korea and Taiwan were also the two most 
successful imitators of Japan’s economic model, the so-called ‘developmental state’ 
model. This created some shared economic interests and values. Thus, it will be 
interesting to examine how these shared interests and values had begun to ameliorate 
historical animosities and hence to facilitate policy cooperation.  
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In addition, there can be no doubt that the ‘nuclear dimension’ increases the complexity 
of security relations in Northeast Asia. All five of the protagonists in the region have 
actual or potential nuclear capacity. China has long been a nuclear weapon state and 
many suspect that North Korea also possesses nuclear weapons. Japan, South Korea and 
Taiwan are widely regarded as ‘nuclear threshold states’, that is, states with the 
capability to develop nuclear weapons quickly if they wished (Buzan and Wæver 2003: 
93).  
 
Finally, the processes of regionalisation and the emergence of multilateralism compel us 
to look beyond power balancing behaviour. Although, in Asia, regionalism and 
multilateralism are primarily phenomena of the post-Cold War era, these processes 
emerged gradually from post-war rivalry and antagonism. Economic interactions and 
the role played by Japan, through its policies of trade, aid and FDI, were especially 
significant. After the late 1970s, China’s economic reform and opening policy provided 
extra stimulus to the overall process. Yet the processes are not confined to the Northeast 
Asian region, but operate on broader levels – in East Asia and in the Asia-Pacific area. 
They also extend from the economic to the security realm.  
 
Perhaps the most interesting outcome is that the processes have altered regional 
boundaries and brought Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia into what Regional security 
complex theory (RSCT) calls a single RSC. But how far have these processes 
contributed to collective identity formation in East Asia and have they changed the 
normative context of East Asian regional society? As I will argue in the case study 
chapters, the processes of regionalisation did not result in an immediate emergence of 
an East Asian collective identity. At least before the Asian financial crisis (1997-98), 
both material conditions and identity factors worked against an exclusive East Asian 
version of regionalism. There was a striking contrast between the failure of the East 
Asian attempt to create EAEG / EAEC in the early 1990s and the success of APEC. In 
other words, economic regionalism in Asia has developed most strongly in the Asia-
Pacific region; it is open rather than closed and supports policies of non-discriminatory 
economic liberalism.  
 
Regionalism and multilateralism in Asia also extended into the security sphere, most 
notably in the forms of the ARF and CSCAP, created in 1994 and in 1993 respectively. 
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Yet these developments did not follow the European model. Instead, they reflected 
earlier experiences in Southeast Asia (Huxley 1996a; Acharya 2003a). In particular, the 
so-called ‘ASEAN Way’ provided much of the practical and normative foundations. 
Following the ASEAN model, the ARF, the principal multilateral security organization 
in Asia-Pacific, did not have conventional collective defence or collective security 
functions. The ARF was founded upon ASEAN norms that included non-interference in 
the internal affairs of states, peaceful settlement of disputes, and the ‘ASEAN Way’ of 
consultations and consensus-based decision-making (Leifer 1996; Acharya 2003a; 
2003b). 
 
These multilateral institutions have been accused of lacking real substance. The Asian 
financial crisis of the late 1990s certainly revealed their limitations when faced with 
crises and conflict management. Yet it is striking that the crisis did not lead to the 
abandonment of attempts to build multilateral structures or to a return to the balance of 
power mechanism. On the contrary, the states of East Asia intensified their efforts to 
rectify the defects of existing arrangements and to find more viable ways of 
collaboration. Perhaps the most significant responses were ASEAN Plus Three, an 
exclusively East Asian initiative, and the eventual holding of an East Asia Summit in 
December 2005. Both Japan and China have played significant and positive roles in 
these developments. The institutionalisation of the APT suggests that East Asians are 
moving towards a new phase of regional community building. 
 
Of course, competition between the various economies and the strength of protectionist 
tendencies still creates difficulties. In the political and security areas, Taiwan’s 
membership of regional institutions remains highly sensitive. In addition, there remains 
the question of whether to include the United States and other Asia-Pacific players, such 
as Canada, Australia, and even India. More importantly, as realists stress, Sino-Japanese 
rivalry for influence over East Asia constitutes a particularly intractable problem. 
Further progress appears to depend on reducing this rivalry and competition. Yet, as 
Barry Desker, Director of the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Singapore, 
confidently asserted at the time of the first East Asian Summit, East Asians really have 
made a major step towards a new era of regional cooperation (Desker 2005). Although 
there have been subsequent developments in the direction of further regional 
cooperation, this thesis examines events up to the December 2005 Summit. 
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1.3  The Application of Regional Security Complex Theory 
 
This survey reveals that the dynamics of security relations in Northeast and East Asia 
are by no means straightforward. Their complexities and contradictions invite several 
questions: 
• What are the main factors that have resulted in so many disputes, conflicts and 
crises?  
• Why have these crises not escalated into out-right armed conflict on a major scale? 
• What are the key variables affecting regional patterns of interaction: changes in 
balance of power, historical legacies, and/or changes in patterns of economic and 
social relations? 
 
Answers to these questions need a proper theoretical and conceptual framework. 
Theories are like lenses that allow us to see things clearer. Of course, there is a danger 
that while some ‘lenses’ or theories may bring clearer resolution to some areas, they can 
obscure others. A magnifying glass is valuable when trying to read individual words, 
but the naked eye will serve better when looking at the whole page. If theories are 
imperfect does this mean that they are useless? By no means, reality is always 
complicated, not least because while some events may occur randomly or by chance, 
others are the product of historical factors whose roots may go back far into the past. 
Flawed though they may be, theories are needed to make sense of anything. But if 
theories are required, should we use one or many? My answer is that we should use 
many, because the distortions of one school of thought are likely to be corrected by the 
distortions of another. In this thesis, therefore, I purposely adopt a posture of theoretical 
pluralism because I believe that this is the best way to avoid distortion in any particular 
direction and hence provides me with the best chance of arriving at a fairly 
comprehensive understanding of the security dynamics of Northeast Asia. 
 
For the purpose of this analysis, I find Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) the 
most valuable and congenial. I believe that RSCT, originally developed by Buzan and 
later associated with the Copenhagen school’s approach to security, provides the best 
theoretical framework to inform my empirical investigations. RSCT insists that RSCs 
are social constructs and hence contends that their inter-subjective processes are highly 
relevant to security analysis. RSCs are defined as ‘durable patterns of amity and enmity 
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taking the form of subglobal, geographically coherent patterns of security 
interdependence’. If this is true, the particular character of a local RSC will often be 
affected by historical factors, either negatively by long-standing enmities or positively 
by common membership of a civilisational area (Buzan and Wæver 2003: 45). 
 
Thus, the future structure of the Northeast Asian RSC – whether it changes or remains 
the same – depends on social processes, such as identity building (historically generated 
amity/enmity relations), norm setting and their internalisation, rather than upon forces 
outside these processes. In other words, while facilitating conditions are accepted as an 
important part of securitisation practice, the crucial elements in security analysis are the 
ways in which peoples and leaders come to identify – or not identify – matters of 
importance as security issues and the effects of these perceptions on security policy-
making. Thus, in Buzan and Wæver’s words, ‘it is these definitions that underpin 
security policy and behaviour, they, and the processes by which they are made and 
unmade, are what must ultimately lie at the heart of security analysis’ (Buzan and 
Wæver 2003: 37). Thus, the application of RSCT to the Northeast Asian case is useful 
in at least three ways. 
 
First, RSCT provides a conceptual framework for security analysis, which is essential in 
security studies in Northeast Asia and in Asia as whole. As Alagappa (1998: 10; 2003) 
lamented, theoretically informed inquiries in Asian security studies have been few and 
often fragmentary. The two volumes edited by Alagappa – Asian Security Practice 
(1998) and Asian Security Order (2003) – are valuable works in regional security 
analysis, which emphasise both material and ideational factors in security analysis. Yet, 
the first volume focuses on individual countries and the second deals with specific 
issues, such as sovereignty, balance of power and institutions. To Alagappa’s regret, 
despite their effort, a volume that focuses on sub-regional or regional security has not 
been materialised. To some extent the omission is made good by Acharya’s (2001) 
Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia, an excellent attempt to develop 
regional security analysis by exploring the concept of ‘security community’. However, 
Northeast Asia is still far away from becoming a ‘security community’, and hence, 
though it provides a good conceptual framework, the concept of security community 
appears not to be ideally suited to an investigation of the current state of the region. Yet 
it must be stressed that RSCT assumes that RSCs are based on interactions of a 
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cooperative as well as of a conflictual nature. Hence, it may be applied not only to 
regions where relations have developed to the level of peaceful interaction and non-use 
of force, but also to those where they have not. 
 
Secondly, the theory provides a framework that allows identification of different types 
of structural changes, both external (depending on changes in boundaries) and internal 
(depending on the degree of amity and enmity and/or distribution of power). The link 
between external and internal structural changes is particularly relevant to East Asia. As 
I shall argue, external transformation – that is, the emergence of Northeast and 
Southeast Asia as an East Asian RSC – has largely contributed to its internal 
transformation. 
 
Thirdly, the application of RSCT allows us to look beyond material forces shaping 
security outlooks. RSCT is essentially eclectic in approach; its dialogue between the 
neorealist structural approach and the constructivist social understanding of 
international systems is especially important for my analysis. Thus, in line with RSCT’s 
approach to security, I explore three distinctive approaches as to the possibility of 
structural change – Waltz and neorealism, Wendt and social constructivism, and Buzan 
and the English school. Waltz’s materialistic and ‘systemic’ theory emphasises the 
reproductivity of the international system. Changes occur only on the surface level, that 
is, through the distribution of capabilities, which are regarded as the most important 
forces affecting states’ behaviour. By contrast, constructivism leads to an investigation 
of identity and interests of the actors – because these identities and interests are the 
ultimate sources of the outcomes. Structural change occurs by changing the identity and 
interests of states. Again, the English school formulation leads to an examination of 
how international society evolves through the creation and evolution of different norms, 
principles and institutions. Since these are not given but are formed through the 
processes of intersubjective practices – a point also emphasised by the securitisation 
approach – they can change through intersubjective practice, hence the structural 
change. 
 
The thesis is thus an attempt to analyse patterns and complexities of security relations in 
Northeast Asia by consciously combining material and social approaches (in this case 
by combining the above three theoretical approaches in conjunction with the RSCT’s 
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conceptual framework, particularly with its securitisation approach). In so doing, it does 
not assume, a priori, that Northeast Asian RSC has already become a ‘security regime’, 
or claim that ideational / social variables will necessarily lead to this outcome. In other 
words, while my analysis goes beyond material forces, it does not overlook them. Yet 
neither does it go so far in the direction of eclecticism to become merely a ‘catch all’ 
summary of different insights with no reflection on their respective merits and 
significance. In essence, my purpose is to locate material factors within a social context 
and then to discover how securitising and desecuritising logics work inside this totality.   
 
Thus, I undertake security analysis in relation to intersubjective processes. This includes 
mutual perceptions and interpretations among actors. In the course of investigation, I 
discover how the logic of balance of power works – in other words, how distribution 
and redistribution of power affect states’ perceptions and interpretations and their 
behaviour. I also discover changes in the normative context in which actors interrelate: 
that is what kind of values, norms and institutions they share, why they are shared, and 
how their identity and interests evolve and change over time. I further consider how 
these changes influence securitisation and desecuritisation practices. These practices 
will ultimately become the sources that determine whether Northeast Asia remains in 
conflict formation mode or moves to a level of security regime.  
 
Thus, for the purpose of this analysis, I adopt a holistic approach to East Asian security. 
In other words, when investigating the impacts of material and social variables upon 
securitising and desecuritising logics, I put these variables into historical contexts. 
While I appreciate that the range of issues may seem too broad to be included in a single 
academic thesis, I am convinced that a proper understanding of securitisation logic in 
Northeast/East Asia is impossible without reference to the historical dimension. A 
narrower focus would carry a danger of distortion and would leave many features of the 
present situation either inadequately explained or not explained at all. It is clear that it 
will no be easy task to investigate these various factors and multiple dimensions in a 
systematic way. I believe, however, that exploration by levels and sectors of analysis 
provides the best way to achieve an appropriate systematic framework. My division of 
chapters reflects this schema. 
 
 21
1.4  The Framework of the Thesis 
 
Chapter 2 provides theoretical frameworks both to inform security analysis and to 
assess the possibility of structural change. As the possibility of structural change is 
theoretically controversial, I explore both sides of the debate: that is theories 
emphasising the continuity of the system structure (Waltz and neorealism) and those 
arguing for the possibility of structural change (Wendt and social constructivism, and 
Buzan and the English school). In particular, I link these analyses to RSC theory’s 
distinctive approach to security analysis and its understanding of the nature of structural 
change. 
 
The next six chapters are devoted to case studies and are divided into three separate 
sections – that is the societal, economic and military-political sectors. Those familiar 
with the RSCT approaches to levels and sectors may be surprised by this particular 
order, yet it has been adopted deliberately. I certainly do not intend to suggest that any 
one sector is more important than others. Rather, my choice of order stems from the fact 
that I take a broad and essentially holistic approach to East Asian security. Here, the 
best way to begin seems to be through the establishment of a chronological sequence. In 
other words, the societal sector comes first, because it sets the overall historical 
background and provides the basic context in which current security dynamics of the 
region should be understood. I then proceed to the economic sector. Many important 
regional developments – such as regionalism and multilateralism, which are so 
important in RSC building – have emerged and evolved first through economic 
interactions. But their implications extend into the security realm and these will be 
examined in the third section, dealing with the military-political sector. After careful 
consideration, I believe that the adoption of this order will make it easier for readers to 
follow the main arguments and thread of my thesis.  
 
The societal sector (chapter 3, 4 and 5) explains the evolution of the RSC or regional 
society in Northeast Asia (sometimes East Asia) from historical and international 
society perspectives. In particular, it explains how the traditional and long-lasting Sino-
centric East Asian world order operated, but eventually collapsed as the region became 
integrated into a Western dominated international society. Here it is important to note 
that, while Sino-Japanese rivalry has deep roots in history, until recently the region has 
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never faced a situation in which China and Japan were great powers at the same time. It 
also examines the norms and institutions that underpinned the traditional East Asian 
world order – how and why they were shared and operated and how they were changed 
and replaced by alternatives as international society expanded. Investigation of this 
historical process assists understanding of many seemingly puzzling phenomena in 
Northeast / East Asia. Not least, why many East Asians subscribe so strongly 
sovereignty non-interference norms and why have regionalism and multilateralism 
developed both so slowly and along lines so different to their European equivalents? 
Yet when these questions are examined in the context of the processes of the expansion 
of international society, things become rather clearer. We shall see how these norms, 
together with ideas of nationalism, were adopted and sometimes secured by East Asians 
as part of their struggle with the Western powers, especially through the processes of 
decolonisation and anti-imperialism. Yet it was precisely those experiences underpin 
their securitisation behaviour.  
 
The economic sector (Chapters 6 and 7) considers how patterns of security practices are 
affected by economic factors and calculations. Here there are many contending views 
and contradictory phenomena. Discussion on the possibility of cooperation between 
states was particularly lively during the so-called ‘neo-neo’ debates of the 1980s and 
early 1990s. Since the new millennium East Asia has been increasingly integrated into 
the world economy and there has been clear shift in distribution of power caused by 
economic developments. As a result, the debate as to whether economic 
interdependence is a force for peace or for conflict acquired renewed urgency. I will 
consider both sides of arguments before drawing my conclusion. 
 
Chapter 6 approaches the debate from the realist perspective. It asks why and how, at 
least until recently, economic interdependence and international institutions were so 
weakly developed in Northeast Asia. It goes on to consider the somewhat alarming fact, 
stressed by neorealists, that, even when economic interdependence increased and some 
international institutions emerged, there was little sign of reduced rivalry or competition 
between the regional actors, especially between the two great powers, China and Japan. 
Of course, neorealists are preoccupied by the rapid rise of China and its impact on 
economic and security relations. It appears that the rise of China presents a particularly 
strong challenge to the mature powers – that is to Japan and the US – and hence some 
 23
analysts argue that the security dilemma is still acute in this region (Christensen 1999; 
Friedberg 2005). 
 
Chapter 7 moves on to examine the more positive side of the economics and security 
relations. Here the dominant theoretical perspective is that of the liberals – although I 
seek to take their analysis further. There can be little doubt that the emergence of 
economic regionalism and multilateralism in Asia and Pacific, represent some of the 
most significant developments in the region – particularly when contrasted to the 
situation in the early period of the Cold War. While the most obvious reason for the 
change is probably the ending of the Cold War and the sweeping globalisation, other 
factors have also been important. In part, the recent emergence of economic regionalism 
and multilateralism can be linked to the long processes of regional developments. Here, 
the most crucial factors were the post-war economic recovery of Japan and the example 
of its developmental model and, more recently, China’s reform and its adoption of a free 
market economy. But how have these economic interactions affected relations among 
the regional actors and above all their security practices? 
 
Chapter 8 examines the politico-military sector. Much has been written on this area with 
studies of the balance of power, arms build ups, crisis points, territorial disputes, etc. 
Taking these as a starting point, I proceed to investigate the interplay between forces 
among global, regional, and domestic levels. Here I focus mainly on the realist side of 
argument, especially on the impact of distribution and redistribution of power in the 
system. The rapid rise of a revisionist China seems to challenge the security and 
stability of the region the most, above all because it invites rivalry between China and 
Japan, and pushes Japan further towards becoming a ‘normal’ country. Already, the 
Sino-Japanese rivalry is becoming more open and the rivalry is extending from 
Northeast Asia to East Asia as a whole. The regional arms build up and the attendant 
danger of nuclearisation has become so serious, that many analysts predicted and 
continue to believe that the security of Northeast / East Asia depends upon an external 
player – that is with the US as a ring holder (Friedberg 1993/4; Yahuda 2002; Klare 
2006). But, even if the US is able and willing to continue with this role, there are 
obvious problems in leaving regional security in the hands of an external power.  
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But is it true that regional security and stability depend exclusively on the preponderant 
power of the US? Are there other variables that work to restrain acute balancing 
behaviour and thus mitigate the security dilemma in Northeast Asia? Finally, in the 
concluding chapter, chapter 9, I return to the central question posed in this thesis: that 
is, whether, as an RSC, Northeast Asia has moved or can move from a level of ‘conflict 
formation’ to one of ‘security regime’. I then evaluate the theoretical implications of 
this study.  
 
First, drawing from material discussed in the case studies and from my investigation of 
pessimistic and optimistic analyses, I conclude that, though, Northeast Asia has not yet 
become a ‘security community’, together with Southeast Asia, it has managed to form 
what might be called a single ‘East Asian security regime’. I do not deny that East Asia 
still faces security challenges; serious security problems continue to exist. Nor do I 
claim that balance of power logic no longer applies to East Asian international relations. 
Indeed, balancing behaviour is still quite common in East Asia, and the fluctuating 
rivalry between the two great powers, China and Japan, is still at work. I freely 
acknowledge that it would be foolish to underestimate the importance of the role of the 
US in maintaining security and stability in East Asia. Yet hegemonic stability is not the 
only way to maintain stability in East Asia. Balancing behaviour and open competition 
are often mitigated by factors such as domestic constraints, economic interdependence 
and institutional developments. Moreover, after the Asian financial crisis, important 
changes have taken place, notably the growth of a regional consciousness and the 
development of multilateral mechanisms to achieve better levels of security. The 
survival of an East Asian security regime – and certainly its possible evolution into a 
security community – depends on two main factors: a growing awareness of regional 
identity / society (especially after the Asian financial crisis) and common interest and 
commitment to the preservation of regional security and stability. 
 
One of the most important theoretical implications from this study is that any exclusive 
focus on particular factors or levels is not only intellectually unsound but can sometimes 
be dangerous in practice. The limitations of such an approach are obvious when 
considering the neorealists’ over emphasis on material power balancing. However, the 
findings in this thesis also suggest that, properly understood, many of the theories 
explored in this study are more complementary than contradictory, depending on which 
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levels of analysis they emphasise. I thus conclude that a posture of theoretical pluralism 
represents the most realistic and fruitful approach to adopt, and the essence of my thesis 
is based upon it. 
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2 RSCT: A Theoretical Framework 
 
Introduction 
As its subtitle  – Sino-Japanese Relations and The Potential for a ‘Security Regime’ in 
Northeast Asia – suggests, this thesis seeks both to understand the security order of 
Northeast Asia in the post-Cold War era and to investigate the possibility of structural 
change in the region. The main features of its approach reflect the premises of regional 
security complex theory (RSCT). These regard regional security complexes (RSCs) as 
durable substructures and regions as socially constructed entities. On the basis of these 
premises, it follows that there is at least a possibility that security complexes can change 
and evolve. Yet, it is controversial as to whether structural/substructural transformation 
is possible and, if so, how it occurs.  
 
The thesis will examine this issue from a number of perspectives by summarising and 
evaluating the work of three distinctive scholars – Waltz, Wendt and Buzan. Waltz’s 
materialistic and ‘systemic’ theory emphasises the reproductivity of the international 
system. Wendt adopts an ideational and social perspective to argue for the possibility of 
structural change. Change occurs by changing identity and interest of states. Buzan’s 
conclusions, based on a social structural approach, also maintain the possibility of 
change, although he takes a broader view. All three approaches are closely linked to 
RSCT. 
 
The Northeast Asian region, with its remarkable history, rich cultural traditions, 
diversity of character, long standing unresolved problems, and the complexity of 
relations between its peoples and states, is an ideal area to apply and test these 
contending theories. The following chapters will attempt to investigate whether this 
complexity of security relations is best understood and explained by material factors or 
by social factors or by some combination of the two.  
 
If one follows Waltzian materialistic approach, the main focus must be the impact of the 
distribution of power on the behaviour of states and their security relations. Issues to be 
investigated include: the role of the US, the increasing power of China, Japan’s military 
potential and the decline in Russian influence. All clearly have a major impact on the 
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security order of Northeast Asia. If we take the Waltzian approach, these will be the 
main elements of investigation, rather than ideology or internal factors.   
 
However, the constructivist and English school’s social approach involves a very 
different emphasis. Here the central theme is an investigation of how states’ identities 
and interests affect their relations, and how the creation and evolution of institutions and 
norms not only regulates but also constitutes their behaviour. The historical context, 
domestic political change, regional institutional development and the impact of these on 
their collective identity formation become the crucial variables.  
 
RSCT is essentially eclectic in its approach. It allows us to explore different approaches 
and to examine the impact of both material and social variables on security relations. 
Indeed the underlying assumption of this thesis is that analysis of both material and 
social factors is necessary to comprehend security relations in Northeast Asia. A 
meaningful understanding requires something of a ‘two pronged’ approach, involving 
appropriate theoretical support. This chapter begins with an examination of the three 
approaches mentioned above in respect of the question of the structural transformation. 
Neorealism’s emphasis on material power position may still be highly relevant to 
Northeast Asian case. Yet, some phenomena, which cannot be explained by materialist 
interpretations, may perhaps be understood by employing constructivist or English 
school social approaches. Then, in linking with these three theories, the main features of 
RSCT will be outlined. And finally, the chapter explains briefly how these approaches 
may be applied to the Northeast Asian case. 
 
2.1 International Structure/Substructure: Reproductive or Transformative? 
 
2.1.1 The Continuity of the System: Waltz’s Neorealism 
 
Waltz’s neorealism is pessimistic about the possibility of deep structural transformation 
and is more concerned with continuity and sameness than with change.  According to 
Waltz, ‘The enduring anarchic character of international politics accounts for the 
striking sameness in the quality of international life through the millennia’ (Waltz 1979: 
66). He expects what is essentially the same system to endure indefinitely; which 
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‘remains highly constant, patterns recur, and events repeat themselves endlessly’ (Waltz 
1979: 66). This leads him to ask why in the history of international relations ‘results 
achieved seldom correspond to the intentions of actors’, and ‘Why are they repeatedly 
thwarted?’ Waltz does not believe that the answers are to be found ‘in their individual 
characters and motives’ (Waltz 1979: 65); rather, it is the anarchic nature of the system 
that thwarted projects for reform in the past and will do so in the future (Linklater 1995: 
241). This pessimistic view underlies his Theory of International Politics (1979).  
 
Reductionism v. Systemic Theories 
How does Waltz conceive this pattern of international politics as a distinct system? How 
do we understand the reproductive logic of his theory? As Burchill says, ‘before 
examining exactly what Waltz understands by ‘structure’ and the nature of the 
international ‘system’, it is important to consider what he is rejecting’ (Burchill 2001: 
90). Waltz distinguishes two types of theories of international politics – reductionist and 
systemic theories. He rejects the former on the grounds that they assume a direct link 
between the intentions of individual actors (states) and the results of their actions. 
 
Waltz describes reductionist theories as theories ‘about the behavior of parts’, which try 
to explain international outcomes – a whole – through elements and combinations of 
elements located at national or sub-national levels – that is the study of its parts (Waltz 
1979: 60). For example, in terms of change, Waltz says that ‘Nations change in form 
and purpose; technological advances are made; weaponry is radically transformed; 
alliances are forged and disrupted’ (Waltz 1979: 67). But these are changes within 
systems. The argument is that the behaviour of states and statesmen is ‘indeterminate’, 
and hence a theory of international politics cannot be constructed by comprehending 
indeterminate behaviour. If such a thing were attempted, the system level would become 
‘all product’ but not ‘all productive’ (Waltz 1979: 50, 68-9). In short, we cannot 
understand world politics simply by looking inside states because the outcomes cannot 
be explained reductively (Waltz 1979: 79). 
 
To support his argument, Waltz asks why different units (states) exhibit similar foreign 
policy behaviour, even though they may have different political systems and contrasting 
ideologies. He attempts to ‘explain’ ‘why patterns of behavior recur’; ‘why events 
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repeat themselves’; and ‘why the range of expected outcomes falls within certain limits’ 
(Waltz 1979: 68, 69). Waltz answers these questions by systemic theory, that is by 
exploring the systemic nature, how ‘the organization of a realm’ – the structure of a 
system – ‘acts as a constraining and disposing force on the interacting units within it’ 
(Waltz 1979: 69, 72). Waltz anticipated the obvious objection to his approach: ‘with 
both system-level and unit-level forces in play, how can one construct a theory of 
international politics without simultaneously constructing a theory of foreign policy?’ 
His answer is that his emphasis on systems resembles market theory, which explains 
‘how firms are pressed by market forces to do certain things in certain ways’ (Waltz 
1979: 71). 
 
Waltz proceeds to define a system on two levels – a structure and interacting units, and 
argues that in systems theory, the structure ‘is the system-wide component that makes it 
possible to think of the system as a whole’. In other words, the ‘structure is a generative 
notion; and the structure of a system is generated by the interactions of its principal 
parts’ (Waltz 1979: 72, 79). The advantage of systemic theories, Waltz argues, is that 
‘From them, we can infer some things about the expected behaviour and fate of the 
units: namely, how they will have to compete with and adjust to one another if they are 
to survive and flourish’. Further, the ‘dynamics of a system limit the freedom of its 
units, hence their behaviour and the outcomes of their behaviour become predictable’ 
(Waltz 1979: 72). In the case of Northeast Asia, the perceived limited choice of Japan 
against the rise of China can be seen as this kind of systemic constraints. 
 
For Waltz, reductionist theories fail to take proper account of the structural conditions 
inherent in the international system. These conditions impose themselves on all the 
units, and therefore ultimately determine the outcomes of the interactions between 
states. Waltz attempts to clarify these determining properties of the structure of the 
international system by distinguishing them from those of domestic political structures. 
He attributes three tiers of structure to the system – the ordering principle; the character 
of the units; and the distribution of capabilities. 
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Three Tiers of System Structure 
Waltz suggests that, as far as political systems are concerned, there are only two 
ordering principles: hierarchy and anarchy. The ordering principle of domestic political 
systems is hierarchic, since power and authority is exerted through the compulsory 
jurisdiction of the political and legal processes. But the ordering principle of the 
international system is anarchy, since there is no overarching authority regulating the 
behaviour of states towards each other (Waltz 1979: 88-93).  
 
‘Self-help’ is a necessary principle of action in an anarchic order, because the problem 
under international anarchy is that, unlike individuals in domestic society, states cannot 
look to any higher authority to provide their security. Thus in a condition of anarchy, 
units, ‘be they people, corporation, states, or whatever’, must rely on the means they can 
generate and the arrangements they can make for themselves in order to maintain their 
security and to achieve their objectives (Waltz 1979:111). This does not mean that 
states do not collaborate each other, but it does mean that collaboration is conditioned 
by anarchic structure, and ‘the acceptability of the means of collaboration takes priority 
over the desirability of its ends’ (Waltz 1979: 107-10; Ruggie 1983: 265). This is 
because, the international system, like a market, once formed, becomes a force that 
constrains states’ behaviour and intervenes between their intentions and the outcomes of 
their actions (Waltz 1979: 90-91; Ruggie 1983: 265). 
 
Waltz believes that in a self-help environment, states are compelled to be functionally 
alike. They perform or try to perform exactly the same primary function regardless of 
their capacity to do so (Waltz 1979: 96). In the process, as Burchill (2001: 91) notes, 
they become socialised into behaviour which centres on mutual distrust, self-reliance 
and the pursuit of security through the accumulation of power. This is because in an 
anarchical order, the security dilemma is common to all states, regardless of their 
cultural or ideological complexions. Thus, a refusal to play the political game may 
endanger their own survival (Waltz 1979: 128). The implication, as Ruggie points out, 
is that this ‘second component of political structure is not needed at the international 
level, because all states are functionally alike (Ruggie 1983: 265). 
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While emphasising the similarities and continuities, Waltz accepts that some things do 
change. The constraints of the system mean that the character of the units is 
undifferentiated, yet states are differentiated in their capabilities. There is an unequal 
and constantly shifting distribution of power across the international system. Moreover, 
the structure of a system changes with changes in the distribution of capabilities among 
its units. Changes in structure change expectations about how the units of the system 
will behave and about the outcomes of their interactions. Thus, for Waltz, the key to 
understanding the behaviour of states is the distribution of power in the international 
system, not ideology or any other internal factor. In this sense, Waltz makes an 
important distinction between great and small powers; international change occurs when 
great powers rise and fall and the balance of power shifts accordingly (Waltz 2000).  
 
However, the important point here, Waltz insists, is that the distribution of capabilities 
‘is not a unit attribute, but rather a system-wide concept because it is the position of the 
units in the system relative to one another, not their capabilities as such’ (Waltz 1979: 
97-8). Ruggie’s interpretation helps us to clarify this point. While ‘Ordering principles 
constitute the “deep structure” of a system, shaping its fundamental social quality’, ‘The 
distribution of capabilities comes closest to the surface level of visible phenomena, but 
its impact on outcomes is simply to magnify or modify the opportunities and constraints 
generated by the other (two) structural level(s)’ (Ruggie 1983: 265).  
 
Thus, Waltz concludes that ‘international structures vary only through a change of 
organizing principle’, that is from anarchy to hierarchy. Or, ‘failing that, through 
variations in the capabilities of units’; changes of this nature can occur as a result of a 
move from a multipolar to a bipolar structure (Waltz 1979:93). Yet in the history of the 
modern state system, ‘a multi-polar configuration endured for three centuries, bipolarity 
‘has lasted for more than three decades’. And a hierarchic system has never occurred 
(Ruggie 1983:271). Thus, the system has been notable for its lack of change and there is 
no reason to suppose that in this respect at least the future will be any different from the 
past. The crucial point is that whether the structure is multipolar or bipolar, it remains 
anarchic and anarchy reproduces itself. Waltz explains this reproductive logic or process 
in two ways: by examining the structure of an anarchic system and by exploring the 
respective roles of balancing and bandwagoning.  
 
 32
First, Waltz argues that states may seek reasonable and worthy ends, but they cannot 
figure out how to achieve them. This is because ‘structures cause actions to have 
consequences they were not intended to have’. The problem does not lie either in the 
stupidity or the ill will of states. When facing global problems, states are ‘like 
individual consumers trapped by the “tyranny of small decisions”’, and ‘can get out of 
the trap only by changing the structure of their field of activity’ (Waltz 1979: 107, 110-
11). 
 
Then, Waltz goes on to contrast the roles of bandwagoning and balancing in the 
domestic and international orders, showing that balancing behaviour prevails in the 
international arena and bandwagoning behaviour in the domestic. This is the direct 
result of the anarchic nature of the international order and the heirarchical nature of the 
domestic order. In a competition for the position of leader, bandwagoning is sensible 
behaviour in a hierarchical order. Such an order creates conditions where ‘gains are 
possible even for the losers and where losing does not place their security in jeopardy’. 
But balancing is sensible behaviour in an anarchical order, where ‘victory of one 
coalition over another leaves weaker members of the winning coalition at the mercy of 
the strong ones’ (Waltz 1979: 126).  
 
In an anarchical order, security must have the highest priority. Only if survival is 
assured can states safely seek other goals such as power or profit with safety. Although 
nobody wants anyone else to win, the first concern of states is not to maximise power 
but to maintain their positions in the system. Power is a means and not an end and hence 
states prefer to join the weaker of two coalitions (Waltz 1979: 126). This ‘Balance-of-
power position prevails whenever two, and only two, requirements are met: the order be 
anarchy and that it be populated by units wishing to survive’ (Waltz 1979: 121). Again, 
this is because a ‘self-help system is one in which those who do not help themselves, or 
who do so less effectively than others, will fail to prosper, will lay themselves open to 
dangers, will suffer’. Fear for such unwanted consequences stimulates states to behave 
in ways that tend toward the creation of balance of power (Waltz 1979: 118). Whether 
states in Asia tend to balancing or bandwagoning has certainly generated interesting 
theoretical debates. 
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2.1.2 The Possibility of Structural Change I: Wendt’s Social Constructivism 
 
As we have seen, Waltz’s theoretical framework of international politics ‘is designed to 
explain why the international system has persisted through time’ (Buzan and Little 
2000: 41), and to show how anarchy perpetuates a self-help system and power politics. 
But Wendt challenges this ‘deduction of power politics from anarchy’ (Ringmar 1997: 
277), and claims that ‘anarchy is what states make of it’ (Wendt 1992). In other words, 
both implicitly and explicitly, Wendt claims that structural transformation is possible, 
though he is well aware of the difficulties. Wendt’s argument is based upon his 
reservations about the philosophical and methodological assumptions that underlie 
Waltz’s analysis; these are identified as materialism, individualism, and rationalism.  
 
The Agent-Structural Question 
Like Waltz, Wendt’s principal aim is to build a structural theory of international 
politics, but his methodological and ontological positions are fundamentally different. 
Waltz’s systemic theory distinguishes between the ‘structure of the system’ and the 
‘structure of its constituent units’, and purposely excludes any reference to the unit level 
in formulation of the international system (Buzan and Little 2000: 41, 42). By contrast, 
Wendt is deeply interested in questions such as ‘what kind of ‘stuff’ the international 
system is made of’ (Wendt 1992; 1999: 35). For Wendt, Waltz’s systemic theory 
focuses on only one of the two sides of the agent-structure relationship. He claims that 
although, ontologically, agents and structures are distinct entities, conceptually they are 
mutually constitutive. Since each is in some sense an effect of the other, they are ‘co-
determined’ (Ringmar 1997: 271-2). Thus, in the case of a social system, ‘the structure 
of the system and the structure of the component units are one and the same thing, 
because the system and the units are mutually constituted’. Consequently, it is 
impossible ‘to talk about the structure of the international system without 
simultaneously talking about the identity and interest of the component units’ (Buzan 
and Little 2000: 42). It is clear that Waltz’s Theory of International Politics (1979) and 
Wendt’s Social Theory of International Politics (1999), despite the similarity of the 
titles, the former represents a materialist approach, while the later is a social one. 
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Identities and Interests of Actors 
Following these opposing methodological assumptions, while Waltz emphasises 
structural conditions and the continuity of the international system, Wendt argues that 
the concept and nature of anarchy can change by changing the identity and interests of 
the component states. Wendt asks ‘what it means to take identities and interests as 
‘given’’, and ‘how we should think about ‘what’s going on’ when actors interact’ 
(Wendt 1999: 36). Here, he makes an important distinction between brute facts and 
social facts, i.e., whether facts ‘remain true independent of human action’, or ‘depend 
for their existence on socially established conventions’ (Brown 2001: 52). This 
distinction is crucial, because the methodological assumption raises ontological 
implication: that is, ‘whether they are seen themselves as processes that need to be 
socially sustained, or as fixed objects that are in some sense outside of social space and 
time’ (Wendt 1999: 36). Therefore, for Wendt, the answer affects not only the perceived 
nature of international politics, but also the possibilities of structural change. 
 
Wendt claims that the structure should be conceptualised in social rather than in 
material terms. It follows that – contrary to the Waltzian structure, where the 
distribution of power matters the most – in the Wendtian structure, the identities and 
interests of the component units are more important. The reason for this is that ‘states 
act differently toward enemies than they do toward friends because enemies are 
threatening and friends are not’ (Wendt 1992: 396). This point resembles RSCT’s 
emphasis on amity/enmity relations in securitisation practice. Wendt gives us a simple 
example: US military power has a different significance for Canada than it does for 
Cuba, despite their similar ‘structural’ positions. Hence, anarchy and distribution of 
power are insufficient to tell us which is which. The distribution of power may always 
affect states’ calculations, but how it does so depends on the inter-subjective 
understandings and expectations, on the ‘distribution of knowledge’, that constitute 
their conceptions of self and other (Wendt 1992:397). Wendt argues that identities are 
inherently relational, in other words, identities and interests are formed through the 
processes of inter-subjective practices between actors; but not prior to interaction. 
Therefore, ‘there is no such thing as a ‘logic of anarchy’. Instead, anarchy is ‘an empty 
vessel, it can vary depending on what kind of roles – enemy, rival, and friend – 
dominate the system’ (Wendt 1999: 247, 249). The implication for the case study is that 
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while no one could deny the importance of the rise of China, dynamic changes in the 
security outlook in Northeast Asia may be influenced more by the ways in which the 
various regional actors identify with each other.  
 
Three Cultures of Anarchy and Their Internalisation 
The inter-subjective view and notions of the importance of identity and norms indicate 
the links between Wendt and the English school. According to Wight there are three 
traditions of theory: realist, rationalist, and revolutionist, or Machiavellian, Grotian, and 
Kantian. Wendt follows Wight, and categorises international systems into three cultures 
– Hobbesian, Lockean and Kantian. These categories depend upon what kind of roles – 
enemy, rival, or friend – dominate the system (Wendt 1999: 247). All three positions 
constitute social structures, based on representations of the Other in terms of which the 
posture of the Self is defined. Here, Wendt introduces two key concepts: culture, or the 
‘shared ideas that make up the subset of social structure’; and role or role structure, ‘the 
configuration of subject positions that shared ideas make available to its holders’. 
Wendt says that at the core of each kind of anarchy there is just one subject position 
(though this view will be further challenged by Buzan (2004a), see next section): in 
Hobbesian cultures it is ‘enemy’, in Lockean ‘rival’, and Kantian ‘friend’ (1999: 249, 
257, 258). 
 
Wendt proceeds to interpret these subject positions as follows. Enemies lie at one end of 
the spectrum of role relationships, here the Other does not recognise the right of the Self 
to exist as an autonomous being, and therefore will not willingly limit its violence 
toward the Self. Violence between enemies has no internal limits. This is the kind of 
violence found in a state of nature (Wendt 1999: 259-60). Friends are at the other end of 
the spectrum of role relationships. Here ‘disputes will be settled without war or the 
threat of war (the rule of non-violence); and they will fight as a team if the security of 
any one is threatened by a third party (the rule of mutual aid)’ (Wendt 1999: 298-9). In 
the middle of the spectrum, violence between rivals, is self-limiting. Unlike enemies, 
rivals are constrained by recognition of each other’s right to exist; therefore they do not 
try to conquer or dominate them. However, unlike friends, recognition among rivals 
does not extend to the right to be free from violence in disputes (Wendt 1999: 279). 
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Wendt identifies the modern, Westphalian state system as Lockean, on the grounds that 
inter-state war is limited, small states thrive, territorial boundaries ‘harden’, and so on. 
Thus he criticises realist indifference to such changes, and focuses on continuities 
instead: wars still happen, power still matters. But he claims that , in reality, the past 
few centuries have seen a qualitative structural change in international politics. ‘The kill 
or be killed logic of the Hobbesian state of nature has been replaced by the live and let 
live logic of the Lockean anarchical society’ (Wendt 1999:279). Then Wendt goes on to 
explore the causes of this change.  
 
Following his identification of three cultures of international systems, Wendt asks how 
these cultures are internalised by actors? In other words, why do states comply with the 
Hobbesian system at some times and with the Lockean or Kantian cultures at others? 
The underlying assumption is that each culture can be internalised to three ‘Degrees’: 
force, price, and legitimacy. First, if a cultural norm is internalised only to the first 
degree, this means that an actor knows what the norm is, but complies only because he 
is forced to. He is neither motivated to comply of his own accord, nor does he think that 
doing so is in his self-interest. He does it because he must, because he is coerced or 
compelled. In this sense, his behaviour is driven purely by external influences rather 
than by internal ones (Wendt 1999: 269).  
 
Secondly, sometimes states follow the norms of a system for reasons of individual self-
interest. For example, when states comply with sovereignty norms, unlike in the First 
Degree case, they now have enough social space to do this by choice. In other words, 
their respect for the sovereignty of others involves a self-restraint which is absent in the 
coercion case: ‘The institution is now achieving effects on states in part from the inside 
out, which is what internalisation is all about’ (Wendt 1999: 287-8). Thirdly, sometimes 
states follow norms, not because they think this will serve some exogenously given end, 
but because they think the norms are legitimate and therefore want to follow them. This 
means that an actor fully accepts the claims of the norm on himself. Compared to the 
Second Degree case, when actors conform to the norm only for instrumental reasons, in 
the Third Degree case ‘actors identify with others’ expectations, relating to them as a 
part of themselves… and now ‘Other’ and ‘Me’ become identical’. Wendt emphasises 
that it ‘is only with this degree of internalisation that a norm itself really constructs 
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agents; prior to this point their identities and interests are exogenous to it’ (Wendt 1999: 
272, 273). 
 
Wendt claims that each culture can be internalised to three different degrees. While the 
Hobbesian culture can be held by coercion, it also can be held by belief in warrior 
culture.  Similarly, the internalisation of Kantian culture may be due to deterrence or 
sanctions by status quo states against revisionists; or for reasons of individual self-
interest; or due to belief. Yet the true internalised Kantian culture is the third degree, 
where states accept the claims made on their behaviour as legitimate. This means that 
states identify with each other, seeing each other’s security not merely as instrumentally 
related to their own, but as literally being their own. The cognitive boundaries of the 
Self are extended to include the Other; Self and Other form a single ‘cognitive region’. 
In this sense, international interests become part of the national interests, not just 
interests that states have to advance in order to further their separate national interests. 
Friendship is a preference over an outcome, not just a preference over a strategy. Thus, 
in the context of the Kantian culture, states must really be friends, not just act as if they 
are (Wendt 1999: 305, 306). 
  
The Collective Identity Formation
It follows that collective identity formation is crucial to account for real structural 
change, because structural change only occurs when actors redefine who they are and 
what they want. For Wendt, ‘a fully internalised culture is that actors identify with it’; 
that means the generalised Other becomes part of their understanding of Self. Wendt 
says this identification or ‘sense of being part of a group or ‘we’, is a social or collective 
identity’, in turn this gives actors an interest in the preservation of their culture’. Thus, 
the structure of any internalised culture is associated with a collective identity. A change 
in that structure will involve a change in collective identity, involving the breakdown of 
an old identity and the emergence of a new (Wendt 1999: 336-8). But how far have 
these processes in the Northeast Asian RSC led to the formation of a collective identity? 
 
Wendt asks how is it possible for states to create a new culture of anarchy when the 
structure of the existing culture disposes them to reproduce it? The focus is on how and 
why the dominant role in the system can be transformed from that of rival to that of 
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friend (Wendt 1999: 338-9). There are two factors that make change difficult. 
Internally, there are forces within actors that make them unwilling to change. More 
importantly, the internalisation of roles in identities, which generates subjective 
commitments to objective positions in society, is liable to produce stability rather than 
change. Externally, institutions and concepts, such as sovereignty and the balance of 
power – which reward certain practices and punish others – inhibit change even when 
actors want it.  
 
Despite the presence of these stabilising influences, Wendt argues that, if identities and 
interests are treated as endogenous, it follows that they ‘are always in process, always 
contested, always an accomplishment of practice’. Even when their reproduction is 
relatively unproblematic and appears as given, this is really part of a process. Although 
agents and social structure are mutually constitutive and co-determined, Wendt still 
believes that actors’ actions are even more important. He says that ‘actors can do things 
even if they do not already have the identities which those practices will eventually 
create. States might initially engage in pro-social policies for egoistic reasons but if 
sustained over time such policies will erode egoistic identities and create collective ones 
(Wendt 1999:342). 
 
Wendt suggests four master variables that cause collective identity – interdependence, 
common fate, homogeneity, and self-restraint. Within these, the first three, are active or 
efficient causes of collective identity formation and thus of structural change. As they 
become more powerful, actors have greater incentive to engage in pro-social behaviour, 
thus eroding egoistic boundaries of the Self and expanding them to include the Other. 
However, as Wendt acknowledges, this process can only proceed if actors can overcome 
their fear of being engulfed, physically or psychologically, by those with whom they 
would identify (Wendt 1999: 357). Thus, self-restraint plays a key role for collective 
identity formation to occur, it is necessary to combine one efficient cause with self-
restraint. Jervis (1982) also emphasises that self–restraint must be practised if a region 
is to meet his criteria for the existence of a ‘security regime’. These suggest that the 
question of whether states in Northeast Asia have demonstrated willingness or an ability 
to exercise self-restraint requires close investigation. 
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Yet, as realists insist, the problem is formidable and is rooted in our inability to read 
others’ minds and thus in our consequent uncertainty as to whether they will actually 
restrain themselves in the absence of third party constraints. This problem is especially 
acute in a self-help system where the cost of a mistaken and over-optimistic inference 
can be fatal (Wendt 1999: 360). However, Wendt argues that, despite our limited 
abilities, human beings do manage to make correct inferences about each other’s 
intentions. Given the empirical reality that states often know that others will be self-
limiting, the question becomes, ‘how do states acquire this knowledge?’ ‘How do other 
states know that they are self-limiting?’ His answer is: 
‘[T]hrough repeated compliance states gradually internalise the institution 
of the pluralistic security community to the third degree. Even if states 
initially comply with this institution for reasons of coercion or self-interest, 
continuing adherence over time will tend to produce conceptions of identity 
and interest which presupposes its legitimacy, making compliance habitual 
or second nature’ (Wendt 1999: 360). 
The best example can be found in China’s participation in regional security institutions 
and in its changing attitude towards regional affairs. 
 
2.1.3  The Possibility of Structural Change II: Buzan and the English School 
 
Wendt’s challenge to the Waltzian concept of the ‘logic of anarchy’ stressed the 
importance of changes in the identities of component units and hence pointed to the 
possibility of structural change. Buzan raises a similar possibility though by a different 
route. His scheme of social structure and his account of structural change place more 
emphasis on issues such as types of international society and the institutions that reflect 
and shape them. Buzan’s approach synthesises English school theory and Wendtian 
social constructivism, as revealed in his recent work, From International to World 
Society? English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation (Buzan 
2004a).  
 
There is clearly a basis for a synthesis of this kind. As Dunne (1995) stresses, many of 
the ideas associated with Wendtian social constructivism can also be found in other 
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traditions of IR thinking, especially in the works of the English school writers, such as 
Bull, Wight and Watson. Dunne cites the English school’s ‘subjectivist understanding 
of the ‘conscious’ common interests and values on the part of states and their 
conformity to a wide range of constitutive practices such as sovereignty, diplomacy’, 
and their belief that ‘a common culture was a necessary condition for the existence of 
international society’. These subjectivist principles mean that both the constructivist and 
the English school approaches are ‘engaged in an exploration of a non-rationalist theory 
of an international system which does not take the rules, identities and interests of the 
units as a given’ (Dunne 1995: 372, 381, 383). Yet, it is important to identify which 
elements of Wendt’s constructivism are adopted by Buzan and to see how he modifies 
and applies them to English school theory. These can be examined from three 
perspectives: Buzan’s social structural interpretation; the debate between pluralism and 
solidarism; and the issues of institutions of international society. 
 
Social Structural Interpretation 
Buzan’s study of the English school theory leads him to conclude that many of its 
insights were valuable because they helped to develop social or ‘societal understandings 
of international systems’ and provided ‘powerful grounds for differentiation and 
comparison among types of international society, and ways of understanding both what 
Westphalian international society evolved from, and what it might be evolving into’ 
(Buzan 2004a: 1, 4). But Buzan also recognises the weaknesses of the theory and argues 
that further development is needed. He notes that, so far, the main sources of progress 
have been ‘Wendt-inspired social structural interpretations’ of the theory (2004a: 3). 
First, this led Buzan to question the distinction between international system and 
international society (or between material and social), made by English school theory. 
As Bull and Watson note (1984:1): 
A group of states (or, more generally, a group of independent political 
communities) which not merely form a system, in the sense that the 
behaviour of each is a necessary factor in the calculations of the others, but 
also have established by dialogue and consent common rules and 
institutions for the conduct of their relations, and recognise their common 
interest in maintaining these arrangements. 
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 For Buzan, such a distinction rests on ‘a separation of the physical system from the 
social one’ in which the system represents ‘the physical mode of interaction’. In other 
words, the depiction of the physical system represents a typical ‘mechanistic, realist-
style analyses of the balance of power as an automatic process rooted in the relative 
material capabilities of states’, whereas the social element is represented by ‘the 
establishment and maintenance of common rules and institutions for the conduct of 
interstate relations’ (Buzan 2004a: 98, 99). Although this kind of understanding is not 
confined to English school – as evident in the treatment of neorealism as ‘material’ and 
constructivism as ‘social’ –, Buzan still argues that ‘the distinction between physical 
and social is not nearly as interesting as it first appears’. Rather he sees a high degree of 
overlap between physical and social systems. For instance, even seemingly mechanistic 
operations, as neorealists themselves often concede, such as the balance of power, can 
be ‘interpreted as the behavioural characteristics of a particular type of social structure’ 
(Buzan 2004a: 100-101). 
 
Buzan (2004a: 99-102) notes that other scholars, including Alan James (1993), have 
taken a similar approach. James treats international society as the key concept in Bull’s 
theories, while dismissing his treatment of the international system as meaningless. 
Even within the English school, writers such as Watson – notably in his pendulum 
theory (swings from anarchy to empire) (Watson 1990, 1992) have shown how difficult 
it is to separate physical structures from social ones. Yet Buzan (2004a: 102) believes 
that it is Wendt who provides the greatest challenge to the idea of ‘distinction’. Wendt 
insists that ‘anarchy is what states make of it’ (Wendt 1992) and hence suggests that 
even Hobbesian cultures are ultimately just as ‘social’ as Lockean and Kantian ones.  
 
If this is true, it follows that, like international societies, international systems should be 
also treated as social structures. This is why Buzan questions ‘whether English school 
theory needs to retain the distinction between international system and international 
society’ (Buzan 2004a: 101). In other words, of the three pillars of the English School – 
‘international system’, ‘international society’ and ‘world society’–, ‘international 
system’ can be removed (Buzan 2004a: 106). Yet, while adopting all international 
structures are social, Buzan (2004a: 101, 102) still argues that this ‘does not rule out the 
options of materialist theory’, nor does it ‘take the physical out of the analysis 
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altogether’. It is merely that ‘the physical aspect ceases to provide the principal basis for 
distinguishing one type of international system from another’. Thus, Buzan can still 
maintain that ‘Physical elements such as the distribution of power, and the nature of 
interaction capacity remain central to the analysis of all social systems’ (Buzan 2004a: 
101-2). It follows that, if an RSC exists, it must be regarded as a social construction – 
even if it remains largely at the ‘conflict formation’ mode – and hence inter-subjective 
processes among its members are important to any security analysis. All three 
approaches present here – neorealism, constructivism, and the English school – rest 
comfortably within RSCT’s eclectic posture. 
 
Buzan’s reinterpretation of English school theory – involving the abolition or at any rate 
the dilution of the distinction between physical and social systems – opens the way to 
further reinterpretation of the different types of international society identified by 
English school theory. Here in line with Wendt’s scheme of social structures – the 
nature of the dominant roles in the system, enemy, rival and friend and their 
internalisation –, Buzan separates out the type of international society from the mode / 
depth of its internalisation. That is, a shift from ‘what the shared norms, rules and 
institutions are, and who shares them, to the means by which these norms are held in 
place as a form of social practice’ (Buzan 2004a: 102). For Buzan, applying this scheme 
is crucial to understand ‘how international or world societies develop, and how stable or 
unstable they might be’ (Buzan 2004a: 105). The questions of what kinds of norms are 
shared – and indeed how and why they are shared – are highly relevant to this thesis. 
Hence these issues will be investigated thoroughly in the context of Northeast Asia.  
 
However, Buzan has reservations about Wendt’s scheme and sometimes finds it is too 
simplistic. Since Wendt sees both his types of social structure and the three components 
of the how/why dimension in mutually exclusive terms but not mixture. 
Wendt’s assumption that the types of social structure in the what dimension 
will always have a sufficiently clear pattern of enemy, rival or friend to give 
them clear and mutually exclusive designations is already bordering on 
heroic simplification (Buzan and Wæver 2003), though it might just about 
be sustainable for analytical purposes. But to assume the same about the 
three elements of the how/why dimension is not sustainable. … Almost any 
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social structure one can think of will be held together by some mixture of 
coercion, calculation and belief. The necessity of mixture, and how to deal 
with it, is what defines politics (Buzan 2004a: 130). 
The result is a radical reinterpretation of the debates on pluralism and solidarism and on 
those institutions of international society. Both are central to English school theory, and 
are crucial to an understanding of the various types of international society. Questions 
about the constitution of society in terms of what values are shared, how and why they 
are shared, and by whom, are bound to be critical (Buzan 2004a: 161).  
 
Pluralism and Solidarism 
In English school literature, a pluralist interstate society is usually identified as one 
based on mutual recognition of sovereignty and non-intervention; hence the rule of 
coexistence is central to pluralism. In a solidarist international society, however, 
relationships between constitutive units (states and non-states actors) go far beyond 
considerations the self-preservation and coexistence, because these relationships are 
now regulated by a wide range of common values and norms, including universal 
human rights. Yet these propositions, so central to the English school, remain 
controversial. They have not fully resolved the debate about pluralism and solidarism 
and it is still hard to determine whether a given society should be described as a 
pluralist or a solidarist one. Buzan’s interpretation and development of the English 
school treats the debate about pluralism and solidarism as one about types of interstate 
society: 
[I]f one accepts the argument that all of international relations is social, that 
‘enemies’ is just as much a social structure as ‘rivals’ or ‘friends’, then the 
term ‘interstate society’ covers a wide spectrum…. In this perspective, the 
debate about pluralism and solidarism can be seen largely as a debate about 
types of interstate society (Buzan 2004a: 140). 
 
Then, what type of values, if shared, count as solidarist and at what point, and by what 
criteria, does an interstate society move from being pluralist to solidarist? Two 
principles can be accounted for such moves. The first reflects a Kantian logic of 
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convergence; that is, ‘states might abandon the pursuit of difference and exclusivity as 
their main raison d’être, and cultivate becoming more alike as a conscious goal’ (Buzan 
2004a: 146). The second relates to Mayall’s idea of an enterprise association. Here, 
states might cooperate in joint projects by coordinating their policies and creating 
appropriate norms and rules, which go beyond survival and coexistence. The joint 
pursuit of human rights provides the best known example and has been extensively 
explored in solidarist literature. Yet Buzan insists that ‘the pursuit of joint gain’ and ‘the 
pursuit of knowledge’ should also receive adequate attention (Buzan 2004a: 150). The 
pursuit of join gain has been an especially important in the economic sector (rather 
neglected by the English school), where it has led states to agree on rules for trade, 
property rights and banking – in turn resulting in more homogenised domestic 
structures. Indeed, for many East Asian countries, growing consciousness of regional 
identity / society derives largely from the processes whereby they pursue economic joint 
gains. 
 
Finally, the location of pluralism and solidarism along a spectrum of types of interstate 
society, does not mean that there are only two types of societies. Rather there are many, 
which Buzan describes as ranging from the asocial, power politics, coexistence, 
cooperative, convergence, to confederative interstate societies, though in reality the first 
and the last maybe rare conditions (see details, Buzan 2004a: 159). These functionally 
based types of interstate society are significantly different from those proposed by the 
English school and Wendtian traditions. 
 
The Institutions of International Society 
Having located international societies along the pluralist-solidarist spectrum, what are 
the distinctive characteristics of the various types? Here, it is important to clarify the 
relationship between different types of interstate society and the range of institutions 
within them. For the purpose, Buzan distinguishes between two kinds of analysis of 
institutions – one proposed by English school theory and the other by Regime theory. 
Accordingly, the English school deals with primary institutions, because these 
institutions reflect something ‘more fundamental’. They are ‘constitutive of both states 
and international society in that they define the basic character and purpose of any such 
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society’. Regime theory deals with secondary institutions, for the most part ‘consciously 
designed by states’ (Buzan 2004a: 161-63, 166-67). 
 
The English school’s idea of institutions in international society provides an important 
starting point. Bull’s set of five institutions – diplomacy, international law, the balance 
of power, war, and the role of great power – is particularly valuable. Building on this 
foundation, and echoing Holsti and others, Buzan postulates a more functionally based 
taxonomy of primary institutions (see details Buzan 2004a: 176-90). He then links these 
institutions with the types of interstate societies – that is, how institutions operate with 
different forms of interstate societies. For the purpose of this thesis, particularly in 
respect of the issue of structural change, I am particularly interested in links between 
primary institutions and different types of interstate / international society. The main 
idea can be summarised as follows (Buzan 2004a: 190-95). 
 
In a Power Political interstate society, the existence of primary institutions will be thin 
and secondary institutions are unlikely to exist at all – because such a society is based 
largely on enmity and the possibility of war.  
 
But in a Coexistence interstate society, core primary institutions emerge – in the shape 
of sovereignty, territoriality, diplomacy, great power management, war, international 
law, and nationalism. This corresponds to the Westphalian model of interstate society 
based upon the balance of power system, or to Bull’s ‘pluralist international society’. 
Historically, the Westphalian model of interstate society first appeared in Europe in the 
seventeenth century and subsequently expanded to embrace almost the entire world. 
 
A Cooperative interstate society occupies a level that has moved some way beyond 
coexistence, but still falls short of domestic convergence. In such a society, primary 
institutions, such as sovereignty, territoriality, nationalism, diplomacy and international 
law – originally arising in a Coexistence society – continue to play important role. Yet 
they may now be interpreted rather differently. Indeed, in a cooperative society, some 
primary institutions, for example the balance of power and war, may be downgraded or 
even eliminated. In particular, the role of war as an institution changes and the scope for 
its legitimate use becomes more circumscribed and narrowly defined. At the same time, 
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the ‘market’ becomes an increasingly important institution – a major feature in the 
spread of the liberal model of international society. 
 
Finally, in a Convergence interstate society, there must be strong shared values among 
the member states and they adopt similar political, legal and economic forms. Yet, it can 
take many forms – liberal democracy, Islamic theocracy, communist totalitarianism, and 
etc. Every thing depends on the model of political economy that member states of the 
society are converging around. In a liberal (Kantian) version of convergence interstate 
society, however, the market, property rights, human rights, and democratic relations 
between government and citizens are likely to be important primary institutions. 
 
Thus, norms and institutions can change. Reasons for change include change in the 
domestic society of the member states or pressure from Transnational Actors (TNAs). 
The interesting point here is that although, to begin with, solidarist evolution will 
probably be built on pluralist foundations, further development may involve more than 
direct accumulation. In other words, as solidarism thickens, some key pluralist 
institutions may be dropped, downgraded or transformed. This provides the basis for 
Buzan’s argument, which resembles Hurrell’s (2002), that the overall set of institutions 
may contain ‘contradictions / tensions among itself’, and these contradictions and 
tensions themselves foster change (Buzan 2004a: 195). War, the market, and 
nationalism as institutions offer examples of these tensions and assist understanding of 
how change can result. 
 
In a power political interstate society, war is an important institution, perhaps even the 
predominant one. In this type of interstate society, there is general acceptance of war 
and conquest as legitimate means by which to achieve political objectives. However, 
when interstate society moves from a pluralist to solidarist one, war as an institution 
becomes more problematic. Buzan contends that this ‘problematisation’ of war is not 
really a consequence of the development of weapons capable of inflicting tremendous 
destruction; such a problem could arise even within a power political interstate society. 
Rather, the real ‘problematisation’ of war flows from the fact that, in solidarist interstate 
societies, there are contradictions between war as an institution and the other institutions 
cultivated by such societies – for example big science or the institutionalisation of the 
market (Buzan 2004a: 196). As I will show, war and international law as institutions 
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have also become increasingly incompatible with each other; which in turn, have 
important implications for states behaviour within Northeast Asian RSC. 
 
In a similar way, the rise of nationalism as a primary institution also brings considerable 
change in international society. After the World War I, national self-determination not 
only displaced dynasticism as the key to political legitimacy, it also sacralised territory 
(Mayall 2000b: 84). Nationalism also undermined colonialism and imposed limitations 
on the legitimate uses of war. This concept of the rise or fall of primary institutions and 
the resulting impact on international society is particularly useful when investigating 
how the East Asian world order was absorbed into an expanding European international 
society. 
 
2.2 Regional Security Complex Theory: An Analytical Tool 
 
Traditionally, security studies were regarded as an academic sub-discipline within the 
overall area of strategic studies. As a result, approaches tended to be dominated by the 
assumptions of realism and hence the basic premise was that issues connected with war 
and force formed the core of security studies. The only referent object was the state and 
security was to be understood in purely objective terms. In Wæver’s words, it is ‘reality 
prior to language, is out there… and it is measured in terms of threat or fear’ (Wæver 
1995: 46). More recently the previous dominance of realism was modified by the 
increasing influence of neorealism. Yet even neorealist assumptions still led to a 
tendency to concentrate too much on the material forces and constraints generated by 
the global structure rather than on the role of regional dynamics. In other words, 
developments in a given region were likely to be explained mainly in terms of changes 
in global power distribution. 
 
From the 1980s, however, there was increasing dissatisfaction with the old military and 
state-centred view of security. As a result, security studies have expanded to embrace a 
wider agenda. Some go so far as to propose that the former focus on the security of the 
state should be replaced by a new emphasis on the security of people, whether as 
individuals or as a global or international collectivity (Booth 1991). There is now also a 
widespread desire to relate security to human needs and thus to maximise security as 
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positive goals (Galtung 1985). This new outlook has major implications both for the 
clarity and coherence of a crucial area of IR theory. 
 
Regional security complex theory (RSCT) was first developed by Buzan in the 1980s. 
As its name suggests, it treats security essentially in relational terms. Buzan claims that 
adoption and application of this theory would overcome some of the disadvantages of 
power theory, particularly its underplay of the importance of the regional level in 
international security affairs. In other words, RSCT advocates the regional level as the 
appropriate one for a large swath of practical security analysis (Buzan 1991: 186; Buzan 
and Wæver 2003: 43). Since then the theory has been further developed by Buzan, 
Wæver and others, and has become associated with the Copenhagen school’s theoretical 
approach to security. Although RSCT has advanced further to embrace a wider security 
agenda and a securitisation understanding (Buzan et al. 1998), the original focus 
remains unchanged. The following section will consider three main aspects of RSCT: 
how does it conceptualise security and the framework of security analysis; how does it 
define types of RSC; and how does it approach the possibility of structural / 
substructural change? 
 
2.2.1 Conceptual Frameworks: An Intersubjective Approach 
 
What is a security issue and what is not and should security be approached objectively 
(a real threat) or subjectively (a perceived threat)? These are the basic questions asked 
by RSC theorists (mainly see, Wæver 1995; Buzan et al. 1998; Buzan Wæver 2003). 
For them security should be regarded as ‘a self-referential practice’, because it is in this 
practice that an issue becomes a security issue – not necessarily because a real threat 
exists but because the issue is presented as such (Buzan et al. 1998: 24). Following 
language theory, Wæver (1995: 55) sees security as a speech act. This has two 
implications: first, ‘the word “security” is the act; the utterance is the primary reality’. 
In other words, by using the word ‘security’, a state-representative begins to move a 
particular development into a specific area, and thereby claims the right to use all 
necessary means to counter the threat. Second, the meaning of security must move from 
positive to negative, i.e. ‘minimising’ security by narrowing the field to which the 
security act is applied. Wæver (1995: 55, 57) believes that the dynamics of 
securitisation and de-securitisation can never be understood so long as investigation 
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proceeds along the normal critical track that treats security as a positive value to be 
maximised. 
 
This concept of the speech act, and the associated process of securitisation, facilitates 
the development of a new understanding of security that goes beyond issues of force. 
Now security is to be regarded as ‘a particular type of intersubjective politics’ (Buzan et 
al. 1998: 26). A simple example is provided by a situation when hostile tanks cross a 
border. Here, hostile is not really an attribute of the vehicle but of a socially constituted 
relationship, because a foreign tank could be part of a peacekeeping force (Buzan et al. 
1998: 30). Thus, RSC theorists propose a definition and criteria of securitisation as 
something ‘constituted by the intersubjective establishment of an existential threat with 
a saliency sufficient to have substantial political effects’ (Buzan et al. 1998: 25).  
 
Here RSC theorists make important conceptual distinctions between a securitising move 
and a successful securitisation; and between referent objects and securitising actors. 
First, they distinguish between a securitising move and a successful securitisation. 
When something presents an existential threat, that may lead to a securitising move but 
by itself it may not create securitisation. An issue is securitised only ‘if and when the 
audience accepts it as such’. To some extent, a North Korean missile test will be seen as 
a securitising move by all states in the region. But whether it can be successfully 
securitised depends on how its neighbours interpret it. The different Chinese and 
Japanese responses to the recent missile and nuclear crises mean that the same 
securitising move can result in different levels of securitisation. In other words, 
securitisation involves more than the breaking of rules and existential threats. The two 
must be combined – that is when cases of existential threats legitimise the breaking of 
rules (Buzan et al. 1998: 25). The other distinction is between referent objects and 
securitising actors. The former means ‘what is to be secured’, while the latter refers to 
those ‘who make claims about this security’ (Buzal et al. 1998: 35-42; Buzan and 
Wæver 2003: 71).  
 
This distinction is important and highly relevant to Northeast Asian cases. This general 
theory allows identification of the conditions in which ‘an actor successfully 
‘securitises’ some threat on behalf of a specific ‘referent object’’. In other words, the 
theory’s open analytical framework helps us to ‘catch’ security in its increasing varied 
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sectors, levels and units, while avoiding the trap of thinking that ‘everything is security’ 
(Buzan and Wæver 2003: 71). The referent objects of both Taiwan and North Korea 
have changed over the years. In both cases, the objectives have become less ambitious, 
though perhaps more fundamental. For North Korea earlier aspirations to victory over 
the South have changed to a preoccupation with regime survival. Similarly, Taiwan’s 
referent object of security has shifted from its re-establishment as the legitimate 
government of the whole China to the creation and defence of a distinct Taiwanese 
identity. Clearly, therefore, the referent object of security can vary as circumstances 
change. The referent objects for security have traditionally been the state and its 
survival. Now, however, ‘universal principles’ – such as free trade, human rights, non-
proliferation – are becoming referent objects in the political and economic sectors.  
 
Under this understanding of securitisation, RSC theorists deny that security is given 
objectively; rather it is determined by actors, and hence is essentially subjective. But 
they also argue that the label ‘subjective’ is inadequate, because it is not individuals 
alone who decide whether an issue is a security issue. In other words, a successful 
securitisation is not decided by the securitiser but by the audience of the security speech 
act. In this sense, securitisation, like politicisation, is ‘intersubjective and socially 
constructed’. The process of securitisation, ‘makes the case for understanding security 
not just as the use of force but as a particular type of intersubjective politics’ (Buzan et 
al. 1998: 26, 29, 30). 
 
Thus, it is important to understand precisely ‘who securitise, on what issues (threat), for 
whom (referent objects), why, with what results, and not least, under what conditions 
(i.e., what explains when securitisation is successful)’ (Buzan et al. 1998: 31, 32). In 
this sense, an objective measure for security can never replace the study of 
securitisation, because the security quality is supplied by politics. But this does not 
mean that a study of the features of the threat itself is irrelevant. On the contrary, these 
features rank high among the ‘facilitating conditions’ – the conditions under which the 
speech act works – of the security speech act (Buzan et al. 1998: 32). In short, RSCT 
specifies ‘facilitating conditions’ that make securitisation more or less likely, yet it is 
‘not causal in a traditional sense’ (Buzan and Wæver 2003: 96). 
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2.2.2 Types of RSC and The Possibility of Change 
 
Based upon this conceptual framework, RSCT identifies the types and natures of RSCs. 
RSCs are to be regarded as substructures of the international system. They are specific 
and functionally defined types of security regions, although they may or may not 
coincide with more general understandings of what is meant by the region concerned. 
This is because such regions are defined by ‘the relative intensity of security 
interdependence among a group of units, and security interdependence between that set 
and surrounding units’ (Buzan and Wæver 2003: 48). For example, while some analysts 
may treat Russia as belonging to Northeast Asia, Russia is not included as a ‘regional 
actor’ in this thesis. I believe that the ties of security interdependence are not strong 
enough to justify the ‘incorporation’ of Russia as a Northeast Asian actor – although it 
will be referred to as necessary. 
 
Within these parameters, the essential structure and character of RSCs are defined by 
two kinds of relations – power relations and patterns of amity and enmity. In the first 
place, as substructures within the international system, RSCs can be analysed in terms 
of polarity. At the same time, they also have important mediating effects on the actual 
operation of the global dynamics of great power across the international system. Here, 
RSCT distinguishes regional powers from global level ones (Buzan and Wæver 2003: 
49). Secondly, the theory treats the distribution of power and the patterns of amity and 
enmity as essentially independent variables. It claims that polarity may influence, but 
not determine, the character of security relations. As RSCs are socially constructed, they 
depend on ‘what and whom they securitise, the region might reproduce or change’. 
Thus, the prediction of patterns of conflict needs more than an investigation of the 
distribution of power. Historical hatreds and friendships, as well as the specific issues 
that trigger conflict or cooperation, are important elements by which to define an RSC 
(Buzan and Wæver 2003: 50). From this argument it follows logically that there is at 
least a possibility that RSCs can change and redefine themselves. 
 
RSCT treats RSCs as durable (not permanent) substructures, which have both internal 
structures and external boundaries that can be used to monitor continuity and change. It 
identifies three possible evolutions and changes in any given RSC: 
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• maintenance of the status quo, which means that there are no significant changes in 
its essential structure; 
• internal transformation – changes occur within the existing outer boundary. This 
could mean changes to the anarchic structure (because of regional integration); to 
polarity; or to the dominant patterns of amity / enmity; and 
• external transformation, which means that the outer boundary expands or contracts 
– that is either two RSCs merge, or one RSC splits into two (Buzan and Wæver 
2003: 53).  
 
Within these variations, I am most interested in internal transformation, particularly 
changes in the dominant patterns of amity and enmity. Yet, as I shall show, the 
possibility of external transformation is also highly relevant to the Northeast Asian case 
– that is a mergence with the Southeast Asian region. Some analysts have already 
identified such a mergence (Huxley 1996b: 216-18; Buzan and waver 2003: 155-64). 
And I shall argue that the two types of change are closely related in this case. 
 
Thus, within these identified structure and evolutions, it is possible to monitor and 
analyse types as well as changes of RSCs through variations either in polarity and / or 
amity and enmity. On the spectrum of polarity, security regions can range from unipolar 
to multipolar. As social structures, RSCs may also be located along a spectrum 
depending on the degree of amity and enmity. That is, at the negative end comes 
conflict formation, where interdependence arises from fear, rivalry and mutual 
perceptions of threat. In the middle lies security regime, where states still treat each 
other as potential threats, but where they have made arrangements to reduce the security 
dilemma among themselves (Jervis 1982). At the positive end lies a security community, 
where states no longer expect, or prepare, to use force in their relations with each other 
(Adler and Barnett 1998; Buzan 1991: 218).  
 
Here we can see that types along the amity and enmity line are closely related to the 
English school’s three categories of Hobbes, Grotius, and Kant; and to Wendt’s three 
cultures of Hobbesian, Lockean and Kantian. It should be noted, however, that the 
concept of conflict formation is wider than Wendt’s Hobbesian model, and that of 
security regime is narrower than his Lockean model (Buzan and Wæver 2003: 53). 
Under this categorisation, the Northeast Asian RSC is clearly located to the bipolar type 
 53
on the polarity line. But does it belong to the conflict formation level or has it moved to 
a level of security regime on the amity and enmity line? 
 
2.3 Conclusion: Intersubjective Processes – a Key to Security Analysis 
 
In the course of this chapter, I have examined how different theoretical propositions 
result in specific ontological and methodological foci and hence give rise to particular 
questions. The Waltzian formulation of the international system clearly leads to an 
analytical parsimony, one that precludes investigation of the characters and intentions of 
individual actors (states) – because these are alleged to have little impact on 
‘international’ politics. In order to understand the behaviour of states, one must 
understand changes in power positions within a system, since the structure of a system 
changes with changes in the distribution of capabilities among its units. Moreover, 
changes in structure change expectations about how the units within the system will 
behave.  
 
By contrast, if we follow the formulation of Wendtian social constructivism, the identity 
and interests of the actors will be at the core of our investigation – because these 
identities and interests are seen as the ultimate sources of the outcomes. Again, the 
English school formulation leads to an examination of how international society evolves 
through the creation and evolution of different norms, principles and institutions. Since 
these are not given but are formed through the processes of intersubjective practices – a 
point also emphasised by the securitisation approach – they can change through 
intersubjective practice, hence the structural change. RSCT guides us to an analytical 
eclecticism and to the use of both materialist and constructivist approaches, such as the 
distribution of power and amity and enmity, but essentially treats them as independent 
variables. 
 
This thesis accepts the argument that all types of international relations are essentially 
‘social’. It posits that, even if largely remain in a conflict formation mode, the Northeast 
Asian RSC is a region that is socially constructed. Evolution and change will be 
contingent on the security practices of the actors. Thus, the analysis of securitisation 
must be made within the context of intersubjective processes. This includes mutual 
perceptions and interpretations among actors. In the course of investigation one must 
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discover what kind of values, norms and institutions they share, and why they are 
shared, and how their identity and interests evolve and change over time. It is also 
important to find out how these changes influence securitisation and dessecuritiastion 
practices. These practices will ultimately become the sources that will determine 
whether Northeast Asia remains in its present conflict formation mode or moves to a 
level of security regime. The next six chapters will apply theories examined in this 
chapter and to analyse the case of Northeast Asia. 
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Part I: The Societal Dimension:  
      The Evolution of Regional / International Society 
           
Introduction 
‘Societal security is about collectives and their identity…. Any we identity 
can be constructed in many different ways, and often the main issue that 
decides whether security conflicts will emerge is whether one or another 
self-definition wins out in a society’ (Buzan et al. 1998: 120). 
Is there a Northeast Asian collective identity? Have national or collective identity 
factors resulted in a Northeast Asian regional international society? According to Bull: 
A society of states (or international society) exists when a group of states, 
conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society 
in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of 
rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of 
common institutions (Bull 1977: 13). 
For a variety of reasons, the collective identity of Northeast Asia is weaker than the 
same phenomenon elsewhere, even in other parts of Asia. As a regional international 
society it is characterised more by diversity than by convergence. This under-
development is manifested in the virtual absence of effective multilateralism or any 
structure of security mechanism until very recently (Hemmer and Katzenstein 2002; 
Buzan and Segal 1994; Yahuda 2002). There is certainly a striking contrast to Europe, 
where multilateral cooperation is more long-standing and more institutionalised. 
 
What are the main causes of this slow process of multilateralism and low level of 
consciousness as a regional society, and has this level risen? To answer these questions, 
this chapter explores aspects of both the English school and constructivism, and seeks to 
explain how these factors affect securitisation / desecuritisation practices in the 
Northeast Asian RSC. In so doing, it challenges some of the views on Northeast Asian 
regional security developed to date.  
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First, it challenges the Waltzian strict systemic approach that assumes that the model 
(the anarchical system) established in seventeenth century Europe is universal and 
hence describes the international system at all times and in all places. It is also assumes 
that structural conditions make all states ‘like-units’ and minimises the role of domestic 
and ideational features in security analysis. Here I challenge the Waltzian position by 
asking how ‘alike’ are the ‘like-units’ that allegedly constitute an international society? 
(Buzan 1996: 266); and suggest that a distinctive ‘Chinese world order’ existed long 
before the modern European international society. 
 
Secondly, I question Hemmer and Katzenstein’s (2002) contention that the lack of 
multilateralism is largely due to American (external) identity factors. While 
acknowledging the importance of ideational factors in the development of bilateralism 
versus multilateralism, I seek to investigate the interplay between external and regional 
actors in their identity formation and its effects on interests and behaviour. 
 
Thirdly, I investigate regionalism and regionalisation movements operating on the East 
Asia and Asia Pacific levels. Although relations among the states began to change in the 
1970s, regionalism in Asia-Pacific has developed significantly in the post-Cold War era, 
coinciding with dramatic changes in domestic political economies, notably in China. 
These processes have resulted in a dynamic interplay between domestic, regional, inter-
regional and global levels. Impacts on regional identity and interests and upon security 
practices are formidable. 
 
For the purposes of this analysis, it is essential to examine patterns of security practices 
in Northeast Asia not only in relation to the evolution of regional international society, 
but also in the larger context of the expansion and development of global international 
society. When defining security complexes, RSC theorists emphasise ‘interactions 
among units’. They argue: 
Since we argue that security is not an objective issue but a product of the 
behaviour of actors, security complexes are not objective in the traditional 
sense. Nor is the security complex to be seen as a discursive construction by 
the actors… Analysts apply the term security complex (and therefore 
designate a region) based upon the contingent, historically specific, and 
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possibly changing constellation generated by the interdependent security 
practices of the actors (Buzan et al. 1998: 20). 
In the processes of securitisation and desecuritisation in East Asia, interplay between 
regional and global international society is particularly strong. As we shall see, the 
different responses of China and Japan to Western expansion present only one of the 
many examples. From this perspective, two phenomena have particular implications for 
regional security: the expansion of European regional international society into a global 
one; and the uneven development of international society at the sub-global/regional 
level.  
 
Thus, my analysis focuses not only on questions such as what kind of values, norms and 
institutions are already shared within Northeast Asian RSC, and why? – but also on how 
the dynamic interplay of global and regional international society shaped and reshaped 
regional society, and how these affected the dynamics of securitisation and 
desecuritisation practices in Northeast Asia? In short, what type of international society, 
if any, has Northeast Asia evolved into? This approach leads me to investigate the 
historical processes through which the Northeast Asian regional society or the Northeast 
Asian RSC has evolved and changed:  
• How in earlier times did the Sino-centric world order sustain a regional yet 
‘universal’ international society in East Asia? 
• How did this East Asian world order collapse? Here the impact of external 
pressures (the expansion of European international society), and internal 
developments (the rise of Japan and Sino-Japanese rivalry) must be considered. 
• Japanese imperialism and its consequences. 
• The impact of the Cold War on Northeast Asian regional society. 
• The impact of the ending of the Cold War. 
 
In so doing, I aim to provide an historical context– the evolution of international society 
in East Asia – in order to arrive at a better understanding of the logic of securitisation / 
desecuritisation in current affairs. Chapter 3 focuses on the Sino-centric world order and 
its demise. Chapter 4 investigates the re-emergence of a regional international society, 
from the first attempt made by Japan to developments in the Cold War period. Chapter 
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5 examines developments of international society in Northeast / East Asia in the present 
post-Cold War era. 
 59
3 The Sino-Centric East Asian World Order and its Demise 
 
3.1 The Sino-Centric East Asian World Order 
 
Until it encountered the European international society in the mid-nineteenth century, 
East Asia was a self-contained world – the so-called ‘Chinese world order’ (Fairbank 
1968) or ‘the East Asian world order’ (K-H Kim 1980). Strictly speaking, this Sino-
centric world was a ‘regional’ society, or in Buzan and Little’s (2001) categorisation, a 
‘sub-global international system’. It developed within the area of Chinese culture 
(though it expanded more widely), and was heavily influenced by the civilisation of 
ancient China. It co-existed with the European society of states until the mid-nineteenth 
century. Yet it was also a unified and ‘universal’ empire, which theoretically embraced 
the entire world. Thus, as Fairbank (1968: 2) notes, although ‘In European parlance, it 
became the Far East’, ‘in Chinese terms this Far Eastern world was Sino-centric’. From 
time of the Middle Kingdom (Zhong Guo, China), it was dominated by the Chinese 
empire (Tianxia, all-under-heaven), presided over by the Son of Heaven (Tianzi, the 
Chinese emperor).  
 
The patterns of this Sino-centric world – its system structure and organising principles – 
evolved in virtual isolation and were little affected by the dynamics of Western world 
(Zhang 2001a: 44; K-H Kim 1980: 1). It endured over two millennia, from at least the 
Han dynasty (206 BC - 24 AD) until the intrusion of the Western powers in the mid-
nineteenth century. What were the distinctive features of this world order and how could 
it survive for so long? 
 
3.1.1 Confucianism: the Philosophical Foundation of the System 
 
To comprehend this system and the hierarchical relations between China and its 
neighbours and peripheries, we must first understand its philosophical basis – 
Confucianism. Zhang (2001a: 51) explains:  
Confucius and Confucians represented one school of thought in the Warring 
States period. They were important, not only because they turned out to be 
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harbingers of a future age, but also because Confucian ideas, ‘amorphous, 
adaptable and various’ as they are (Wight 1991: 66), were used for the 
design of imperial institutions and systems of government and governance, 
particularly in the Han Dynasty, as the Confucian-legalist amalgam (the so-
called Imperial Confucianism) became the prevailing ideology in the 
imperial bureaucracy. 
Two notions require particular examination because they were crucial in shaping the 
Chinese view of the world: the concept of unity as peace or universal kingship; and the 
notion of hierarchy as a natural or Confucian moral order. 
 
Unity as Peace and Hierarchy as a Natural Order 
The notion of universal kingship derives from an idealisation of the unity of Ancient 
China under the Zhou Dynasty (1027-777 BC), which assumes a natural harmony 
between heavenly and earthly forces. Although the notion itself was pre-Confucian, as 
Schwartz (1968: 278) argues, over time, it became inextricably linked with ‘an 
absolutisation of the Confucian moral order’. Accordingly, peace and harmony were 
intrinsically related to political unity. When advising King Hui of Liang – who asked 
‘How may the world be at peace?’ – Mencius replied ‘When there is unity, there will be 
peace’ (Fung Yu-lan 1948: 180). The rise of Confucianism during the Han dynasty and 
the associated belief in unity and peace gave rise to the Pax Sinica and remained its 
raison d’etre thereafter.  
 
The idea of hierarchic order is even older than Confucianism. ‘From the first, the 
Chinese world was hierarchic and anti-egalitarian’, or in Fei’s words, a caxu geju 
(concentric hierarchical order) (Fairbank 1968: 5; Fei 1945: chapter 4). As an ancient 
Chinese institution, li (rituals) revealed, the cosmic order was perceived as a hierarchy 
within which every being was assigned an appropriate place. ‘The Confucian 
philosophy that sanctioned this hierarchic order became an orthodoxy’ (Fairbank 1968: 
6). Confucian teaching identifies five important human relations regulating familial and 
social life: relations between father and son, ruler and official, husband and wife, elder 
and younger brother, and friend and friend. Since these relationships were moral norms, 
though not actually legally binding, they would be enhanced by the strict observance of 
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proper ceremonial forms (li). Further, in order to achieve harmony and peace, all kinds 
of political conduct must conform to these norms and strictly observe the five human 
relationships. Thus, Confucian orthodoxy provided the basis upon which China and 
non-Chinese states in East Asia conducted relations with one another. The five 
Confucian relationships usually ‘provided the vocabulary of definition for specific 
tributary relationships’ (Mancall 1968: 65). 
 
3.1.2 The Tribute System: an Hierarchical Structure 
 
Thus, the Chinese empire developed a system structure different to that of the 
international society that emerged in seventeenth century Europe. It is important to 
understand this difference, and here the concept of shared institutions, developed by the 
English school, may be helpful. The ‘modern’ European interstate society was based 
upon the organising principle of sovereignty, that is, equality of states. Within this 
interstate society, territoriality was an important institution: ‘defined political space was 
one of exclusive legal jurisdiction’ (Holsti 2004: 83). By the late seventeenth century, 
this was fully accepted as an essential characteristic and became institutionalised in the 
eighteenth. Thus, with its preoccupation with precise division of territories and its own 
concepts of legitimacy, the order was largely maintained by such concepts as the 
balance of power and great power management. Other core institutions, such as 
diplomacy, war, and international law, also played important role in maintaining the 
system structure. 
 
In contrast, the Chinese world order was ‘unified and centralised in theory by the 
universal pre-eminence of the Son of Heaven’ (Fairbank 1968: 9). The fundamental 
institutional arrangement within this world order was the tribute system, which was 
hierarchical and anti-egalitarian. Thus compared to the modern European interstate 
society, there were fundamental differences in shared institutions. Unlike the modern 
European interstate society, territoriality was not an important institution, because the 
Chinese order was not organised on the basis of a clear division of territories between 
sovereigns of equal status. The concentric hierarchical order was sustained by the 
subordination of all local authorities to the central and awe-inspiring power of the 
emperor (Fairbank 1968: 9; Fei 1945). Thus, there were no institutions such as 
nationalism and international law. Even if they existed in any sense of the word, they 
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were not of primary importance. Further, balance of power and great power 
management were also less important.  
 
Diplomacy as an institution did play an important role though it operated in a different 
manner to its European counterpart – not least because the tributary relationship ‘was 
always bilateral, never multilateral’ (Mancall 1968: 65). Participants in the Chinese 
world order interacted with Imperial China but not with each other in any meaningful 
way. For instance, Annam (Vietnam) and Korea, two core members of the Chinese 
tribute system, had no regular or sustained contact with each other. Korea’s relationship 
with Japan was also different to that with China; while Korea considered relations with 
China ‘familial in nature and obligation’, those with Japan were regarded as ‘purely 
contractual in nature and origin’ (K-H Kim 1980: 20). 
 
Instead, ceremonial forms (li, rituals), were the dominant institutions and played the 
most important role in maintaining the order of the Chinese empire. Li comprised ‘the 
rules, norms and accepted behaviours and the institutional practices’ (Zhang 2001a: 49). 
Although not legally binding, li was a moral norm that regulated relations between 
China and non-Chinese regimes. As the outward manifestation of Confucian rules of 
propriety, it provided a foundation for the belief that rule by virtue (de zhi) offered the 
best chance of peace and harmony; right conduct according to the proper norms would 
move others by its example.  
 
3.1.3 The Confucian Moral Rule: Theory and Reality 
 
It followed that the pre-ordained order of natural harmony in a cosmic unity could only 
be achieved through the Confucian rule of propriety, and by strict observation of the 
five human relationships. But to what extent did the Confucian moral and intellectual 
structure correspond to the actual practice of China’s relations with its periphery? 
Theoretically, the institution of war was only to be regarded as of secondary importance 
in the vital task of maintaining the divinely sanctioned order. However, in reality, war 
played a much greater role than the theory allowed. As K-H Kim (1980: 5, 6) notes, 
struggles for mastery of the Chinese continent and for hegemony in East Asia were 
frequent and fierce. These struggles were particularly acute in the sixteenth and early 
seventeenth centuries and often embroiled Korea, the pivot of East Asia. In 1592, 
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Toyotomi Hideyoshi invaded Korea with the professed aim of conquering China. The 
Manchus also invaded Korea in 1627 and 1636, again as a preparatory move in their 
planned conquest of China. Logically a substantial gap between theory and practice 
must raise a question as to the value of the theory – does it become worthless or does it 
still retain some significance?  
 
Some scholars have questioned the Confucian notion of moral authority, and Alastair 
Ian Johnston (1995) has gone so far as to virtually deny it any credibility. His study of 
Chinese strategic culture – the relations between strategic culture and strategic choice – 
examines the Seven Military Classics and Ming policy towards the Mongols. Johnston 
claims that strategic offensiveness, rather than Confucian rule by virtue, dominated 
Chinese strategic culture. Johnston admits that there were two strategic cultures in 
Chinese tradition. He calls one ‘the Confucian-Mencian paradigm’, which corresponds 
to the ideas of the Confucian moral rule. It assumes that conflict is aberrant and 
avoidable. Even when force has to be used, it should be applied defensively and 
minimally. He calls the other culture ‘the parabellum paradigm’ and this comes close to 
Western notions of hard realpolitik. It assumes that conflict is a constant feature of 
human affairs and that, in a zero-sum context, the application of violence is highly 
efficacious when dealing with the enemy (Johnston 1995: 249). 
 
Moreover, Johnston’s most striking claim is that, while both paradigms existed, they did 
not enjoy equal status. The Confucian-Mencian paradigm was an idealised strategic 
culture, which had little influence in actual decision-making processes. For the most 
part, the parabellum paradigm was dominant and informed imperial strategic choice. In 
other words, the Confucian-Mencian symbolism did inform theories of statecraft and 
abstract questions on the legitimacy of force. But when it came to specific strategic 
problems or matters of state security, the decision was rarely in favour of 
accommodationist or defensive strategies. Rather all means were to be used to destroy 
an adversary. The dominance of parabellum strategic culture seems to be confirmed by 
Ming memorials on policy towards the Mongols. Hence Johnston (1995: 253) concludes 
that the Confucian-Mencian strategic culture is idealised; it existed but was irrelevant. 
The parabellum strategic culture not only existed but was also relevant.  
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Yet, even if we accept Johnston’s claim, it is still hard to explain how Imperial China 
managed to maintain its rule over an area so vast and diverse and for such long period. 
Empires based upon force alone are usually short-lived. Further, how do we explain the 
survival of the Chinese empire even when China itself was militarily weak? Finally, 
how do we explain the gap or even contradiction between the normative claim of rule 
by Confucian moral example and actual practice in Chinese world order? While many 
scholars have answered these questions in terms of flexibility of the system (see 
Mancall 1968; Fairbank 1968; Zhang 2001a), I believe that other factors were at work. 
Here the Wendtian model of internalisation – how a cultural norm is internalised by 
actors and the reasons why states comply with certain systems (see chapter 2) – may be 
of assistance.  
 
3.2 The Longevity of the Chinese World Order and the Question of 
Internalisation 
 
Wendt identifies three degrees of internalisation: force/coercion, price/calculation, and 
legitimacy/belief. Depending on which degree is seen as predominant, we obtain three 
very different explanations of the extraordinary longevity of the Chinese world order. If 
‘force/coercion’ is what really mattered, then East Asians must have accepted their 
tributary relations with China because they were coerced by imperial military might. 
Here acceptance would be reluctant and entirely external and East Asians would have 
looked for ways to escape it. If the ‘price/calculation’ level is dominant, however, they 
would accept subordinate status because they supposed that this would bring economic 
or other advantages. Here acceptance would be a little more voluntary, but it would still 
be largely ‘external’ and conditional. If the expected advantages did not materialise, 
then they would still want to escape. But if ‘legitimacy/belief’ is dominant, then there 
would be no thoughts of escape. Acceptance would be entirely voluntary and fully 
internalised. In other words, they would consciously subscribe to the tenets of the 
Confucian system. But China had many neighbours and it is possible these different 
levels preponderated in different relationships and that these also varied over time.  
 
Thus, before we address the question of degrees of internalisation, it may be helpful to 
investigate what Fei (1945) calls the concentric image (tongxin yuan or chaxu geju) of 
the Chinese world order. The hierarchical Sino-centric world was graded and was not 
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coterminous with the Chinese cultural area. China’s relations with its periphery 
certainly varied in different zones. For analytical purposes, I adopt Fairbank’s (1968: 2) 
division: 
1. The Sinic zone: consisting of geographically close and culturally similar tributaries 
– such as Korea, Vietnam, the Liuqiu (Ryukyu) Islands, and, briefly, Japan. 
2. The Inner Asian Zone: consisting of the nomadic or semi-nomadic peoples of 
Inner Asia. Ethnically and culturally these peoples were non-Chinese, and were 
outside or on the fringe of the Chinese culture area. 
3. The Outer Zone: consisting of the “outer barbarians” (wai-i) generally at a greater 
distance, including eventually Japan and other states of Southeast and South Asia 
and Europe that were supposed to send tribute when trading. 
 
In theory, all non-Chinese states and peoples, wherever located, were expected to pay 
proper tribute to the Son of Heaven in the Central Country, and to be governed by the 
same Chinese Confucian propriety (li). Subscription to this theory assumed that the rule 
of the Chinese Emperor could be maintained by belief and legitimacy alone. While true 
in theory, in practice, the concept was often flouted. Indeed, patterns both of Chinese 
rule and the responses of non-Chinese regimes show an interesting mixture of 
coercion/force, calculation/interest, and belief/legitimacy. Fairbank divides these aims 
and means as follows: 
• military (wu) or administrative (li rituals, fa legal rules) control; 
• cultural and ideological (wen, de) or religious attraction; and  
• material interest (li) or diplomatic manipulation (cf., Fairbank 1968:13, table 2). 
Let us consider in more detail how deeply this system structure was internalised. 
 
3.2.1 Coercion as the Driving Force  
 
Despite adherence to the Confucian principle of rule by virtue (de zhi) and the myth of 
unity as peace and harmony, the expansion of the Chinese empire and nature of its rule 
over the Sino-centric world were nevertheless characterised by elements of force and 
belligerency. The role of coercion was particularly marked in relations with Inner and 
Central Asian nomadic and barbarian tribes. Unlike states in the Sinic Zone – closely 
tied to China by cultural bonds such as the Chinese written language and Confucianism 
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– the peoples of the Inner Asian Zone were not only ethnically and culturally non-
Chinese but were also outside or on the fringe of the Chinese culture area. For the most 
part, their role in the Chinese world order was as objectives of war and conquest. The 
position is well summarised by Mancall (1968: 70-71):  
China constantly sought to dominate the Central Asian steppes and deserts 
by demonstrating her military strength, trying to force the barbarians to 
recognize it by performing the prescribed Confucian rituals. Confucian 
China was not only a military-political threat to the sedentary grain-growing 
societies of Southeast and East Asia, but it threatened the very way of life of 
the Turkish and Mongol nomads, who were never at ease in their 
relationship with the imperial power. 
 
To some extent, wuzhi (rule by force) applied even within the Sinic zone, particularly 
over Vietnam (Annam) and Tibet. In any case, even if coercion was not the main 
driving force, China’s physical size, its military power, and the sophistication of its 
economy and government would leave surrounding relatively small countries no choice 
but to subordinate themselves to it. Indeed the degree of acceptance varied greatly. 
While some, like Korea, Vietnam and Liuqiu, accepted Confucianism as the tributary 
state’s own ideology, others, such as Central and some Southeast Asian countries, only 
accepted subordination for the sake of their own survival. When circumstances 
permitted they often ‘challenged the very legitimacy of the dynasty in Confucian terms 
by suggesting that the emperor had lost the mandate of heaven because of his inability 
to control the barbarians’ (Mancall 1968: 70). From time to time, and especially in the 
late sixteenth century, even Japan challenged Chinese superiority by competing to 
acquire their own tributaries through attempts to secure the allegiance of several 
adjacent kingdoms, including the Liuqiu (Ryukyu), and Korea. However, coercion was 
not the most important instrument in maintaining the Chinese world order. 
 
3.2.2 Interest as the Driving Force 
 
Wendt (1999) argues that states sometimes follow the norms of a system not because 
they are coerced or compelled but for reasons of individual self-interest. Wendt assigns 
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these reasons to his second degree of internalisation. It seems that, to a great extent, 
states and regimes in the Chinese world order that accepted Chinese superiority did so 
for their own interests – probably from economic or security calculations or both. 
According to Mancall (1968: 75), while the economic benefits of trade between China 
and the countries of Southeast Asia were useful or ‘convenient’ to both parties, 
economic links between China and Central Asia were ‘vital’. Imperial China required 
horses and other products of animal-husbandry economies not found in sufficient 
quantities in China itself, while Central Asia needed Chinese tea, grain, other 
agricultural products, and luxury goods, which played a key role in status 
differentiations within barbarian societies. 
 
Japan’s position within this Chinese world order was an evolving one, and its role was 
largely determined by economic considerations. Japan had accepted some form of 
tributary status to China as early as the Han dynasty (206 BC to AD 219) and definitely 
acknowledged its inferior status in the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries. Many of 
the Ashikaga (1392-1573) rulers, received formal investiture from the Ming court as 
‘kings of Japan’. Howe (1996: 4) argues the main reasons for Japan’s acceptance of 
Chinese superiority were ‘the trading advantages’ this conferred. However, Tokugawa 
Japan (1603-1867), maintained no formal ties with China and remained outside the 
Chinese tribute system. This was mainly due to the influence of domestic elements such 
as the court nobility, the Shinto clergy and other groups opposed to the ruling 
shogunate. They were fiercely loyal to the Mikado – the Japanese emperor, who, though 
politically impotent for centuries, still remained the de jure sovereign. Yet, the 
Tokugawa shoguns’ position towards China was essentially the same as that of the 
Ashikaga rulers (K-H Kim 1980: 23-24). Above all, despite the ‘closure’ of Japan to the 
outside world in the middle of the seventeenth century, the Tokugawa bakufu (central 
government) maintained commercial relations with China through Nagasaki and 
through relations with Korea and the Liuqiu kingdom. As Harootunian (1980: 11) 
observes, in the distinctive Tokugawa speech, hakuraihin (imported goods) referred to 
goods produced in China; significantly, the term also came to mean ‘elegant products’. 
Thus, although Japan was sometimes outside the formal tribute system and often played 
a challenger role, economic interests kept it close to China both formally and 
informally. 
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3.2.3 Legitimacy as the Driving Force 
 
Despite the various facts suggesting that the Chinese world order was held together by 
force and calculations of self-interest, belief also played a crucial role. Indeed, the 
importance of this factor becomes evident when one asks how the Chinese world order 
was able to survive even when China itself was militarily weak. The significance of 
belief was particularly great for countries within the Sinic Zone, that is, societies 
historically most influenced by the civilisation of ancient China, sharing the Chinese 
ideographic writing system, subscribing to classical Confucian teachings about family 
and social order and adopting the official examination system. 
 
Korea provides the best example because it was the ‘probably the first major non-
Chinese state to acknowledge Chinese suzerainty and certainly the last one to renounce 
it formally’ (K-H Kim 1980: 2-3). Of course, there were elements of force and interest 
in maintaining a tributary relationship with China. Korea’s major concern was security, 
a preoccupation derived from its geographical position, which often made it the focus of 
the rival ambitions of various Asian states. Hence a guarantee of Chinese protection was 
indispensable if Korean security was to be preserved in times of external threat. The 
value of Chinese protection was amply demonstrated by the massive Ming assistance 
that enabled the Koreans to withstand the Toyotomi Hideyoshi invasions in the 1590s. 
However, it must be acknowledged that belief in Confucianism was perhaps the main 
reason why Korea remained loyal to China.  
 
Through its long and close cultural and political ties with China, Korea became the most 
Confucian of all East Asian societies. Particularly under the Yi dynasty, Korea 
proceeded to transform itself into a model Confucian state by creating new political, 
social, and cultural institutions based closely on those of Song and Ming China. By the 
early decades of Ming China, Sino-Korean tributary relations attained full institutional 
maturity. This deep internalisation made it difficult for Korea to change its tributary 
relations when the Ming dynasty was replaced by the Qing. Much later the same pattern 
was repeated when Korea came under Western pressure to renounce its tributary status 
to Qing China. Thus when the Manchus invaded Korea twice in the early seventeenth 
century, they compelled a reluctant Korea to renounce its tributary ties with the Ming 
and to accept vassalage to the Qing. Later, with the Manchu conquest of China itself, 
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Qing policy towards Korea assumed a more traditional stance – that of seeking to 
restore the old pattern of harmonious suzerain-vassal relations. Korea eventually 
accepted tributary status to Qing China. By the late eighteen century, Korea had even 
come to respect the daqing (great Qing), not merely because Qing China was feared or 
because Chinese policy was more accommodating, but mainly because Qing China ‘had 
“become the successor of the great [Confucian] culture”’ (Chun 1968: 111). In other 
words, what had originally been perceived as an alien culture had itself become 
Sinicised 
 
The legitimacy argument may even apply to Japan. While it kept its place in the 
Chinese world order mainly for economic reasons, these were supported by elements of 
belief. As mentioned above, in Tokugawa speech, the term hakuraihin (imported 
goods), referred to goods produced in China – ‘elegant products’. Harootunian (1980: 
11) argues that the sense of inferiority implicit in the word ‘hakuraihin’ ‘probably 
informed even other areas of Tokugawa life. Chinese doctrine and culture were 
esteemed over native accomplishments, often at the expense of forgetting about Japan 
itself’. Hence one may conclude that the Japanese relationship with China depended 
upon more than calculations of self-interest; it was also sustained by continued belief in 
and admiration for Chinese civilisation. 
 
Thus, following Zhang (2001a: 57), we must stress the importance of legitimacy in 
maintaining the Chinese world order : ‘So long as the hegemonic belief in the moral 
purpose of the state and more broadly, of the political community incarnated in 
Confucianism, prevails, the tribute system as basic institutional practices in the Chinese 
world order is likely to stay’. Of course, it is true that the Chinese world order 
eventually collapsed in the second half of the nineteenth century, but it had then 
survived for more than two millennia. No other international system approaches it in 
terms of longevity. Understandably, this extraordinary longevity has impressed many 
modern Sinologists, but it may have led them to some rather questionable assumptions. 
They appear to believe that the survival of the system is only explicable in terms of a 
widespread acceptance of the principles of the Confucian moral order and that these 
same principles are likely to inform the future pattern of the relations between China 
and the other states of East Asia. Yet some historians and IR specialists have queried 
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this extreme Sino-centrism and have expressed doubts as to whether Confucian ideals 
were either so dominant in the past or likely to be so important in the future.  
 
3.2.4 Implications for Chinese and East Asian International Relations: Some 
Controversies 
 
It is striking that the rapid rise of China and its growing influence in the region – so 
obvious from the 1990s onwards – coincided with a new trend in IR thinking. Cultural 
and civilisational dimensions began to be viewed with renewed interest. Of course, this 
new orientation appears incompatible with the emphasis on the role of structural 
conditions in the determination of states’ behaviour, characteristic of mainstream IR 
theories. In practical terms, these differences of theory lay behind the debate as to 
whether other East Asian countries would respond to the rise of China by engaging in 
‘balancing tactics’ or by ‘bandwagoning’ with it. 
 
For those whose ideas about international relations centre on the concept of the balance-
of-power, it is self evident that balancing behaviour is the natural response of states 
facing the phenomenon of a rising power. Balance-of-power theories assume that states 
are unitary actors in an essentially anarchic system. At the minimum, they seek their 
own preservation, while, at the maximum, they aspire to universal domination. When 
they face what they see as an unfavourable balance, they are prepared to use all means 
at their disposal to redress it (Waltz 1979: 102-28). In other words, once they are locked 
into such a system, all states must follow the rules of the balance-of-power ‘game’; any 
other response would invite danger. East Asians are no exceptions; if they want to 
survive and prosper they too must play the ‘game’.  
 
But the conventional wisdom of structural constraints and balance of power logic is now 
challenged by other approaches, perhaps best described as ‘Asian exceptionalism’. 
David Kang (2003a; 2003b) argues that East Asian states are not balancing against a 
rising China, but are actually bandwagoning with it. Kang echoes Huntington’s (1996) 
assertion that the continuing influence of historical and cultural traditions associated 
with ‘Confucian civilisation’ means that the other states of East Asia are likely to 
bandwagon with a rising China. In other words, the most significant moulding factors 
on the pattern of international relations in East Asia are to be found in Asia’s own 
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history, culture, and civilisation. This is tantamount to saying that the pattern of state 
behaviour in Asia will not reproduce that of Europe from the seventeenth century 
onwards. Yet, we still need to understand why Asia will be different. In other words, 
how do we understand the legacy of East Asian history – particularly the Confucian 
civilisational tradition – and its influence? 
 
It is important to stress that, while, like Kang, Johnston is convinced of the importance 
of culture, his conclusions are radically different. As we have seen, Johnston’s study of 
Chinese strategic culture insists that the dominant element in this culture was that of the 
parabellum paradigm, rather than the Confucian-Mencian tradition. If Johnston is right, 
it may be that the real traditions of Asia are not so different to those of Europe after all. 
Clearly, the parabellum paradigm is close to realpolitik traditions of Europe and hence 
‘not self-evidently unique’. Johnston goes on to argue that the parabellum is ‘cross-
cultural and learned’. Implicitly therefore, however ‘cultural’ his analysis, Johnston 
rejects the case for ‘Asian exceptionalism’ (Johston 1995: 28, 31). 
 
While both of these interpretations provide valuable insights, even taken together they 
encompass only some aspects of the relationship between China and its neighbours. As 
Michael Hunt (1996: 8) points out, the history of Chinese foreign relations consists of 
‘not just one or two traditions but a multiplicity of traditions’. Perhaps emphasis on one 
aspect inevitably leads to the neglect of others. Even if we concede that the Confucian 
civilisational tradition dominated a vast area of East Asia for an extraordinarily long 
time, it must be stressed that there were other traditions that are also worthy of 
investigation. .  
 
As we have seen, Johnston has identified an alternative, parabellum, paradigm, 
operating alongside the Confucian tradition and at times perhaps more powerful. 
Indeed, if we extend our historical horizons further back in time – to the period before 
the ‘Middle Kingdom’ – we encounter still more traditions that seem to have informed 
the relationship between China and its neighbours. Thus, scholars have confirmed that, 
during the ‘Spring and Autumn’ and ‘Warring States’ periods (656-221BC), multi-state 
systems operated in China itself. It seems that these systems closely resembled the 
modern European state system. The existence of multi-state systems in Chinese history 
has led Gerald Chan (1999) to question the long-standing belief that the modern state 
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system first appeared in Europe. In other words, if Chan is right, the significance of the 
Treaty of Westphalia has been exaggerated. If only unconsciously, the European 
statesmen of seventeenth century were merely replicating systems that had operated in 
the Far East anything up to two thousand years earlier. Hui (2005: 1) even argues that 
‘[a]lthough it is often presumed that China or Zhongguo refers to the “Middle 
Kingdom”, this term originally referred to “central states”.’ Eras of international 
anarchy, and hence of sovereign states, followed the collapse of strong Imperial 
dynasties – as in the Spring and Autumn periods after the collapse of the Zhou dynasty 
and during the Three Kingdoms period after the collapse of the Han dynasty. Thus there 
have been times when China was no stranger to essentially amoral interstate systems, 
characterised by constant manoeuvre and ruthless competition (Hunt 1996: 6; Hui 2005) 
 
Further, it seems that, even when established, the operation of the Chinese Empire or 
world order went through a number of phases. Indeed, Rossabi (1983: Introduction) 
goes further, insisting that the so-called Chinese world order did not persist for the 
entire period from the second century B.C. to the Opium War. In reality, at different 
times, China adopted different policies towards foreigners. Hunt divides these policies 
into two types: the tribute system model with its unshakable Sino-centrism and a more 
flexible pattern characteristic of the Han (206 B.C. – 220 A.D.) and Tang (618-907 
A.D.) dynasties. When the second pattern predominated, China had extensive dealings 
with foreign peoples, and these contacts brought new goods, aesthetic values, and ideas 
into China. Hunt further argues that the waxing and waning of Chinese strength along 
the inner-Asian frontier contributed to the ‘cosmopolitan nature’ of these periods. For 
example, at its peak China gained control of the Central Asian trade routes and brought 
non-Chinese peoples on its periphery within its borders. When China was weak, 
however, these same people asserted themselves, at times claiming political control over 
parts of China itself (Hunt 1996: 5, 6). 
 
In a similar vein, Ledyard (1983) argues that in the course of its long history, Chinese 
foreign policy has tended to oscillate between Yang and Yin phases. During a Yang 
phase (such as the Tang dynasty), the Chinese were sufficiently powerful to impose 
their system of foreign relations and even secure recognition of its superiority. Yet, in a 
Yin phase (such as the Song dynasty), China was weak and officials were frequently 
compelled to accept foreign states as equals and pursue essentially accommodationist 
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foreign policies (Ledyard 1983: 313-53). Thus, in the long history of Chinese empire, 
the combined effects of Yang and Yin phases, especially in terms of frontier interaction 
and of two-way long distance commerce, resulted in both a Sinicisation of Asian culture 
and in a ‘barbarization’ of Chinese culture. These developments were reflected in 
clothing, food and, above all, in religion (Hunt 1996: 6). 
 
But there was one further historical tradition – perhaps the most important of all – that 
was to transform China itself and its relations with its neighbours, and indeed with other 
parts of the world. This came in the form of the expansion of European international 
society into East Asia. All previous experience of the non-Chinese world had indicated 
that while ‘barbarians’ could indeed conquer China and go on to establish major 
dynasties such as the Jin (265-42), the Yuan (1271-1368), and the Qing (1644-191), 
their overall impact was relatively modest. In other words, they could ‘conquer China’ 
but did not ‘transform it’ (Hunt (1996: 7). The Chinese may well have supposed that 
European ‘barbarians’ would be no different. If so, they were seriously mistaken. It was 
not just a matter of the European’s overwhelming military superiority. The crucial 
difference between the Europeans and earlier barbarian incursions was that the 
Europeans were able to impose fundamentally different institutional patterns, whose 
impact soon brought the Chinese empire to a total collapse. Of course, these new 
institutional patterns and the value system that informed them challenged and 
undermined long standing and deeply rooted beliefs in the moral purpose of the state in 
the Chinese world order.  
 
3.3 The Expansion of European International Society 
 
In the course of the nineteenth century, the Sino-centric world order, traditionally 
maintained by China, faced ever-grave challenges. One came from a previously 
unfamiliar part of the world and took the form of massive intrusion by the Western 
powers. As Gong (1984b: 3) points out, the challenge ‘was not merely political or 
economic, certainly not only military. It was fundamentally a confrontation of 
civilizations and their respective cultural systems’. It soon became clear that, with 
modern technology and power, Western states had the means to impose their system of 
international relations upon China, Japan, and the rest of East Asia. For their part, the 
East Asian countries found themselves virtually powerless and hence had little choice 
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but to accept what was imposed upon them, even though Western concepts were 
entirely alien to those that had long underpinned the traditional Chinese world order. 
Eventually, these developments led to the total collapse of the Chinese world order and 
to the emergence of a new international society on a global scale, dominated by the 
Western powers. 
 
On the surface, the story seems to centre upon how Asian societies adapted to the new 
situation and the extent to which they fulfilled the requirements of the European 
‘standard of civilisation’ to become members of the ‘family’ of that civilisation. But the 
truth is more complex. Behind the ostensible fulfilment and acceptance, a more 
fundamental struggle was taking place between the countries of East Asia and the 
Western powers. While the traditional Chinese world order collapsed extremely swiftly, 
the process of becoming members of the new family required more time and effort. But 
why and how, willingly or unwillingly, did countries formerly vital elements in the 
Sino-centric world order, seek entrance to an international society dominated by the 
West? What impact did the expansion of European international society have upon the 
countries and society of East Asia? The three major countries of Northeast Asia – 
China, Japan, and Korea – represent very different responses and experiences. In 
particular, the dynamics of the processes of the expansion of international society were 
to bring fundamental changes both to Sino-Japanese relations and to their relations with 
other East Asian countries.  
 
3.3.1 The Impact on China 
 
Faced with the intrusion of Western powers, Imperial China itself was probably the 
most traumatised. After all, as discussed above, although in Chinese history, there were 
times when China accepted non-Chinese rulers, such as the Mongols and Manchus, 
acceptance was essentially political rather than cultural. Even when Mongols and 
Manchus ruled, they did so in accordance with the Chinese traditions of proper 
ceremonial forms (li, rituals). Thus in the long run, it was ruling non-Chinese (Mongols 
and Manchus) who were largely Sinicised, though one cannot deny the opposite effect 
of ‘barbarisation’ of Chinese culture in its history (Hunt 1996). There remained an 
underlining belief, at least in China, that eventually China – and China ruled by Chinese 
– would return to its natural position, the centre of the world.  
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 However, Western intrusion presented fundamental challenges that China had never 
faced before. It attempted to alter the essential foundations that had upheld the Chinese 
empire for millennia and hence challenged Chinese civilisation itself. In the past, it had 
been the non-Chinese who had ‘faced a constant problem of adjustment’ in their contact 
with China (Fairbank 1968: 12). Now, with the arrival of Western powers, China had to 
face the same problem – though in an even more profound way. Indeed, China did not 
change willingly; rather it was ‘forced to meet every term dictated by the European 
powers in its international relations’ (Zhang 1998: 9). 
 
Western Coercion 
When the Western powers attempted to establish trading and diplomatic relations in the 
nineteenth century, they discovered that neither China nor other East Asian countries 
could accept practices based on Western concepts such as equality of sovereignty, free 
trade, the diplomatic/consular system and international law. From the Western 
perspective, unsympathetic or rather uncomprehending responses to diplomatic and 
other approaches must have been frustrating. But the simple fact was that there was no 
place in the traditional Chinese world order for Western notions of equal rights or of 
relations with other powers based upon reciprocal interest. When diplomatic means 
failed to produce the desired results, the European powers did not hesitate to exercise 
their military might. ‘War was then a justifiable instrument of the European expansion 
to place the world under the blessings of the European civilisation and to cast the world 
in the European image’ (Zhang 1998: 9).  
 
In the process of ‘opening’ China, Western powers demonstrated the overwhelming 
superiority of their military technology and organisation. Having defeated China in the 
Opium War (1840-42), Britain imposed the first unequal treaty, the Treaty of Nanjing 
(1842), which compelled China to open five coastal cities as treaty ports for Western 
commerce. This event was followed by a series of bloody encounters with Western 
powers. In less than two decades, China was forced to sign a whole series of unequal 
treaties, including the Treaty of Wangxia with America (1844); the Treaty of Whompoa 
with France (1844) and the Treaty of Tianjin with Russia (1860): These unequal treaties 
are known as treaty system in China. They became ‘the means by which China was 
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gradually if forcibly drawn into what it perceived as a European international society’ 
(Gong 1984a: 183). With its own corruption and weakness, China had no viable 
alternative but to adopt the institutions and practices required for ‘civilised’ countries, 
including those relating to the protection of foreign life and property, to governmental 
organisation, to diplomatic representation, and to international law (Gong 1984a: 183).  
 
Survival as the Ultimate National Interest 
The treaty system represented the most visible manifestation of the threat to Imperial 
China and its core Confucian values. Both were now on the point of collapse. The real 
significance of the threat came with two related issues – inequality and national security 
– that eventually and inevitably forced China to abandon its traditional ways.  
 
In reality, what the treaty system brought to China was not the Western notion of 
sovereign equality but rather one of inequality. The rules and institutions embodied in 
the treaty system (such as capitulations) were different to those prevailing in the 
European society of states (free trade for example). They were ‘designed in particular to 
govern relations between China and Europe and more broadly, the West’ (Zhang 2001a: 
59). This meant while the expansion of the European international society and the treaty 
system would bring the Chinese empire down, it would not mean that China would 
become an equal member of the new international family. Rather China was now under 
the Western collective domination – a ‘semi-colonial’ position.  
 
In turn this led to the second issue – that of national security. As the treaty system 
placed China’s security and survival in jeopardy, China now had to fight. However, in 
order to contest ‘unequal treaties’ and extraterritoriality, China had to adopt decidedly 
‘Western’ principles such as sovereign equality and territorial integrity. Ironically, 
acceptance of these Westphalian principles meant that China had to discard its 
hierarchic and traditional Sino-centric view of the world. The two notions – sovereign 
equality and hierarchy – were incompatible. Indeed, hierarchic notions, if they had any 
role at all, worked in favour of the West and at the expense of China. Thus, in a position 
of extreme weakness, Western notions such as sovereign equality and international law 
(rather than Confucianism) could offer a measure of protection against external 
intrusion. In what must have seemed an ‘upside down’ world, China’s national interest 
demanded the rejection of hierarchy and the adoption of equality. Alien though it was, 
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at least equality was preferable to inferiority. Indeed, for the sake of national survival, 
China made considerable changes to traditional practices and institutions dealing with 
foreign relations. These included the establishment of the Zongli Yamen (prototype of a 
Foreign Office) in 1861, a step seen by some scholars as ‘a turning point in China’s 
foreign relations’ (Banno 1964:1); and the adoption of resident diplomacy, international 
law, and other basic European institutions. 
 
In this sense it may be argued that China’s adoption of Western institutions and 
practices, reflected an overlap between the two levels of internalisation – coercion and 
calculation. There was little sign of enthusiasm for the new values; in reality China 
complied with Western rules and practices ‘more as a defensive means to enforce the 
treaties which kept the West from further encroaching on Chinese sovereignty, than as a 
positive means to secure favourable treaty revisions’ (Gong 1984a: 181). 
 
A Full and Equal Membership in International Society 
Under the treaty system, Imperial China was moving swiftly towards total collapse, yet 
the process of gaining acceptance as a full and equal member of the expanding 
international society was far more protracted. While the treaty system did create 
sustained political, economic and cultural relations between China and the European 
states, the unequal treaties did not and could not ensure China’s acceptance as an equal 
member of the expanding international society. Two factors were of crucial importance 
– the issue of the standard of ‘civilisation’ and changes in primary institutions at the 
international system level. 
 
The Standard of Civilisation 
Chinese and other non-European civilisations were insulted by the idea that they should 
be judged by a standard of ‘civilisation’ as defined by Europeans (see details, Gong 
1984b). When China and other East Asian countries were brought within the compass 
of the expanding European-centred international system, European states had to define 
the conditions under which non-European societies would be admitted to membership 
of the international society that the European powers had formed among themselves. By 
definition, as Gong (1984b: 3) notes, ‘those who fulfil the requirements of a particular 
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society’s standard of civilization are brought inside its circle of ‘civilized’ members, 
while those who do not so conform are left outside as ‘not civilized’ or possibly 
‘uncivilized’’. 
 
Western pressure to ‘civilise’ was echoed in increasingly vociferous domestic demands 
for reform. The example of nearby Japan (which had methodically ‘civilised’ itself with 
dramatic results) stimulated China to increase its objections to the unequal treaties. As 
such, the beginning of the twentieth century, the final decade of Imperial China, has 
been identified as a period of reform and revolution. The main reforms carried by 
Imperial China included the abolition of the civil examination system in 1905, the 
creation of a ‘New Army’ modelled on the Japanese and the German armies and the 
adoption Western-style of judicial codes and procedures (for the Imperial reforms see, 
Zhang 1991: 8-11; Wright 1968). 
 
Imperial China implemented these reforms in an attempt to resist foreign encroachment 
and to save China from total collapse. Such imperatives, as Zhang (1991: 10) points out, 
were precipitated by a sense of national crisis, particularly after the Allied pillage of 
Beijing in the wake of the Boxer Rebellion in the early 1900s. This was accompanied 
by the rise of Chinese nationalism culminating in the Republican Revolution of 1911. 
The establishment of the Republic of China on 1 January 1912 may be seen as the 
formal conclusion of Imperial China. However, despite the significant efforts made by 
imperial China to lessen the gap between China and European states, and despite the 
fact that China had proclaimed itself as a new state, they did not bring China a full 
membership of the family of nations. We must now move from domestic change to the 
system level. 
 
The Change in the International System 
From the system level perspective, Zhang (1991; 1998) has made an important point – 
that is, changes in international system after World War I created an international milieu 
favourable to China’s search for its rightful place in international society. But Zhang 
has not given sufficient attention to changes in primary institutions in international 
society. The point is simple. Until World War II, colonialism remained an important 
institution in the international states system. Hence sovereign equality could not become 
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a universal norm. Here Holsti’s (2004) accounts of change in institutions in the 
international system facilitates a further understanding of the difficulty China faced in 
becoming an equal member of the international society before the Second World War.  
 
According to Holsti (2004: 248), ‘colonial expansion was largely a game of 
international politics, prestige, and military security’ in the late nineteenth century, and 
the idea of colonialism was applied beyond formal colonies. Holsti (2004: 243-44) 
defines colonialism as ‘an ostensibly legal arrangement formalised through treaties and 
constitutional law’. Thus, although China did not become a formal colony in the face of 
the Western intrusion, in reality the extraterritoriality of the treaty system, was actually 
a facet of imperialism and colonialism. Thus we may agree with Holsti that the partial 
democratisation of the international system after the World War I represented a 
significant development in the expansion of interstate society, perhaps ‘the first major 
step towards de-colonization and the end of colonialism as an international institution’ 
(Holsti 2004: 262). The idea of colonial authority was explicitly challenged at the Paris 
peace Conference of 1919. The Mandate system was designed to deal with the colonies 
of the defeated powers. 
 
In reality the system was not all that effective and, even at the time, it was seen as a 
mere rhetorical means to cover the traditional division of the spoils of war. Yet the 
mandates had significant implications in the overall process of undermining the 
legitimacy of colonialism. Holsti argues that ‘the language of the Covenant relating to 
the Mandates is significant because it was the first explicit statement that political 
independence – full sovereignty – should be the ultimate goal of colonial policy’ (Holsti 
2004: 269). Thus, the establishment of the League of Nations, the declared principle of 
national self-determination and the idea of collective security, all challenged the pre-war 
international order and created a positive environment in which all states and political 
communities, whether African or Asian, could be incorporated into a framework of 
international peace and order. 
 
Indeed, indigenous political activities and resistance also played an important part in the 
overall decolonisation processes. China certainly played an assertive role in the 
reconstruction of international order in the post-war years. Its participation in the Paris 
Conference and its successful attempt to secure membership of the League of Nations 
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provide good examples. More specifically, China’s demand for the recovery of its 
territory – notably of Shandong, which had been under German control – was entirely 
consistent with the principles of national self-determination and territorial integrity now 
universally recognised by the emerging international society. These developments 
demonstrate that although decolonisation proper was only achieved after 1945 with the 
founding of the United Nations, some of the groundwork had been undertaken in the 
inter-war period. There can be no doubt that China’s protests against the unjust 
treatment it had received in the past should be seen as part of a wider process through 
which it gained full membership of international society and as one aspect of the entire 
process of decolonisation. 
 
Yet China had to wait until 1943 for the total abolition of the treaty system. As Fishel 
(1952: 209) observes, during World War II, the Japanese attack on the United States 
and the Philippines in 1941, brought Great Britain and the United States together and 
made China a major ally in the war against Japan. This brought a significant change in 
the allies’ policy towards China. One major consequence was that, on the initiative of 
the British and American governments, extraterritorial rights in China were abolished in 
1943. Of course, Zhang (1998:15) is right to point out that there was a strong element of 
political expediency behind the Anglo-American abrogation of extraterritorial rights. In 
the long run, however, abrogation could be regarded as the culmination of changes in 
the normative foundation of the international system in the interwar period and 
thereafter. Holsti (2004: 271) notes:  
The obsolescence of colonialism was not a ‘big Bang’ event, but a lengthy 
process founded on the residues of world war and changing capabilities, and 
most of all, on intellectual change involving reconstruction and 
deconstruction of ideas and beliefs, the unveiling of inherent ideational 
contradictions, and the undermining of the myths and stories upon which 
colonial authority had been founded and legitimized (italic added). 
 
Decolonisation and the obsolescence of colonialism may be seen as post-World War II 
phenomena, yet by the time of World War II, the foundations were in place. Thus, the 
idea of maintaining the extraterritorial rights was no longer tenable. Fishel (1952:1) is 
right to see abrogation as removing ‘one of the obstructions to complete political 
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equality among the United Nations’. To put it another way, to a great extent, the 
difficulty China experienced in achieving an equal place in international society had 
arisen from factors at the international system level. Until World War II, with 
colonialism continuing as an institution, sovereign equality was not and could not be 
universal, but belonged exclusively to the privileged class in the international society.  
 
Finally, the processes by which China had been transformed from a world in itself to 
become a state among other states, has had a major impact on the emergence of China’s 
present curious dual identity – at once a great power but also a weak and victimised 
developing nation. An understanding of this duality is important when seeking to 
comprehend China’s behaviour thereafter.  
 
3.3.2 The Impact on Japan 
 
Japan also faced Western intrusion but its experience and response was very different to 
that of China. As Gong (1984b: 164) observes, ‘Japan exemplified par excellence the 
East Asian countries which conformed its governmental institutions, legal system, and 
general international practices to the interests, rules, and values of the “civilized” 
international society’. Above all, in contrast to the protracted process in China, the 
collapse of the traditional Japanese order and the emergence of a centralised modern 
state were astonishingly rapid. While this contrast needs some explanation, the major 
questions to be asked here are how and why Japan conformed – and with exceptional 
speed and thoroughness – to the Western standard of ‘civilisation’? And, more 
importantly, how this transformation affected Japan’s own identity, particularly its 
conceptions of the West and of Asia? 
 
Japan’s Entry into International Society: the Question of How and Why 
Conformity by Force 
Within five years of the arrival of Commodore Perry in 1853, treaties were concluded 
between Japan and the Western Powers. Perhaps the most significant was the Ansei 
Treaty with the United States (1857). This treaty opened Japan to Western trade and 
specifically gave the Americans access to Nagasaki and the right to permanent residence 
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at Shimoda. Thus, in a limited way, Japan began to practice some of the basic rules and 
practices of international society. Unlike the Chinese case, no overt military force was 
used to achieve this opening or the signature of the initial treaties. However, an element 
of coercion was present, especially during the Bakumatsu (End of the Bukufu) period. 
The then Japanese government, the Bukufu, did not or could not resist Perry by force, 
and simply accepted Western terms in discussions about the treaties. The significance of 
China’s humiliation in the Opium Wars and the overwhelming superiority of Western 
technology and power suggested ‘to the more perceptive Japanese leadership that 
peaceful accommodation was preferable to a war which Japan would inevitably lose’ 
(Gong 1984b: 171).  
 
The coercive nature of the relationship was reflected in the initial low level of 
internalisation of Western values, particularly before the Meiji Restoration. The 
Western powers did not regard Japan and other East Asian states as equal members of 
family of nations, indeed Japan ‘did not appreciate the value of preserving these 
institutions, or indeed of becoming a member of an international society with such 
institutions... it is doubtful whether Japan can be said to have become a member of 
international society in any proper sense during the Bukumatsu Period’ (Suganami 
1984: 190). Yet, despite of this low level of internalisation, the impact of the West 
through the treaty system was profound. To a great extent, it hastened the fall of the 
Tokugawa regime and facilitated the emergence of a new centralised Meiji state (For 
different views on the downfall of the Tokugawa regime see Storry 1960: 94-95).  
 
Conformity by Interest and Belief 
The Meiji restorers overturned the Tokugawa Bakufu under the slogan son-no jo-i 
‘Revere the Emperor; Expel the Barbarian’. Yet, while they understood ‘by 1864 the 
futility of attempting to repel the Western powers’, they still ‘clung to the later half of 
the slogan because it effectively disclosed the Bakufu’s weaknesses’ (Suganami 1984: 
191). Of course, the reformers had neither the power nor the intention to revert to the 
policy of seclusion, and so, in 1868, the new Meiji government formally declared that it 
would abandon the policy and comply with Western rules and practices. Thus, we still 
see a degree of ‘coercion’ in Japan’s abandonment of isolation, an essential part of the 
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process of Westernisation and the first step to becoming a member of international 
society.  
 
However, the coercive dimension soon gave way to a high level of acceptance of 
Western values, based on a mixture of genuine belief and careful calculation. As 
Suganami (1984: 191-92) suggests, after a short period as an ‘unwilling pupil’, Japan 
soon became ‘a keen student of Western diplomacy’. The Iwakura Mission to the West 
(1871-73) can be seen as turning point in Japan’s internalisation of the standards of 
‘civilisation’. It was Meiji government’s first official diplomatic mission specifically 
‘designed to evidence its new understanding of Western diplomacy’ (Gong 1984b: 179), 
and to secure from the Western nations revision of the unequal treaties. Storry may be 
right to argue that the mission was premature, because it failed to achieve its objective 
of securing the revision of the treaties, but he still acknowledges that the mission had a 
profound impact on Japan’s modernisation and Westernisation.   
The venture was premature; but the failure spurred the Japanese government 
to make greater efforts to hasten the modernization of the country. This 
proceeded at an ambitious pace throughout the seventies and eighties 
(Storry 1960: 107). 
 
It is noteworthy that the leading members of the Mission, who had now acquired 
extensive experience of direct dealings with foreign powers, became major figures in 
Meiji Japan. Furthermore, bummei kaika (civilisation and enlightenment) was now 
adopted as one of Japan’s slogans for progress. It was appreciated that the best way to 
achieve the aim of fukoku kyohei (a rich country and a strong army) was by learning 
from the Western powers – acquiring their technology as well as replicating their 
political structures and institutions. Thus, what had previously been regarded as alien 
methods and institutions, especially international law, and accepted unwillingly in the 
face exterior coercion, were now embraced with enthusiasm. In other words, Japan had 
to adopt the ‘civilised’ ways of the foreigners in order to achieve its goal of catching up 
with the West. 
 
It was this change in perceptions and belief – that is, recognition of its own 
backwardness and acceptance of European civilisation as a standard – that led to the 
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astonishing speed of Japan’s modernisation and Westernisation. Within a short space of 
time, Japan fundamentally changed both its political organisation and its diplomatic and 
legal sectors. They were all ‘part of a much larger movement to emulate the general 
civilization of the West’ (Gong 1984b: 187), under the catch phrase oitsuke oikose 
(catch up and over take). Thus, by the end of nineteenth century Japan ‘had transformed 
her uncertain relationship with the West into a full ‘societal’ one, while her traditional 
ethnocentric system lost its practical relevance’ (Suganami 1984: 190). 
 
Despite the high level of belief, calculations of self-interest were also important in the 
adoption of Western norms into Japanese foreign policy. For Japan, international law 
and the norms of sovereign equality and non-interference provided both means of 
defence against Western interference – especially as devices to secure the abolition of 
the unequal treaties – and useful tools to break the traditional Chinese suzerainty in the 
region, particularly over Korea. In relations with the West, Japan succeeded in securing 
an agreement to terminate the unequal treaties in 1894 and followed this by removing 
restrictions on its tariff autonomy in 1899. In relations with its neighbours, by 
successfully employing international law, Japan first imposed a Western style ‘unequal 
treaty’, the Treaty of Kanghwa, on Korea in 1876 and then gained most-favoured-nation 
status in relation to China after the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-95. Thus, by the turn of 
the century, use of Western concepts and methods, coupled with its newly gained 
strength, had enabled Japan to begin to behave ‘like a Great Power, and to be accepted 
by the Western Powers as a member of the ruling directorate of international society’ 
(Suganami 1984: 192-93). Yet, the impact of this development upon the Japanese 
identity was more ambivalent and complicated; this was affected both by Japan’s 
relations with the Western and with its Asian neighbours. 
  
The Impact on Japan’s Identity and Conceptions  
The encounter with the expanding Western-dominated international society certainly 
brought profound changes to the Japanese identity. Today we often talk about Japan’s 
ambivalent identity between Asia and the West. This ambivalence, as Bessho (1999:13) 
argues ‘stems not from any ‘cultural’ or ‘civilisational’ characteristics, but from the 
history of the country’s dealings with Asians and Westerners’. The processes by which 
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Japan was transforming its traditional feudal structure into a centralised modern state 
system also involved a search for a new identity and place in the world.  
 
Modernisation and Westernisation 
As we have seen, unlike China, the opening of Japan was not accompanied by overt 
military force. Yet, as with China, the imposition of ‘unequal’ treaties meant that the 
initial encounter with the Western powers exposed Japan’s inferiority and backwardness 
to the mighty western powers. Against this backdrop, again in comparison with China, 
revolutionary change in Japan came much quicker. The events of 1868-9, which 
abolished Japan’s traditional feudal structure, though officially a ‘Restoration’, should 
really be described as a ‘Revolution’ that was to ‘transform the face of Japan’ (Storry 
1960: 105). Despite the initial slogan son-no jo-i (Revere the Emperor; Expel the 
Barbarian), the Meiji leaders were quick to recognise the futility of this aspiration and 
hence abandoned the old policy of isolation. Now they sought to learn from the West 
and indeed, ever since, modernisation, often treated as synonymous with 
Westernisation, has been the predominant theme in Japan’s state building.  
 
The quest for Westernisation was given powerful impetus by observation of the fate of 
China. ‘That massive country, too proud and disdainful to copy the methods of the 
West, was humiliated again and again by the ‘barbarians’’ (Storry 1960:106). If China 
was powerless against Western civilisation, what could Japan do? Although written 
some time after the Meiji Restoration, realisation of the futility of attempts to resist the 
advance of Western civilisation was well expressed in Fukuzawa’s (1885) article 
“Datsu-A-ron” (Dissociation from Asia). Fukuzawa was no admirer of the West, going 
so far as to compare the spread of Western civilisation to the spread of measles. But as 
with measles, there was not much that could be done to stop it: ‘Even if we were to 
abhor the damage done by this epidemic… we could do nothing’. For Fukuzawa, 
therefore, there was little to be gained by a doomed attempt to arrest the advance of the 
West. There was only one sensible course: ‘as men of wisdom we should endeavour to 
promote its spread so that the people may enjoy its beneficial effects’ (Fukuzawa’s 
“Datsu-A-ron” quoted in Hashikawa 1980: 328-55). 
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The sense of the irresistibility of the West was soon accompanied by a genuine 
admiration for Western civilisation, especially its scientific achievements and high 
industrialisation. These attitudes became especially marked after the Iwakura Mission. 
Storry (1960: 107) describes the changed outlook: 
Indeed the first two decades of the Emperor Meiji’s reign saw a Japan to all 
appearances intoxicated with the strong wine of Western thought, 
techniques, and customs. Some prominent Japanese, such as Inoue Kaoru, 
even went so far as to advocate the universal and permanent adoption of 
European dress by both sexes, the substitution of bread for rice, and the 
large-scale importation of sheep to graze on those rice fields, transformed 
into meadows, that had not been turned over to the production of wheat, 
oats, and barley. 
Such suggestions raise more fundamental questions; to what extent did Westernisation 
change Japan’s identity? Had Japan accepted the values of the West not just 
superficially but in a much deeper sense; had it become a truly ‘Western’ power?  
 
It is true that the Westernisation of Japan brought about a remarkable and rapid 
transformation of a traditional feudal society into a powerful modern state. In terms of 
technology, political organization and even lifestyle, Japan seemed to adopt virtually 
every aspect of the general civilisation of the West. But there was always a hint of 
reservation; there was more enthusiasm for the technology of the West than for other 
facets of Western culture. In the words of a contemporary slogan, the catchwords were 
to be wakon yosai (Japanese spirit, Western technology). This implies that the changes 
‘were essentially pragmatic, far-reaching in form rather than in spirit: the aim was to 
build ‘a rich nation and a strong army’ (fukoku kyohei) to gain the West’s respect’ 
(Bessho 1999: 14).  
 
Thus, there was probably no desire to affect a fundamental change in the Japanese 
identity or spirit. Rather, the externals – but not the internals of the West – were taken 
on in an attempt to secure ‘a place among the ranking great powers of “civilized” 
international society’ (Gong 1984b: 181). It remained to be seen how far Japan could 
achieve this goal by fulfilling the standards of ‘civilisation’?  
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Becoming a ‘Western’ Power? 
Japan may have looked for rewards earlier than they actually materialised. The signs 
were that it would need more than fulfilment of the standards of ‘civilisation’ to achieve 
the equal status so much desired. Even though the Meiji government gave a high 
priority to the abolition of the ‘unequal treaties’, sparing ‘no efforts toward internal 
readjustment and reform’ (Ishii 1933: 223), four decades elapsed between the first treaty 
with Perry in 1854 and the abolition of the unequal treaties in 1894 (the Aoki-
Kimberley Treaty). Even then, Japan still found that its status was not truly ‘equal’ with 
the ‘civilised’ powers. These interactions and experiences resulted in considerable 
changes in Japanese ideas on international relations. 
 
In the years immediately after the Meiji Restoration, the overall mood was optimistic. It 
was believed, as Jansen (1968b: 157-58) observes, that huge benefits would follow from 
the adoption of ‘the “universal principle” whereby Japan should be friendly with 
foreigners’. In part, this somewhat naïve belief stemmed from the way in which 
Western text books on international law were translated, which using a terminology 
derived from Neo Confucian morality. But reality began to dawn when the Iwakura 
Mission failed to secure the desired abolition of the treaty system. As Bismarck 
cynically told the Mission, ‘although people say that so-called international law 
safeguards the rights of all countries, the fact is that when large countries pursue their 
advantage they talk about international law when it suits them, and they use force when 
it does not...’ (Quoted in Jansen 1968b: 158). What Japan learned was that ‘international 
life was much more predatory and the powers far less rational and disinterested’ than 
pure theory suggested (Jansen 1968b: 158). 
 
It is true that Japan finally secured an agreement for abolition of the ‘unequal treaties’ in 
the Aoki-Kimberley Treaty in 1894. As Aoki noted at the time, it seemed that Japan 
could now ‘disregard the insults we have suffered over the last thirty years and at one 
go enter the “Fellowship of Nations”’ (Gong 1984b: 195). However, at that time, Japan 
could not have anticipated the blow to its aspirations that would fall a year later – in the 
shape of the Triple Intervention. The Intervention occurred after Japan had been 
victorious in the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-95 and, under the terms of the subsequent 
Treaty of Shimonoseki, obtained the Liaodong peninsula from China, with the provision 
that a Japanese naval base could be established in the area. Although Japan had obtained 
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promises from the Great Powers that they would not intervene in the conflict, Russia, 
Germany and France now threatened Japan with military action unless the Liaodong 
peninsula was restored to China. The shock was immense. As Gong (1984b: 196) notes, 
‘After conforming wholeheartedly to the spirit and letter of international law and 
diplomacy, Japan seemed forced to conclude that, in the end, only force mattered in 
international relations’.  
 
Yet, while the Triple Intervention may have represented a humiliation for Japan, still 
‘Japan’s status after the war with China was vastly improved’. Although it may have 
achieved less than it hoped for, it had secured the ‘independence’ of Korea, acquired 
Taiwan, and gained a huge indemnity. While Western diplomacy coupled with threats 
of force may have deprived Japan of some of the fruits of victory, it had retained many. 
In the last resort, the lesson of the war was that ‘the use of force paid good dividends’ 
(Storry 1960: 128). Thus, by force Japan had entered the club of Western imperialists. 
And although Japan’s view of the West was now more cynical than in the early days of 
the Meiji Restoration, it was still profoundly different to the Japanese view of the other 
countries of Asia.  
 
3.3.3 The Impact on Sino-Japanese Relations and Regional Security 
 
The entry of China and Japan into the Western-dominated international society in the 
middle decades of the nineteenth century indicated that the traditional Chinese world 
order could not last much longer. But it is still important to investigate precisely how 
the old order ended and to identify the consequences of its collapse for Northeast Asian 
regional security and for amity/enmity relations between the countries involved. It is 
tempting to assume that an external threat would have bound regional actors more 
strongly together against a common enemy. If so, Western expansion might have 
generated a regional collective identity, a ‘we-ness’ against the ‘other’. It is certainly 
true that Western expansion did have a major impact upon regional identity and its 
securitising and de-securitising logics. Yet the processes by which the Chinese world 
order was finally brought to an end had different meanings for the various regional 
actors. There was no ‘common response’ and, indeed, if anything, regional collective 
identity was weakened rather than strengthened. In particular, the rise of Sino-Japanese 
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rivalry was the major theme in this un-precedentedly tumultuous era, and Korea became 
the focal point in this drama. 
 
A Dualistic Policy 
By the 1860s, extensions to the treaty system had brought most of the East Asian 
countries into the expanding international society dominated by the Western powers. 
But this did not result in an immediate and total collapse of the traditional Chinese 
world order. Korea, the hermit kingdom of the East, still remained outside this newly 
introduced system. Neither the French expedition in 1866, nor the American one in 
1871 succeeded in breaking Korea’s policy of strict isolation. Korea still refused to have 
official trading or diplomatic contacts with Western countries, even with Japan, and 
continued to live in ‘a Confucian dream world’ (Wright 1958: 367) while remaining as 
a vassal state of Qing China. 
 
Furthermore, even after the Tianjin treaties of 1860, and the establishment of the Zongli 
Yamen in 1861 – which symbolised commitment to the treaty system – it was still 
doubtful whether China itself fully accepted the system. As we have seen, in the ancient 
Chinese world, the natural order had been perceived as resting on unity (rather than 
division) and on Chinese rule (rather than barbarian rule). These long-established values 
were slow to change. The treaty system may have been powerfully enforced, but that 
probably did not stop many Chinese officials from regarding it as no more than ‘a 
temporary expedient to be discarded as soon as China regained sufficient strength to 
reassert its imperial authority’ (K-H Kim 1980: 69). Thus change in Chinese policy was 
only partial. While still ‘highly selective’ (Fairbank, Raischauer and Craig 1965: 9) in 
its adoption of Western ideas and institutions, China did conduct its relations with 
Western powers in conformity with the treaty system. Yet there was no corresponding 
change in China’s relations with its Eastern tributaries; there was thus no hint of 
acceptance of the Western principle of ‘sovereign equality’ in its dealings with Korea 
and Vietnam. 
 
Within this dualistic system, the position of Korea was seen as crucial, not least because 
of its geographical importance. Of course, in itself, Korea did not pose a direct threat 
either to China or Japan – and had never done so (K-H Kim 1980: 13, 14). However, 
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because of its pivotal position in East Asia, both China and Japan had always been 
fearful that Korea might fall into the other’s hands. Now, with the emergence of a 
centralised Meiji state, Japan was eager to break Korea’s dependency on China, while 
China was determined to keep Korea within its sphere of influence whatever the cost. 
Yet, for China, this objective became increasingly difficult to maintain: not only 
because of the expansion of Western influence, but also – and more crucially – because 
of the rise of modern Japan. The unrealistic rigidity of Korean foreign policy made 
China’s task even more difficult. 
 
The Treaty of Kanghwa and the Opening of Korea 
Despite their geographical proximity, relations between Korea and Japan were very 
different to those between Korea and China. While Korea’s relationship with China 
‘was known as sadae (serving the great)’, that with Japan ‘was succinctly described as 
kyorin (befriending the neighbouring country)’ (Oh 1980: 38), and was largely confined 
to contacts through the Tsushima han (fief) of Japan. As early as 1868, the new Meiji 
government had sought to reform the old pattern of practices in relations with Korea. 
When sending a mission to announce the reorganisation of the Japanese government, 
the new authorities requested the opening of direct relations. But Korea was then under 
the rule of the Taewon’gun1, who pursued a firm closed-door policy. Taewon’gun was 
scornful of Japan’s acceptance of Western ideas and refused the request. Subsequent 
missions from Japan in 1869 and 1871 received the same response. 
 
The ‘Sei-Kan Ron’ and the ‘Unyo’ Incident  
Korean intransigence antagonised the Saigo Takamori faction in the Japanese 
government, and they now demanded an invasion of Korea. This led to a political crisis 
within the Japanese government in 1873, known as sei-Kan ron (conquer-Korean-
argument). While supporters of sei-Kan ron insisted that Korea was important for the 
future security of Japan, moderates, led by Okubo and others, argued that Japan was not 
yet in a position to undertake overseas military expeditions. For the time being, the 
                                                 
 
1 Taewon’gun (Grand Prince), the de facto ruler and the father of the king, who was known as foe of 
Japan and the West. 
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moderates were able to prevent the immediate dispatch of a punitive expedition to 
Korea. Yet, as Nelson (1946: 127) observes, it was only ‘the imperial will and fear of 
the Western nations’ that ‘enabled the policy of the peace group to prevail’. 
 
While Japan was in the grip of political crisis over the sei-Kan ron, an important 
political change took place in Korea. Taewon’gun, the de facto ruler and implacable foe 
of Japan and the West, was forced from power in internal power struggle. But even then 
the Korean government was slow to change its traditional policy. By 1875, the Japanese 
government had become convinced that the ‘opening’ of Korea would require strong 
measures. Following accepted Western practice, the Japanese waited for specific pretext 
to provide a justification for securing satisfaction from Korea (Nelson 1946: 127). The 
opportunity came in September 1875, when, in utmost secrecy, Japan dispatched three 
warships to make a survey of the Korean coast. One of the warships, Unyo, was fired 
upon when it appeared on the western coast, off Seoul. There followed the ‘celebrated’ 
Unyo incident (Oh 1980: 42).  
 
The Treaty of Kanghwa 
The Japanese government used this incident effectively as a means of forcing Korea 
into a treaty relationship. Success came on 27 February 1876 with the signing of the 
historic treaty of amity, known as the Treaty of Kanghwa. The treaty has considerable 
historical significance. It was the first treaty embodying Western concepts of 
international law to be signed by Korea. It is striking that it was Japan that had forced 
Korea to change its ways; earlier attempts by Western powers had failed. The treaty also 
marked a turning point in an even more fundamental way.  
 
It showed that it was no longer possible to maintain a kind of ‘half way house’ 
consisting of ‘Western-style’ relations with Western powers and ‘traditional relations’ 
between the Asian countries themselves. ‘Western’ notions would apply to all relations 
between states, including those between Asian countries. Of course, although, the treaty 
was signed between Japan and Korea, the underlying contest was between resurgent 
Japan and China. It also represented the first major conflict between the Eastern and 
Western systems of international relations within the regional powers. 
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To the Japanese, it appeared that ‘the Western idea of sovereign statehood was a 
convenient tool’ for starting the process of breaking the bonds previously uniting Korea 
and China and replacing them with a close relationship between Korea and Japan 
(Nelson 1946: 126). Yet, as an East Asian country, a neighbour of China and Korea, 
Japan appreciated the strength and importance of the ancient relationship between the 
Middle Kingdom and the peninsula. This awareness was fully revealed in Mori’s 
mission to China immediately after the Unyo incident. 
 
In the aftermath of the attack on the Unyo, Japan despatched ‘a military expedition to 
Korea in emulation of Perry’s expedition to their own country’ (Nelson 1946: 128). 
Simultaneously, it also sent a separate mission, headed by Mori Arinori, to China. Mori 
had been instructed to persuade the Chinese authorities to issue a definite and formal 
acknowledgement of Korea’s independence. In negotiations with Zongli Yamen, Mori 
encountered a readiness to acknowledge Korean independence, but this was hedged 
about with references to Korea’s continued tributary status to China.  
 
The Japanese concluded that, although China now claimed to subscribe to Western 
notions of international law, as long as China still maintained that Korea was a 
dependent nation, any nominal acknowledgement of Korean independence would mean 
little. Thus, Mori’s arguments were consistently based on Western principles of 
sovereign non-intervention and hence he sought to force China to abandon the 
Confucian connection with Korea. When his negotiations with the Zongli Yamen 
reached deadlock, Mori approached Li Hongzhang – the imperial commissioner of the 
northern ports – and secured a promise that Li would use his influence to obtain a 
courteous reception for the Japanese. But the Li agreement, as Nelson (1946: 130) 
noted, was not to ‘renounce China’s claims to Korea’, as generally supposed; rather it 
‘gave concrete illustration of the strength of the time-honoured connection’.  
 
Yet, even if China had been able to exercise its ‘time-honoured’ authority over Korea 
until the mid nineteenth century, thereafter the task had become increasingly difficult. 
While pressures from external powers had played a part, internal weaknesses in China 
itself had probably been more important. In short, China faced an acute dilemma in its 
relations with Korea. Wright (1958: 369) explains: 
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On the one hand, it was physically impossible for China to defend Korea’s 
extreme stand against all the world at a time when China’s own energies 
were bent on the domestic reconstruction, which dictated the avoidance of 
any international entanglement. On the other hand, it was morally 
impossible for China either to renounce its suzerainty over Korea or to force 
Korea to abandon the Confucian tradition which China itself had not yet 
abandoned. 
 
Thus, Li Hongzhang’s agreement with Mori revealed that considerations of ‘power’ 
were central in the conflict between two systems and conceptions. Security concerns 
were the main reasons behind Li’s readiness to come to an agreement with Mori. As Oh 
observes, even before Mori’s visit, Li told Yamen of his concern over the tensions 
between Korea and Japan and of his fears that these could lead to war. If hostilities 
occurred, Korea would be ‘no match for Japan and probably would ask for assistance 
from China – as in the sixteenth century when Japan invaded Korea’ (Oh 1980: 43). 
However, the position of Qing China in the mid-nineteenth century was different to that 
of Ming China more than two hundred years earlier. The problem now was that, if 
China sent troops to strengthen Korea, Japan would express outrage and respond by 
attacking Korea. Further, if as seemed likely, Japan succeeded in conquering Korea, 
Manchuria would probably become its next target. Following Li’s analysis, Oh (1980: 
44) argues that: 
Li’s recommendation, adopting a more positive policy toward Korea, was 
impelled primarily by concern for China’s own security. But Li had not 
realize the far-reaching implications of his proposal: by urging a change in 
the old “hands-off” policy in order to keep Korea in its traditional 
relationship with China, he was, in fact, undermining the traditional 
relationship. 
 
In February 1876, the Japanese mission to Korea arranged a treaty of peace and 
friendship, the Treaty of Kanghwa, with little trouble. The treaty, consisting of 12 
articles, met Japanese objectives by opening three Korean ports for trade, establishing 
diplomatic relations and granting Japan the right to conduct a coastal survey. In 
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particular, Article 1 declared that ‘Chosen [Korea], being an independent State (zizhu, 
or tzu chu ), enjoys the same sovereign rights as does Japan’. Thus, the treaty marked 
the end of Korea’s policy of isolation and its entry into ‘relations with a nation in the 
Western manner’ (Nelson 1946: 131). In practice, there was no immediate change in 
Japan’s actual policy towards Korea. Official stances and international law 
notwithstanding, Japan could not completely ignore the historical fact of Chinese 
suzerainty over Korea (K-H Kim 1980: 341). China, too, did not at first realise how 
seriously the Treaty would affect its relations with Korea. China ‘was convinced of 
Korea’s loyalty and presumably read the “independence” clause of Article 1 in a light 
more favourable than that of the English translation’ (Nelson 1980: 135). 
 
However, despite Chinese sensitivities and Japanese caution, the treaty with Korea 
meant that Japan had achieved its major goals – diplomatic and commercial parity with 
Western powers in dealing with other East Asian countries. It also gave Japan further 
confidence in its ability to handle Korea, particularly in light of its growing ability to 
control Ryukyu/Liuqiu and its success in the Taiwan expedition. Thus, K-H Kim (1980: 
338) argues that, ‘Japan’s Korean policy shifted from the conciliatory approach adopted 
after the sei-Kan crisis of 1873 to intimidatory gunboat diplomacy culminating in the 
Unyo incident in September 1875’. It did not take long for China to realise the growing 
threat to Korea from both Japan and Russia, a recognition that forced China to make a 
radical change in its Korean policy. 
 
China’s Interventionist Posture 
Chinese policy towards Korea finally began to change in 1879 – the year of the Sino-
Russian dispute over Ili and of the Japanese formal annexation of the Liuqiu/Ruykyu 
islands. The first sign of the change was that management of Korean affairs was 
transferred from the Board of Rites to Li Hongzhang, who we have already encountered 
as imperial commissioner for the northern ports. 
 
China’s major problem – in the face of the increasing threat to Korea from Russia and 
Japan – was lack of adequate resources, especially the military capability to defend 
Korea. Indeed, if Korea fell under foreign dominance, China’s own security would be 
threatened. Such considerations gave Li and his associates little choice but to rely 
 95
chiefly on diplomacy. He therefore advised the Korean government to negotiate treaties 
with the Western powers. Li’s policy of ‘opening Korea’ can be seen as a resort to the 
ancient Chinese strategy of yi-yi zhi-yi (using barbarians against other barbarians), or 
even as a realisation of the merits of the modern European concept of balance of power. 
In other words, Li was suggesting that Korea should use the Western treaty powers to 
check the Japanese and Russian threat to the peninsula. As far as China was concerned, 
Japan and Russia were more dangerous than the Western powers. While the Western 
powers wanted an expansion of trade and missionary activities, Japan and Russia 
wanted territory. 
 
But China’s policy toward Korea involved more than advice; in practice it became 
increasingly interventionist. Li’s advice to Korea to improve relations with the Western 
powers arose from his fears that Japan would offer its services as a mediator in disputes 
between Korea and the West – and then exploit the situation to its own advantage. To 
Li’s dismay, however, it was soon obvious that the Korean government was ignorant of 
modern international diplomacy and lacked the ability to act decisively. Li was forced to 
step in himself and act as the self-appointed representative of Korea. Thus he 
‘negotiated with the American representatives on his own, with little consultation with 
the Korean government’ (K-H Kim 1980: 346). A treaty, agreed in Tianjin between Li 
and Commodore Shufeldt of the United States, was presented to Korea and signed by 
the Korean government on 22 May 1882. In the same year, Korea also signed treaties 
with Britain and Germany, thus fulfilling a major goal of China’s new Korean policy.  
 
However, the new policy did not produce the expected benefits for either Korea or 
China. Chinese statesmen might be capable of impressive pragmatism and show 
increasing understanding of modern international diplomacy, but, without sufficient 
power at their disposal, their Korean policy could not fully exploit either the old 
principle of yi-yi zhi-yi or the new one of the balance of power. Li failed to include a 
clause in the treaty with Shufeldt recognising Korea’s tributary relationship with China, 
while this and the other treaties with the Western powers did not signal any immediate 
change to the signatories’ lack of interest in Korean affairs. More seriously, while 
China’s ultimate objective was to preserve Korea’s status as a vassal state to itself, 
ironically, it was China itself that altered the very nature of Chinese suzerainty over 
Korea by its unprecedented interventionism.   
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Virtually taking over the conduct of Korean foreign policy, China made an 
unprecedented departure from the traditional practice of non-interference in 
Korea’s affairs. By its own actions and by Korea’s ready acquiescence, 
China transformed what had been its moral and ceremonial authority into a 
political authority (K-H Kim 1980: 347-48, italics added). 
 
By the early 1880s, therefore, the old Chinese world order had come to an end both in 
theory and in practice – not least because of the actions of the Chinese themselves. 
Chinese interference was taken further by its military intervention in Korean domestic 
politics. In 1882, there were signs of strong conservative opposition against the policy 
of rapid opening. Sections of the Korean army mutinied in Seoul in July and this 
produced tension between Korea and Japan. The Chinese authorities then sent troops to 
Korea without prior consultation with the Korean government. Perhaps without fully 
appreciating the significance of its actions, China had gone beyond seeking to influence 
Korean foreign policy to direct interference in domestic politics. 
 
In December 1884, the situation was made more complicated when a small band of 
Japanese-supported radical reformers attempted an anti-Chinese coup. Although the 
coup was crushed by Chinese troops, the problems it raised were settled in separate 
treaties – the Seoul Protocol between Korea and Japan, and the Tianjin Convention or 
Li-Ito Convention between China and Japan. By these treaties Japan gained virtually the 
same rights as China to intervene in the peninsula. By the mid-1880s, along with the 
French seizure of Tongking, ‘the metamorphosis of Sino-Korean relations brought the 
final demise of the old world order’ (K-H Kim 1980: 349). Now all Northeast Asian 
countries, including Korea, had been brought into the new family of nations. In the 
processes of the transformation, pressure from the West (the ‘other’), had not resulted in 
a Northeast Asian collective identity formation, which would have bound the states of 
the region together against the outside powers. Rather, as Oh (1980: 57) points out: 
 During the decades of modernisation in China and Japan and their own 
struggles against Western encroachment, to maintain or secure control of 
Korea became a measure of the success of Chinese and Japanese efforts to 
survive and to achieve power status. 
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 In their rivalry, fear of Japanese threat to Korea, forced China to adopt and impose a 
policy of ‘opening Korea’. The policy may have been intended to head off the danger 
from Japan but, however well intentioned, it actually increased the threat to Korea and 
ultimately to China itself. The subsequent interventions into Korea by both China and 
Japan only heightened the sense of mutual distrust, suspicion, and even antagonism 
between them. Moreover, Sino-Japanese rivalry over Korea represented more than a 
struggle for power and influence; it was also a conflict between two opposed concepts 
and systems. The Confucian propriety, li, as the basic institution that sustained the 
Chinese world order, was undermined, not only by the treaty system, but also by 
China’s interventionist policy. Now, in place of li, war, the balance of power, 
territoriality, diplomacy, along with sovereignty and international law, became the 
major institutions governing international relations in the expanding international 
society. Thus, in the succeeding international order, intra-regional relations had to take 
on the new spirit of international power rivalry, in which Japan would strive to create a 
new East Asian order/society. 
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4 The Re-Emergence of an East Asian International Society? 
 
In chapter 3, I examined the operation and demise of the Chinese world order. This 
chapter continues that theme and investigates what kind of new order / society then 
emerged and how. Here, I focus on two issues. The first concerns the shift in power 
positions within regional and global systems: in other words, how changes in power 
structure influenced and even defined the new regional society. The second concerns 
changes in normative structure: that is, what kind of norms and institutions have 
emerged and how some concepts and principles must now be reinterpreted. In the 
course of my analysis, I examine the impacts of Japanese imperialism, and of the onset 
of the Cold War in Northeast Asia.  
 
4.1 The Emergence of Japanese Imperialism: Towards a New Regional Order? 
 
The expansion of European international society into East Asia brought the old Chinese 
world order to an end. Of course, this meant that the basic normative structure had to be 
changed completely. With the collapse of the tribute system, hierarchical and concentric 
notions were replaced with ones of sovereign ‘equality’ and the concept of nationalism 
arrived in East Asia. As explained in Chapter 3, within the old Sino-centric world order, 
territoriality as an institution did not play a significant role. Hence, loyalties were 
directed to family, lords, kings, emperors, or religious leaders, rather than to nations 
(Mackerras 1998: 36). In addition, the concept of power also received a new 
interpretation. As Lucian Pye (1985: ix) observes, historically power was associated 
with beliefs about ‘the role of authority in upholding the cosmic order’, but now it 
became more identified with ‘social status’.  
 
Thus, increasingly ‘international relations’ in East Asia became power-struggle for 
survival, influence and status. In this struggle, while the weakness and backwardness of 
Imperial China reduced it to a status of less than a state among states, Japan transformed 
itself from an old feudal kingdom into a centralised nation state. Through rapid 
industrialisation and modernisation, Japan subsequently developed into an imperial 
power. This involved the acquisition of Taiwan in 1895, the annexation of Korea in 
1910, the creation of the puppet state of Manchukuo, occupation of additional parts of 
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China and the colonisation of many parts of Southeast Asia. Thus, within less than fifty 
years, Japan ‘successfully’ reshaped the East Asian order under its own leadership until 
its sudden collapse in 1945 following defeat in the Pacific war. Many questions arise:  
why and how did Japan turn to imperialism, how was this new East Asian order held in 
place, why did it collapse and what were the main consequences on the region’s 
identity/society and security?  
 
4.1.1 The Rise and Fall of Japanese Imperialism 
 
Clearly, the biggest difference between China and Japan was that, whereas China was 
brought to the brink of destruction as a result of the impact of the West, Japan escaped 
colonisation by engaging in a successful process of nation-building on more or less 
Western lines. Japan’s experience from the middle of the nineteenth century was to be 
crucial in shaping its modern national identity and, at the same time, drastically altered 
its relations with neighbouring countries. Japan chose to leave behind the familiar 
‘balanced and relatively stable world order that revolved around China’; and to compete 
in ‘the Western international system, where the strong eat the weak’ (Goto 2003: 3). In 
this power struggle, Japan devoted its energy first to securing national independence 
against the threat post by Western imperialism.  
 
There were two different approaches as how to achieve its new objective. One option 
was to promote the cause of Pan-Asianism, emphasising the need for Asian unity in the 
face of Western encroachment. The other was to ‘cast off Asia’ and to seek the club of 
Great Powers. As discussed in the previous chapter, during the Meiji period (1868-
1912), the latter option – striving for equality and joining the West – was regarded as 
the only ‘realistic’ response and hence dominated Japanese foreign policy (Saaler 2996: 
2, 3). However, with the passage of time, Pan-Asianism regained its appeal and 
provided a rationale for the creation of a ‘new East Asian order’ led by Japan. But why 
did Japan ‘return’ to Asia and what kind of new order did it create? 
 
Pan-Asianism and the Creation of the Japanese Empire 
Japan made effective use of pan-Asian rhetoric to support its attempt to create a new 
East Asian order under it leadership, even attempted to create a pan-Asian imperial 
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identity. 2  The notion of Japanese superiority over China was not new and was 
sometimes advanced even when – whether formally or informally – Japan was part of 
the Sino-centric hierarchic system. Japanese assertiveness had been revealed in various 
invasions of Korea, designed to wrest the peninsula from its attachment to China and to 
subject it to Japanese influence. On occasion, the Japanese went so far as to claim that 
they, rather than the Chinese, represented the true ‘Middle Kingdom’. Whereas Chinese 
dynasties had come and gone, the unbroken Japanese imperial line made it the senior 
dynasty of East Asia and perhaps of the world (Saaler 2006: 3). 
 
However, despite these occasional challenges, by and large, Japan remained fairly 
comfortably with its inherently subordinate position in the old Chinese world order, 
treating China as its ultimate civilisational centre and teacher. Even when Western 
intrusion effectively destroyed the Chinese world order, Japan could not immediately 
aspire to a new order under its own leadership. Yet, as Goto observes, Japan soon 
concluded that China was no longer to be regarded as its teacher and or as the centre of 
civilization; in reality it was actually only ‘half-civilized’ (Goto (2003: 3, 4). But, at 
least initially, Japan did not see itself as China’s successor. Rather, it regarded the West 
in much the same way that it had once viewed China. In other words, the sense of 
inferiority and awe, once directed to China, was now focussed away from Asia and 
towards Europe and North America. Such attitudes were surely behind Japan’s decision 
to cast itself off from Asia (datsua nyūō). Interestingly, Goto (2003: 4) sees the 
ideology of the ‘Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere’ as a deformed amalgam of 
Japanese inferiority and superiority. 
 
Return to Asia 
Before World War I, ‘Asianism’ amounted to little more than a somewhat vague and 
romantic yearning for Asian solidarity. Subsequently, however, it developed into 
something more formidable and came to be perceived as a ‘realistic option’ for Japanese 
foreign policy (Saaler 2006: 6). In the 1930s, the Japanese government embraced pan-
Asian rhetoric with increasing enthusiasm. Now more strident than in the past, it 
emphasised hostility to the West, especially opposed to Western imperial domination. 
                                                 
 
2  For changing national identities in East Asia in the period of Japanese expansion, see Narangoa and 
Cribb (eds) 2003. 
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At the same time, the rhetoric was used to legitimise Japan’s claims to leadership in 
Asia. ‘Return to Asia’, so different to the earlier policy of ‘European orientation’, 
clearly requires explanation; considerations of status and security probably weighed 
most heavily.  
 
Although there had been minor disappointments, until the end of World War I, Japan’s 
policy of abandoning Asia and ‘tilting’ to the West had produced impressive results. 
Starting with the Treaties of Kanghwa (1876) and Shimonoseki (1895), which extended 
its influence over Korea and Taiwan; Japan had gone from strength to strength. In 1902, 
it concluded an alliance with Britain, in many ways still the greatest power in the world. 
In 1905, Japan inflicted a decisive yet unexpected defeat on Russia ‘the White’. 
Following participation on the Allied side in World War I, it was accorded a place 
alongside the major victors at the Versailles Peace Conference of 1919. Japan was now 
one of the five great powers and seemed to have realised its ambition, pursued with 
such single-minded determination, to be accepted as an equal by the West. 
 
However, this story of apparent success only served to expose the underlying tensions 
between Japan and the European powers. It soon became clear that the fact that Japan 
had secured an ‘advanced’ status in relation to its neighbours – largely by the use of 
Western methods – had not guaranteed complete equality with the Western powers. The 
Triple intervention and failure to secure the proposed racial equality clause in the 
Covenant of the League of Nations were significant set-backs for Japan – the first major 
ones since the Meiji restoration. The sense of disappointment, even of betrayal, led 
Japanese such as Ishii to reassess the situation, especially in the light of anxieties and 
tensions over Korea and Manchuria. Ishii (1933: 220; 223) claimed that, ever since it 
had entered the ‘family of nations’, Japan’s prime objectives had been ‘equality and 
security’. Yet it was now abundantly clear that neither could be achieved by fulfilment 
of Western ‘standards of civilisation’. Thus, security and status concern was in the heart 
of its foreign policy, and much influenced its identity building. The point was well 
made by Hayes (2001: 22):  
From the time of the restoration to the 1930s, Japan’s political development 
was influenced in decisive ways by the enduring sense of insecurity, both 
physical and cultural. This insecurity led to an exaggerated ambition for 
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national power, respect, and equality. These motives, intertwined and often 
inseparable, made up the chemistry of a distinctive nationalism, a force 
which impelled Japan along its particular historical path. 
 
There were now increasingly influential elements in Japanese political and military 
society who opposed the status quo. Inevitably their seemingly aggressive posture 
produced anxiety and hostility in the West. The Manchurian Incident of September 
1931 was the first military action taken by the Japanese without prior consultation with 
the other powers. The West was particularly alarmed because Japan’s reliance on force 
seemed to echo the policies and style of dictators such as Hitler who were coming to 
power in Europe. Reaction to the Manchurian Incident led Japan to withdraw from the 
League of Nations in March 1933. This withdrawal was to have a deep effect on 
subsequent Japanese foreign policy and Goto (2003: 18) identifies it as the first step 
toward de-Westernisation and the eventual adoption of a return to Asia policy. 
 
Pan-Asianism: Non-hegemonic Course 
But Japan’s ‘return to Asia’ cannot be explained solely in terms of disillusion with 
Europe and all that it stood for. Japan was also driven towards China and Southeast 
Asia for economic reasons, above all by the perceived need for assured markets and 
sources of raw materials. Goto (2003: 5, 7) suggests that, while the Japanese regarded 
themselves as culturally superior to the peoples of Southeast Asia, they believed even 
more strongly that the region as a whole possessed ‘great economic value’. Southeast 
Asia was thirteen times larger than Japan and its population three times bigger; it also 
contained important raw materials and constituted a potentially significant market for 
the products of Japanese industry. Similar calculations informed Japanese attitudes to 
Taiwan, Manchuria and other parts of China. At least until the mid-1930s, however, 
Japan’s southward-advance policy (nanshin seisaku) continued to emphasise an 
essentially peaceful approach to the realisation of its objectives. But when Japan turned 
towards colonial expansion, pan-Asian rhetoric assumed a central role of Japan in its 
bid to create an economically integrated Empire. This development should not be 
explained solely in terms of the evolution of official policy; other elements also played 
parts in the drive to create pan-Asian solidarity and regional identity. 
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While official policy showed few signs of turning away from Europe before the 1920s, 
pan-Asian activists within Japan had long sought contacts with their counterparts in 
other Asian countries. Especially after 1905, these activists sought to give 
encouragement and support to revolutionary movements that aimed to overthrow 
traditional regimes in countries like Korea and China. As early as 1898, the Chinese 
reformers Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao, who had been forced to flee Beijing, were 
warmly received by Japanese pan-Asianists. The Chinese revolutionary leader, Sun Yat-
sen (1866-1925), and the Korean dissident, Kim Ok-kyun (1851-94), were frequently 
guests at pan-Asian gatherings in Japan (Saaler 2006: 6). The same pattern was also 
visible in Southeast Asia before 1945. Some Japanese visitors identified strongly with 
the peoples of the region, forming connections with nationalists in territories under 
colonial rule. A few even stayed after the War to assist and participate in nascent anti-
colonial movements (Goto: 2003: 10). 
 
The Problems of Pan-Asianism 
The creation of an East Asian order inspired by the ideas of pan-Asianism – whether in 
the form of the ‘New Order’ of the 1930s or the ‘Greater East Asia Co-prosperity 
Sphere’ of the 1940s – encountered many problems. Observers elsewhere in Asia could 
hardly fail to notice that Pan-Asian ideas had largely originated in Japan and that their 
growing influence had at least coincided with the rise of Japan to near equality with 
major Western powers. There were bound to be suspicion that these ideas were actually 
the product of Japan’s increasing success. In other words, however, benign in theory, 
was pan-Asianism merely a cover to advance Japan’s interests, not to the advantage of 
the other peoples of the region but to their detriment? It was surely worrying that many 
of the most fervent advocates of Pan-Asianism insisted that its objectives could only be 
realised under Japanese leadership, perhaps only under Japanese colonial rule. Far from 
bringing liberation to the oppressed peoples of Asia, would the end result be no more 
than the replacement of one sort of colonial regime with another? Japan’s track record 
in Korea and Taiwan did not fit easily with the ‘benign face’ of pan-Asianism. 
 
These fears were to be justified after Japan entered the ‘Greater East Asia War’. As 
Japanese forces swept through the former European colonies and their peoples were 
subjected to Japanese military rule, the earlier version of pan-Asianism experienced 
significant modification. The notion of Japan as the leader ‘meishu’ and ‘liberator’ of 
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East Asia was asserted with greater stridency, yet other tenets subscribed to by the Pan-
Asianists earlier in the century – such as Asian solidarity and equality – appeared to 
become forgotten. The stress on Japan’s ‘mission’ to liberate Asia replaced earlier 
emphasis on Asia’s ‘common destiny’ (Saaler 2006: 8, 11, 12).  It seems that many 
Japanese were unaware of the contradictory elements in the Pan-Asian programme, 
although these must have been brutally obvious to many in China, Malaya, Indo-China, 
Burma, Indonesia and elsewhere.3  
 
Ironically, in some respects, the ideas behind the operation of the ‘New Order’ under 
Japanese leadership were similar to those that had informed the traditional Chinese 
tributary system. In both, the principle of hierarchy was central. Previous chapter 
identified concentric hierarchic zones – the Sinic, Inner, and Outer zones – within the 
Chinese world order. The Japanese ‘New Order’ produced its own version of hierarchy: 
‘independent’ or ‘puppet’ states, semi-independent protectorates, directly administered 
by Japan, and colonies that would remain under the rule of European powers (Saaler 
2006: 12-13). Of course, in this New Order the Japanese would be the ‘leading race’ in 
the region for all time (Benson and Matsumura 2001: 80, 81). Yet the ultimate object 
was even more ambitious. If the Chinese world order had once claimed to embrace ‘all 
under heaven’ (Tianxia), Japan now advanced a concept of hakkō ichiu (eight corners of 
the world under one roof). In other words, Japan would assume ‘the whole world’s 
unification under the emperor of Japan’ (Hook et al. 2001: 29).  
 
Thus, in some respect, the new order in East Asia represented little more than a change 
of masters for East Asia; the old hierarchical Chinese and the subsequent European 
imperial order was to give way to a new hierarchy under Japan. Of course, there was a 
difference. Japan could find some justification for its actions by stressing its 
contribution to the defeat of the Western powers – the common oppressor of East Asia. 
In this sense it may be argued that ‘pan-Asian’ ideology did more than use a traditional 
characteristic of East Asian international society to provide a degree of some legitimacy 
for Japanese leadership. It may also have served as the essential foundation for any 
subsequent, more ‘genuine’ regional union. In the 1930s and 40s, Japan attempted to 
                                                 
 
3 For the contradictions of Pan-Asianism, see Narangoa and Cribb (eds.) (2003); Szpilman, Christopher 
W. A. (2006). 
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create a pan-Asian imperial identity, with itself as the model for others to follow. At 
times, this was accompanied, by policies of assimilation or Japanisation, particularly in 
Korea and Taiwan. Of course, as Narangoa and Cribb (2003: 2) point out, Japan’s 
attempt to remodel the national identities of East Asia fell ‘far short of its intentions’ – 
an understatement to put it mildly. But they also argue that the implications of this 
apparently unsuccessful attempt were ‘much more far-reaching’. But was this because 
Japanese rule and dominance was so short-lived or were other factors at work? In order 
to discover the answer we must examine the nature and operation of the Japanese order 
in more detail. 
 
4.1.2 The Operation of the Japanese Order 
 
The relatively brief period of Japanese imperial expansion and the attempt to create a 
Japanese-led ‘new order’ in Asia remains highly controversial. Rival interpretations 
constitute a major obstacle both to improved relations between Japan and its neighbours 
and, more generally, to the further development of regional integration.4 In particular, 
neighbouring countries have been angered by the way Japan’s role is treated in Japanese 
school text-books and by the visits of prominent Japanese politicians to the Yasukuni 
Shrine. For these countries, the story of the years between 1931 and 1945 is above all 
one of Japanese aggression. In Japan, however, there has been an increasing tendency – 
closely linked with growing inward-looking nationalism, associated with the 
conservative Right – to portray the Pacific War as a sacred struggle in which Japan 
made enormous sacrifices to try to free the peoples of East Asia from Western 
colonialism. 5  Thus, if the rest of East Asia complains of Japanese aggression and 
brutality, at least some elements in Japan complain of East Asian ingratitude. Here I 
examine more closely the respective roles of ideology, interests and coercion in the 
operation of Japanese empire. 
 
The Role of Ideology 
As discussed earlier, when seeking to create a new East Asian order, Japan employed a 
pan-Asian and anti-imperialist rhetoric that was primarily directed against the Western 
                                                 
 
4 For the impact on regionalism, see Saaler and Koschmann (eds.) (2006). 
5 For changes in nationalism in Japan, China and Taiwan, see Deans (forthcoming). 
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imperial presence in Asia. On the face of it, this rhetoric had much in common with the 
nationalist agenda elsewhere in Asia became a strong force in the course of the 1920s 
and 30s. Since Japan had been ‘the first to successfully challenge the Western 
conception of international society as a closed club’ (Mayall 2000a: 188), and had 
succeeded in securing the complete abolition of the unequal treaty system by 1911, it 
appeared well-placed to present itself as the potential or actual liberator of other Asian 
nations. Japan’s earlier success, particularly its defeat of Russia in 1905, had made 
many Asians eager to imitate Japan’s ‘political, social and technological model’ 
(Narangoa and Cribb 2003: 6). From the end of the nineteenth century, many young 
radical Chinese and Koreans attended military schools in Japan. When they returned 
home, they took the lead in reforms and revolutions; the Chinese revolution of 1911-12 
is a case in point. As exemplified by Sun Yat-sen’s 1924 Kobe speech, pan-Asianism 
was gaining a significant following in several Asian countries.  
 
Japan’s relationship with the countries of Southeast Asia was particularly complex. 
When Japan sought to expand into this area, much of it was under Western colonial rule. 
Thus, as Goto (2003:22, 79) points out, for a while at least, opposition to Western 
colonialism served the interests both of Japan and of local nationalists. For Japan, even 
though the prime objective of its ‘southern expansion’ was the swift acquisition of 
important natural resources such as petroleum, tin, and rubber; this frank avowal was 
rapped up in lofty expressions of the sacred cause of the liberation of Asia and the 
destruction of Western colonial rule. In other words, some of the language was virtually 
identical to that employed by local nationalists. But how should these react? If their 
countries had already been independent, they would have had little option but to regard 
collaboration with the Japanese as treason. But it was not so simple for those in colonial 
territories. Some collaborated willingly with the Japanese, claiming that collaboration 
was their patriotic duty, a strategy that would soon bring full independence.  
 
However, it is questionable whether the seemingly attractive ideologies of ‘Asia for the 
Asians’ and Pan-Asian solidarity, had become deeply internalised among the Japanese 
or their ‘colonial’ subjects. No doubt, there were some in Japan who really believed that 
their destiny was to create a new order in Asia that would expel Western influences and 
establish a new structure based on Asian concepts of justice and humanity (Pyle 1978: 
147). But there are bound to be doubts. There was an element of cynicism in the way 
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the Japanese authorities used of the high-flown phraseology of pan-Asianism to serve 
their own purposes. As Goto (2003: 22) argues, it was a useful device to gain the 
support of local nationalists and to mobilise enthusiasm for the war among the Japanese 
themselves, especially the younger generation. Local nationalists were also somewhat 
calculating. In part, they gave the appearance of subscribing to the ideas of pan-
Asianism and of collaborating with the Japanese, either to further their real goal of 
eventual independence or because Japanese coercion gave them no choice. So long as 
Japanese military might seemed unassailable, collaboration was the only way to achieve 
eventual independence.  
 
The Role of Interest and Force 
 Especially for Japan, the drive to establish a New Order in East Asia was as much the 
product of economic calculations as of security considerations. Indeed, Japan’s need for 
natural resources was central to the entire process. Thus Japan extended its influence 
and control, already established in Korea and Taiwan, to China and to most of Southeast 
Asia. The slogan, ‘the Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere’, emphasised ‘mutual’ 
economic interests and held out a prospect of prosperity for all. Even in the 1930s, 
‘Japanese of nearly all political persuasions looked at their country’s involvement in 
China as sanctioned by economic need’ (Hayes 2001: 24). 
 
Many Asians, too, genuinely admired Japan’s rapid modernisation and technological 
advancement; even before 1905, Japanese progress had inspired many Koreans. A 
minority welcomed modernisation, and some of this group were to serve the subsequent 
Japanese colonial regime. In Southeast Asia, too, Japanese expansion seemed both in 
tune with demands for greater secularism and likely to further the regional quest for 
economic and political liberation from Western colonial powers. Thus, as Japan 
developed important economic networks throughout the region, it also offered financial 
assistance and military training to anti-colonial Filipinos and Indonesians as well as to 
the subjects of the French and British Empires.  
 
However, serious problems arose as Japan expanded into China and then into Southeast 
Asia in 1930s and 1940s. Acute labour shortages meant that Japan resorted to 
increasingly draconian methods to recruit workers to sustain its economy and war 
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effort.6 The beginning of all-out war with China in 1937 had already created serious 
labour shortages in Japan, but was further exacerbated by the effects of the Pacific War 
and Japan’s massive territorial expansion. Now the Japanese tried to obtain workers, not 
just from Korea and China but also from virtually everywhere in the occupied territories. 
Some of these workers were needed for local Japanese-owned enterprises, especially in 
mines, but others were sent to distant parts of the Empire.   
 
It must be stressed that, coming as they did in the aftermath of the economic collapse of 
the 1930s – which had created high levels of unemployment in much of the region – 
Japan’s initial  attempts at recruitment met with a quite favourable response. Many were 
glad to take any work on offer. Furthermore, Japan made some effective use of 
intermediary organisations, such as the North China Labour Association, to recruit 
workers (Ju 2005). However, towards the end of the war, especially in 1944 and 1945, 
Japan increasingly adopted methods of forcible recruitment. Workers were sent to 
distant locations and many did not return. Koreans were a major element in this foreign 
work force. They were employed in Japan in coal-mines, construction, and in dock 
transport. Some modest wages were paid, but life in the Japanese coal mines was 
extremely harsh. Explosions caused by gas, rock falls, and accidents with coal trucks 
resulted in a heavy mortality among Koreans and Japanese alike (Naitou 2005: 91, 95).  
 
In fact workers were recruited throughout the entire area controlled by Japan and used 
for a variety of purposes, but especially on military construction projects. Even in 
Indonesia, as Raben shows, tens of thousands of Indonesian workers, known as 
rōmusha, died of malnutrition, disease, and maltreatment. Most were buried in 
unmarked graves far from home, and no records were kept of their deaths. Raben argues 
that, understandably, at least outside nationalist and upper class circles, the years of 
Japanese rule in Indonesia are remembered as ‘a time of massive enslavement and 
hardship’ (Raben 2005: 197, 211). In Nish’s (2000: 85) words, while many Asians had 
looked for Japanese leadership, ‘they did not like it when it came’. If Japanese rule was 
indeed synonymous with enslavement and hardship, then it must be concluded that, in 
                                                 
 
6 For labour in the wartime Japanese Empire, see Kratoska (ed.) (2005). 
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reality, all the talk of pan-Asian solidarity turned out to be a deception, a horribly cruel 
joke. We must examine the implications of this for regional identity and security. 
 
4.1.3 The Impact on Regional Security: Nationalism in East Asia 
 
The speedy rise and even more sudden collapse of the Japanese-led East Asian Empire 
or society, had major consequences. It certainly fostered strong revolutionary and anti-
colonial nationalism. Understandably, people in East Asia welcomed the end of the war, 
yet, even in Southeast Asia, they were reluctant to accept a return to the pre-war status 
quo of colonial rule by foreign nations. Nationalism helped to inspire decolonisation 
movements based on anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist sentiments, which also gave 
rise to a loose feeling of regional solidarity. Yet, at the same time, much anti-colonial 
nationalism in East Asia also had a specifically anti-Japanese flavour. Hence, although 
this concept of nationalism is ultimately derived from the expansion of European 
international society into East Asia, it has taken a form that is radically different from 
the Western version. The distinctive features of East Asian nationalism continue to 
affect regional relations.  
 
In the nineteenth century, the expansion of European international society into a global 
one introduced the concept of nationalism, together with other ideas such as sovereignty 
and international law, into East Asia. Thus, ‘nationalism’ emerged as a constitutive 
institution (Mayall 1990, 2000b) or, in Buzan’s terminology, as a ‘primary institution’ 
(Buzan 2004) in the extended global international society. In the West, although 
nationalism emerged in opposition to imperialism and colonialism, it sought to replace 
dynastic with popular sovereignty (Mayall 1990: 2). Since 1919 the political principle 
of national self-determination has been a close adjunct of nationalism in the struggle 
against colonialism. However, the spread of nationalism took a distinctive course in 
East Asia. Here, nationalism is more associated with the idea of preservation of states 
against outside pressure – namely the challenge of the West. It is often expressed in 
patriotic terms, rather than linked to that of modernity or notions of popular sovereignty 
(Yahuda 2000: 25).  
 
Initially Japanese nationalism ‘had its impact on nationalistic movements around Asia’ 
(Nish 2000: 85). Faced with the Western challenge, by and large, Asians attempted ‘to 
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join the society of states on equal terms, not to challenge it’ (Mayall 2000a: 188). These 
efforts were primarily directed towards the preservation of their states against outside 
pressure. From the 1890s onwards, however, these states were threatened not only by 
the Western powers but, increasingly, by Japan. Ironically, by its successful challenge 
to Western imperialism, Japan itself became the major imperialist power in East Asia 
and faced resistance from its own colonial subjects. For instance, defeat in the Sino-
Japanese war of 1895 sparked off modern Chinese nationalism. The Japanese 
authorities confronted major nationalist opposition in Korea, China, and Taiwan in 
March and May 1919, and in January 1921 respectively. Thus, under the principle of 
‘national self-determination’, nationalist movements in East Asia increasingly took on 
not only an anti-imperialist but also a specifically anti-Japanese character.  
 
Moreover, from the early 1930, with growing military influence in its government, 
Japan turned to ultra-nationalism and militarism. In part, this reflected a world-wide 
trend; in many countries liberalism collapsed and was replaced by nationalism, racism 
and imperialism (Nish 2000: 85). Thus, although Japan presented itself in pan-Asian 
terms as the only force capable of defeating European colonialism and of bringing peace 
and prosperity to East Asia, ‘the reality was quite different: it was an occupation of 
extreme barbarism’ (Mackerras 1998: 39). Benson and Matsumura (2001: 83) insist that 
the Japanese ‘proved even more harsh and insensitive than their predecessors’, 
especially through the imposition of broad programs of ‘Japanisation’. After acquiring 
Taiwan in 1895 and annexed Korea in 1910, in both territories, Japan adopted a policy 
of ‘assimilation’ in an attempt to turn Koreans and Taiwanese into Japanese by forcing 
them to learn the Japanese language and to adopt Japanese culture. It is hardly 
surprising that the horrors of Japanese expansionism and militarism gave rise to anti-
Japanese nationalism. The sudden collapse of Japan in the 1940s brought a further 
strong nationalist upsurge throughout East Asia.  
 
What were the main consequences of the emergence of nationalism as a key institution 
in East Asian regional society? Mayall argues that the rise of nationalism challenged 
many of the existing institutions of international society, especially imperialism and 
colonialism, and eventually de-legitimised them (Mayall 1990: 35). This was true of 
East Asia, where anti-Western and anti-Japanese revolutionary movements should be 
seen as part of the international anti-imperialist / colonialist movement. The process 
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began when East Asia entered the expanding international society. There, both 
nationalism and sovereign norms developed with strong link to anti-colonialism and 
anti-imperialism. Moreover, here these objectives were achieved through long and 
painful efforts. So, in Acharya’s words (2003/4:159), these norms have been ‘hard-
earned’, rather than just provided by others.  
 
However, unlike its Western counterpart, in East Asia, nationalism did not have a close 
association with ideas of democracy and human rights. In other words, in the West, 
national self-determination was more than an end in itself, but was seen as a means of 
achieving a more democratic society. Ultimately, it was democracy that would 
legitimate the new arrangements. In the East Asia, however, the struggle against 
colonialism and for national self-determination was all-important. Thus, while they 
exploited the symbols of nationalism in their efforts to dislodge foreign rule, political 
elites in East Asia paid scant attention to the ethnic or cultural dimensions of self-
determination. Therefore, ‘decolonisation’ and ‘self-determination’ became 
unproblematic synonyms (Mayall 2000a: 190). Thus, successful resistance to Japanese 
rule, rather than respect for popular sovereignty – that is democracy – became the 
hallmark of legitimacy. These differences had both immediate and long-term 
implications for regional international society. 
 
From the start, nationalism was equated with patriotism. Many Asians, particularly in 
China, ‘nationalism’ means aiguo zhuyi (patriotism), a concept strongly linked with 
political legitimacy, rather than minzu zhuyi (nationalism). This was clearly revealed 
when Japan was defeated and withdrew from China. Both the Nationalist Party (KMT) 
and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) took on the mantle of patriotism and hence 
claimed legitimacy on same grounds. Both had fought against the Japanese though 
neither could claim to be democratic in the ‘Western’ sense of the word. The competing 
claims of ‘patriotic legitimacy’ resulted in civil war in China between 1946 and 1949. In 
Korea, too, various nationalist groups and political parties were formed from the 1920s 
onwards. Among these, the movement led by Kim Il Sung was popular because it linked 
nationalism and communism together with anti-imperialism (Cumings 1998: 154).  
 
Thus, although nationalism became a primary institution on the global scale, Eastern 
and Western understandings of it remained far apart. In some ways, this divergence has 
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become even more important since the end of the Cold War. In particular, it has affected 
attitudes to democracy and human rights. East Asian nationalism puts so much 
emphasis on sovereignty and non-intervention norms that it tends to regard anything 
potentially incompatible with these norms with suspicion – and this includes such things 
as insistence on democracy and human rights. Today, many disputes and tensions over 
sovereignty and territory in the region can only be understood in the context of 
specifically East Asian ‘patriotic’ notions of nationalism. Only when this point is 
grasped, it is possible to answer otherwise puzzling questions: why have visits to the 
Yasukuni shrine and the contents of school text books provoked such fury in Japan’s 
neighbours; why has the relationship between Japan and China been one of ‘hot 
economics and cold politics’; why have regionalism and multilateralism have been so 
slow to develop in Northeast/East Asia; and why, when these have appeared, are their 
characteristic features so different to superficially similar institutions elsewhere, 
particularly in Europe? 
 
4.2 The Cold War in Northeast Asia 
 
The end of World War II brought significant changes to international society. The rise 
of nationalism and decolonisation finally gave international society a truly global 
character. Yet, the development of superpower rivalry between the United States and 
the Soviet Union divided the expanded international society into two opposed camps. 
Above all, the binary division between the Western and Communist Blocs meant that 
several norms and principles operated differently in the rival camps. While the Western 
side extolled democracy and the free market, the Communist camp sought to achieve 
socialism through self-reliance and centrally planned economies.  
 
Developments also varied at the regional level. Though it expanded to become all-
inclusive, the society of states still exhibited different degrees of development. Types of 
states varied widely – as they still do. To take one example, multilateralism as an 
institution has become increasingly prominent after World War II, and has come to be 
seen as a criterion to determine whether a particular society is well integrated or well 
developed. Northeast Asia is widely regarded as ‘impoverished in its development’ as a 
regional international society, and the virtual absence of effective multilateralism has 
often been seen as worrying (Buzan and Segal 1994). This was particularly true in the 
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Cold War era; in the 1950s and 1960s, Northeast Asia almost ceased to function as a 
regional society in any sense of the term. Why?  
 
No doubt, the legacy of Japanese expansion, followed by the divisions of the Cold War, 
partly explains this low level of development. But there have been other variables, less 
well appreciated but at least as important. From ideational and comparative 
perspectives, Hemmer and Katzenstein (2002), stress the role of America’s collective 
identity in its preference for bilateral rather than multilateral approaches in its dealings 
with Asian countries. While this is a valuable aid to an understanding of the situation in 
Northeast Asia, it could be taken further. There was also a significant lack of collective 
identity among the regional actors and not all of this can be attributed to American 
policy. Yet, even within these low level of interaction some unmistakable changes have 
been occurring. These can be analysed through following three aspects. 
• The Arrival of the Cold War in Northeast Asia: Domestic and Global Factors. 
• Multilateralism versus Bilateralism. 
• Re-emergence of Northeast Asian International Society. 
 
4.2.1 The Arrival of the Cold War in Northeast Asia: Regional Divisions 
 
In the immediate aftermath of World War II, domestic developments in Japan, China 
and Korea exercised a major influence on the future course of the region. The sudden 
collapse of the Japanese empire divided the East Asian RSC into separate Northeast and 
Southeast Asian RSCs (Buzan and Wæver 2003). It also resulted in an upsurge of 
radical nationalist movements, as examined earlier. Communists and anti-communists 
alike derived their legitimacy from their successful resistance to Japanese imperialism; 
in several instances these rival claims resulted in civil war. But the political space 
created by the collapse of Japan was not only filled by new nationalist regimes; 
essentially ‘outside’ superpowers were either drawn or intruded into the region. 
 
The Domestic Impact 
After Japan’s defeat in the Pacific War, it underwent a period of Allied Occupation 
(1945-52). Efforts to reform Japan and to prevent remilitarisation were exemplified in 
the so-called peace constitution, particularly in Article 9, which prohibited the use of 
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armed force. Further, under the San Francisco peace treaty and the simultaneous US-
Japan security treaty of September 1951, Japan was firmly incorporated into the US 
camp both politically and militarily. In addition, traumatised by war and defeat, 
ordinary Japanese and many influential elites came to reject the pre-war approach to 
national security and its associated nationalist ideology (Berger 2004). Thus, Japan 
distanced itself from East Asia, a tendency strengthened by Yoshida’s policy of 
accepting political, economic and security dependence on the US. The overall result was 
that Japan ceased to function as a major independent power, while remaining as a US 
ally and dependent. Ideologically, Japan came to identify itself with the Western bloc, 
both in terms of politics and values.   
 
Meanwhile, Japan’s defeat enabled the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the 
Nationalist Party (KMT) to resume their civil war in 1946. After three years 
devastation, the war ended in victory for the Communists under Mao and the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) was established in October 1949. The KMT and the 
government of the Republic of China (ROC) retreated to Taiwan, hence creating the de 
facto division of China that has lasted ever since. While the Chinese civil war and 
national division sowed the seeds of tension and insecurity in both Chinese regimes and 
in the region generally, the victory of the CCP and the emergence of communist China 
also had a significant impact on international society. As Dockrill (1988: 48) notes, 
particularly in the US, the Chinese communist victory was linked with the explosion of 
a Soviet atom bomb. The rapid succession of these events had a profound and unsettling 
effect. It seemed that ‘communism was on the march everywhere’. As a result, 
American ‘isolationism’ in the traditional sense all but disappeared. The US could no 
longer insulate itself militarily from the rest of the world. A year after the Chinese 
communist victory another war broke out, this time in the Korean peninsula. 
 
When Eberstadt and Ellings (2001: 5) argued that in world affairs, a country’s location 
could have ‘profound, far-reaching, and enduring consequences’, they cited Korea as a 
prime example. The Korean peninsula occupies precisely the space where the territories, 
or at any rate the spheres of influence, of the great powers of the Pacific – China, 
Russia, Japan and the United States – happen to adjoin. Each of these powers has tended 
to regard the Korean peninsula as falling naturally within its own sphere, while fearing 
that it might fall into other hands. 
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 An old Korean saying describes the country as ‘a shrimp among whales’. In other 
words, Korea’s location meant that it could not escape from the struggles between the 
great powers for hegemony in East Asia. This had happened many times in the past (see 
chapter 3). Once Korea was freed from Japanese occupation, it once more became a 
‘shrimp’, this time between the whales of the United States and the Soviet Union. 
Almost immediately after the Japanese surrender, Korea became the place in Asia 
where Soviet-American Cold War rivalry revealed itself earliest and most forcefully 
(Mackerras 1998: 41). It was divided involuntarily into Soviet and American zones of 
occupation along the 38th parallel, a division which continues to date. Moreover, 
between June 1950 to July 1953, Korea was the scene of the ‘hottest’ of all Cold War 
conflicts; British, American and Chinese forces were directly involved. But the results 
of this extremely bitter conflict were inconclusive. At the end of the war, Korea 
remained divided along the original 38th Parallel, and the peninsula has continued to be 
a potential point of conflict ever since – between the two Koreas or between the United 
States and China (Bell 2001: 112).  
 
The Global Impact 
Prior to 1949, the Cold War had barely touched the Asian Mainland. Yet the victory of 
the Communists in China and the outbreak of the Korean War changed both regional 
and global landscapes. These developments gave a global dimension to the Cold War 
and, thereafter, Northeast Asia as an RSC was to be heavily penetrated by the two 
superpowers. After the Korean War, the US incorporated Taiwan into its defence 
perimeter and commenced large-scale aid to regimes it favoured. The war also had 
significant effects on the ex-enemy state, Japan. It hardened American determination 
that Japan should not become dependent on trade with mainland China, and that it 
should have closer links with Chiang Kai-shek and Taiwan than with Mao Zedong and 
the mainland (Dunbabin 1994: 116). Equally, the War strengthened the Sino-Soviet 
alliance – though it would split later – and both supported North Korea.  
 
Thus, the Cold War bipolarity effectively divided Northeast Asia into communist and 
anti-communist camps. The result was that the capitalist countries of the region now 
communicated with each other through the United States, a process institutionalised in 
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bilateral defence treaties with Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. Thus, direct or 
‘horizontal’ contact between South and North Korea or between China and Taiwan was 
non-existent and extremely limited between Japan and the Communist states (Cumings 
1998: 458; Pempel 2005: 8-9). 
 
4.2.2 Multilateralism versus Bilateralism 
 
The division between Communists and anti-Communists made it difficult for Northeast 
Asia to develop into a meaningful regional international society, much less to acquire 
any sense of community. The problem was exacerbated by the contrast between US 
bilateralism in Asia and its multilateralism in Europe. A new phenomenon, 
multilateralism expanded after World War II, largely in accordance with ‘the American 
vision as to what constitutes a desirable world order’ (Ruggie 1994: 560). But 
multilateralism progressed furthest in Europe and in the North Atlantic Community. To 
a more limited extent, multilateral and regional approaches also emerged in Southeast 
Asia from the late 1960s, although in ways and forms different to those in Europe. 
However, Northeast Asia has not yet experienced a movement to multilateralism of any 
sort until recently. Why? 
 
The Impact of US Identity 
US foreign policy towards Europe and Asia in 1940s and 1950s resulted in very 
different outcomes. In Europe the US alliance structure led to the establishment of 
multilateral organisations, such as NATO, but there was no similar organisation in Asia. 
Rather, the United States preferred a ‘hub-and-spoke’ alliance system, based on 
arrangements with individual allies, such as Japan and South Korea and Taiwan. When 
comparing these differences, Hemmer and Kantzenstein (2002) ask important questions: 
why did the US government favour multilateral security arrangements in Europe and 
bilateral ones in Asia; and if NATO was so successful in Europe, why was it not copied 
in East Asia? Hemmer and Katzenstein do not deny the realist argument that the great 
disparity of power between the US and its Asian allies made the multilateral approach 
unattractive to the US. They contend, however, that considerations of identity may have 
been more important in determining America’s behaviour.  
 
 117
The main arguments are that:  
Different forms of cooperation make greater or lesser demands on shared 
identities. Multilateralism is a particularly demanding form of international 
cooperation. It requires a strong sense of collective identity in addition to 
shared interests. 
However, 
Shaped by racial, historical, political, and cultural factors, U.S. 
policymakers saw their potential European allies as relatively equal 
members of a shared community. America’s potential Asian allies, in 
contrast, were seen as part of an alien and, in important way, inferior 
community. At the beginning of the Cold War, this difference in mutual 
identification, in combination with material factors and considerations of 
efficiency, was of critical importance in defining the interests and shaping 
the choices of U.S. decision makers in Europe and Asia (Hemmer and 
Kantzenstein 2002: 575). 
 
According to this analysis, lack of US identification with Northeast Asia was crucial to 
the absence of multilateralism in the region. US relations with its European allies were 
underpinned by many common values, such as democracy, the free market and religion. 
These provided a firm basis for US identification with Europe. Moreover, the common 
threat posed by Soviet Union in the immediate aftermath of World War II served to 
strengthen mutual identification. As Wæver (1998: 81) argues, the Soviet threat was the 
issue ‘securitised most dramatically, constantly’ and ‘legitimised a wide array of 
activities and contributed to defining the identity of what was first of all a Western or 
North Atlantic community’.  
 
It is true that US relations with the Northeast Asian counterparts of its European allies 
were very different. There were few shared values between them – whether religious, 
economic or political. At that time, none of America’s allies in the region (Japan, South 
Korea, or Taiwan) was a true democracy: only Japan was to introduce the Constitutional 
Law at the behest of the Allied occupation authorities, in a hope for transforming it into 
a liberal democratic country (Bessho 1999: 15). South Korea and Taiwan were 
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‘essentially developmental authoritarian regimes’ (Hook et al. 2001: 160). In addition, 
Japan, formerly the US’s enemy, had been totally defeated in World War II, Chiang 
Kai-shek’s Nationalists were defeated in the Chinese civil war and retreated to Taiwan, 
and Korea, just freed from Japanese occupation, was in a state of internal chaos. Not 
surprisingly, the US could not see its potential Asian allies in equal terms.  
 
Moreover, the US policy towards Northeast Asia was essentially instrumental. It was 
driven by an ideological purpose – the containment of communism, especially 
communism in China. Here, the Chinese Communist victory in 1949 and its subsequent 
military intervention in the Korean War were highly significant. The Chinese civil war 
revealed that Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalists could not defeat the People’s Liberation 
Army led by Mao Zedong – despite US support, involving aid amounting to hundreds of 
millions of dollars and the delivery of massive military supplies. In the Korean war, too, 
Chinese intervention prevented the US-led UN troops from crossing the 38th parallel. 
The result, as argued earlier, was increased American involvement.  
 
Thus, the US intensified its commitment, yet only through bilateral means with Japan, 
South Korea, and Taiwan. Hence we may agree with Hemmer and Katzenstein that US 
identification constituted a major obstacle to the development of multilateralism in 
Northeast Asia. However, some puzzles remain. Although Northeast Asia was divided 
into two camps – communist and anti-communist – there was no integration between 
states allied to the US.  It was rather like the position in the time of the old Chinese 
world order when all tributary states had bilateral relations with Imperial China but not 
between each other (Dan 2005; Mancall 1968); now the various allies were connected 
bilaterally to Washington (Ikenberry 2001). Yet equally, on the Communist side, there 
was no arrangement corresponding to the Warsaw Pact standing in opposition to the US 
alliance system. The absence of multilateralism on the Communist side raises doubts as 
to whether American identity factors – that is those of an external actor – can provide a 
complete explanation. It seems likely that the identities of regional actors were even 
more important.  
 
 119
Collective Identity of Regional Actors 
Two historical factors had particularly critical effects on collective identity formation in 
Northeast Asia – the legacy of the Chinese world order and the legacy of Japanese 
Imperialism. 
 
The Legacy of Chinese World Order 
As explained in the previous chapter, the Chinese world order developed into a system 
structure very different to the kind of international society that emerged in seventeenth 
century Europe. First, the tribute system was anti-egalitarian. Zhong Guo (the Middle 
Kingdom) was not simply Asia’s largest state, but was also a self-contained world, 
theoretically embracing the whole Earth, and ruled by Tianzi (the Chinese emperor) 
(Fairbank 1968; Bessho 1999: 31). Secondly, the tributary relationship was ‘always 
bilateral, never multilateral’ (Mancall 1968: 65). In other words, participants in the 
Chinese world order interacted with Imperial China but not with each other in any 
meaningful manner (see chapter 3).  
 
The fact that the legacy of the old order did not provide a good cultural basis for the 
development of a regional identity/society still has negative implications. Under the 
‘concentric’ hierarchic order, East Asia had little experience of multilateralism or even 
inter-state relations, at least in modern sense (see Fairbank 1968; Fei 1945; Kang 2003b, 
2003c). China saw itself as superior to other Asian states, which, in theory, were 
expected to be properly tributary. Though they related to Imperial China according to 
their levels of allegiance to the Emperor, these surrounding states did not develop a 
common identity. In other words, there was no strong regional collective identity. Thus, 
because of their long experience of ‘suzerain and vassal’ relations, regional actors tend 
to view ideas of multilateralism and regional integration with suspicion. Such concepts 
may be perceived as threats to their hardly-won sovereignty. In other words, the 
surrounding states’ attitudes reflect concerns about the possible revival of the old 
Chinese claims to suzerainty. No doubt their fears are sharpened by the sheer size of 
China.  
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The Legacy of Japanese Imperial Past 
While nationalism in East Asia was arising in opposition to imperial and colonial rule, it 
must be acknowledged that there were at least some faint signs of a nascent regional 
identity, transcending ethnic and religious divisions. But this ‘proto’ regional identity 
was focussed on Japan. Japan’s earlier success, its defeat of Russia in 1905, and its anti-
Western and pan-Asian rhetoric did go some way to inspire a nascent regional identity. 
Later, the promotion of the idea of a ‘New East Asian order’ under the banner of ‘Co-
Prosperity Sphere’ seemed to provide a beacon for those who sought to create an East 
Asian order characterised by genuine equality and co-prosperity. Yet, the new Order 
when it came was marked by extreme inequality and a notable lack of prosperity. In 
other words any sense of emerging regional identity was destroyed and both the ‘New 
East Asian Order’ and the circumstances of its collapse actually placed major obstacles 
in the way of the development of any new regional identity (see earlier argument). 
 
In most of East Asia, Nationalism came to be understood in essentially anti-Japanese 
terms and this was especially true of Japan’s near neighbours in Northeast Asia.  Post-
war governments even based their claims to legitimacy on their successful resistance to 
Japanese aggression. Hence the situation (now that the main imperialist enemy was 
within) seemed to preclude the development of any sense of regionalism or even of any 
alliances that might include Japan as a member (Duffield 2001). In part, this explains 
the puzzling persistence of earlier patterns. There was no horizontal integration among 
US Asian allies. A sense of distrust for and securitising of Japan was not only a 
characteristic of the opposite communist camp; it was also a powerful sentiment in 
South Korea. Even though South Korea was on the same side as Japan in the US-led 
anti-communist camp, and both faced threats from China and North Korea, relations 
between Japan and South Korea remained negative or hostile (Cha 1999; 2000).  
 
These historical legacies – a suspicion of Chinese suzerainty and securitisation of 
Japanese imperialism – impeded multilateralism and hindered the emergence of regional 
consciousness and collective identity. This lack of regional identity / society was 
worsened by the Cold War ideological division. Thus, until 1960s, Northeast Asia 
almost ceased to function as a regional international society and no multilateral 
mechanisms developed. While US lack of identification with its Asian allies (more than 
power asymmetry) may have been partly responsible, regional factors – such as 
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historically generated lack of regional collective identity (both by China and Japan) – 
played even more important part. But things did not remain this way for ever; some 
unmistakable changes have been occurring from the post-war division. 
 
4.2.3 The Re-emergence of Northeast Asian Regional Society 
 
After a protracted period of post-war rivalry and antagonism, Northeast Asia has 
gradually re-emerged as a regional international society. Relationship between China 
and Japan has improved much in this improving context. Two factors are particularly 
important: the Sino-US rapprochement (which partly broke Cold War logic) and Japan’s 
adoption of anti-militarist norms (which helped to reduce regional suspicion and high 
securitisation). 
 
The Sino-American Rapprochement 
The Sino-US rapprochement is an important factor in rebuilding Northeast Asian 
international society, in that it provided political conditions that allowed former enemies 
to have some contact with each other. It can even be argued that the Cold War ended 
rather earlier in East Asia than in Europe. Whereas, in Europe, the Cold War only ended 
in 1989, the watershed changes in East Asian politics occurred in the early and mid-
1970s. The beginning of the Sino-Soviet conflict and the start of the new Sino-
American relationship, ‘emptied Cold War logic of its previous meaning’ (Cumings 
1998: 459). From an international society perspective, while the Sino-American 
rapprochement and Sino-Japanese normalisation in the 1970s were certainly 
developments of enormous political and strategic significance in themselves, they had 
even wider implications. Above all, they appeared to create the right conditions for the 
rebuilding Sino-Japanese relations and of a regional international society. 
 
There were probably many divergent calculations behind the opening of diplomatic 
relations between the United States and China in 1971. Faced with a deteriorating 
relationship with Moscow, Beijing had good reason to seek better relations with the US, 
while Washington may have wished to take advantage of its improving relationship 
with Moscow to gain more leverage in its Asian policy. Yet, despite initial divergent 
motivations, the opening of diplomatic relations between the US and Communist China 
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was to transform their ‘deep enmity to not-so-tacit partnership’ (Dunbabin 1994: 108). 
This political change has profound implications throughout the region. It led Japan to 
normalise relations with China, though the Taiwan question became more complicated7. 
It also fostered increasing regional economic interactions. Most important of all, it 
prepared the ground for dramatic internal changes within China itself and for the 
integration of China into international society.  
 
Since the 1970s, China has turned away from its previous internal strife and external 
isolation. Gradually it has re-entered international society, taking the UN seat 
previously occupied by Taiwan in 1971. 1978 is now seen as the crucial turning point. 
The removal of the Cultural Revolution leadership allowed Deng Xiaoping to introduce 
reforms and to open China to the rest of the world. Meanwhile Japan not only 
normalised relations with China, but also extended its regional relations through 
economic means. Improved relations between Japan and China and/or relatively stable 
relations between the big three (the US, Japan and China) had important implications 
for Northeast Asian regional security. As the political environment began to change, 
powerful economic forces emerged pushing Northeast Asia towards closer integration. 
 
Further changes came in the 1980s, both reflecting and causing economic growth. 
Notable developments included democratisation processes in Taiwan and South Korea. 
It appeared, therefore that several of the regional actors were moving towards more 
convergent values. Furthermore, growing interaction between them and their efforts to 
find common ground – particularly in the economic sphere – finally supplied some of 
the underlying conditions that would enable regionalism to emerge in East Asia and 
Asia-Pacific region once the Cold War proper came to an end. 
 
Japan’s Domestic Normative Developments 
Although less dramatic than the Sino-US rapprochement, domestic change in Japan – 
the adoption and developments of pacifist and anti-militarist norms – is another 
important factor in region-building in Northeast and/or East Asia. Berger (1993: 120) 
argues that since World War II Japanese society has developed a strong anti-militarist 
                                                 
 
7 About Japan’s relations with Taiwan after the Sino-Japanese normalisation, see, Deans (2001). 
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norm, ultimately derived from the experience and collective memory of aggression and 
war in the 1930s and 40s and, even more, from subsequent total defeat, for ever 
associated with the horrors of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bombs. Thus, Japan 
has learned an essential lesson from history, namely that ‘the military is a dangerous 
institution that must be constantly restrained and monitored lest it threaten Japan’s post-
war democratic order and undermine the peace and prosperity that the nation has 
enjoyed since 1945.’ 
 
Although this social norm or culture of anti-militarism originally developed ‘under the 
aegis of a benevolent U.S. hegemon during the 1950s and 1960s’, over time it has 
become institutionalised in the Japanese political system (Berger 1993: 120). Despite 
some challenges from traditional nationalists in the early years of the Cold War, and 
again in the changing environment of the post-Cold War era, pacifist norms have 
endured and still constitute constraining forces on Japanese security thinking and hence 
continue to shape foreign policy. In the 1950s when the conservatives, particularly 
Prime Minister Kishi, held power, there were attempts to revise the Constitution in line 
with a gradual change in government policy. In other words, the Kishi government tried 
to ‘contest the pacifist social norms’ embodied in the Constitution – yet it failed 
(Katzenstein and Okawara 1993: 100, 102-103, 107-08). Thus, Maull argues that, like 
Germany, Japan is already in a prototype ‘civilian power’. By this he means: ‘a) the 
acceptance of the necessity of cooperation with others in the pursuit of international 
objectives; b) the concentration on non-military, primarily economic, means to secure 
national goals, with military power left as a residual instrument serving essentially to 
safeguard other means of international interaction; and c) a willingness to develop 
supranational structures to address critical issues of international management’ (Maull 
1990/91: 92-93).  
 
Indeed, in the post-Cold War era Japan faced new challenges and there have been 
considerable changes in Japan’s approach to international affairs. This trend has been 
accelerated by the war on terrorism after 9/11, which led some analysts to question 
whether Japan is becoming a ‘normal’ country (see, chapter 8). However, there is no 
doubt that Japan’s domestic development of anti-militarist norms played an important 
role in regional security practices. It was particularly important in the early years of 
post-war era, when Japan’s relations with its neighbours remained largely at the enemy 
 124
end. When explaining subject positions in terms of social structures, Wendt (1999: 260) 
defines ‘enemy’ as follows:  
Enemies are constituted by representations of the Other as an actor who (1) 
does not recognize the right of the Self to exist as an autonomous being, and 
therefore (2) will not willingly limit its violence toward the Self. 
 
In the eyes of its neighbours, Japan was the ‘enemy’ in a series of conflicts – including 
the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-5, the colonisation of Taiwan and Korea, the Russo-
Japanese war and the Pacific War – and perpetrated violence against them on a massive 
scale. In the aftermath of the Pacific war, when memories of the war were still fresh, 
Japan’s relations with its neighbours were still largely at the enmity end of the 
spectrum. The level of regional securitisation was high and chiefly directed against 
Japan’s imperialism. In such circumstances, the highest priority for Japan’s security 
perception was not how to resist physical invasion from the Other. It was more 
important to strive to reduce the Other’s high securitisation against the Self, while at the 
same time maintaining domestic stability. In such circumstances, a balance-of-power 
approach became ‘officially taboo’ in post-war Japan – because ‘such an approach 
would imply that Japan’s involvement in power politics had gone beyond provision for 
its self-defense’ (Soeya 1998: 211). 
 
Thus, in this inter-subjective process, the domestic development of anti-militarist 
norms, together with the US security engagement, played an important role in reducing 
the Other’s suspicion of Japan’s remilitarisation. The resulting reduced level of regional 
securitisation allowed Japan to re-engage with regional actors – largely through 
economic interactions – and gradually to become a major player in emerging 
regionalism in East Asia and Asia-Pacific.  
 
Conclusion 
After the collapse of old Chinese world order, the first attempt to rebuild international 
society in East Asia – one under the dominance of Japanese imperialism – failed badly. 
In the days of the Cold War, no further attempt at rebuilding was possible. Under the 
Cold War division, Northeast Asia was separated from Southeast Asia and almost 
ceased to function as an international society. The Northeast Asian RSC remained 
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deeply fragmented with high levels of mutual suspicion. It was also strongly penetrated 
by the two superpowers. Things only began to change when China and Japan 
normalised their relations in 1972, a development closely linked to the emerging Sino-
US rapprochement. Other major changes have included the apparent consolidation of 
anti-militarist norms in Japan and huge domestic changes in China since the late 1970s. 
Together, these developments provided the essential background for the first signs of 
the re-emergence of a regional international society. We must now turn to developments 
in the post-Cold War era. 
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5 The End of the Cold War: Northeast Asia and Beyond 
 
The present situation in Northeast Asia differs fundamentally from that found in the 
days of the Cold War. The full extent of the transformation is difficult to determine in 
that elements of continuity interweave with those of change. Both elements affect the 
nature of the evolution of regional international society and have interesting 
implications for the logic of securitisation / desecuritisation. It seems that the best way 
to approach these issues is through analysis of the impacts of the following factors: the 
ending of the Cold War; domestic changes in China; the region’s two flash points; and 
the growing regionalism and multilateralism in East Asia and Asia-Pacific. 
 
5.1.1 The Ending of the Cold War  
 
Initially, the end of the Cold War was marked by the abandonment of ideological and 
military confrontation between the US and the Soviet Union. But the effects on 
international society in Northeast Asia, particularly on the relationship between China 
and Japan, have been mixed. In several ways, the end of the Cold War brought the US 
into greater prominence and pre-eminence. Indeed, the collapse of the Soviet empire 
and then of the Soviet Union, effectively ended the bipolar system and provided the US 
with a much-improved strategic environment. This transformation of the global system 
both heightened American exceptionalism – the belief that American values and their 
associated rules have universal validity – and strengthened its tendency to unilateralism. 
Of course, the end of the Cold War meant more than the disappearance of the bipolar 
system. It appeared to signal the victory of the West and its values and the US is the 
prime supporter and promoter of those values. It followed that, once the ideological 
Cold War division had broken down, many hoped that international society could move 
from a pluralist to a solidarist basis – as revealed in the growing desire ‘to promote 
convergence towards certain core values, and a focus on the sovereignty of individuals 
rather than of states’ (Foot 2001: 30). In other words, the post-Cold War era might come 
to be characterised as an ‘era of accelerated globalisation’ (Rozman: 2004b: 226). Of 
course, this trend to globalisation or convergence raises questions as to how the US – 
now the lone superpower – defines international society or globalisation and what kind 
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of values, norms and rules does it promotes, and how? China and Japan, the two great 
powers in the region, certainly face dilemmas in this new security environment. 
 
Dilemmas in Sino-Japanese Relations 
Although the removal of ideological competition between the two superpowers meant 
that it would now be easier for China and Japan to cooperate, especially in the economic 
sphere, their relationship also became more complicated as new difficulties and 
dilemmas were thrown up. As a result of the fall of the Soviet Union and the reduced 
influence of Russia, China increased its power both relatively and absolutely, which 
allowed it to project its identity as a great power. It makes no secret of its desire to 
promote an essentially multipolar world order. Yet the fall of the Soviet Union also 
made the rise of China appear more threatening and hence complicates its relations with 
other powers, particularly with Japan (see, chapter 8).  
 
Moreover, the demise of the Soviet Union and the collapse of communism in Eastern 
Europe also produced a difficulty that was unique to China. In other words, although the 
end of the Cold War was welcome in the sense that it gave China greater opportunities 
to strive for a great power status, it was highly unwelcome in that it appeared to leave 
China ideologically isolated and even raised a question mark over the legitimacy of the 
Communist regime. The obvious question was whether Communist China could remain 
immune to the tide that was sweeping away most of the other Communists regimes in 
the world? The issue was brought into even sharper focus by what appeared to be the 
new direction of US foreign policy after the Cold War. As Rozman observes, from 1989 
to 1995, the United States viewed globalisation largely through the lens of human rights 
and democracy. Though willing to accept economic integration as a necessary element 
of globalisation, China ‘refused to embrace the twist that Americans, triumphant in the 
Cold War and angered by Tiananmen, gave to it’ (Rozman 2004b: 226).  
 
Ironically, without the common threat posed by the Soviet Union/Russia, Beijing’s 
bargaining power vis-à-vis the US became weaker and it had no option but to make 
concessions on issues such as NPT, trade and human rights (Buzan and Wæver 2003: 
166). At the same time, in an improved strategic environment, the US is well placed to 
lead on many international issues. Above all, it can exert formidable pressure on other 
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countries to move more speedily towards an American vision of political and economic 
reform. Thus, in the new environment, China’s efforts to achieve integration into 
international society encountered serious difficulties. The Tiananmen incident 
epitomised this dilemma. The American reaction, including immediate imposition of 
sanctions on China, ‘demonstrated anew America’s power in the global system’ (Foot 
1995b: 20).  
 
The event created high tension between Beijing and Washington and complicated 
Japan’s position. Like Taiwan and South Korea, Japan had relatively few problems with 
the values and norms promoted by the US. The real problem for Japan is increased 
entrapment and abandonment dilemmas, which result from the difficulty of balancing 
between the US and China. According to Drifte (2000: 454, 455), during the Cold War 
period, Japan’s main fear was entrapment – as revealed in conflicts such as the Korean 
and Vietnam wars. But Japan must now face dangers, both from entrapment and from 
abandonment. Since the mid-1990s, Japan has deepened its alliance system with the US, 
including the revision of Guidelines and joining TMD development – essentially to 
reduce the risk of abandonment. Yet such steps create the danger of entrapment, since 
Beijing views them as directed against China. The strong American reactions both in 
the Tiananmen crackdown 1989 and Taiwan crisis 1995-96 made Japan realise the 
difficulty of managing relations both its main ally (the US) and its most important 
neighbour (China).  
 
Yet Japan is also motivated by fears of abandonment. There were serious concerns 
about the implications of US-Japanese trade disputes in the late 1980s and early 1990s 
and of the 1996 Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute (see detailed account, Deans 2000), 
when the US showed some ambiguity over whether the Security Treaty covered the 
islands (Funabashi 1999: 401-07). Fears of abandonment were increased by the Clinton 
administration’s perceived over-emphasis on ‘the importance of China in relation to a 
number of countries but in particular to Japan’ (McDevitt 1998). However, the most 
serious challenge for Japan, particularly in times of crisis, is how to balance between the 
US pressure and China’s opposition to it and how to manage the consequent regional 
securitisation. Indeed, if war should break out, many Japanese leaders admit that their 
country would face a nightmare situation (interviews, April 2005). The most dangerous 
scenario would be a new crisis over Taiwan. If Japan failed to support the US, that 
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would endanger the US-Japan alliance, but if it gave total support to the US it would be 
sure to encounter the wrath of China. Japan’s new multilateral approach to security in 
the post-Cold War era is unlikely to solve this fundamental dilemma, but should 
certainly be seen as part of an attempt to reduce it.  
 
Greater Cooperation? 
At the same time, the US approach to security in Northeast / East Asia has undergone 
some changes. As Huxley (1998: 114-15) observes, Washington’s East Asia strategy no 
longer rests solely on calculations of relative power. While retaining a strong military 
presence, the US has simultaneously attempted to engage China and has supported 
regional confidence-building dialogues. To some extent, the new US posture has 
facilitated the extension of the scope of regional cooperation. 
 
First, with the end of the Cold War and the diminishing importance of ideological 
factors, the US began to shift its exclusive ‘hub and spoke’ system and to view 
multilateral, or at any rate ‘minilateral’, security arrangements with more favour. After 
APEC, the US has supported the ARF, the most important multilateral security 
arrangement in the Asia-Pacific region. In Northeast Asia, the US initiated the creation 
of KEDO, involving cooperation between the US, Japan, and South Korea, in an 
attempt to deal with the North Korean nuclear issue. Although KEDO has been 
criticised for its lack of progress (Segal 1997: 245), it represented the first attempt in 
Northeast Asia to solve a specific and very difficult security issue through a multilateral 
agreement. More recently, the US has also committed itself to the Six-Party Talks. 
Adam Ereli, deputy State Department spokesman, insists that ‘we have a multilateral 
approach to dealing with North Korea’, that is, the Six-Party Talks (Xinhua 21 June 
2006). Of course this does not mean that the US has abandoned bilateralism. In fact, the 
ties between the US and its East Asian allies have been strengthened, particularly with 
Japan (see, chapters 7, 8). 
 
Secondly, the nature of Sino-American relations and their competition in the post-Cold 
War era also deserves more careful examination. Of course, as sole superpower, the US 
makes it clear that it will not allow a peer competitor to arise and challenge its own 
position – and China is no exception. However, contemporary Sino-US relations should 
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not be seen as displaying essentially the characteristic features of the Cold War rivalry 
between the US and the Soviet Union. During the Cold War era, the US succeeded in 
securitising the Soviet threat on the global scale, in Buzan’s words a successful ‘macro 
securitisation’ (2006). For more than forty years, the Soviet threat was the over-riding 
priority of American policy – sometimes to the apparent exclusion of everything else. 
Although Beijing clearly fears that the US will take the same line with China, US 
attempts to contain China look decidedly half hearted in comparison with the resolute 
determination so long displayed towards the Soviet Union. We must ask why.   
 
Of course, the power gap between the US and China is still very wide; there is nothing 
like the near equality of power that once existed between the US and the Soviet Union. 
Although Chinese power has risen, American power has not waned. It may be that 
American superiority is so great that Washington sees little need to subject China to the 
kind of pressures it once used against the Soviet Union. Yet, given its track record with 
the Soviet Union, the American stance towards the rise of China – in some ways 
encouraging its development and certainly more engaging than containing – seems hard 
to explain. As Christenson argues, since late 1978 – when the US normalised relations 
with the PRC and Deng Xiaoping launched his historic reform program – ‘no foreign 
country has done more to make China stronger economically and diplomatically than 
the United States’ (Christenson: 2006: 108). Robert Zoellick, then Deputy Secretary of 
State, even stated publicly that the US engagement strategy has worked well: ‘the 
dragon emerged and joined the world’. He has insisted that it is very much in the 
interests of the US to persuade China to become a ‘responsible stakeholder’ in the 
international system (Zoellick 2005). These developments suggest that, while changes 
in the balance of power is important when state determining its securitisation practices, 
it may be more important how actors identify each other – in the last resort should they 
be regarded as enemies or friends? From Zoellick’s perspective, it would appear that, if 
China is not yet regarded as a friend, it is certainly no longer perceived as an enemy in 
the Cold War sense. 
 
There have been corresponding developments on the Chinese side. One of China’s most 
influential scholars in American studies, Wang Jisi (2001; 2005d), is convinced that 
there is room for accommodation between China and the US. He thinks that, despite the 
rise of China, the two countries can ‘avoid’ (bimian) a new Cold War; and other 
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Chinese scholars agree (Zheng Bijian 2005; and interviews, June 2005). Their optimism 
is derived from the belief that there are fundamental differences between recent Chinese 
foreign policy and the objectives pursued by Soviet Union in the Cold War period. The 
Soviet Union’s ultimate goal was the end of capitalism throughout the world. Even 
when it made agreements with the West, the Soviet Union regarded them as no more 
than temporary expedients; they did not mean that it had abandoned its mission to 
secure the eventual overthrow of the Western world order. 
 
But the recent position of China is very different. Rather than wishing to destroy the 
Western world order, since the late 1970s China has become increasingly appreciative 
of the benefits that this order may produce for itself and is hence correspondingly eager 
to be integrated (rongru) into it (Wang Yizhou 2003). It follows that Chinese policy is 
driven more by pragmatism rather than by rigid ideology, and accommodation with 
international society is a vital strand in China’s ‘peaceful rise’ strategy (see below 
China’s domestic changes). Thus, relations between China and the US are no longer 
seen in terms of a strictly zero-sum game8. Since the September 11, the scope of their 
cooperation and the elements of strategic partnership have expanded further. It remains 
true that China and the US are not firm friends, but their relationship is someway 
removed from the ‘enemy’ end of the spectrum. There are still many contentious issues 
that divide them – notably the Taiwan question – which could easily draw them into 
heightened competition, serious conflicts and even war. That is why the US 
simultaneously enhances its bilateral alliance system while engages in multilateral 
approaches. Nevertheless, as Christenson (2006: 110) argues, the broader US strategy 
towards China is now ‘not one of Cold War–style containment’ and their present 
relations reveal more positive sum elements than seemed possible in the early 1990s. 
These changes have enormous implications – mostly welcome – for the other regional 
actors, since virtually none want to have to choose between the US and China (Huxley 
1998; Shambaugh 2004/05).  
 
                                                 
 
8 An excellent account on US security strategy in East Asia both from zero-sum and positive-sum 
approaches, see Christenson 2006. 
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5.1.2 China’s Domestic Changes 
 
In the post-Cold War era, the rise of China received much attention both regionally and 
internationally, and, particularly in the early and mid 1990s, it became fashionable to 
talk about the ‘China threat’ (for details see Roy 1996). Yet we cannot ignore China’s 
domestic change and the changing nature of its relations with regional and international 
society, which may have even greater significance for regional security and stability. As 
argued earlier, in the early years of the regime, Communist China adopted a strong 
revolutionary and anti-imperialist rhetoric. However, more recently China has shown a 
different face to the world – not only in terms of the way it projects its material power 
but also in terms of its presentation of its own images and its relations with regional and 
global societies. Many see developments over the last half-century – that is from 
China’s internally costly and externally dangerous isolation to more recent moves to 
‘rejoin the world’ – as making a remarkably positive contribution to regional and 
international peace (Oksenberg and Economy 1999). Here it is important to examine 
how China ‘rejoined the world’ and to what extent its identity and interests changed in 
the processes. 
 
China ‘Rejoined the World’ 
Of course, the true extent and significance of China’s integration into the global 
community and the adoption of cooperative behaviour within it remains controversial 
and difficult to assess. In terms of quantity, the number of China’s membership and 
participation in regional and international institutions and organisations has increased 
dramatically. In terms of quality and commitment, however, the position is less clear. In 
particular, it is hard to judge how much this kind of participation has changed China’s 
identity and interests, and hence changed its foreign policy orientation. China’s record 
in various international and regional institutions provides evidence that can be used to 
support a range of different conclusions.  
 
In quantitative terms, a brief explanation will illustrate how China’s participation in 
international organisations increased so impressively in the 1980s and 1990s. As 
Samuel Kim (2004b: 42) concludes, China’s membership of international governmental 
organisations increased ‘from only two in the 1960s to 52 in the 1990s, about 83 per 
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cent of the average of major Western democracies and about 160 per cent of the world 
average’. It is often said that China has a better record in the economic sphere, yet 
according to Swaine and Johnston (1999: 100-101, 107) and Johnston (2003:12), 
China’s perspective has changed dramatically even in the area of arms control and non-
proliferation. In the past, it saw arms control agreements as largely irrelevant to its own 
concerns but now recognises their benefits. Thus, while in 1970 China had signed up to 
only 10-20 percent of the arms control arrangements for which it was eligible, the 
proportion had reached 85-90 percent by 1996. 
 
Of course, China did not move in this direction without hesitation; in particular it had 
serious reservations about signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) or 
committing itself to any other regime that might restrict its nuclear programs. This 
attitude arose from fears that the viability of China’s nuclear deterrent might be 
undermined by the deployment of ballistic missile defence systems in the US or Russia. 
However, after intense negotiations, primarily with the US, a compromise was reached 
on the intrusiveness of the CTBT verification regime. China eventually signed the 
CTBT treaty in 1996 even though this represented a considerable sacrifice and a 
constraint on its power. Hence, Swaine and Johnston (1999: 100-101) argue that China 
has shown considerable flexibility when participating in international institutions, and 
has made significant efforts to be seen as a responsible power. Similarly, many positive 
effects followed from China’s participation in regional security institutions. (I will look 
at these aspects in more detail in chapter 7). These changes have had profound impact 
on the emerging international society in Northeast / East Asia, as well as on the regional 
securitisation practices. 
 
The Implications for China’s Identity and for Regional Society 
Contrary to the position taken by neorealists, constructivists tend to emphasise the 
possibility of change in state identity and interests. China’s participation in the ARF 
provides a good case to examine how much state identity and interests can be changed. 
As Foot (1998) observes, less than five years after the first ARF meeting, China had 
abandoned its initial scepticism and had become an active, even enthusiastic participant. 
During the Asian financial crisis, China made further efforts to change its image to that 
of a benign power, and was eager to increase its influence in East Asia. Now under its 
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‘peaceful rise’ strategy, China wishes to be seen as a constructive economic player in 
the region and to gain more trust from ASEAN countries and from the world. At the 
2004 National People’s Congress, Premier Wen Jiabao went so far as to describe China 
as ‘a friendly elephant’ that posed no threat to others (Cheow 2004).  
 
Thus, if has not yet changed its identity, at least China has become both more flexible 
and skilful in its handling of issues, including sensitise ones. For instance, at the time 
when China was considering membership of various institutions the case of Taiwan’s 
membership appeared a major stumbling block, because the China/Taiwan question had 
been central to China’s extreme sensitivity over matters of sovereignty. Under the 
principle of one-China policy, the exclusion of Taiwan appeared a precondition for 
China’s membership. Indeed, China often insisted that this was non-negotiable. But as 
time passed, China became less inflexible. By 1986, both P. R. China and Taiwan were 
full members of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) – made possible by the simple 
expedient of referring to Taiwan as ‘Taipei China’. The implicit compromise provided 
the crucial precedent for dual membership of other international institutions, and made 
subsequent agreements easier (Deng 1997: 59). Taiwan joined PECC in 1986 and Hong 
Kong in 1990; in 1991 China, Taiwan and Hong Kong all joined APEC. In terms of 
military transparency, too, China has made gradual improvement, as demonstrated by 
its recent publication of several defense white papers (Shambaugh 2004/05: 88)  
 
Over democracy and human rights, Beijing has also shown some modest flexibility. 
Early in April 2004, it rejected a demand that, in 2007 there should be direct elections to 
choose the chief executive in Hong Kong. Of course this encountered strong protests 
from Hong Kong, UK, US and others. Yet, on the eve of his European tour (28 April 
2004), Chinese Premier Wan Jiabao, signalled a softer approach. He said ‘The objective 
stipulated in the Basic Law has not changed’, and direct elections of the chief executive 
and entire legislature were still the ultimate aim (Financial Times 29 April 2004). In 
March 2004 the National People’s Congress amended the constitution to include formal 
guarantees of human rights and private property (FEER 25 March 2004). These changes 
may be only minor or symbolic, yet they still reflect a change in direction and in degree. 
We may not be seeing dramatic changes – as when norms and institutions wither, 
emerge or collapse – but more subtle changes in understandings and interpretations of 
existing norms must also be counted as changes.  
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5.1.3 The Two Flashpoints in Northeast Asia 
 
The very existence and certainly the development of the Northeast Asian RSC is 
challenged most seriously by two related questions; both involve divided countries – 
between  China and Taiwan, and between two Koreas. Both problems have deep 
historical roots and have been much affected by the divisions of the Cold War. In the 
post-Cold War era, they raise serious new challenges, yet also provide opportunities for 
the regional actors. I will examine these issues in detail in chapter 8, but here I will 
discuss them with particular reference to ideational factors. 
 
The Taiwan Question 
In the post-Cold War era, tensions over Taiwan have become more acute – that 
‘relations between China and Taiwan suffered their worst crisis for 40 years in 1995-96’ 
(Lee 1999: 9). What are the main causes of such crisis? The Taiwan question began in 
1949, when the Chinese Nationalist Party or Kuomintang (KMT) lost the civil war with 
the Chinese Communist party (CCP). The KMT fled to the island of Taiwan and 
continued its struggle with the CCP throughout the Cold War. Both the KMT and the 
CCP insisted that there was only one China and each claimed to be the legitimate 
government of the whole of the country. Thus, the referent object of security for both 
was the nation state – China as a whole. In this zero-sum game, the central question was 
who was the legitimate government of China. Tension was high in the 1950s, yet 
Beijing’s attempts to regain Taiwan were deterred by ‘an explicit US military protection 
of Taiwan backed with veiled threats of nuclear weapons’ (Kang 2003: 362). The 
Taiwan problem has had major implications on the triangular relationship between 
China, America and Japan, perhaps even more so on direct Sino-American relations. 
Initially, both Washington and Tokyo recognised the Taipei government, headed by 
Chiang Kai-shek, as the legitimate government of China and signed peace treaties with 
the ROC. The newly established Beijing government allied with the Soviet Union and 
identified itself with the communist bloc.  
 
Changes in the Referent Object of Security 
In the course of the 1990s, the security issue, the referent object (that is what is to be 
secured) shifted from the legitimacy of the government of the whole China to focus on 
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the status of Taiwan. The change may be traced back to 1970s, when the international 
community, particularly the US and Japan, transferred their recognition from the ROC 
to the PRC. The new situation, especially American de-recognition, was a major blow 
to Taiwan’s global and geopolitical status, completely destroying its claim to represent 
China as a whole. In other words, Taiwan, could no longer compete with the PRC 
because the international community had rejected its claim to represent the whole of 
China. Indeed, in 1991, it officially abandoned the idea of retaking the mainland. This 
shift has been accelerated by democratisation in Taiwan. The process began in the 
1980s and increasingly brought the idea of a distinct Taiwanese identity to forefront of 
domestic political debate. Since then the political space has widened dramatically. 
Taiwan has moved from an authoritarian regime to one based on elections, a 
transformation culminating in a free presidential election in 1996. Further major steps 
towards democracy followed. In 2000, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), 
formerly in opposition, became the ruling party, and the Referendum Law was passed in 
November 2003 (Kang 2003: 364; Wu 2004). 
 
Paradoxically, however, as Buzan and Wæver (2003: 149-52) suggest, the ROC’s 
abandonment of its claim to represent the whole of China has not reduced tension with 
the PRC – because it actually challenges the PRC’s own ‘one China’ dogma. From 
Beijing’s point of view, this is totally unacceptable. While Taipei may have abandoned 
the one China dogma, the PRC has not and views it as a cornerstone of China’s 
sovereignty and territorial integrity, upon which no compromise is possible. Thus, 
Chinese leaders have repeatedly threatened to use force to prevent Taiwanese 
independence. It was within this context that two crises occurred in 1990s.  
 
At the turn of the millennium the problem of Taiwan’s status and tension across the 
Strait remained acute. In 2000, when Chen Shui-bian was elected president, the DPP 
replaced the long dominant KMT as the ruling party. The DPP not only campaigned for 
greater democracy but was also more strongly committed to independence than its rival. 
The two causes were seen as inextricably linked. A growing sense of ethnic identity has 
been the driving force in the rise of the DPP, which enjoys substantial support among 
the bensheng-ren (Taiwanese natives). DPP policy has moved beyond the claim to 
unconditional sovereignty for an independent Taiwanese state; it now pursues a ‘one 
China, one Taiwan’ agenda.  
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Challenges and Limitations of the Taiwan Issue 
The Taiwan question poses particular difficulties for Sino-Japanese relations. For 
China, the possibility of Taiwan’s independence is clearly a highly sensitive and 
perplexing issue, or, in Mahbubani’s (2005) words, one of its most ‘tender spots’. This 
is not surprising, because ‘the issue ultimately impacts on the legitimacy of the 
communist regime’ (Buzan and Wæver 2003: 151). It is also the last remaining symbol 
of a century of Chinese humiliation, much of it at the hands of Japan. Japan defeated 
China in the war of 1894-5 and ruled Taiwan for fifty years until its defeat in the Pacific 
War (see chapter 3). Thus, the Taiwan issue became sensitive to both sides, and their 
already difficult relationship became increasingly complicated in the post-Cold War era.  
 
After the switch of diplomatic recognition from the ROC to the PRC in 1972, Japan 
officially supported the ‘one China’ policy and hence confined relations with Taiwan to 
the unofficial level (for a detailed account, see Deans 2001). Until the early 1990s, 
however, the problem did not appear insuperable. Although Japan could no longer 
recognise the ROC or maintain formal diplomatic relations with it, Tokyo adopted the 
principle of seikei bunri – the separation of politics and economics – thus allowing it to 
maintain informal contact with Taipei. Deans describes Japan’s practice as one of 
‘informal politics and virtual diplomacy’ (Deans 2001: 152) in which Japan enjoyed 
reasonably harmonious relations with both China and Taiwan. Thus, while official 
policy was to support ‘one China’, in practice, Japan operated something close to a ‘two 
Chinas’ policy.  
 
Recently, however, the Japanese position has become more complex. Many Japanese, 
especially the younger generation of politicians, admire the successful democratisation 
of Taiwan and a perceived convergence of values has been seen as the basis for closer 
bilateral ties between Japan and Taiwan (Q. K. Wang 2000: 360). There is thus an 
inclination in some quarters to ‘tilt’ towards Taiwan – and by implication away from the 
still far from democratic PRC. This tendency has been reinforced by the so-called Lee 
Teng-hui factor. The former President of Taiwan (KMT) was educated in Japan, speaks 
fluent Japanese and has strong personal ties with many Japanese politicians. In the 
1990s tensions occurred between China and Japan over the issue of invitation of 
Taiwanese politicians, including Lee Teng-hui, as Beijing viewed those invitations as 
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serious challenge to the ‘one China’ principle. Beijing’s concerns were heightened by 
the development of closer ties between the US and Japan, because it particularly worries 
their implication for Taiwan (see chapter 8). 
 
Yet the future may not be so bleak. Recent developments in China, Japan, and in 
Taiwan itself also point to the emergence of constraining forces that could reduce the 
threat of war over Taiwan. Most importantly, China faces an acute dilemma over the 
Taiwan question. In particular, its desire to uphold its political principles and maintain 
its legitimacy is to some extent offset by an understandable reluctance to engage in all 
out war. Indeed, in 2002, the 16th National Congress of the Communist Party adopted 
avoidance of conflict with the US over Taiwan as an official objective of Chinese 
policy. Thus, while Beijing continues to improve its military capabilities for a possible 
conflict in the Taiwan Strait, it clearly hopes that it will not have used them. 
Significantly Beijing sees the US as the key to the solution of the Taiwan problem and 
looks to Washington to provide the necessary ‘heavy lifting’ to restrain Taipei’s pro-
independence moves (Glaser 2004). But China is also interested in direct contacts with 
Taiwan, strikingly demonstrated in the historic meeting between leaders of the CCP and 
KMT in Beijing in April 2005. Thus, there are signs that, over the years, Beijing’s 
position has moved from a belligerent emphasis on its readiness to use force towards a 
tacit readiness to settle for the status quo. 
 
Similarly, the pressures pushing Japan closer to Taiwan are balanced by other 
calculations pointing in the opposite direction. As I argued earlier, in essence, the 
dilemma facing Japan is whether to seek to preserve its alliance with the US at all costs 
or to give priority to maintaining stable relations with China. The dilemma is 
particularly acute because, under the revised US-Japan security guidelines, Japan is 
committed to providing logistical support for US military interventions in ‘areas 
surrounding Japan’. As a Japanese official admitted, if the cross-strait conflict 
intensified to a point where it prompted US intervention, Japan would face a ‘nightmare 
in which it has to choose’ between the US and China (Japan Times 19 March 2000; 
interviews, April 2005). Thus, Tokyo desires a peaceful settlement of the cross-strait 
conflict to avoid direct military confrontation with China. In other words, with 
increased tension cross the Strait, Japan’s first concern was to avoid entanglement in a 
crisis in which it has no desire to be involved. 
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 Moreover, developments within Taiwan in the 1990s and in the new century suggest 
that there is appreciation of the risks of a formal declaration of independence and an 
underlying preference for a continuation of the status quo. Of course, the ‘Taiwan 
identity’ movement has become a major force in Taiwanese politics since the mid-
1990s. Chen was elected in the 2000 and 2004 elections, largely due to the support of 
those who emphasised Taiwanese identity (Schubert 2004). However, when Chen went 
so far as to provoke Beijing and to risk war, the Taiwanese electorate was notably less 
enthusiastic. In the run-up to the December 2004 legislative elections, Chen and his 
supporters repeatedly indicated that they might seek to adopt a new constitution. Beijing 
responded by escalating its threats to use force and even President George W. Bush 
publicly criticised Chen. Significantly the DPP lost ground in the legislative elections of 
December 2004.  
 
Other developments in Taiwan also suggest a more conciliatory mood. Subsequent 
developments cross the Strait suggest a further conciliatory trend rather than toward 
actual war. Opposition parties, such as the KMT and the People First Party (PFP), took 
heart from the DPP’s setback in the December 2004 legislative elections. Thus, despite 
the fact the China passed the Anti-Secession Law in March 2005 – which inflamed 
public opinion in Taiwan against the mainland – the KMT Chairman Lien Chan visited 
the mainland in April 2005 and the PFP Chairman James Soong followed in May. Both 
confirmed their support for the ‘1992 consensus’ and their opposition to Taiwan’s 
independence (IHT 29 April 2005; People’s Daily 10 May 2005). Polls taken shortly 
after Lien’s trip showed that 56 percent of Taiwan’s electorate supported his visit and 
that 46 percent identified the KMT as the party most capable of handling cross-strait 
relations, whereas only 9.4 percent believed that the DPP was most capable (Ross 
2006).  
 
These developments suggest that while many of its inhabitants now think that Taiwan 
has an identity separate from China’s and hence merits a degree of international 
recognition, this does not mean that they favour a formal declaration of independence to 
risk of war (Ross 2006). In short, the Taiwanese are concerned about any developments 
that would change their day- to- day lives. That is, while conscious of their separate 
identity, Taiwanese voters seem to prefer the status quo in cross-strait relations. Thus, 
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although Taiwanese identity or formal independence has become a referent object of 
security, it is somehow muted by the risk of day- to- day stable life.  
 
The Korean Question: From Victory to Regime Survival 
Of all the problems facing the Northeast Asian RSC, Korea has proved the most 
difficult and intractable. Despite the end of the Cold War, the Korean peninsula still 
remains a serious source of mistrust and conflict; the problem has become even more 
acute because of decisive changes in power balance (see chapter 8). These have been 
caused not only by the relative decline in North Korea’s capability against the South, 
but also by changes in great power support behind the two states. An asymmetry 
appeared in which the South was recognised by China and Russia, but the North was 
not recognised by either the United States or Japan. Thus, these developments ‘not only 
undermined the credibility of the commitment of the North’s great power backers, but 
they also eroded the credibility of the North’s case against the South’ (Yahuda 1996: 
265). According to Kang (2003a: 356) these highly negative developments forced North 
Korea to change its strategy. The North could no longer win a power game against the 
South. Its over-riding objective moved from victory over the South towards an 
increasing preoccupation with the survival of the regime itself. This change provides the 
essential context for an understanding of the many crises that have occurred in Korea 
since the mid 1990s.   
 
Threats, Dilemmas, and Opportunities 
North Korea has demonstrated that it can complicate Sino-Japanese relations and 
seriously undermine regional and international security; it even has the capacity to cause 
major destruction. Yet, while the problems of Korea have presented the states of 
Northeast Asia with a series of threats and dilemmas, they have also provided them with 
opportunities.  
 
Certainly Japan experiences the same twin dilemma in relation to the Korean issue, 
although in the case, it is arguable that historical factors are even more important. 
Japanese leaders acknowledge that it is difficult to take any clear stance on the Korean 
reunification. If Japan supports reunification, it may be accused to seeking to weaken 
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the Korean economy. Yet if it shows no enthusiasm for reunification, it could face the 
allegation that it wishes to prevent Korea from achieving political and military strength. 
Thus, Armacost and Pyle (2001: 131, 132) see Japan’s low profile in inter-Korean 
affairs as the result of the long and troubled history of Japanese-Korean relations. They 
argue that despite new conditions, the burden of the past will continue to weigh heavily 
on the course of Japan’s present and future relationship with Korea. In a same vein, 
Samuel Kim (2002: 28) identifies Japan’s colonial past as the ultimate reason why it has 
made less progress than the other members of the ‘Big Four’ in normalising its relations 
with North Korea. 
 
Developments in Korea also present China with a dilemma. The peninsula has a 
tremendous significance for Chinese security, ‘a source of threat’ unless it is ‘controlled 
or neutralised’. Above all, Korea is ‘a potential entry point for rival powers’ (Scalapino 
2001: 107). Thus, after the partition of Korea, China pursued a policy of assisting the 
survival of the North Korean regime, both for ideological considerations and for reasons 
of its own national security interests. Although, following the example of Russia, 
Beijing normalised relations with Seoul in 1992, China certainly fears any sudden 
collapse of the North Korean regime. Ideologically, North Korea is one of the few 
surviving fellow communist regimes and hence the Chinese are more committed to its 
survival than they were to that of other Communist states, such as Russia. Chinese 
national interests may be even more important. Yet North Korea’s nuclearisation 
increasingly complicates China’s relations with other states particularly with Japan (see, 
chapter 8). 
 
Yet the Korean problem has also given China and Japan and regional actors opportunity 
to improve their relations with each other. First, Japan’s relations with South Korea 
improved considerably over the years, though with some fluctuations. As Cha (1999; 
2000) observes, relations between Japan and South Korea have been marred by intense 
antagonisms rooted in feelings of historical injustice. However, in the post Cold War 
era, policy co-ordination between Japan and ROK has developed to quite a high level, 
including joint management of KEDO following the Agreed Framework (despite many 
problems in its implementation). Japan and South Korea joined the US in creating the 
Trilateral Cooperation and Oversight Group (TCOG) in the wake of the Taepodong-1 
incident. Auslin (2005:467) argues that the crises over North Korea were mainly 
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responsible for this cooperation. The rapprochement between Japan and South Korea 
has been extended to address history. As Berger (2004: 152) notes, despite numerous 
setbacks, the two sides have tried hard to overcome historically generated feelings of 
antagonism. At the 1998 summit, the Japanese Prime Minister, Obuchi Keizo, made a 
formal apology for Japanese misdeeds during the colonial period, while the Korean 
President Kim Dae Jung also sought to move beyond the acrimony of the past. His 
government eased bans imposed a half century earlier on Japanese investment and on 
the importation of Japanese movies, music, magazines and other forms of popular 
culture (Armacost and Pyle 2001: 143). 
 
The Six-Party Talks: a Positive Move?  
The effort to end North Korea’s nuclear weapons programs brought six nations – the 
two Koreas, Japan, China, Russia, and the United States – together in Beijing in August 
2003. By November 2005, five rounds had been held. There have been many 
complaints of lack of progress and the six parties themselves often assembled in Beijing 
‘with very low expectations’ (BBC 28 February 2004). Yet, despite the low expectations 
and criticisms, at least the Talks continue to provide a framework for addressing the 
North Korean problem. The continuation of the Talks suggests a tacit recognition by all 
the parties that there is no alternative to negotiation, although none have much room for 
manoeuvre. This ‘stalemate’ has important implications for regional security.  
 
Some of the complaints made about the talks may be unfounded. While no break-
through has been achieved and some of the obstacles appear almost insurmountable, 
analysis of the successive rounds does suggest some modest progress. In the first two 
rounds, there was no agreement at all – except to meet again. North Korea would not go 
any further than its offer ‘to freeze but not scrap its nuclear facilities in return for energy 
aid and security assurances’, while the US appeared equally intransigent, demanding 
that North Korea agree to the ‘complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement 
(CVID) of all its nuclear capabilities (BBC 28 Feb 2004).  
 
Yet, in the third round (June 2004), the parties were more flexible and reached some 
tentative agreement. As Cossa (2004) noted, the US stopped taking about CVID, 
recognising that the term carried too much political baggage – even though it continued 
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to regard this as the only acceptable long-term outcome. On the other side, under strong 
pressure from the US, Pyongyang accepted that the proposed ‘freeze for rewards’ would 
be a first step towards dismantlement of all its nuclear weapons programs. For its part, 
the US agreed that the ‘rewards’ could come early in the process. Other countries 
seemed amenable to ‘front-loading’ energy and economic assistance if a verifiable 
freeze progress could be initiated. On 19 September 2005 during the fourth round, for 
the first time, the six parties agreed a joint statement of principles. This created a real 
momentum after two years of meetings and Japan’s Foreign Minister paid tribute to the 
efforts of all the countries involved, particularly China (MOFA, Foreign Minister 
Machimura’s statement 20 Sep 2005). 
 
Of course, these achievements are relatively modest and the denuclearisation of Korea 
remains a long way off as evident of recurring crises. Nevertheless, as Adam Ereli, 
deputy State Department spokesman, points out, the Six-Party Talks still provides ‘a 
framework for achieving jointly held goals, jointly held objectives’, and can be regarded 
as ‘an effective one’ (Xinhua 21 June 2006). More importantly, the talks could have 
positive long-term effects on Northeast Asian regional security. Some scholars believe 
that if the Talks become systematic and regular, they can develop into a general system 
to ensure security in Northeast Asia (Shen Dingli, interview in June 2005). Pang (2004) 
argues that the Six Party Talks have ‘kindled of gleam of hope for the establishment of 
a multilateral security system in the region’. As a Chinese scholar at the University of 
Nankai, he even sees the possibility that the process could culminate in China bringing 
the Taiwan issue to a multilateral table – unthinkable previously. 
 
5.1.4 Growing Regionalism and Multilateralism 
 
The emergence of regionalism and multilateralism in East Asia and in the Asia-Pacific 
region, suggesting a trend to a new pattern of relationships, has attracted growing 
attention since the end of the Cold War. The increasing sense of regionalism is an 
important and positive development, especially when compared to the situation of Cold 
War fragmentation. Particularly it is significant as historically East Asians have not 
experienced multilateralism. The main question here is to what extent these processes 
facilitated the emergence of regional identity / society (for other aspects of regionalism 
and multilateralism will be examined in subsequent economic and military-political 
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sectors). To answer this question, while examine the Sino-Japanese factors and the role 
of ASEAN, I look at more closely the role of the US. 
 
The Sino-Japanese Factor and ASEAN Experiments 
The leadership issue has always been at the centre of Sino-Japanese relations in the 
context of regionalism and multilateralism in Asia. So far, neither of the two great 
powers has taken a full leadership role. Rather, they have been willing to see ASEAN 
take on a role of collective leadership. Identity factors and their respective positions in 
regional and global international society help to explain these somewhat surprising 
attitudes. As I discussed in the previous chapter, both China and Japan have problems in 
their regional identity and neither finds it easy to accept the other as a leader.  
 
China, historically an Empire itself, found it difficult to see itself as ‘part of Asia’; 
rather Asia was once merely ‘China’s periphery’ (Bessho 1999: 31). Thus, while 
regional actors may fear a revival of China’s old claims to suzerainty, China also has 
difficulty in accommodating itself into multilateral arrangements. This was particularly 
true in the early 1990s – the initial period of emerging regionalism and multilateralism 
in East Asia and Asia Pacific – when a desire to socialise China to make it a more 
responsible power was clearly a driving force (Foot 1998). For different reasons, Japan 
also finds it hard to identify itself solely with Asia. Since the Meiji period Japan never 
fully resolved its dilemma between the West and Asia. Even today it is often said that 
Japan is in Asia but not of Asia (Bessho 1999). This ambivalence hindered Japan’s 
leadership role, which was not helped by regional distrust and Japan’s own doubts about 
its own imperial past.  
 
Thus, historically constructed identity factors worked negatively for both China and 
Japan and hampered any aspiration to claim legitimate leadership of the emerging 
regionalism. Since neither China nor Japan could take a role of legitimate leadership in 
a regional grouping, an alternative approach was necessary. There was probably a desire 
to ‘socialise’ China and this objective seemed more likely to be achieved in a larger 
rather than a smaller grouping. In other words it made better sense to include Southeast 
Asia in a multilateral approach rather than to attempt an exclusively Northeast Asian 
grouping – in which Sino-Japanese rivalry was likely to be the dominant feature. 
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Fortunately, a model was already available in the shape of the long-established ASEAN, 
which already had considerable achievements to its credit9.  
 
ASEAN was formed in 1967 and, as Acharya (1998: 204) argues, was certainly inspired 
by the progress of the European Community, although its members were ‘not interested 
in emulating the EC model’. Unlike the European model – which aspires to a high level 
of regional integration requiring at least partial surrender of member states’ 
sovereignties – ‘ASEAN was conceived as a framework which will allow its members 
to preserve their independence and advance their national interests, rather than promote 
supranationalism’. In the processes, something now known as the ‘ASEAN Way’ has 
developed. Acharya (2003b: 253) explains: 
The “ASEAN Way” consists of a code of conduct for inter-state behaviour 
as well as a decision-making process based on consultations and consensus. 
The code of conduct incorporates a set of well-known principles, e.g. non-
interference in the domestic affairs of each other, non-use of force, pacific 
settlement of disputes, respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of 
member states…. 
 
ASEAN’s experiences and its approaches provided a model for post-Cold War security 
multilateralism in Asia. The ARF was founded upon the norms of ASEAN, including 
non-interference in the internal affairs of states, non-use of force, pacific settlement of 
disputes – in short upon the ‘ASEAN Way’. In the processes of regionalism and 
multilateralism, ASEAN countries, particularly Malaysia and Singapore, endorsed ideas 
such as ‘Asian values’ and ‘East Asian community’ as important symbols. However 
both in economic and security realms, regionalism and multilateralism did not result in 
an immediate and exclusively East Asia identity / society. Rather in the processes, the 
so-called ‘super-regional projects’ (Buzan 2004b: 103-6), such as APEC and ARF, have 
been institutionalised; and ideas such as ‘Asia-Pacific’ or ‘Pacific-Rim’ now became 
widely accepted that some even refers to as ‘rimspeak’ (Cumings 1993: 29-47). To find 
the main reasons, one has to turn to the role of the US. 
                                                 
 
9 About the role of ASEAN in the Emerging East Asian Security Architecture, see Huxley 1996a. 
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The US Role 
In large measure, the reason why regionalism and multilateralism has not developed on 
an exclusively Northeast or East Asian basis, but rather on a wider Asia-Pacific one, is 
that this accords with the preferences of the United States. From identity considerations, 
Katzenstein stresses lack of any meaningful Asian-American identity on the US side. In 
the 1990s, the US was becoming part of an emerging Asia-Pacific region in the 1990s, 
yet it still perceived itself as more closely linked with ‘Eurocentric Anglo-American 
culture’ than with any ‘Asian-American identity’. Thus, the US eschewed ‘references to 
Asian values and an East Asian community’ (Katzenstein 2000: 358, 359). This means 
that the US identification towards East Asia has remained the same as in the 1940s and 
50s, when it preferred a system of bilateral alliances to a multilateral one. Now for the 
same reason the US still cannot subscribe to the idea of an East Asian community.  
 
Yet the question remains as to why the US supports a specifically Asia-Pacific grouping 
and identity? Here Buzan’s (2004b) arguments on the US ‘swing power’ strategy are 
relevant. According to Buzan, American preference of Asia-Pacific or Pacific-rim is 
more than instinctive; it is a conscious choice, closely linked with the way it manages 
its superpower position throughout the world: 
The US has adopted a swing-power strategy in which it positions itself as a 
member of three macro-regions (Asian-Pacific, North Atlantic, Western 
hemisphere) as a way of legitimizing its actual presence as an outside power 
in Europe, East Asia and Latin America (Buzan 2004b: 7). 
 
It suited American interests to construct Asia-Pacific as a ‘super-regional’ project, 
because this would permit the US to institutionalise its position inside this ‘super-
region’ – precisely as it had done in other ‘super-regions’ such as in Europe and Latin 
America. The ‘Asia-Pacific’ strategy had the advantage of effectively preventing the 
possibility of any consolidation of East Asia that ‘might either shut the US out’ or, 
‘even develop as global power rivals to it’ (Buzan 2004b: 104). Moreover, by 
constructing such super-regional projects, the US did not lock itself completely into 
them and hence retained its ability to act as a ‘swing power’. In other words, while 
engaging in several regions, it was not permanently wedded to any. In principle, it could 
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‘vary the degree and character of its engagement according to its own choice’ – that is 
the way how it manages its ‘superpowerdom’ (Buzan 2004b: 105). 
 
Thus, if lack of ‘Asian-American identity’ led the US to eschew specific East Asian 
regionalism, its interests as the sole superpower actively drew it to Asia-Pacific 
regionalism. Of course, the US could be a legitimate member of an ‘Asian-Pacific’ 
grouping whereas it could never be a member of an exclusively East Asian one. At the 
same time, involvement in ‘Asia-Pacific’ did not threaten to ‘pull’ the US from 
legitimate membership of other regional groupings and placed some limits on its 
commitments to this – or indeed to any other – region. In this way, the US has 
institutionalised the idea of Asia-Pacific and its ‘swing-power strategy’. Moreover, the 
US has the ability to construct its ‘swing’ identity and enforce its strategy. In East Asian 
case, the regional dependency on the US further increased America’s power of leverage, 
and enhanced the prospects of the ‘Asia-Pacific’ way it preferred.  
 
Thus, a mixture of material and ideational factors affected the development of 
regionalism in Asia and the Pacific. Whatever may have happened elsewhere, 
particularly in Western Europe, regionalism in Asia did not lead to the formation of a 
strong collective identity. Yet this may change; the Asian financial crisis (1997-98) 
triggered renewed interest in something more exclusive, the so-called new East Asian 
regionalism. The creation of ASEAN Plus Three represents a major development in the 
relationship between ASEAN and Northeast Asian powers. APT, which brings together 
the ten member states of ASEAN with China, Korea and Japan, had its first meeting in 
1997 to discuss a regional response to the financial crisis. The APT summit meeting in 
1999 produced a Joint Statement on East Asia Cooperation. This was followed by other 
developments aimed at greater regional collaboration in East Asia, and included the 
‘Chiang Mai Initiative’ of May 2000, the ASEAN-China Free Trade agreement of 2001, 
and the first East Asian Summit of December 2005. The processes have been moving 
further towards an East Asian community building. 
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Conclusion to Part I 
 
Part 1 of this thesis has sketched a brief history of the evolution of international society 
of Northeast and East Asia from the Chinese world order, through its collapse and 
integration into the global international society and then the brief experience of 
Japanese imperial order, on to the intense military and ideological competition of the 
Cold War, and finally arriving at the post-Cold War period. Of course my main purpose 
is to examine Sino-Japanese relations and the Northeast Asian security order in the post-
Cold War era. I believe, however, that current events and trends cannot be properly 
understood unless they are viewed in the light of history. If approached with no 
historical context, many contemporary phenomena appear anomalous and puzzling. In 
other words, the historical experience of East Asia, going back for millennia, has 
important implications both for IR theories and for empirical interpretations. 
 
The mainstream IR thinking assumes that the model established in seventeenth century 
Europe is universal and hence describes the international system at all times and in all 
places. However, the story of Northeast Asia and East Asia exhibits a very different 
reality, one in which the Chinese world order, with all its distinctive features, existed or 
co-existed with the European society of states until the mid-nineteenth century. 
Moreover, the process whereby the Chinese world order collapsed and the territories 
formerly belonging to it became integrated into the expanding European international 
society suggests that Samuel Huntington’s ‘clash of civilizations’ thesis is not just a 
present or future scenario. Rather it was part of the process whereby the present 
international society was constructed. The European international society successfully 
expanded itself to East Asia and to the rest of the world. Yet, whether through 
colonisation and decolonisation or through ‘socialisation and competition’ (Waltz 
1979), the process of forming a ‘standard of civilization’ (Gong 1984a) is still 
continuing. After the collapse of the old order, Northeast / East Asians constantly strove 
to build and rebuild regional international society, which would coexist with, to be 
integrated into, or even compete with the expanding and evolving global international 
society. 
 
 149
It is certainly true that examination of the contemporary situation in Northeast / East 
Asia reveals the inadequacies of general or single IR theories. Many phenomena simply 
cannot be explained in these terms. For instance, historically, the international order in 
East Asia has been characterised by the application of the principle of hierarchy; notions 
of sovereign equality have only gained currency since the mid-nineteenth century. It is 
curious, however, that while the Western powers, the original inventors and imposers of 
the sovereign norm, are moving beyond the Westphalian model, many Asians still 
subscribe enthusiastically to the Westphalian norm of sovereign equality. How should 
we interpret this apparent reversal of positions and what implications does it have for 
security relations in the region?  
 
While it may be possible to find a partial explanation for this phenomenon in terms of 
systemic constraints, it makes better sense to investigate it in the historical context – 
that is to explain how East Asians entered into present international society and how 
they gained their sovereign rights through the processes of anti-imperialism and anti-
colonialism. Similarly, the historical experiences of the ‘standard of civilisation’ should 
be used to assist understanding of the emergence of distinctive versions of regionalism 
and multilateralism. These versions have developed more slowly than their European 
equivalents and exhibit major differences from them. These matters will be more fully 
investigated in the next two sections, dealing with the economic and military-political 
spheres respectively. 
 
Moreover, on the global scale, the rise of China has been seen as presenting a major 
challenge to the post-Cold War security order both regionally and internationally. Yet 
many Northeast and East Asian countries have viewed the rise of China with relative 
equanimity. They have taken a softer posture than the Western powers and displayed 
greater engagement towards the rise of China. Does this mean, as Huntington (1996: 
237-38) and Kang (2003a; 2003b) argue, that East Asia will revert to the historical norm 
of a hierarchical order, a revived but modified version of the old Chinese world order. I 
will argue that the possibility of this happening is remote. I shall contend that, despite 
its long history of hierarchy, the experience of East Asia since the mid-nineteenth 
century has also been highly formative. East Asian countries have concluded that their 
national interests are best served by application and acceptance of the principle of 
sovereign equality. Here, as argued in Chapter 4, the process of the emergence of 
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nationalism is of crucial importance, as indeed is the chain of events that led to 
independence of these states. 
 
Finally, Sino-Japanese rivalry has become a central concern in the Northeast Asian or 
Asian security order. In part, this concern reflects a response to a shift in the balance of 
power – the stock in trade of traditional IR theories – but the historical dimensions are 
important too. The present situation in East Asia is unique in its history in that there 
have never been two regional great powers in the region at the same time. But it is not 
entirely unprecedented; historically, Japan and China have often been rivals. Even in the 
days of the Chinese world order, Japan frequently challenged Chinese superiority and 
attempted to expand its sphere of influence. Japan’s domination eventually came into 
reality when it acquired Taiwan from China and displaced Chinese influence from 
Korea – and going on to conquer most of East Asia and much of China itself. Thus, the 
high levels of securitisation logic associated with tensions over Taiwan and the Korean 
peninsula have deep roots in history and cannot be explained without it. Hence, this 
societal sector provides the essential background for the understanding and 
interpretation of security dynamics in the post-Cold War period both in economic and 
military-political dimensions, too. 
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 Part II:  The Economic Dimension:  
                 The Possibility of Cooperation and Beyond 
 
Introduction 
 
The relationship between economics and security or, more precisely, how economic 
interactions affect security dynamics, is highly controversial. Perhaps the most 
controversial question of all is whether close economic interdependence and mutual 
involvement in international institutions makes states more cooperative and hence 
lowers the possibility of war. This issue was at the centre of the dialogue between 
neorealists and neoliberals in the 1980s and early 1990s – the so called ‘neo-neo’ 
debates (see Baldwin ed. 1993).  
 
In this Part, I explore aspects of neorealism and neoliberalism to determine whether new 
calculations resulting from closer economic interaction induced regional actors to 
become more cooperative or more competitive in their behaviour. Yet I go beyond the 
‘neo-neo’ debate to consider the effects of increasing economic interaction on 
normative conditions and on security dynamics – focussing in particular on the 
emergence of economic regionalism. Chapter 6 investigates the neorealist approach, 
especially the impact of economic development on states’ capability and the resulting 
effects on security practice. Chapter 7 examines the neoliberal perspective, especially 
the impact of economic interdependence and international institutions on states’ 
behaviour. This investigation is taken further to include the English school approach to 
the role of norms and institutions in international society. These various approaches will 
all be linked to the central question of whether developments in the economic sphere 
reduced or increased the logic of securitisation.  
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6 Economic Capabilities and the Distribution of Power 
 
Introduction 
 
In debates about economics and security relations, two relatively optimistic liberal 
views seem to have prevailed. One holds that increasing economic interdependence 
raises the costs of conflict and lowers the incentives for war. The other contends that 
international institutions provide information that engenders trust and reduces 
uncertainty, and hence makes states more willing to cooperate (Keohane and Nye 1977; 
1987). But neorealists reject these optimistic analyses. As discussed in Chapter 2, the 
basis of the neorealist position is the belief that the international system is, by nature, an 
anarchy and that this has important consequences. Hence, neorealists hold that states 
take a ‘positional’ stance in the international system and that the logic of security 
competition compels them to aim to maximise their power positions relative to other 
states (Grieco 1993: 117-18; Mearsheimer 1994/95: 11-12). Neorealists accept that 
economics and security are closely related, but the true significance of this relationship 
is that, since economic resources and development contribute directly to a state’s 
capability, it follows that they help to determine its power position within the system. 
As the economies of states rise or decline, a redistribution of power occurs within the 
system and causes major changes in security relations among the actors. 
 
Even viewed from an economic angle, if the neorealists are right, there is little reason to 
take an optimistic view of the security relations of Northeast Asia. Of course, it is true 
that the webs of economic interdependence and multilateral institutions, which 
neoliberals think should have pacifying effects, have not developed very far until very 
recently. But neorealists insist that, even if these webs and institutions became more 
highly developed than at present, there would be no guarantee that a benign security 
regime would follow. In other words, economic interdependence can cause conflicts and 
war as readily as it can promote peace. Thus, the most critical aspect of economics-
security relations in Northeast Asia is the distribution of power. This distribution is 
already being affected by China’s rapid economic expansion, representing an obvious 
challenge to the US’s interests and position in the region and also liable to provoke the 
remilitarisation of Japan. This chapter focuses on two main issues: the weak effects of 
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economic interdependence and institutions; and the security challenges posed by the 
rapid rise of China. 
 
6.1 Interdependence and Institutions: Weak Effects 
 
Neorealists believe that, even at best, increasing economic interdependence and the 
emergence of multilateral institutions will have only marginally positive effects on 
security in Northeast Asia; indeed the effects could well be negative. The situation may 
be contrasted to that found in Western Europe. There, the density of economic 
interconnections and institutional developments has facilitated the emergence of a 
security community. Thus, even if conflicts occur, they will be resolved in peaceful 
ways. In Northeast Asia, however, even with rapid economic growth, ties of economic 
interdependence remain weak. Further, multilateral institutions are also underdeveloped, 
even compared to Southeast Asia or to the European Community in its early days. 
These factors meant that, until the mid 1990s, there was ‘no mechanism’ in Northeast 
Asia to discuss broader strategic issues or to minimise disputes (Buzan and Segal, 1994: 
12; Yahuda 1996a; 2002). We must ask, therefore, why the region was so 
underdeveloped, both in terms of economic interdependence and international 
institutions, at least until the mid 1990s. There are probably many reasons, but these can 
be divided into two categories – the global level impact and the regional factors. 
 
6.1.1 The Global Level Impact 
 
From the global level perspective, two interrelated factors obstructed the development 
of regional interdependence and integration: the extension of the Cold War into 
Northeast Asia and US policy of communist containment. Their combined effect both 
divided Northeast Asia into two competing camps and created a situation in which 
many regional actors became dependent on the US market – instead of developing 
greater regional interdependence between themselves.   
 
In the first place, the binary logic of the Cold War hindered regional coherence and 
interaction. Of course, as argued in Chapter 4, in the aftermath of World War II, many 
historical developments – including antagonisms generated by Japanese aggression and 
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by the civil wars in China and in Korea – had already produced deep divisions that 
seemed to preclude moves towards integration. Yet any prospect of integration, 
however remote, was certainly worsened by the bipolar competition of the Cold War, a 
competition that became particularly acute in the 1950s and 1960s Beijing and 
Pyongyang identified with Moscow, while anti-communist regimes communicated with 
each other through their bilateral alliance systems with Washington. Economically, too, 
there were competing approaches – the free market (though the genuineness may be 
questioned) versus centrally planned economies following policies of autarky. 
 
Secondly, the US policy of containment, adopted after the communist victory in the 
Chinese civil war, added another dimension to the division. In Northeast Asia, the US 
made no attempt to bring its diverse allies into effective multilateral institutions – either 
military or economic – by reasons of its identity and ideology (see chapter 4). This has 
significant implications for regional economy. Fear of ‘Communist blackmail and 
ideological contamination’ led the US to seek to persuade its allies in Northeast Asia 
(Japan, South Korea and Taiwan) not to develop significant economic relationships with 
China (Shaller 1985: 291). As an inducement, the US was prepared to open its own 
markets asymmetrically to its Northeast Asian allies, particularly to Japan. While there 
can be no doubt that access to the US market was crucial to several Asian economic 
success stories, the availability of this market certainly diminished the attraction of any 
moves towards greater regional interdependence. 
 
Thus, from the beginning of the Cold War, there was no direct or ‘horizontal’ contact 
between the two hostile blocs (Cummings 1998: 458; Ikenberry and Mastanduno 2003), 
while even US allies in Northeast Asia had ‘far stronger ties across the Pacific than they 
had among themselves’ (Pempel 2005: 9). Again the difference with Western Europe is 
striking; there, institutions designed to promote economic cooperation date back to the 
immediate aftermath of the Second World War, yet APEC – with a similar function – 
was only launched in November 1989. In other words, in the economic sphere as in the 
political-military one, Northeast Asia lags far behind Europe in constructing explicit 
cooperative arrangements.  
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6.1.2 The Regional Factors: The Asian Model Development 
 
The weakness of regional economic interdependence and institutionalisation also reflect 
important regional factors. After World War II, communist regimes pursued self-
reliance policies that were designed to minimise economic dependence. Elsewhere, 
regional economic developments in Northeast and Southeast Asia were dominated by 
Japan. Japan’s remarkable economic recovery in the 1950s and 1960s, soon allowed it 
to re-emerge as a major economic power. Countries such as South Korea and Taiwan 
sought to emulate the ‘Japanese developmental model’, to such effect that it came to be 
known as the ‘East Asian Developmental Model’.  
 
After the Plaza Agreement (1985) – which resulted in the rapid rise of the yen against 
the US dollar – the Japanese economic presence in East Asia expanded rapidly. By the 
1990s, the Japanese economy had become the second largest in the world, while other 
parts of East Asia had come to achieve high levels of economic growth and 
modernisation. However, despite industrialisation and high economic growth, regional 
economic interdependence and institutionalisation have yet to progress far. Trade 
disputes, starting in the 1980s, between the US and East Asian economies, particularly 
Japan, have certainly not helped. The problem may be more fundamental and could lie 
in the very nature of the Japanese/Asian model of development itself.  Here, the most 
relevant implications are: the competitiveness of regional economies, and the possibility 
of conflicts between Asian and the Western, particularly US, economies. 
 
The Asian Developmental Model 
Since the early 1980s there have been intense debate about East Asian economic 
development and the model behind it. The debates centre both on the apparent difficulty 
in explaining the economic success of East Asia from the perspective of traditional 
neoclassical economic theory; and more immediately from heightened concerns in the 
US over its trade deficits with East Asian partners, particularly with Japan. Neoclassical 
economists assume that an economy will be most successful if it is allowed to function 
according to the universal laws of the self-regulating market. This universalist approach 
means that structural differences between national economies are largely ignored. Yet 
revisionist scholars, such as Chalmers Johnson, have challenged the neoclassical 
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position, arguing that the state played a central role in promoting Asian economic 
development. Hence Johnson identifies a distinctive Asian ‘developmental model’ to 
describe a process of industrialisation radically ‘different’ to the model followed in 
quite different from that followed in other capitalist economies (Johnson 1982). If 
Johnson is right, the question arises as to whether the earlier clash between the rival 
ideologies of communism and capitalism has been replaced by a different kind of 
conflict between rival models of development within capitalism. Clearly, the trade 
disputes between the US and East Asian countries, particularly with Japan, could reflect 
these more fundamental differences.   
 
The concept of the ‘developmental strong state’ was first proposed by Johnson in the 
context of Japan. Johnson (1982) defines Japan as a plan-rational state, which not only 
differs from plan-ideological states such as China and former Soviet bloc, but is also 
distinct from market-rational states like the US and most Western countries. Japan was 
late to industrialise and had a strong sense of economic and political vulnerability. 
Hence the state itself led the industrialisation process, taking on developmental 
functions. This involved setting substantive social and economic goals that gave 
industrial development the highest priority. Thus, unlike Western market-oriented 
capitalism, the Japan/Asian ‘developmental’ model is best described as neo-
mercantilist.  
 
In this mercantilist developmental model, two related features are especially striking: 
the role of government and a distinctive trade pattern. In order to enhance Japan’s 
international competitiveness, the government was more interventionist than any of its 
Western counterparts. In many instances, this intervention took the form of the adoption 
of protectionist measures. Johnson even believed that it was really the economic 
bureaucracy – the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and the Ministry of International Trade 
and Industry (MITI) – that planned and executed most important decisions; in large 
measure big business simply fell in line with these decisions. In other words, it the 
economic bureaucrats were the ultimate architects of Japan’s economic success 
(Johnson 1982). 
 
The Neo-mercantilist economic strategy was also expressed in a distinctive pattern of 
foreign trade. A substantial proportion of the foreign trade of the US and of European 
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countries is intra-industrial, whereas Japanese trade has been largely inter-industrial. In 
other words, a good deal of Western trade consists involves imports and exports of 
manufactured goods. While exporting large amounts of manufactured goods – such as 
electronic and other high-tech products – Japan imports only small quantities of these 
things. Its imports are mainly in the shape of commodities, such as food and raw 
materials. In large measure, the Japanese pattern of trade reflects features of government 
intervention, notably the setting of industrial targets, the provision of subsidies and the 
imposition of quality regulations (Lincoln 1990).  
 
The characteristic features of the plan rational model, successfully adopted by Japan, 
were soon copied by South Korea, Taiwan and several other East Asian economies. The 
Japanese model was followed particularly closely in South Korea, where government 
intervention also involved planning, target setting, protection and price control – even a 
distorted price structure as a result of subsidies (Amsden 1989). But in other East Asian 
capitalist countries state intervention also relied on organisational and institutional links 
between politically insulated state development agencies and major private-sector firms 
(Johson 1987). Yet the results have been mixed.  
 
The strategy has been successful in that most East Asian capitalist economies have 
experienced impressive economic growth. But neo-mercantilist policies inevitably mean 
that East Asian economies are highly competitive with each other. Exports – especially 
exports to the United States – rather than the domestic market, have been the chief 
drivers of economic growth. In other words, it was the US that bore the main burden of 
adjustment when there was a rapid expansion of exports of manufactured goods from 
the East Asian NICs in the 1980s (Ravenhill 1993: 118). Of course, the crucial question 
is whether the US is willing to accept a situation in which its markets are open to East 
Asian products but East Asian markets are largely closed to American products. Such 
an imbalance is bound to mean that the US faces a large trade deficit. American concern 
about this deficit – was certainly at the root of the trade disputes of the 1980s and early 
1990s.   
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Possible Economic Conflict between the US and East Asia 
The US-Japan trade conflict arose from concerns about Japan’s immense trade surplus 
and America’s enormous deficit. At least for a time, there were fears that economic 
conflict might have dangerous knock-on effects in the security area. Once the Cold War 
ceased – and with it the old competition between capitalism and communism – Samuel 
Huntington (1991) could announce that Japan now presented a serious security threat to 
the United States. As explained above, revisionists ascribed the conflict to the 
distinctive East Asian economic strategy. Of course, this analysis was based on the 
postulate that the Asian strategy was the direct cause of the huge trade imbalance, 
especially of the American deficit. Neoclassical economists questioned this and argued 
that the trade imbalance was the result of macroeconomic factors rather than of the 
rational plan development policies followed by the East Asian countries. Instead, the 
Neoclassical economists insisted that trade surpluses or deficits were essentially the 
products of high or low savings rates, high in the case of Japan and low in the case of 
the US. After examining both the revisionist and Neoclassical explanations of trade 
imbalances, Gilpin (2003) concludes that the two views are really more complementary 
than contradictory; the seemingly divergent explanations reflect different levels of 
analysis.  
 
Gilpin agrees with the neoclassical economists by accepting their argument that Japan’s 
trade surplus is not responsible for the America’s trade deficit and that both are 
attributable to high and low savings rates. Yet why should Japan have such a high 
savings rate? Here, Gilpin comes closer to the revisionist position when he contends 
that the high savings rate in Japan is itself a product, and a deliberate one at that, the 
neomercantilist economic policies followed by the Japanese government. It may be true 
that Japan does not import much in the way of manufactured products – that it has a low 
level of intra-industrial trade – because it is so good making manufactured goods itself. 
Its comparative advantage certainly lies in this area rather than in the production of 
other goods. Yet, according to Gilpin, this comparative or competitive advantage in 
manufactured goods has been substantially increased or exaggerated by ‘the quite 
visible hand of the Japanese state rather than by the invisible hand of the market alone’ 
(Gilpin 2003: 318, 319).  
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Yet the tensions that had been so acute in the 1980s seemed to fade in the mid-1990s. 
The improvement was aided both by economic recovery in the United States and by 
some changes to the pattern of Japanese foreign trade following the Plaza Agreement. 
The dramatic rise of the yen led to increased imports of manufactured goods from other 
APEC countries, particularly from the East Asian NICs. Hence Japan’s index of intra-
industry trade rose beyond the previous peak in the early 1970s. Ravenhill (1993: 120) 
claims the Plaza Agreement produced a ‘rupture with Japan’s previous pattern of trade’. 
Yet he admits that Japan still lags considerably behind the United States in its imports 
of manufactured goods from other East Asian countries. Indeed the same is true of 
imports of finished goods from a rather wider area, including China and Southeast Asia. 
In other words, the United States now faces the same problem it once faced with Japan 
– but on a much larger scale. In turn, a new version of the old question reappears: will 
the US be willing to bear a disproportionate share of the costs of adjustment to East 
Asian industrialisation and hence allow the adverse trade imbalance between itself and 
East Asia to continue to rise?  
 
The security implications appear negative. Indeed, since the mid 1990s, the US trade 
deficit with Japan has reduced, though it still continues. America’s own economic 
recovery and fears of likely adverse consequences on US-Japanese security ties, meant 
that the US eased pressure on Japan to open its markets to more imports from America. 
However, it must be acknowledged that the trade imbalance and its associated 
consequences for US wages and employment could still provoke a significant 
protectionist ‘back-lash’ (Gilpin 2003: 319). The effects of the East Asian financial 
crisis of 1997-98 have increased this danger. Possible negative reactions in the United 
States are now likely to be directed not merely against Japan but also against China and 
other Asian countries. The financial crisis resulted in a sharp fall in Asian currencies 
against the dollar, making East Asian manufactured goods more attractive to American 
consumers and thus increasing the volume of imports. Furthermore, as mentioned 
earlier, East Asian economies are very competitive and have long targeted the American 
market. This, coupled to high East Asian savings rates, must lead to ever-larger trade 
imbalances. So long as the US remains reasonably prosperous there may be no serious 
trouble. But, if there should be a prolonged American recession, Gilpin believes that 
‘calls for protectionism against “unfair” Asian producers could become irresistible’ 
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(Gilpin 2003: 320, 321). If the US turned to protectionism, as in the 1930s, the impact 
on East Asia would be immense. 
 
Thus, both global and regional factors did not favour the emergence of regional 
economic interdependence and institutions. Of course, the obstacles were greatest in the 
Cold War period. Yet the central neorealist contention is that, even though Northeast 
Asia is now becoming more interdependent in economic terms, there is no strong reason 
for thinking that this must lead to more cooperation or greater harmony. Waltz argues 
that ‘interdependence promotes war as well as peace’ and hence ‘among the forces that 
shape international politics, interdependence is a weak one’ (Waltz, 2000: 14). There 
were close economic relations between Japan and the United States in the 1920s and 
1930s, yet they came to war in 1941. In 1914, Britain and Germany were each other’s 
most important trading partners. Recent history suggests that this pattern could repeat 
itself.  
 
Rather than emphasising the pacifying effects of economic interdependence, neorealists 
fear that rapid national economic growth may cause conflict or even war. The main 
concerns in the economic area in Northeast Asia are rapid economic growth (except 
North Korea) and increased military spending. Above all, they see the chief challenge to 
security and stability in China’s emergence as an economic great power. This issue is 
closely linked to the questions of how long is Japan, with its enormous economic 
capability, likely to refrain from becoming a military great power and how any major 
changes in power position would affect US interests in the region. The economics-
security relationship in the region is clearly highly constrained by the structure of 
international system. The impact and implications of economic growth and interactions 
must be examined in the context of the overall distribution of power within this system. 
 
6.2 The Rise of China: Challenges to Regional Security 
 
Since the start of its programme of economic reform in 1978, China has achieved 
impressive and continuous economic growth. In November 1992, the Economist 
reported: 
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China’s economic performance in the 14 years since then has brought about 
one of the biggest improvements in human welfare anywhere at any time. 
Real GNP has grown by an average of almost 9 % a year. By 1994, China’s 
economy is almost sure to be four times bigger than it was in 1978. 
The extent of Chinese economic growth can be overstated and there are legitimate 
doubts about the accuracy of official statistics, yet China is generally believed to have 
achieved sustained growth rates of between 7 and 9 per cent in the 1990s, even during 
the Asian Financial Crises of 1997-1998. This rapid growth has continued and even 
accelerated in the new millennium. Hu Jintao, China’s President, said on 16 April 2006 
that the economy had grown at annual rate of 10.2 per cent in the first quarter, the 
biggest increase in three years (The New York Times 18 April 2006).  
 
Is such a strong China compatible with regional security and stability? While opinions 
remain divided as to whether China’s rise can be peaceful, understandable concerns 
about the likely effects on regional security emerged immediately after the end of the 
Cold War (see Segal 1993; Kristof 1993; Roy 1994). Neorealists see an inherent 
connection between rapid national economic growth and expansionism. After all, 
historically, the external expansions of Britain and France, Germany and Japan, the 
Soviet Union and the United States all coincided with phases of intense industrialisation 
and economic development. Waltz argues that countries with great power economies 
become great powers – whether they want to or not (Waltz 2000: 34). In this analysis, 
states function in a self-help environment and their behaviour is best understood in 
terms of responses to threats and opportunities. The very nature of the international 
system and of states themselves will ensure that they will always seize any chance to 
put themselves in a dominant position in relation to other states. Neorealists see no 
reason why China should be different and identify additional factors that seem to 
strengthen their conclusion. China’s rising power is certainly accompanied by 
increasingly nationalism. It could well be that the reaction against ‘the century of shame 
and humiliation’ could make this nationalism more xenophobic and Chinese foreign 
policy more irrational and inflexible. The neorealist analysis appeared especially 
plausible in the early and mid 1990s. It had obvious and alarming implications for Sino-
Japanese relations and for Northeast Asian security and formed the intellectual basis of 
the fashionable ‘China threat’ thesis.  
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 Yet, against the ‘China threat’ thesis, China itself contends that the implications of its 
rise are benign. Since the mid 1990s China has gone out of its way to reassure its 
neighbours about the likely results of its ‘peaceful rise’ – or rather of what it now 
prefers to call its ‘peaceful development’. A distinctive ‘peaceful rise’ thesis has been 
developed in Chinese government and academic circles – not least to refute the 
arguments of the rival ‘China Threat’ thesis. The essence of the thesis is that the rise of 
China poses no threat to its neighbours and actually offers them extremely favourable 
opportunities. This point was highlighted in a speech delivered by Premier Wen Jiabao 
to the first East Asian Summit leaders dialogue on 12 December 2005. Wen’s speech, 
entitled ‘China’s Peaceful Development: An Opportunity for East Asia’ insisted that 
while certainly benefiting its own 1.3 billion people, China’s rise ‘also provides more 
opportunities for other East Asian countries’ (Wen 2005). 
 
The ‘peaceful rise’ thesis obviously appeals to those who support regional attempts to 
socialise China into becoming a good citizen. Indeed, over the years, particularly since 
the Asian Financial crisis of 1997/98, the Chinese case has gained quite widespread 
acceptance – apparently with good reason. However, in reality there are also many 
negative factors behind these interactions. 
 
6.2.1 Competition between China and ASEAN Economies 
 
As explained earlier, the present structure of the East Asian economy is essentially 
competitive rather than complementary. This is true of the relationship between the 
economies of China and its Southeast Asian neighbours and the competitive element 
has proved a major obstacle to closer economic integration. Competition is strong both 
in terms of trade and of investment. In terms of trade, China and ASEAN countries are 
not each other’s chief export markets. Both China and the ASEAN countries send more 
of their exports to the industrialised economies of the West and Japan and look to them 
to supply advanced technology and investment capital. Thus, as Wong and Chan 
observe, despite the steady increase in bilateral trade, Sino-ASEAN trade does not 
account for a significant proportion of each other’s total trade. For instance, in 2000, 56 
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per cent of China’s total exports and an average of 57.4 per cent of ASEAN-4’s10 were 
destined for the industrialised countries of the US, Japan, and the EU (Wong and Chan 
2003: 516-17).  
 
The main problem is the economies of most of ASEAN countries have factor profiles 
and technology levels similar to that of China. That is, China and the ASEAN countries 
export similar products and similar markets, although China has a competitive edge due 
to its lower labour costs. The only exception is Singapore, the one country whose 
industrial structure actually complements China’s. It accounts for approximately forty 
per cent of foreign trade with China (Tan, interview March 2005). This explains why 
the Singapore was the main proponent of the FTA Agreement, while closer, yet more 
economically backward ASEAN states, such as Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and 
Vietnam, were more reluctant to enter into the agreement. Similarly, in terms of 
investment, China and ASEAN countries are not significant investors in each other’s 
economies, rather they are direct competitors for FDI. In 2001, Hong Kong, Japan, 
Taiwan, and South Korea accounted for an overwhelming 54 per cent share of FDI 
inflow into China. In the same year, however, the ASEAN-511 countries accounted for 
only 6 per cent of China’s FDI inflow. This very modest investment inflow – with 
similarly small amounts between the ASEAN nations themselves – certainly hinders 
higher levels of economic interdependence among them. 
 
Consequently, it is no surprise that even as ASEAN signs a free trade agreement with 
China, its secretary-general, Severino, still calls for closer integration between the 
member states of ASEAN. He believes that ASEAN countries are confronted with more 
intense competitive environment, largely because of the economic transformation of 
China. FDI into China soared from just over $11 billion in 1992 to $44 billion in 1997, 
only dropping slightly to $40.8 billion in 2000 (Severino 2003). Hence, Wong and Chan 
(2003: 523) even argue that at present, ASEAN countries still fear an FTA, tightening 
the economic ‘embrace’ of China, will result in more intense ‘competition’ rather than 
in more ‘cooperation’. 
 
                                                 
 
10 ASEAN-4 refers to Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand, but not includes Singapore. 
11 ASEAN-5 refers to ASEAN-4 plus Singapore. 
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Motives behind China’s ASEAN strategy 
How should China’s recent enthusiasm for closer economic interaction and for 
‘improved’ relations with Southeast Asian countries be regarded? As I argued above, 
most neorealists believe that China is unlikely to refrain from acting like any other great 
power; if possible, it will expand its spheres of influence, utilising force when 
necessary, and generally strive to maximise its relative power over others. Since 
China’s power is rising so rapidly, it is likely to be presented with many opportunities 
and it will do everything it can to exploit these to greatest advantage. Thus, China’s 
Southeast Asian strategy should not be viewed in isolation; it must be approached from 
a broader power position perspective. Although less negative than some other 
commentators, Moore (2004: 122) points out that China’s seemingly benign economic 
initiatives could be no more than a cover for more selfish political purposes:  
Although Beijing’s pursuit of an FTA with ASEAN is ostensibly about 
economics (trade liberalisation) and Chinese relations with Southeast Asia 
more generally, a closer look reveals that it is actually driven more by 
politics (regional influence) and China’s relations with Japan, South Korea, 
and the United States. 
 
Similarly, Khoo and Smith do not go so far as to argue that the dramatic rise of China 
requires acceptance of Mearsheimer’s variant of realist theory – that is China will be a 
destabilising force in twenty-first century Asia. Yet they note that it is quite obvious that 
China has been steadily increasing its relative power over the Southeast Asian states by 
weaning them away from China’s competitors: Japan, Taiwan, and the United States. 
Even the planned formation of a Sino-ASEAN FTA by 2010 should be seen in this light 
(Khoo and Smith 2005: 203). If this is right, we must proceed to examine how the rise 
of China is likely to affect the two mature powers in relating to the region – the United 
States and Japan. 
 
6.2.2 The Impact on Sino-US Relations 
 
How will the ‘peaceful’ rise of China affect its relations with the US and American 
Asian strategy? Will it foster an increased regional cooperation and stability or lead to 
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open competition, conflict and even war? On the economic front, two important 
questions arise: how might China challenge US interests both regionally and globally, 
and how might the US respond to such a challenge? The answers to these questions 
must have profound implications for regional security and stability. Of course, China 
has displayed considerable diplomatic skill in presenting a favourable image of itself 
and achieved some success in gaining acceptance of its ‘peaceful rise’ thesis. Beijing 
has given repeated assurances that China will never seek hegemony, and has insisted 
that its rise is conducive to world peace, stability and prosperity. 12  However, as 
explained earlier, realists doubt whether a state can rise peacefully in an anarchical 
international system. They are equally sceptical as to whether any dominant and mature 
power will tolerate challenges posed by rising powers (Mearsheimer 2001; Huntington 
1991; Friedberg 1993/4). 
 
China’s Expanding Economic Interactions: at the Expense of the US Interests? 
Despite its ‘peaceful rise’ strategy and attempts to portray its influence as essentially 
benign, China’s rapid rise and steady expansion, particularly at the beginning of the new 
century, appear to present ever greater challenges to US interests globally and 
particularly in East Asia. China’s economic success has enabled it to expand its 
interactions almost worldwide – into the Middle East, Africa, Europe, and even Latin 
America (home of US influence). For instance, the BBC (3 April 2006) reported, 
‘Chinese influence in Brazil worries US’. While the US concentrated on its ‘war on 
terror’, China was promoting its slogan of ‘peaceful rise’ to a receptive audience in 
Latin America. This led Washington to dispatch Thomas Shannon, the assistant 
secretary of state responsible for Latin America, to Beijing to find out what is going on. 
 
In recent years, Chinese influence has increased in many parts of the world, but the 
increase has been particularly marked in Southeast Asia. China’s success may be largely 
attributed to a ‘charm offensive’ in which it has assiduously cultivated its Southeast 
Asian neighbours. The Chinese efforts appear in marked contrast to the posture of 
relative neglect adopted by the US. Whatever the reasons, there can be little doubt that 
                                                 
 
12  About China’s stance, its ‘peaceful development’ policy, see special issue on People’s Daily at 
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/zhuanti/Zhuanti_458.html. 
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Chinese influence has increased at the expense of that of America – the region’s 
traditional hegemon (Economy 2005). Of course China’s East Asian campaign has been 
greatly assisted by major economic developments – including growing trade relations, 
the signing of numerous cooperative agreements, and even Chinese development 
assistance to Laos, Burma, and Cambodia. Yet from time to time, China has shown a 
less benign face. On occasion it has behaved aggressively and even used force, 
particularly in its attempt to control the South China Sea. Following the promulgation in 
1992 of a Territorial Waters Law – which reiterated its claim to the Spratly Islands – 
China engaged in many disputes with Southeast Asian countries, including one with 
Vietnam over the Spratly Islands 1994. In 1995, it occupied Mischief Reef, also claimed 
by the Philippines. Significantly, the occupation of Mischief Reef occurred soon after 
the US withdrew from Subic Bay and Clark air force base.  
 
To a great extent, China’s attempts to control the South China Sea stem from the 
potential oil and gas reserves in that sea (see Salameh 1995/6). Daojiong Zha, Director 
at the Centre for International Energy Security, Renmin University, also admits that 
growth in energy consumption has become a security issue that could pose a real threat 
to China (Zha 2006). With phenomenal economic growth and its huge population, 
China has moved from energy self-sufficiency to energy dependence. Thus, while China 
exported 30 million tonnes of oil in 1985, by 1993 it had become a net importer of oil 
products and, by 1996 a net importer of crude oil. Since then, the trend has continued, 
so that, in 2000, oil imports almost doubled from 36.6 million to 70.2 million tonnes. 
Zha is clearly right to claim that ‘the era of Chinese energy independence is gone’ (Zha 
2006: 180). 
 
Fears about the implications of energy dependence, already acute in the United States, 
Western Europe and Japan, are now being shared by China, not least because many of 
its industries are heavy users of energy and levels of energy efficiency are poor by 
Western standards. If present trends continue, by 2020, almost 60 percent of China’s 
energy requirements will come from abroad. It follows that the energy resources of the 
South China Sea, Malaysia, Brunei, and especially Indonesia, will become increasingly 
attractive as China’s oil dependence grows. Thus analysts believe that China may be 
tempted to use military pressure to ensure that these nations give Beijing preferred 
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access to their energy resources (Copeland 2003: 336). If these happened, how would 
the US respond?  
 
US Responses 
On the surface at least, relations between Washington and Beijing appear quite positive 
since the events of 11 September 2001. They have co-operated over many issues, 
including the handling of North Korea and Iran. Yet some commentators doubt whether 
relations are really so positive (Friedberg 2002; 2005; Roy 2003; Klare 2006). The US 
side increasingly fears that the balance of power in East Asia is shifting towards China 
and that growing Chinese influence works to the disadvantage of America. These 
concerns are clearly reflected in the US Defense Department’s 2005 and 2006 Annual 
Reports on China’s military strength. In particular, the 2006 Report declares starkly, 
‘China’s military expansion is already such as to alter regional military balances’.13
 
If the balance of power is shifting towards China, will the US simply acquiesce or will it 
take counter-measures? Copeland (2003: 336) believes that since it is highly likely that 
Washington would indeed take counter-measures, ‘the risk of escalation would be 
significant’. Friedberg (2005: 21-22) expresses similar concerns: 
If this is true, and assuming that the United States continues to adhere to its 
century-old policy of opposing the dominance of either half of Eurasia by a 
hostile power or coalition, the stage will be set for an intense and possibly 
protracted strategic competition between the two Pacific giants (Friedberg 
2005: 21-22). 
 
Indeed, some analysts, such as Klare (2006), contend that there has been no 
fundamental change to America’s long-standing policy of opposing any power that 
seeks dominance in East Asia. In other words, it would be wrong to think that the 
                                                 
 
13 About the Executive Summary of the Report of 2006 is accessible at 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2006/2006-prc-military-power.htm. About China’s 
immediate responses, see People’s Daily 29 July 2005, 
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200507/26/eng20050726_198368.html; People’s Daily 27 May 2006, 
http://military.people.com.cn/GB/42969/58520/4409049.html. 
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present preoccupation with the ‘global war on terror’ marks more than a temporary shift 
in US priorities; in the last resort, the US will continue to pursue its traditional and long-
term objective. In the early 1990s, US strategic goals for the post-Soviet era were 
encapsulated in the so-called the permanent-dominancy doctrine, which was formalised 
by the Defence Planning Guidance (DPG) 1994-99. The chief objective is ‘to prevent 
the re-emergence of a new rival... that poses a threat on the order of that posed formerly 
by the Soviet Union’ (quote in Klare 2006). In other words, the doctrine was designed 
to deter potential rivals – implicitly including Russia, Germany, India, Japan, and China 
– from seeking to develop, although the doctrine did not actually identify those potential 
rivals. Towards the new century, however, the dramatic rise of China seemed to narrow 
the list of potential rivals to just one – China itself. This was clearly articulated by 
Condeleeza Rice (2000), who believed that, as an ambitious and rising power, China 
would inevitably challenge vital US interests. When Bush took office in 2001, he 
appeared totally committed to the tenets of the permanent-dominance doctrine and there 
was every sign that he intended its fulfilment to be a central objective of his Presidency. 
 
Indeed, despite the continuation of the global war on terror and America’s 
preoccupation with Iraq and Iran, Washington has begun to turn once more to the 
problem of China. American determination to contain China has been particularly 
marked since 2005. Of course concerns about the implications of the rise of China go 
back much earlier, as do the measures designed to contain it. Thus the US has been 
taking steps to strengthen its alliance with Japan since the mid 1990s. Attempts to 
upgrade relations with America’s traditional Southeast Asian allies and the designation 
of the Philippines and Thailand as major non-NATO allies in 2003, are clearly part of 
the overall US long-term strategy. Of course, Beijing sees these moves as threatening 
and often criticises the ties developed by the US as ‘lengzhan shiwei’ (relics of ‘Cold 
War mentalities).  
 
Yet since 2005, however, Washington has not only expressed concerns about China 
more openly but has also taken firmer direct measures to protect its interests. At first 
sight it may be surprising that, given its many other preoccupations, the US should have 
focused upon China at this particular moment. Klare (2006) is convinced that the 
explanation lies in a revised perception of China; ‘China had finally emerged as a major 
regional power in its own right and was beginning to contest America’s long-term 
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dominance of the Asia-Pacific region’. It was not really Chinese military strength or 
occasional belligerence that was at the heart of Washington’s concerns. Rather, the US 
was alarmed by Beijing’s success in exploiting its enormous purchasing power and 
hunger for resources to establish friendly ties with such long-standing US allies as 
Thailand, Indonesia. In other words, the US was finally waking up to the fact that the 
Bush administration’s preoccupation with the Iraq war meant that it has done little to 
counter the huge increase in Chinese influence in Southeast Asia. Now the realisation 
dawned that something had to be done (Klare 2006). 
 
From this perspective, the US-Japan (2+2) talks of February 2005 may be seen as 
marking a decisive shift from mere anti-Chinese rhetoric and towards more concrete 
action. In the talks the US and Japan agreed to expand their military collaboration in an 
area stretching from Northeast Asia to the South China Sea. They also adopted the 
peaceful resolution of the Taiwan problem as their ‘common strategic objective’. Of 
course, Beijing is bound to regard the agreement as indicative of the Bush 
administration’s determination to create an anti-Chinese alliance system. On this basis, 
many analysts believe that the security dilemma logic is still highly applicable to the 
state of international relations in Asia (Christensen 1999; Friedberg 2005). Indeed, 
recent American moves and China’s response to them pose further questions as to the 
relationship between economic interdependence and security. 
 
The Impact of Possible US Retaliation on China 
If the US perception of the ‘China threat’ remains unchanged and its policy of 
containment is taken further, the impact on China would be enormous. Clearly, 
economic interdependence between China and the US has become very deep. The US is 
now China’s biggest trading partner and the maintenance of close relations with 
America is vital to China’s continued development. According to Chinese statistics, 
China-US trade amounted to $80.5 billion in 2001, thirty times more than in 1979. 
Beijing admits that US investment has led the way in the recent wave of overseas 
investment fever (People’s Daily 5 February 2002). On 11 April 2001, the BBC 
reported that China had now replaced Japan as the country with the largest trade surplus 
with the US. The implications of the close economic ties between China and the US 
have major, though uncertain, implications for the security of East Asia. They could 
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point to an increasing cooperation between Chinese and the US, but other factors may 
lead to the disruption or even cessation of the trading links between the two countries. 
There can be no doubt that, if the US was ever to cut-off its trading links with China, 
the effects on the Chinese economy would be devastating. 
 
Copeland introduces the idea of ‘a state’s expectations for future trade’ as an important 
factor into the debate as to whether economic interdependence will drive actors to peace 
or conflict. He argues that positive trade expectations promote peace. However, 
interdependence can also lead a state towards aggression, particularly when it has 
negative expectations for future trade – fearing a cut-off of vital goods or markets or 
even the continuation of current restrictions (Copeland 2003: 323-4). From these 
variables he sees quite high possibility of future conflict between China and the US. 
Historically, conflict and war between Japan and America occurred in precisely such a 
situation. In the 1920s, like China today, Japan was eager to trade extensively with 
America and with the outside world. Yet, as the world became increasingly protectionist 
in the 1930s, Japan changed its policy and sought to create an East Asian ‘Co-prosperity 
Sphere’ to minimise the impact of protectionism on its economy. Washington 
eventually retaliated by imposing harsh sanctions. As Japan’s trade expectations fell 
even further, it resorted to war (Copeland 2003: 329-34). While Copeland 
acknowledges that the present international environment is different to that of the 1920-
40s, he still sees some parallels with today’s Sino-US relation. We must now consider 
the impact of the rise of China on Sino-Japanese relations. 
 
6.2.3 The Impact on Sino-Japanese Relations 
 
The rise of China presents an even bigger challenge to Japan – its great power 
neighbour and rival – than it does to the US. The challenge may be more acute because 
of recent changes in the nature of nationalism both in China and in Japan. This 
challenge has significant implications for regional security; in particular it affects the 
sensitive issue of whether Japan will become a ‘normal’ country commensurate with its 
economic strength. Indeed, some analysts have argued that the development of Japanese 
domestic political culture meant that Japan would remain a ‘civilian power’. The reason 
is that Japan, like Germany, has followed ‘remarkably consistent national security 
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policies that deemphasise military instruments as a means of achieving national 
objectives’ (Berger 1996: 317).  
 
Neorealists admit that Japanese domestic caution has been a major constraint precluding 
a more assertive military role. The terms of its Constitution and public distaste have 
prevented Japan from assuming the mantle of a great power. However, neorealists insist 
that the behaviour of states in the international system, responds more to external 
conditions than to internal habit if external change is profound. Moreover, in a system 
of self-help, ‘the possession of most but not all of the capabilities of a great power 
leaves a state vulnerable to others’. Economically, Japan already possesses the 
technological capabilities to transform itself rapidly into a great power. This means that, 
given the constant competition for wealth and security and the necessity of taking care 
of one’s interests in an anarchic environment, positive refusal to become a great power 
can only be described as ‘a structural anomaly’ (Waltz 2000: 33, 34). So far, Japan has 
remained unassertive because it has been protected by the US security umbrella and a 
relatively weak China has posed little serious challenge. But, since external conditions 
shape the behaviour of states, when these conditions become seriously threatening, 
neorealists argue that Japan will be compelled to exchange its present lack of 
assertiveness for a more assertive policy (Roy 1994: 164; Calder 2006). 
 
Of course, it remains to be seen whether the neorealists’ gloomy predictions will come 
true, yet there can be no doubt that relations between Japan and China in the post-Cold 
War are undergoing a serious test. It was clear that China’s growing assertiveness 
became evident as early as the 1990s, as revealed in Beijing’s nuclear and missile tests 
and military exercises in 1995 and 1996. Japan also took increasingly assertive posture 
towards China. For example, in 1994, Prime Minister Hosokawa and Prime Minister 
Hata ‘both took a harder line with Beijing on military transparency and nuclear tests 
than their predecessors ever had’ (Green and Self 1996: 36). Yet, while changes in the 
distribution of material power are obviously important, their significance may be 
outweighed by other developments. In particular changes in the nature of nationalism in 
both China and Japan threaten to drive their peoples further apart. 
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Nationalisms in China 
For most of the twentieth century nationalism played an important part in Sino-Japanese 
relations, and today it increasingly complicates the relationship between the two 
countries. As discussed in chapter 4, the ultimate basis of the CCP’s claim to be the 
legitimate government of the whole of China is that its leaders served the cause of 
Chinese nationalism by gaining victory over Japan. Thus nationalism provides the 
Communist government with a valuable propaganda tool to maintain its authority. 
Indeed, the emphasis on nationalism increased in the 1990s. In earlier days of P. R. 
China, CCP could base its claims to legitimacy on two grounds – on nationalism and on 
Marxist-Leninism. But the effective abandonment of any ideological commitment to 
Communism meant that nationalism became the sole justification.  
 
Claims to legitimacy have subsequently encountered major challenges – represented by 
the implications of the end of the Cold War and those of the Tiananmen massacre of 
1989. Both raised issues that threatened to make the CCP government more vulnerable. 
On the international level, the collapse of communist regimes in Eastern Europe and in 
Russia was an enormous blow to Beijing. Domestically, the results of economic reform 
were mixed. While they succeeded in creating impressively rapid economic growth – 
and hence helped China’s bid for great power status, they also brought new problems 
for the government. In the first place, the fact that economic growth was highly uneven 
and was accompanied by high inflation, corruption and unemployment, was bound to 
weaken support for CCP rule, not least among its traditional supporters. Perhaps even 
more important, there were many who thought that the transformation of Chinese 
society begun with economic reform could not be complete unless there was also 
political reform, including the introduction of Western-style democracy. A capitalist 
economic system seemed to require a capitalist political system too. Dissatisfaction 
about lack of political reform was largely behind the Tiananmen demonstration in 1989. 
International condemnation of its brutal repression and the introduction of sanctions 
only served to make Beijing feel more vulnerable and insecure. 
 
In response to international condemnation and signs of internal discontent, in the early 
1990s, the Chinese authorities launched the Patriotic Education campaign, whose 
purpose was to ensure loyalty by direct evocation of Chinese nationalism. The 
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campaign offered a version of guoqing jiaoyu (education on national conditions), which 
insisted that political stability and continuing economic development were dependent on 
the continuation of one party rule. Yet there was also an appeal to history. The 
communist government reasserted its claim to legitimacy by stressing the suffering and 
humiliation that China had experienced at the hands of foreign powers – exemplified in 
the Nanjing massacre of 1937 – and by highlighting the CCP’s achievement of victory 
over Japan.  
 
However, Chinese nationalism is a complex phenomenon that has developed on variety 
of levels. As Deans observes, there are clear differences between the kind of 
nationalism subscribed to by the ruling elite and that of the Chinese masses. The elite 
discourse on nationalism, or more precisely ‘patriotism’ (aiguozhuyi), centres on the 
qualities of loyalty and national unity. It is harder to identify the chief characteristics of 
mass nationalism or minzuzhuyi, but Deans thinks this ‘may go beyond the state’s 
approved and preferred boundaries of discourse’ (Deans forthcoming, m/s). There is 
certainly a powerful strand of hostility to Japan in this popular nationalism – as 
exemplified in scenes at the Asia Cup Final in Beijing in 2004 and in the anti-Japanese 
demonstrations of spring 2005. The Chinese government is clearly worried that popular 
anger against Japan could actually be turned against itself. There can be little doubt that, 
in 2005, popular and emotionally-driven anti-Japanese sentiments – fanned by internet 
sites and use of mobile phones – came as something of an embarrassment to the more 
pragmatically inclined leadership, who saw it as threatening their projects for further 
reform. The supporters of popular nationalism called upon the Chinese government to 
take a harder line against what they perceived as American and Japanese provocations. 
In reality some of the more pragmatic elements in the Chinese leadership were highly 
unsympathetic to these demands, not least because they appreciated that China’s 
economic success is heavily dependent upon integration with the outside world and, 
above all requires reasonably cordial relations with advanced countries, including Japan 
(Shuisheng Zhao 2007). 
 
The formulation of ‘peaceful rise strategy’ and the associated principles of peaceful co-
existence and harmonious relations with the rest of the world must be seen in this 
context. On occasion, some Chinese intellectuals even sought to overcome historical 
barriers and move to give Sino-Japanese relations a new basis – the so-called ‘new 
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thinking’ (xin siwei) (Ma Licheng 2002) or ‘revolution in diplomacy’ (waijiao geming) 
(Shi Yinhong 2003). It appeared that the chief requirement should be that China should 
cease to dwell so much on past injuries and should concentrate more on future 
partnership with Japan. In particular, Ma called for ‘new thinking’ in China’s policy and 
was critical of what he saw as the excessive nationalism that characterised attitudes 
towards Japan. It is not entirely clear whether the new Chinese leaders, Hu Jintao and 
Wen Jiabao, directly endorsed Ma’s position but it is striking that his article appeared in 
December 2002 – that is directly after the 16th CCP Congress which had effectively 
approved the new leadership arrangements. There is good reason to think that the 
successors of Jiang Zemin, the ‘fourth generation leadership’, genuinely attempted to 
create a constructive environment for Sino-Japanese relations.14
 
Sadly the attempt was short lived. Ma’s article produced fury in popular nationalist 
circles. Furthermore, it may be that, as Shu Yinhong – author of ‘revolution in 
diplomacy – claimed, the Japanese government failed to respond sufficiently positively 
(jiji huying) to these more conciliatory signals coming from China.15 Indeed, rising 
nationalism in Japan, and particularly Koizumi’s repeated visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, 
looked very much like a rebuff. The Chinese leaders were obviously upset and, when in 
Japan in May 2005, Wu Yi, the Chinese Vice-Foreign Minister, cancelled a planned 
meeting with Koizumi in protest at his regular visits to the Shrine. Thus, developments 
within Japan, particularly the rise of what Deans (forthcoming) calls, ‘revisionist 
nationalism’ also affects greatly the relationship between the two great powers of East 
Asia. 
 
Nationalisms in Japan 
After Koizumi became Prime Minister of Japan, he continued to make annual visits to 
the Yasukuni Shrine, where Class-A war criminals are buried and commemorated. 
These visits provide the most obvious explanation for the steady deterioration in Sino-
Japanese relations that occurred during Koizumi’s Premiership. They certainly 
provoked outrage among Japan’s neighbours, particularly China, and led to a 
                                                 
 
14 Interviews in Japan and China between April and June 2005, some of them believed that Hu and Wen 
were behind the ‘new thinking’. 
15 Personal interview with the author in May 2005; also see, Shi 2006. 
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suspension of top-level meetings between the leaders of the two countries. Yet the 
Yasukuni visits were probably merely a symptom of the wider phenomenon of the rise 
of ‘revisionist nationalism’ in Japan. As discussed in chapter 4, Japan’s motives and 
role in the attempt to create an East Asian order between the early 1930s and 1945 were 
already extremely controversial. Elsewhere in Asia and also in the West, Japan was seen 
as having used the ideology of Pan-Asianism as a cynical cover for its true ambition. In 
reality, Japan had only sought to eject the European powers from Asia in order to set up 
a colonial Empire of its own, if anything more oppressive and exploitative than the 
European versions. Japan’s position was rather like that of Germany in 1919; in effect, 
it too was ‘convicted’ of ‘war-guilt’. As in Germany, there were some in Japan who 
never accepted this verdict. As Deans (forthcoming) argues, while there are many 
different strands in Japanese revisionist nationalism, its real focus is a demand that 
Japan should rebut the charges made against it and produce a version of history that 
rehabilitates its record. Clearly this agenda ‘directly challenges, confronts and rejects 
the dominant narrative in most other Asian countries and in western historiography’. 
 
In the 1990s, revisionist nationalism – in Goto’s words, ‘a deepening inward-looking 
nationalism’ – grew in strength. School textbooks and the popular media seemed to be 
returning to the rhetoric of the war years, interpreting the Pacific War as a sacred 
struggle for Asian liberation (Goto 2003: 290). The new mood also found expression in 
the increasing demand for the revision of the so-called ‘peace constitution’ of 1947. At 
the same time, Japan strengthened its defence forces and adopted a more assertive 
stance in its policy towards China. For many, it appeared self-evident that Japan was 
moving to become a ‘normal country’. According to many Chinese scholars, this 
development could only have one purpose: it was designed to thwart the resurgence in 
Chinese power (Liu 1997). Of course, these developments must also be viewed in 
international and regional contexts.  
 
Internationally, the Gulf War of 1991 marked the beginning of a new era. For the first 
time since 1945, there was a possibility that Japanese forces would serve overseas and 
perhaps find themselves in a combat role. This seemed the only logical result if Japan 
agreed to American requests that it should make a ‘human contribution’ in support of 
the US-led war effort. Pressure intensified after 9/11 2001, with increasing demands 
that Japan should be ready to deploy its SDF overseas in support of the US-led war on 
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terror. Regionally, there were crises in Korean peninsula and over Taiwan Strait in the 
early and mid 1990s and again from 2000 onwards. In all of these crises, the growing 
power of China became increasingly evident. 
 
But Japan’s higher profile was not merely the result of changes in the international and 
regional security environment. It was also affected by internal changes, notably the 
apparent weakening of progressive forces within Japan. External and internal factors 
seemed to be working together to promote the transition to a ‘normal country’. 
Significantly, there was more public support for constitutional revision and for the 
overseas use of the SDF. At the same time, previous signs of quite friendly attitudes 
towards China appeared to be evaporating. Here we can see the full significance of 
Koizumi’s visits to the Yasukuni shrine and his powerful advocacy of constitutional 
revision. Koizumi appeared to be giving a degree of official recognition to tenets of 
revisionist nationalism in a way that none of his predecessor would have done. There 
can be little doubt that Koizumi encouraged and emboldened elements supporting 
revisionist nationalism. Of course, the consequence was a marked deterioration of 
relations, not only with China, but also with other countries, such as South Korea, that 
had had similar and painful experience of the reality of Japanese ‘liberation’. As Deans 
argues, Koizumi’s visit carried a clear message, both at home and overseas. At home, he 
was really saying that ‘Japan was changing, that it could now look at its past without 
fear’. Toward its neighbours especially to China and South Korea, he was signalling 
that ‘Japan would no longer automatically defer to criticism about the past’ (Deans 
forthcoming). It was in these contexts of both growing Japan’s assertiveness and rising 
popular nationalism in China that Sino-Japanese relations have suffered from the so-
called ‘economically warm but politically cold’ syndrome in recent years. 
 
The ‘Hot Economy Cold Politics’ Syndrome 
In recent years, economic interaction in Northeast Asia has increased dramatically. In 
particular, the rapid expansion of China’s economy and foreign trade have certainly 
been major factors in the creation of much higher levels of regional economic 
interdependence. However, growing regional economic interdependence in the post-
Cold War era has not produced closer friendship between China and Japan. The gap 
between them has actually widened since the start of the new millennium (Yahuda 
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2002). The result has been a ‘hot economy but cold politics’ syndrome (see Jin 2004; 
2005; Xaopu Wang 2005; Taniguchi 2005). While China (including Hong Kong) finally 
overtook the US to become Japan’s most important trading partner by 2004 (see below 
figure 1), relations are very cool in the political and security spheres. Jin Xide, a 
specialist in Sino-Japanese relations, argues that there is no sign, at least in the short or 
medium terms, that ‘hot economy, cold politics’ will become ‘hot economy, hot 
politics’; rather it could become a matter of ‘cold politics, cold economy’ (Jin 2004; 
2005). 
 
Trade with Japan (2004 Fiscal Year) 
  
 Export Import Total 
 
Hong Kong 3,830,868,452 175,796,257 4,006,664,709
 
China 7,994,233,171 10,198,963,424 18,193,196,595
 
HK + China 11,825,101,623 10,374,759,681 22,199,861,304
 
The US 13,730,742,370 6,763,358,820 20,494,101,190
        
Figure 1: ASIA  Calendar Year Data  (a thousand yen), 
Source: Ministry of Finance, Japan Statistics. 
 
 
Indeed, in Japan’s NDPO (2004), China was formally identified as a major security 
concern – along with North Korea. Previously only Russia had been described in such 
terms. In the light of these concerns, Japan has devoted far more attention to its 
defences. It has further strengthened its ties with the US and steadily expanded the 
activities of its SDF. Perhaps the most significant move has been proposals to remove 
the post-war constraints on Japan’s military forces. Recently the attempt to revise the 
so-called peace constitution has gone so far that many analysts believe that major 
changes are likely or even inevitable in the near future (Nishi, Osamu 2005; Klare 
2006). If these trends continue to their logical conclusion, Roy (2005:196) argues that 
Japan might eventually qualify as ‘a full-fledged great power’ as opposed to an 
‘incomplete’ or ‘economic’ power’.  
 
Of course these Japanese moves have raised serious concern in Beijing. The tension 
approached crisis point in the spring of 2005, when there were large-scale anti-Japanese 
demonstrations in China. Beijing was particularly alarmed by the February 2005 US-
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Japan joint statement concerning Taiwan. From China’s point of view, the joint 
statement represented an unprecedented step for Japan. Not only did it mark a departure 
from Japan’s previous practice of avoiding all reference to the Taiwan issue, but also 
contained a hint that Japan would be prepared to assist the United States in the event of 
a military clash with China. In recent years, the two great powers of East Asia have 
engaged in several acrimonious disagreements, but the dispute over energy probably has 
the most serious implications for economics-security relations. As noted earlier, since 
the 1990s, China has moved from energy self-sufficiency to energy dependence. Yet 
Japan has long been energy dependent and now imports about 99 per cent of its oil and 
natural gas. Thus the dispute over the gas fields under the East China Sea (see chapter 
8) affects both economic and security relations. As the Chinese old saying suggests, it 
may be difficult to keep two tigers in one mountain. 
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7 Economic Interactions and the Possibility of Cooperation 
 
Introduction 
 
Chapter 6 examined the effects of economic growth and interactions on states’ 
capabilities, especially in terms of alterations to the distribution of power and of 
implications for regional security dynamics. These effects were identified, by 
neorealists, as largely negative, but this chapter goes further and investigates other, 
perhaps more positive, consequences of economic interactions. Can economic 
interdependence and the creation of international institutions facilitate cooperation 
between states and produce more benign security practices and outcomes in Northeast 
Asia? In other words, the central question is whether economic developments increase 
or decrease securitisation logic among regional actors? 
 
Liberals are generally more optimistic than realists about prospects for international 
cooperation. They believe that economic interdependence encourages cooperation and 
hence make states less likely to seek to resolve conflicts by force (see Keohane and Nye 
1977; 1987). Moreover, liberals claim that international regimes and institutions have 
active as well as passive roles. Instead of merely reflecting power relations, they can 
provide ‘constructed focal points’ that make cooperative outcomes more likely 
(Keohane and Martin 1995: 44-45).  
 
It must be acknowledged that it is not easy to apply the liberal model to Northeast Asia. 
For instance, the present troubled Sino-Japanese relationship suggests that economic 
interdependence has not done much to improve matters in the political and security 
spheres. Further, economic interdependence was often the result rather than the cause of 
political change. This point is exemplified in the fact that increasing economic 
interactions followed the normalisation of relations between the US and China and 
between China and Japan. Moreover, there is a sharp contrast between Asia and the 
West. The Western institutional model is highly developed and is based upon universal 
principles and legalistic and contractual paradigms. So far, institution building in 
Northeast Asia is at a very early stage. Although it has proceeded somewhat further in 
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East Asia and the Asia-Pacific area, even there it has not followed the Western patterns. 
Institutions are relatively informal and processes more ‘bottom up’ than ‘top-down’ 
(Pempel 2005).  
 
However, despite these limitations and the significant divergence from Western patters, 
the fact remains that economic interactions and the emergence of some regional 
institutions have had important and positive consequences. Particularly when compared 
to the high level of fragmentation after World War II, growing economic interactions 
and consumerism have led Northeast and East Asian countries towards greater 
integration – a trend especially marked since the end of the Cold War. The trend has 
been reflected in the steps taken to resolve or ease conflicts, to expand cooperative 
endeavours and to build closer ties among previously hostile governments. These 
processes, which led to the emergence of an East Asian international society, developed 
further after the Asian financial crisis. Thus, Morgan (1999: 5) argues that ‘the East 
Asian regional system has made remarkable gains’. 
 
The impact of growing regional integration and cohesiveness on security relations can 
be examined on various levels. First, on the global level, we must examine the impact of 
the end of the Cold War and the role of the US global market as a spur to regional 
economic development. Secondly, on the domestic level, the key elements are 
developments in Japan and China. Thirdly, on the regional level, the growing 
acceptance of free trade and market economy in the region narrowed the regional gap 
between the capitalist and communist camps. The result was the emergence of natural 
economic territories (NETs) in the region. Finally, on the inter-regional level, one of the 
most important developments in the post-Cold War era has been the emergence of 
economic regionalism in East Asia and Asia-Pacific. This chapter examines economic 
and security relations on these four levels. 
 
7.1 Global Level Influences on Regional Economic Developments 
 
In the previous chapter, I examined global level factors hindering the emergence of 
regional economic interdependence – the extension of the Cold War into Northeast Asia 
and the US policy of communist containment. But here I examine the more positive side 
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of global influence on regional economic development – notably structural changes 
resulting from the end of the bipolar system and the rise of a global market, particularly 
in the US. 
 
7.1.1 The End of the Cold War: Implications for Regional Integration 
 
As discussed in the chapter 6, the Cold War era, especially the 1950s and 60s, was 
characterised by an emphasis on radically different approaches to economics and 
correspondingly divergent attitudes to political and strategic issues; and there was 
relatively little intra-regional trade. Indeed, given the divisive impact of the Cold War, 
the end of bipolar structure was a key factor in the move towards a more benign 
environment in the region. The end of the Cold War and the abandonment of ideological 
and military confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union, led to a 
growing belief that economic issues would now dominate global policy agendas. This 
expectation was enhanced by the apparent triumph of the US-led capitalist system. Free 
trade and the market economy, with their associated liberal and democratic principles, 
appeared to be carrying all before them. China has long accepted free trade and the 
market, and even North Korea has begun to adopt some features of a market-oriented 
economy. Thus, although the full logic of the Cold War had been weakened in 
Northeast Asia in the early 1970s as a result of the emergence of Sino-Soviet conflicts, 
links between the ‘capitalist’ and ‘communist’ blocs now expanded much further.  
 
The early 1990s witnessed many new interactions between former ‘enemies’. South 
Korea and China normalised their relations in 1992. Given its special and difficult 
relations with the North, this step had enormous strategic importance for South Korea; 
for China, however, economic considerations were probably paramount. Yet, even 
between the two Koreas, interactions began in the early 1990s, including prime 
ministerial talks in autumn 1990 and signing the Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-
Aggression and Cooperation on 13 December 1991 (Kihl 1997). China also began to 
expand its economic relations with Taiwan, despite long standing and often acute 
political antagonism. In such a new environment, Asian regionalism has begun to 
emerge. Multilateral networks of various sorts have been created, including trade, 
finance, and government collaboration.  
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7.1.2 The Role of the US Market 
 
The development of the Northeast Asian economy, even that of East Asia as a whole, 
depended heavily on access to the global market, especially on exports to the US. 
Initially, the US opened its market asymmetrically to its Northeast Asia allies, 
particularly to Japan, in order to further its policy of containing communism. It is true, 
as argued earlier; the availability of US markets diminished the attraction of any moves 
towards greater regional interdependence. However, while US motives may not have 
been altruistic, there can be no doubt that access to its markets was crucial to several 
Asian economic success stories. Since the countries of Northeast Asia sought to 
promote economic growth by increasing their exports, they were notably reluctant to 
take imported manufactured goods from their neighbours. Japan’s low levels of 
imported manufactured goods only increased dependence on the US. 
 
After the Plaza accord of 1985, Japan’s trade with and investment in the region 
increased significantly, yet regional dependency on the US still continues. It followed 
that, when regionalism emerged in Asia, it could not be exclusively East Asian but had 
to follow the US ‘swing-power’ strategy of the Asia-Pacific model (see chapter 5; 
Buzan 2004b). Significantly, dependence on the US market has also been a major 
element in China’s economic success story. As elsewhere in East Asia, the expansion of 
exports to America has been crucial to China’s economic growth since mid-1970s. The 
US has become China’s biggest trading partner, and the PRC enjoys what is called 
‘permanent normal trading relations’ (PNTR) with the US. In other words, Chinese 
goods are admitted to the US on the same terms as exports from other countries (BBC 
11 April 2001). 
 
7.2 The Domestic Level: Economic Policy Changes in Japan and China 
 
While global level influences played a significant role in fostering Northeast Asian 
economic development and integration, their significance can be exaggerated. Changes 
at the domestic level, especially Japan’s post-war economic recovery and the changes in 
China since the 1970s, have been equally important.  
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First, ‘Japan has been the most important motive force in the emerging Asian 
regionalism’ (Pempel 1996/7: 14). Its remarkable economic recovery in the 1950s and 
1960s created one of the important conditions for the later emergence of economic 
interconnectedness – both as a developmental model for other countries and as a 
practical catalyst. By 1991, Tokyo had become the world’s largest donor of official 
development assistance (ODA). With nearly half of this aid bound for Asia – Indonesia 
and China have traditionally been the largest recipients of Japanese bilateral ODA – the 
programme represents an important source of capital for Asia (Kohara 2003: 196-98; 
Johnstone 1999). (I will discuss Japan’s role on the inter-regional level in more detail 
later in this chapter). 
 
Secondly, changes in China’s economic policy since the mid-1970s have also boosted 
regional integration. The victory of the Chinese Communists in 1949 was followed by 
decades of internal strife and external isolation, especially during the period of the 
Cultural Revolution (1966-76). It was not until the late 1970s that China began to 
emerge from this situation. Since the 1960s, advocates of a ‘Pacific community’ have 
been striving to create regionally based networks and regimes to further economic 
cooperation. A notable example was the attempt to establish a PAFTA. Yet for much of 
this time, China remained aloof. The government in Beijing was one of the most 
isolated states in the world, with a high level of securitisation of global threats. 
Internally, China followed a policy of self-reliance and, on the international level, 
identified more with the Third World and revolutionary movements than with rapidly 
developing capitalist societies (see chapter 4). It made little attempt to define its place in 
Asia.   
 
The Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Chinese Communist party 
in 1978 is generally regarded as the turning point of China’s relationship with the 
outside world. But what is the significance of the ‘opening policies’ and what are their 
implications for regional integration? It must be admitted that the initial stages of 
reform focused more on the agricultural sector and mostly affected the peasants. While 
some of the policies involved foreign trade, investment, and borrowing arrangements, 
China’s opening to the global economy was limited to specially selected coastal cities, 
namely the Special Economic Zones (SEZs), and hence did not signal an immediate 
reversal in Beijing’s attitude to regional economic cooperation. Beijing still feared that 
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regional cooperation would work mainly to the advantage of Japan (Deng 1997: 57), on 
the ground that it would provide the Japanese with secure access to raw materials, 
energy supplies and markets and would thus increase Japan’s regional and global 
political influence. Nor did the international community do much to encourage Chinese 
participation, because a rising China might pose a challenge to regional and global 
international societies. In other words, there was concern about China’s rising economic 
and political status and about how Chinese leaders might use this. 
 
However, since the mid-1980s, China has pushed forward economic reform and 
opening up policies and made strenuous efforts to create an environment attractive to 
foreign investors. Incentives have included tax rebates for exporters, the creation of a 
legal basis for wholly foreign owned enterprises and low labour costs and rents (Breslin 
2004: 112). As these policies were implemented, they narrowed the structural gap 
between China and the outside world, and hence reduced obstacles that had previously 
prevented a reluctant China from participating in free market oriented regional and 
international cooperation programmes. Gradually, the international community also 
moderated its view of China. Increasingly its rapidly growing presence in international 
markets and its modernisation campaign were viewed ‘less as a threat to the global 
economic system than as an opportunity to bring China into the global economy on 
favourable terms’ (Pearson 1999: 214). In addition, there was growing recognition of 
the diversity of the region and thus greater appreciation of the need for greater 
flexibility. Hence it was hoped that the tremendous uncertainties about China’s 
development could be resolved through multilateral joint efforts (Deng 1997: 57, 58). 
 
Thus, the relationship between China and the international community has changed 
dramatically since the mid 1980s. Foreign-investment enterprises now play a crucial 
role in the Chinese economy; in 1986, these enterprises accounted for only 2 per cent of 
exports and 6 per cent of imports but by 2000, the figures had increased to 48 percent 
and 52 per cent respectively (Braunstein and Epstein 2002: 23). Yet changes in China’s 
attitudes to international and regional institutions may be even more significant. Here, 
the Chinese position has moved from one of rejection (ju jue), through recognition 
(cheng ren), to active membership (can yu) (Yizhou Wang 2003: 252). In other words, 
as argued in chapter 5, China began to be increasingly integrated into regional and 
international societies. Since the Asian financial crisis, the process has been taken 
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further and acceptance of China as member of the WTO in 2001 marked an especially 
important step.  
 
But what reasons and motives lay behind the new Chinese posture? The most obvious 
answer is that it served the interests of both China and many of the regional actors as 
well. It is obvious that participation in multilateral dialogues and institutions – and 
acceptance of their associated norms – serves China’s interests better than would be the 
case if it rejected them and pursued unilateral policies and actions (interviews, 
Chanrong Jin; Xiaoming Zhang, May 2005). Such an analysis is at the core of the 
thinking behind China’s ‘peaceful rise’ strategy. At the same time, China’s opening also 
served the interests of many economies in the region. As Breslin (2004: 112-13) argues: 
Increasing production costs in Hong Kong, Taiwan and South Korea 
coincided with appreciating regional currencies, which increased the cost of 
exports on the US market. As such, both those Japanese producers that had 
originally invested in regional NICs to produce exports, and indigenous 
producers from the NICs themselves, were searching for new lower-cost 
production sites. 
It is in this context that growing economic interactions occurred in the region, including 
the emergence of natural economic territories. 
 
7.3 Regional Level: The Emerging Natural Economic Territories 
 
In contrast to the post-war division and fragmentation, from the mid-1970s, economic 
interactions and consumerism began to pull Northeast Asians together. Particularly after 
the Plaza Accord of 1985, trade, investment, and production network increasingly tied 
the region in more complex webs. Earlier trans-border trade and investment had mostly 
linked South Korea and Taiwan to Japan and to the US, but now, as argued earlier, the 
quest for cheaper labour and other resources turned Japan, South Korea and Taiwan 
towards China and to the countries of Southeast Asia. Investment also flowed from both 
manufacturing and financial institutions based in Hong Kong and Taiwan and much of 
this investment went to China.  
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The development of regional economic cooperation facilitated more flexible business 
interactions through cross-border trade and investment. One important phenomenon is 
what Scalapino (1997:139) calls ‘Natural Economic Territories’ (NETs), defined as 
‘economic entities that cut across political boundaries, taking advantage of geographic 
proximity and various complementarities to combine manpower, resources, capital, 
technology and managerial skills’. 
 
NETs have emerged in Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia. In Southeast Asia, growth 
triangles, such as the Indonesia-Malaysia-Singapore Growth Triangle (IMS-GT), have 
become increasingly important. In Northeast Asia, NETs include: the Southern China 
NET, which links China’s two southern provinces – Guangdong and Fujian – with 
Taiwan and Hong Kong; the Yellow Sea rim, which links among China, Japan and 
South Korea; and the Tumen River project, which involves no less than six states – 
North and South Korea, Japan, China, Russia, and Mongolia.  
 
Perhaps, as Cossa and Khanna (1997: 228) observe, this approach is particularly suited 
to the Asian context; informal agreements, rather than legalistic and binding treaties, 
and incremental rather than bold systemic change are preferred. Above all, given 
Northeast Asia’s varying levels of economic development, different socio-political 
systems and complex security and political relationships, this flexible approach provides 
greater opportunities for states and entities to engage each other – despite their 
divergent interests. On balance, these experiments in cooperation have positive 
implications for both political and security relations (Scalapino 1997). 
 
One relatively early development and a very successful one was the Southern China 
NET, which emerged from early 1980s. With China’s economic reform, SEZs along 
China’s south-eastern coast attracted capital and other inputs from Taiwan and Hong 
Kong. The result was an economic boom that ‘thoroughly swept across political 
borders’ (Jordan and Khanna, 1995:436). The success of this experiment seems to raise 
an interesting possibility: ‘if cross-border trade and investment can pervade even the 
political hostility of the Taiwan Strait, what would be the effect if governments were 
actively to cooperate for mutual economic benefit?’ (Cossa and Khanna 1997: 228).  
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This emerging NET probably had some desecuritising effects, although it is hard to 
measure their extent, especially in terms of cross-Strait tensions. Beijing did not 
renounce the possible use of force if Taiwan claimed outright independence and there 
were crises over the Taiwan Strait in 1995/6 and in 1999. Yet, the NET did lead to the 
first direct interaction between the two governments after four decades of hostilities. At 
least the crises did not lead to actual war and economic links were not interrupted. 
Although there were many other reasons for China’s relative self-restraint over the 
Taiwan issue (see chapter 4), there can be little doubt that economic calculations figured 
prominently. When the 1999 crisis was at its height, the Hong Kong Economic Journal 
(Editorial 19 July 1999) was quick to point out that, if war broke out, ‘the bulk of 
China’s economic achievements that have been built up painstakingly over the last 20 
years will become history and China’s national fate will henceforth be reversed’. 
Significantly, the trend towards closer economic ties was not even broken when the 
DDP – far more inclined to independence than the KMT had been – came to power in 
Taiwan. Indeed, by 2001, the mainland had become Taiwan’s most important export 
market and, since 2002, more than half of Taiwan’s foreign investment has gone to the 
PRC (Ross 20006: 141-48). Thus, the success of the Southern China NET had 
implications that went beyond the economic sphere; at least implicitly, it had made a 
significant impact on political and security matters. 
 
Since the early 1990s, partly inspired by the development of the Southern China NET, 
other NETs – particularly the Yellow Sea rim and the Tumen River project – have 
emerged in Northeast Asia. Yet behind these plans and developments, initially inspired 
by economic motives, there are important political and security calculations. In the post-
bipolar structure, regional players tend to balance their previous focus on the global 
stage with a greater recognition of the value of regional ties. In other words, they seek to 
create multiple policy options in international relations. Members of the ‘pro-Western 
group’ no longer place sole reliance on the United States, while Anti-Americanism is no 
longer the first principle of the nominally Communist group. Nowhere is the tension 
between the global and regional approaches more evident than over the critical question 
of North Korea. The continuing uncertainty over Korea has made regional actors of all 
persuasions appreciate the necessity of working together, but the legacy of the past still 
restrains them from proposing really bold solutions. 
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A sharp comparison may be made between the Southern China and the Yellow Sea rim 
NETs on the one hand and the Tumen River project on the other. Despite official UN 
endorsement, the Tumen River project has made extremely slow progress. Its future is 
uncertain because of tensions involving Pyongyang. In addition there are many other 
difficulties. The political rift between Japan and Russia over the disputed Northern 
Islands reduced Japan’s enthusiasm. Russia has been preoccupied with internal 
economic turmoil and has no resources to contribute to its Far East. South Korea, which 
once hoped the plan would nudge North Korea out of isolation, has decided that 
bilateral trade between the two must now take priority over multilateral schemes (Jordan 
and Khanna 1995: 448, 49). Nevertheless, the project still has great significance for the 
region, as Foot notes: 
[I]ts contemplation reflects many of the features of the post-Cold War era: 
an attention to economic development and reform, a greater willingness by 
the divided states to be flexible concerning representation, and a closer 
association between nominally communist states and their capitalist 
neighbours (Foot 1995: 244).  
 
In comparison, the Yellow Sea rim economic cooperation has achieved more progress. 
This NET links China’s northern coastal region from Liaoning down to Shanghai, 
Korea’s west coast centred on Chungchong and Cholla Provinces, and Japan’s Kyushu. 
The Yellow Sea rim Net also enjoys government support especially from South Korea 
and China. For China, Japanese and South Korean capital and technology are attractive 
because they can foster China’s further economic advance. South Korea’s support is 
consistent with its ‘west coast development’ strategy. It is also consistent with South 
Korea’s ‘Northern policy’, adopted in July 1988 to negotiate diplomatic relations with 
China and the former Soviet Union16, given their important relationship with North 
Korea. Thus, NET economic cooperation demonstrates that, despite continuing political 
and security complexities, the nations of Northeast Asia have shown a willingness, even 
a practical ability, to put historic enmities and suspicions aside. They appreciate that this 
is essential if they are to participate in and sustain the region’s growing economic 
                                                 
 
16  Under this ‘Northern policy’, South Korea re-established diplomatic relations with Moscow in 
September 1990, and with Beijing in August 1992.  
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prosperity. But regional cooperation and integration processes have gone even further in 
the overall East Asian context and hence we must now move on to investigate 
developments at the inter-regional level. 
 
7.4 Inter-Regional Level: Growing Economic Regionalism and Multilateralism 
 
At the inter-regional level, the most important development has been the emergence of 
regionalism and multilateralism in East Asia and Asia-Pacific. Of course, this owes 
much to economic interactions and, whether by conscious design or not, the states of the 
region have developed closer ties and connections. In turn, these developments raised 
the question of the possibility of what RSCT calls ‘external transformation’ – the 
change in regional boundaries. Indeed, some analysts, such as Huxley (1996b: 216-18), 
have already questioned the sustainability of distinct Southeast and Northeast Asian 
RSCs. In other words, we have to consider the extent to which these processes have 
driven Northeast and Southeast Asians into single East Asian identity/society; and what 
are major implications for regional security. Chapter 5 examined this issue in terms of 
identity; here I turn to the economic dimension, and to examine their implications for 
security. 
 
7.4.1 Towards an Asia-Pacific Region: before the Asian Financial Crisis 
 
In Western Europe and in the North Atlantic area, multilateral institutions, even a 
multilateral spirit, appeared in the decade following World War II. This development 
was encouraged by the United States and seemed to reflect the American vision of the 
world order (Ruggie 1994). But Asian regionalism and multilateralism is a much later 
phenomenon, one that did not become really significant until after the end of the Cold 
War. Since then, it has developed on an Asia-Pacific regional basis rather than on an 
exclusively Northeast Asian or even East Asian one. Of course, this distinctive pattern 
of regionalism – in many ways so different from the European model has been strongly 
influenced by economic factors. Two elements have been particularly important: the 
role of Japan and regional dependency on the US. 
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Japan and the Emergence of Regionalism in Asia-Pacific 
While the emergence of regionalism and multilateralism in Asia is largely a post-Cold 
War phenomenon, its origins can be traced back to the post-war period. Here, Japan’s 
role was especially significant. The first signs were visible as early as 1965, when 
Kojima, attempting to implement the flying geese theory, proposed a Pacific Free Trade 
Area (PAFTA) to encompass all five industrialised countries in the Asia Pacific region 
– Japan, the US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Externally, the proposal was 
intended to counter the consolidation of the EEC and the increasing possibility of an 
Atlantic-based NAFTA (Deng 1997: 31). Internally, Kojima sought to create a regional 
system in the Pacific area that ‘would support the process of economic change through 
which Japan and its Asian neighbours would be indelibly linked’. Under this scheme, 
Japan would have been linked both to ‘the advanced US economy on whose markets its 
exports depended vitally, as well as backward Southeast Asia that was destined to 
absorb Japan’s sunset industries’ (Katzenstein 2000: 357). 
 
Thus, from the beginning, it was clear that Japan’s economic interests would be better 
served by the creation of a wider Asia-Pacific base than by an exclusively East Asian 
region. Thus the idea of an Asia-Pacific region became the ‘basic context’ of Japanese 
foreign relations. In 1967, the foreign minister Takeo Miki, for the first time officially 
and explicitly articulated an Asia-Pacific policy that included an awareness of common 
principles, regional cooperation in Asia and cooperation among the advanced nations 
around the Pacific Ocean. Moreover, the track-II meetings starting in 1969 became a 
powerful lobby for a market-led integration of the broad Pacific area. Subsequently, in 
September 1980, the Japanese Prime Minister Ohira, the foreign minister Okita and the 
Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser convened a meeting at the Australian 
National University, which led to the establishment of the Pacific Economic 
Cooperation Conference (PECC). As Deng argues (1997: 36), PECC, ‘composed of 
representatives from academic, business and government circles, has proved most 
effective in fostering a regionally based trans-national ‘epistemic community’ that has 
helped enhance communication and identified common concerns and interests’.  
 
Consequently, the first multilateral Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum 
was established in Canberra in November 1989. It encompassed a broad membership 
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and at the Seoul meeting in November 1991 three new members – China, Hong Kong, 
and Taiwan (under the name of Chinese Taipei) – were admitted. The enlarged group 
held its first summit in Seattle in November 1993. By 1994, Cabinet-level 
representatives from eighteen states (or quasi-states) in the Asia-Pacific region were 
involved. APEC supports policies of economic liberalism but its main objectives are: to 
sustain the growth and development of the region; to develop and strengthen the open, 
multilateral trading system; and to reduce barriers to trade in goods and services and in 
investment (Foot, 1995: 246-47). Thus, the creation of APEC symbolised the 
emergence of Asia’s market-based and ‘open’ regionalism.  
 
This emerging new regionalism was also influenced by developments in the 
international environment towards the end of the 1980s and early 1990s. Regional 
cooperation was now seen as a crucial bridge to global multilateralism. For example, 
difficulties encountered in the GATT Uruguay Round negotiations and accelerating 
regionalization in Europe and North America led both the United States and Japan to 
view regional economic cooperation in a new light. For Japan, APEC appeared a 
convenient and relatively safe mechanism through which it could help to support and 
extend the GATT-based trade regime (Deng 1997: 39). For the US, both conflicts 
between it and the EU, leading to a possible failure of the GATT Uruguay Round, and 
growing trade frictions with Japan made APEC an attractive counterweight to a rising 
tide of protectionism (Katzenstein 2000: 358).  
 
However, the aspect of APEC was not entirely to the taste of many Asian governments, 
who wanted to adhere to specifically Asian values and to foster a distinct East Asian 
regionalism. In 1990, the Malaysian Prime Minister, Mahathir, proposed the creation of 
East Asian Economic Group, with the explicit purpose of developing a purely East 
Asian voice and identity. But the proposal was rejected due to the opposition from other 
East Asian governments, often acting under US pressure. Even when the proposal was 
formally endorsed by ASEAN in July 1993, the idea of an Economic Group was 
downgraded to a mere ‘caucus’ that would meet within APEC (Ravenhill 2002: 168). 
The entire project was overshadowed and largely nullified by the rapid success of 
APEC and opposition from the US. 
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This slow and often difficult evolution towards a more inward-looking East Asian 
regionalism demonstrates that an idea is one thing but its realisation is another. Indeed, 
as argued in chapter 5, it was the US interests to promote the idea of Asia-Pacific rather 
than East Asia. This fitted neatly with its ‘swing-power’ strategy (Buzan 2004b). Yet 
the success of Asia-Pacific and the relative failure of East Asia also points to the 
region’s essential weakness – its dependency on the US in both the economic and 
security spheres. Economic dependency on the US derives partly from the region’s own 
economic model. East Asia as a whole has largely followed the Japanese economic 
‘developmental state’ model (Johnson 1982). In this model, free trade and the market 
operate within a context of considerable state management and control (see chapter 6, 
the East Asian developmental model). Although by adopting this strategy, many East 
Asian economies have experienced impressive economic growth, its inherently neo-
mercantilist nature means that their economies are rather competitive with each other. 
Inevitably, export-led growth has depended largely on external markets. In other words, 
exports – especially exports to the United States – rather than expanding domestic 
markets – have been the chief drivers of economic growth. In turn, dependency on 
external markets means that there has been only limited interdependence between these 
countries. Thus Asia-Pacific regionalism retained considerable appeal – even for many 
East Asians.   
 
Thus, economic factors also did not lead the processes of regionalisation to the 
immediate emergence of an East Asian collective identity/society. This is evident from 
a comparison between the fates of various initiatives. Thus the East Asian attempt to 
create EAEG/EAEC failed in the early 1990s. By contrast, as symbolised by success of 
APEC, regionalism in Asia has developed most strongly in the Asia-Pacific region. 
Asian-Pacific regionalism is open rather than closed, and supports a policy of non-
discriminatory economic liberalism. However, the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 was 
to bring a rather different direction to regional developments. 
 
7.4.2 New East Asian Regionalism 
 
Towards the end of the millennium, things began to change. In responding to the Asian 
financial crisis of 1997-98, ‘East Asian states have moved towards institutionalising an 
exclusive Asian grouping in the ASEAN Plus Three meetings, a body that has adopted 
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an increasingly ambitious agenda for regional economic cooperation’ (Ravenhill 
2001:210). Proposals for regional collaboration in East Asia proliferated at multiple 
levels, including bilateral free trade arrangements, regional trade liberalisation, and 
various forms of cooperation in the monetary field. The most important developments 
have been the ‘Chiang Mai Initiative’ of May 2000 and the ASEAN-China FTA of 
2001. While the CMI was seen as another version of the Asian Monetary Fund, the 
Chinese initiative leading to the ASEAN-China FTA was regarded as a strategic coup 
by Beijing (Robertson 2002). It allowed China to take the lead in future proposals for 
the inclusion of Japan and South Korea in any ASEAN Plus Three free trade agreement.  
 
However, the APT is not an entirely new idea; it can be seen as a revival of the failed 
EAEG / EAEC attempt of the early 1990s. Its creation suggests that, while regional 
initiatives and the ideas that inform them may fail if launched prematurely, this does not 
preclude later revival and success in a more favourable climate. In these new initiatives, 
both China and Japan play more positive roles. In particular, Japan’s support for the 
APT is in marked contrast to the hesitation it displayed towards the EAEC project. The 
changed approach may reflect the fact that the United States no longer objected so 
strongly to such schemes and hence Japan felt less constrained about involving itself in 
the APT (Terada 2003: 268). But Japan did not have an entirely free hand. Whereas, in 
the past, it had been held back by American pressure, now it was driven forward by its 
continuing rivalry and competition – however ‘soft’ – with China. As Stubbs (2002: 
443) argues, ‘the Chinese government’s agreement to take up ASEAN’s invitation 
essentially forced Tokyo’s hand’. In other words, faced with increased ASEAN- China 
cooperation, Japan could not afford to let its rival gain ‘an uncontested leadership 
position in the region’.  
 
Yet, whatever its reasons, Japan’s approach toward East Asia became even more 
positive at the start of the new century. Its new position was clearly expressed in 
Koizumi’s speech in Singapore (January 2002), where he suggested that East Asian 
should seek to create a ‘community’. To achieve this end, it was essential to make ‘the 
best use of the framework of ASEAN+3’ (Koizumi 2002). Koizumi’s comments also 
shed light on Japan’s role in the CMI. This successful revival of the earlier – and failed 
– AMF project allows signatory states to borrow US dollars from other members’ 
reserves to buy their own currency. In other words, it provides a mechanism intended to 
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assist currency stability by creating a bulwark against the potentially destabilising 
effects of global financial flows and speculative attacks (Wang Seok-Dong and 
Andersen 2003).  
 
While the Japanese position has altered, China’s changing attitudes and its more active 
role in East Asian initiatives may be even more significant. As mentioned earlier, APT 
is an extremely important East Asian initiative. Beginning with discussions on a 
regional response to the crisis in 1997, the APT meeting produced a Joint Statement on 
East Asia Cooperation in 1999. Initially, China was relatively ‘cool’, emphasising that 
the implementation of the 1999 Joint statement must be incremental and consistent with 
the principles of consensus. Yet China became increasingly enthusiastic and now 
argued that the process should be developed into the ‘main channel’ of East Asian 
regional cooperation (Haacke 2002). Beijing must have calculated that such cooperation 
would work to its advantage – as indeed it does. It is in China’s interest to work with 
neighbouring states to prevent or contain potential crises – if only because its continued 
growth would be jeopardised without closer cooperation and enhanced regional 
stability. 
 
Thus, China’s ‘peaceful rise’ strategy, especially its newfound enthusiasm for the 
expansion of economic ties with its neighbours, has transformed its regional posture. 
Here, the engagement between China and ASEAN – culminating in the establishment of 
the China-ASEAN FTA – appears particularly significant (see Ba 2003). Given China’s 
previous hostility to regional trade agreements, it is hardly surprising that the initial 
proposal – made by the then Premier, Zhu Rongii, during meetings with ASEAN 
officials at the APT Singapore summit in November 2000 – was received with some 
scepticism. But negotiations began and, despite occasional difficulties, progress was 
made; Expert Group studies proved especially useful in overcoming problems. Finally, 
the two parties signed a Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic 
Cooperation at the Phnom Penh APT summit in November 2002.17 This stipulated that 
an initial common tariff reduction would be completed by 2006 and that a full free-trade 
would be in place by 2013. Of course, we must ask how far have these processes have 
                                                 
 
17 The Framework Agreement signed in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, 4 November 2002 is accessible at 
http://www.aseansec.org/13196.htm. 
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contributed to the wider task of East Asian region-building and explore their 
implications for Sino-Japanese relations and for regional security. 
 
7.4.3 The Significance of Regional Initiatives 
 
We must now assess whether the developments discussed above will lead to new levels 
of collaboration in the trade and financial fields and hence facilitate true regional 
integration. Breslin (2004: 122) believes that the ASEAN-China FTA is likely to foster 
such processes, notably because it is intended to spur intra-regional investment and to 
allow ASEAN producers increased access to the Chinese market. Bergsten (2000: 23) 
goes even further and speculates that the FTA and CMI could ultimately lead to a 
replication of much of the European experience; East Asia could have its own version of 
the EU: 
Virtually unnoticed by the rest of the world, East Asian countries are getting 
together to make their own economic arrangements. As a result, for the first 
time in history, the world is becoming a three-block configuration. 
 
These predictions could be realised. For instance, the 2002 ASEAN-China Agreement 
has done much to allay fears – once widespread among ASEAN countries – that closer 
ties with China would damage their own economies, especially if the Chinese were to 
take over their export markets. In particular, China has displayed an apparent 
willingness to open its own markets and has already reduced tariffs on some (mainly 
agricultural) imports from ASEAN countries (Wong and Chan 2003; Moore 2004: 122). 
The result has been a rapid growth in ASEAN-China trade. Premier Wen was quick to 
emphasise the benefits for China’s Asian trading partners:  
With import growing by an average annual rate of over 15% in recent years, 
China is ranked [the] world’s third largest and Asia’s largest importer. In 
2004, China’s import from other Asian countries and areas grew by 35% 
over 2003 to about US$370 billion, accounting for 65% of its total import. 
With domestic demand growing, China will import more than US$2 trillion 
of goods in the next five years (Wen 2005). 
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 However, despite enthusiasm and widespread expectations of future benefits, in some 
respects, the actual results to date have been quite modest. As I argued in the previous 
chapter, the East Asian economies are still more competitive than complementary. 
Major benefits are likely to be some way in the future. Thus, Tan, a specialist on Asian 
Economic Development and Cooperation (personal conversation, September 2005), 
stressed that the FTA must be seen as a long-term process. Today, Malaysia, Thailand, 
and Indonesia all compete to sell rubber on world markets. This is why states such as 
Singapore have made so many bilateral agreements (with Japan, New Zealand and 
Australia) rather than multilateral ones. Singapore knows that the FTA will take a long 
time to mature. In a similar vein, Ravenhill (2002: 187) argues that the exact shape of 
the CMI ‘remains to be determined but from its implementation to date it is possible to 
deduce what the scheme will not do. The product will not be a regional institution but a 
series of bilateral swap arrangements’. It is true that, so far, post-crisis initiatives have 
been largely bilateral and directed towards forging closer links with Western partners. 
There is an obvious tension between this pattern and the aspiration to create an 
exclusively East Asian bloc. 
 
7.4.4 Implications for Regional Security 
 
While economic interactions and calculations about economic interests may largely 
explain the origins of regionalisation and regionalism in East Asia and Asia-Pacific, 
these processes have now expanded some way into the security realm – especially 
through the ARF and APT. It is clear, therefore, that the emergence of regionalism and 
multilateralism in the region has important implications for regional security. But what 
has been the impact on securitisation practices? It certainly seems that all three of the 
major powers involved in the region – the US, Japan and China – have changed their 
positions more or less significantly. Yet elements of ambiguity remain, especially in the 
relationship between the two actually located in the region – China and Japan. . 
 
Changes in China’s approach need little further explanation, as these have been 
discussed at some length in chapter 5 and at the domestic level in this chapter. Clearly, 
China’s foreign policy now appears far more pragmatic than the ideology-dominated 
policy of the past. Above all, China seeks to project the image of a good neighbour and 
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a good partner under its ‘peaceful rise’ strategy. According to the recent survey taken by 
Yomiuri Shimbun (5 September 2006), more than 80 percent of people in Malaysia, 
Thailand and Indonesia had a ‘good impression’ of China. The change has been most 
dramatic in Indonesia. When the same question was asked in 1995, only 31 per cent 
indicated a favourable impression whereas, by 2006, the figure had risen to 81 per cent. 
These responses suggest that many people in South East Asia view the rise of China 
more with enthusiasm than with alarm. Also ‘there is a recognition within the rest of 
East Asia that any viable organization has to include China’ (Breslin 2004: 120).  
 
Similarly, Japan’s more positive attitude towards East Asian initiatives, particularly its 
support for APT, has been regarded as ‘a milestone for East Asian regionalism’ (Terada 
2003: 267). As a result, many East Asians, particularly Southeast Asians, express 
exceptionally favourable views regarding Japan. The same survey by the Yomiuri 
Shimbun shows that in many Southeast Asian countries, about 90 per cent of those 
interviewed had a ‘good impression’ of Japan and hoped it would play a greater 
economic and political role in regional affairs (Daily Yomiuri 5 September 2006; 
Huanqiu Shibao 12 September 2006). Such positive assessments of Japan should indeed 
encourage it to play a bigger part in regional affairs. Of course, as mentioned earlier, 
Japan’s more positive stance may reflect reduced US opposition to such possibilities. In 
fact the US approach towards East Asia as a whole has changed considerably, especially 
towards the turn of the century. If it has not abandoned its bilateral approach and its 
alliance system, the US became more willing to participate in and to support regional 
multilateral and minilateral arrangements. In part, the success of the APT rests on tacit, 
if not active, US support. In turn, the new American position may have been facilitated 
by the fact that most of the regional actors – including China – also appreciate the 
importance of US support in regional affairs. 
 
Sino-Japanese Relations 
But while the US, China and Japan all seem to be adopting quite positive positions, 
Sino-Japanese relations in this context appear more problematic. Their rivalry for 
influence over East Asia constitutes a particularly intractable problem for 
regionalisation processes. Thus, even when China made what it hoped would be 
regarded as ‘positive’ moves, these were often interpreted as attempts to dilute Japanese 
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and American influence. In some instances, they triggered a new round of competition 
between China and Japan. For instance, a ‘Strategic Partnership’ was agreed between 
China and ASEAN in October 2003. Although words of the agreement were benign – 
‘non-aligned, non-military, and nonexclusive’ – they were modified on the advice of 
Washington (FEER 20 November 2003). Japan also responded by holding a similar 
summit with ASEAN, in which the parties agreed to create a new ‘special relationship’ 
and Japan also joined TAC (Glosserman 2004). These developments suggest both China 
and Japan are still anxious about the other’s influence in the region. 
 
However, it should be noted that, while rivalry continues, other forces seem to be 
working in the region at least to prevent major escalation of that rivalry. It is also true 
that both China and Japan have found it easier to work together in this emerging 
multilateral context. In the light of past history, it would have been difficult for Japan to 
express a unilateral concern about the lack of China’s military transparency, because 
this might alarm Japan’s neighbours. Concern could be expressed more effectively if 
they were raised in concert with ASEAN and South Korea. Indeed, these joint 
statements seemed effective in that China responded positively by increasing its levels 
of military transparency (Shambaugh 2004/05: 88). The same lesson can be drawn from 
the emergence of the APT after the Asian financial crisis. Here, both China and Japan 
responded favourably to essentially East Asian initiatives. At the same time, 
cooperation between China and Japan and among the Northeast Asian Three expanded 
significantly.  
 
Following Japanese Prime Minister Obuchi’s proposal, leaders of three Northeast Asian 
countries – Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji, Japanese Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi and 
South Korean President Kim Dae-jung – held an informal breakfast meeting on the 
sidelines of the third APT summit meeting in November 1999. This was the first 
meeting between the leaders of the three states in modern times (Terada 2003: 267; 
Yoshimatsu 2004). Thereafter, things were taken further. In October 2003, the leaders 
of the three states – Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi 
Junichiro and ROK President Roh Moo Hyun – met in Bali and signed the Joint 
Declaration on the Promotion of Tripartite Cooperation to promote trade, culture, 
personnel exchanges, political and security cooperation between the three parties. They 
also discussed the idea of a trilateral foreign ministers’ meeting – the first was held in 
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Beijing in June 2004. It is significant that, when there were strong anti-Japanese 
demonstrations in major Chinese cities and in South Korea early 2005, senior officials 
from the three countries met swiftly and agreed on steps to alleviate the tensions (Zhitao 
Ding 2005). Thus, it is in this increasingly complex regional context that Sino-Japanese 
rivalry has been managed to certain degree. Sometimes they compete and sometimes 
they cooperate with each other. 
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Conclusion to Part II: Economics and Security 
 
In this part, through two chapters, I examined the relations between economics and 
security. Chapter 6 focused on neorealist perspectives, which generally portray the post-
Cold War relationship between economics and security in Northeast Asia as highly 
competitive and unstable. It is true that economic interdependence and multilateral 
institutions were weakly developed in Northeast Asia, particularly during the Cold War 
period. Global and regional factors led Northeast Asian or East Asian economies to 
become more competitive than complementary – a feature that seriously hindered 
further regional integration. Indeed, even when much higher levels of economic 
interdependence were attained – as between China and Japan after 2000 – this did little 
to produce more harmonious relations. Their relationship could be described as one of 
‘hot economy but cold politics’. Sino-Japanese rivalry is certainly an obstacle to the 
development of any idea of an East Asian community. 
 
Thus realists such as Waltz (1979; 2000) and Mearsheimer (1994/95) insist that the 
crucial factor in determining the relationship between economics and security must be 
relative gains and losses and how these affect the distribution of power within the 
international system. Here, the most critical change in Northeast Asia is surely the rise 
of China as a major economic and political power as against the relative decline in 
Japan’s economic might. Despite China’s contention that its ‘peaceful rise’ threatens 
no-one, there can be no doubt that its increased influence, particularly in Southeast Asia, 
does constitute a threat to the interests of the US and Japan. The result has been 
increasingly open competition between the great powers involved in the region and this 
competition has been especially marked over energy resources.  
 
Chapter 7 examined economic and security relations from the liberal perspective and its 
later developments. Although the case of Northeast / East Asia does not fit the liberal 
analysis exactly or exclusively, the dynamics of economic interactions have had 
significant effects on regional security. Here, the emergence of an essentially East Asian 
international society is perhaps the most important outcome. In Northeast Asia, cross 
border joint projects, especially in the form of NETs, involve government agencies and 
private companies. They bind previously hostile actors together in pursuit of their joint 
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interests. Over time, a common set of interests and some sense of regional society have 
emerged.  
 
There have been especially important developments in East Asia. The emergence of 
regionalism and regionalisation has linked Northeast Asia to the broader East Asia and 
Asia Pacific regions. More significantly, after the Asian financial crisis, the processes 
have led East Asians toward greater integration and community building. Economic 
interest, above all the desire to sustain economic development, has certainly been a 
driving force, while the links between Northeast and Southeast Asia – bringing both 
greater economic opportunities and access to ASEAN’s experiences – have had 
significant desecuritising effects.  
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Part III  The Politico-Military Dimension: Sino-Japanese Rivalry 
 
Introduction 
 
In the aftermath of the Cold War, debates about security in Asia and in Northeast Asia 
were dominated by speculations about the impact of the distribution / redistribution of 
material power within the international system. The likely – in some cases the only 
possible – outcome was identified as a ‘back to the future’ scenario, in which the Asian 
and Northeast Asian regional security order would be prone to crisis and conflict 
(Friedberg, 1993/93; Roy, 1994). Of course, predictions of this kind appeared most 
convincing when crises were actually occurring. According to the traditional approach, 
the end of the Cold War brought fundamental changes to the Northeast Asian regional 
security environment, and hence transformed the strategic context of Sino-Japanese 
relations. The most serious problem arising from the redistribution of power was 
perceived to stem from the rise of China. This part examines Sino-Japanese rivalry and 
regional security dynamics in the military-political dimension mainly through neorealist 
perspective. 
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8 Rivalry for Pre-Eminence 
 
Introduction 
 
Relations between China and Japan and between these two powers and the US are 
central to any analysis based on the power position perspective. Three interrelated 
concerns can be identified. The first, and most serious, is the challenge posed by the rise 
of China as a major economic and military power. As a rising power, China may 
become increasingly assertive. This would alarm China’s neighbours and also inevitably 
challenge Japanese and American interests in the region. This leads to the second and 
third concerns: the possibility of Japan’s remilitarisation and uncertainty as to whether 
the US, ultimately an external power, will remain committed to its present role as a 
guarantor of regional security. Given the tensions and crises in Korea, problems over 
the Taiwan Strait and other territorial and energy disputes, Northeast Asia could be 
heading towards a ‘back to the future’ scenario. This chapter focuses on the distribution 
and redistribution of power and their impact on regional security dynamics. It considers 
how Sino-Japanese rivalry and regional instability may be generated by factors 
operating on four different levels – domestic, regional, interregional, and global. 
 
8.1 The Domestic Level 
 
Domestic developments in China and Japan seem likely to have important consequences 
for their relations and for regional security and stability as a whole. Neorealists are by 
no means indifferent to domestic developments. Their main concerns, however, are not 
with characters or ideologies, but with domestically generated capabilities, especially 
economic and military power. Above all, they believe that changes in the relative 
strengths of states and their positions within the international system have the biggest 
impact upon security relations. Hence, what matters about domestic developments is 
that how they affect relations between China and Japan and how they change the 
relative position of these states in the region and in the global system. 
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8.1.1 The Rise of China 
 
Since the rise of China has been identified as the most serious security challenge in 
Northeast Asia – and even in the world – it is not surprising that there is talk of a ‘China 
threat’. As noted in chapter 7, the introduction of its economic reform and ‘opening’ 
policy, allowed China to achieve continuous and impressive economic growth of 
between 7 and 9 per cent per annum. China has also undertaken a huge programme of 
military modernisation. But what are the implications and consequences of China’s 
growing relative and absolute power? Is a stronger China compatible with regional 
security and stability? Although analytical emphases vary, protagonists of the ‘China 
threat’ are united in appealing to a series of related theoretical, historical and empirical 
arguments. 
 
Concerns about the rise of China and resulting implications for regional security are 
often associated with power transition theories, which postulate a direct link between 
internal growth and external expansionism. Gilpin (1981: 187) argues that ‘As its 
relative power increases, a rising state attempts to change the rules governing the 
international system, the division of the spheres of influence, and most important of all, 
the international distribution of territory.’ Hence, rapidly rising powers are identified as 
revisionist or dissatisfied powers because they seek to change the existing international 
order. Although power transition theory deals with the international system, Roy (1994: 
165) believes that the same logic can be applied to ‘a regional rivalry for control of East 
Asia between a dominant but mature Japan and a rising China’. 
 
Historically, the ‘external expansion of the UK and France, Germany and Japan, the 
Soviet Union and the United States coincided with phases of intense industrialisation 
and economic development’ (Huntington 1991:12). Although the character of these 
great powers varied – from relatively benign to malign – all were subject to the same 
pressures and temptations to expand their influence and domination. Will a more 
powerful China experience the same pressures and temptations or is there any reason 
why China should depart from this pattern? Not surprisingly, realists think it will not. 
Many analysts predict that ‘China will undoubtedly be moving into such a phase in the 
coming decades’ (Huntington 1991:12). Furthermore, Kristof (1993: 71) notes, as the 
rise of new powers creates widespread alarm, ‘there is a growing suspicion in Asia and 
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abroad about China’s intentions and aspirations’. In other words, history may repeat 
itself. 
 
Empirical evidence suggests that a rapidly growing China will be more assertive. Its 
revisionist or dissatisfied stance appears to be reflected in the priority it has given to 
enhancing its military capability. As Kristof (1993: 59) asserts, ‘China is the fastest 
growing economy in the world, with what may be the fastest growing military budget’. 
Since the late 1980s, China has increased expenditure on armaments and made intensive 
efforts to acquire advanced air and naval systems. China’s defence budget doubled 
between 1990 and 1994 – an increase unmatched by any other state in the region 
(Pagano 1997). Indeed, after the Cold War, the other major powers in the world reduced 
their military expenditures by at least 30 per cent. The Gulf War (1990-91) led China to 
reassess its defence strategy. It began to abandon its traditional emphasis on large low-
technology ground forces and to embark on a major programme of military 
modernisation. The purchase of modern arms equipment and a new air-defence system 
from Russia began in the early 1990s. Segal (1993: 29, 30) argued that these purchases 
indicated that ‘China was prepared to enter into long-term military procurement 
agreements with Russia’s defense industry’. Towards the late 1990s and in the new 
millennium, these purchases expanded to include systems such as Su-27UBK and SU-
30MK2 (Military Balance 2004-5, IISS).  
 
Many believe that ‘China is not simply a status-quo power, but is pursuing nationalist 
aims’, and thus seeks to recover territory and prestige lost to the West during the 
century of humiliation (Segal 1993:29; Roy 1994: 61; Drifte 2002: 131-32). Kristof 
(1993: 72) argues that, despite obvious differences, there are striking similarities 
between contemporary China and Wilhelmine Germany. Both societies exhibit ‘the 
sense of wounded pride, the annoyance of a giant that has been battered and cheated by 
the rest of the world’ (cf., similar view, Taniguchi 2005). Thus, as it modernises, China 
seeks a regional and global role commensurate with what it considers its rightful 
historical place (Drifte 2002: 131-32). China’s irredentist claims have resulted in 
disputes and conflicts, such as those over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands with Japan (see, 
Deans 2000), and over the South China Sea islands with many Southeast Asian 
countries. Recently there have been further disputes with Japan over the gas fields in the 
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East China Sea. China has also often indicated its willingness to use force over the 
Taiwan issue if necessary. 
 
During the Cold War, Chinese leaders often perceived the international environment as 
primarily hostile and their own place within it as insecure. But the end of the Cold War 
has not removed this sense of insecurity; all that has changed is that the chief threat has 
taken a different form. As Yahuda (1996: 211) argues, in the past, the main threat to 
China was perceived as primarily ‘military’, but now it has become ‘political’. The 
collapse of communist states in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union raises obvious 
doubts about the long-term survival of Communist Party rule in China. Thus, Kristof 
(1993: 72) speculates that ‘Chinese leaders may be tempted to promote Chinese 
nationalism as a unifying force and ideology, to replace the carcass of communism.’ It 
is true that in the early 1990s, the Chinese government, led by Jiang Zemin, did launch 
the Patriotic Education campaign (see, chapter 6) 
 
What does the rise of China, with its attendant revisionist tendencies, imply for 
Northeast Asian regional security? How do actors (status quo powers) respond to such a 
challenge? Gilpin (1981:187) argues that ‘the dominant power counters this challenge 
through changes in its policies that attempt to restore equilibrium in the system. The 
historical record reveals that if it fails in this attempt, the disequilibrium will be resolved 
by war.’ This suggests that a stronger China is likely to undermine the regional peace. 
In the first place, a stronger China challenges US interests in the region. In turn, this 
raises the question of US responses and of American engagement (I will discuss this 
question in detail on the Global level). It also challenges Japan’s existing interests and 
causes a redistribution of power. Thus, domestic developments in China raise the 
question of Japan’s response. If this response is remilitarisation, it will represent a 
serious challenge to regional security. 
 
8.1.2 The Japanese Question 
 
With the end of the Cold War, uncertainties about domestic developments in Japan and 
its future role in international affairs have given rise to serious concern in Northeast 
Asia, and in Asia as a whole. The main uncertainty was whether Japan would retain its 
low and dependent politico-military posture. If, as seemed increasingly likely, it would 
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not, then two further questions presented themselves: would Japan emerge as an 
independent military power in its own right, or would its more assertive posture take the 
form of a more active security role in support of the US? In the early 1990s, the first 
possibility aroused greatest concern, but, in the last decade, the second has seemed more 
likely.   
 
The Cold War Period 
Despite remarkable economic growth since the end of World War II, Japan has been 
either unable or unwilling to pursue a truly independent foreign policy or to display 
decisive international political leadership. Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution – the 
so-called ‘Peace Constitution’ – prohibits the use of armed force. Wartime memories in 
neighbouring countries and elsewhere, coupled with Japanese reaction to the use of 
nuclear weapons against Hiroshima and Nagasaki, made it difficult for Japan to apply 
military pressure as a legitimate instrument of state policy. Moreover, in the Cold War 
circumstances the so-called Yoshida Doctrine – choose to focus on economic matters 
while depending on the US for its strategic political and security matters – served Japan 
well. These factors ‘effectively deprived’ Japan of credibility as a major security actor 
in the Cold War period (Hook et al. 2001: 12). In short, Japan’s defence policy relied 
almost exclusively on the US ‘security umbrella’.  
 
The End of The Cold War 
However, developments in the late 1980s and early 1990s seemed to pose fundamental 
challenges to ‘the entire foundation of Japan’s post-war international stance’ (Brown 
1994: 430). In the first place, the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet 
Union raised questions as to the future credibility of the US-Japan alliance system. They 
also changed the strategic context of Sino-Japanese relations (Yahuda 1996: 247; 2002). 
The ‘anti-hegemony’ clause in the Sino-Japanese Communiqué, implying common 
opposition to a perceived Soviet threat, lost much of its former meaning. In addition, 
growing trade frictions between the US and Japan since the 1980s and signs, in the early 
1990s, that the US was retreating from East Asia suggested that Japan would have to 
seek a more independent solution. 
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These developments must be considered alongside China’s rapid rise in the region and 
perhaps in the world. Yahuda (1996a: 262) argues that Japan may be ‘the only country 
capable of balancing Chinese power in the event of a major American military 
withdrawal’. Hence, attention has focussed on Japan’s likely domestic development 
and, in particular, on its response to a rising China. Indeed, there are increasing voices 
that urging the country to protect itself more vigorously. As such, Japan’s constitutional 
status as a pacifist country – one of its post-war foundations – was also being 
questioned. Increasingly both policy elites and public opinion are more supportive to the 
idea of constitutional amendment, including Article 9. In September 2003, Koizumi 
called for a national debate on the issue of amending Article 9; and Nishi Osamu (2005: 
32) claimed: 
It is now inevitable that a move will be made to revise the Constitution, and 
it goes without saying that when this time comes the biggest point of 
contention will be Article 9. 
In other words, the revision of the ‘peace Constitution’ including Article 9 is 
increasingly possible. These trends have caused concern whether Japan’s pacifism, anti-
nuclearism, and dependency of the US that evolved since the postwar era are eroding 
(Matthews 2003). 
 
In this sense, the 1991 Gulf War was an important turning point for Japan’s security 
posture. The war shattered the ‘taboo’ on the overseas use of the Japanese SDF, 
allowing Maritime SDF minesweepers to participate in operations at the end of the 
conflict. In June 1992, the Japanese Diet passed the Peacekeeping Operations Bill, 
which allowed the SDF to participate in various UN PKOs, such as Cambodia (1992-3), 
Rwanda (1994), and East Timor (1999 to present). Of course, these activities were 
confined exclusively to non-combat roles, yet still many Asians reacted with suspicion 
and hostility, particularly the Chinese and Koreans. Ezrati (2002: 20) sees these 
activities as providing Japanese troops with an opportunity to gain training, experience, 
and even a reputation for effectiveness, while incurring few negative diplomatic side 
effects.  
 
Secondly, Japan’s changed international posture is also evident in its increasing 
firmness towards China. From the time of the Sino-Japanese ‘normalisation’ in 1972 
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until the early 1990s, Japan adopted a low posture towards China. Conscious of Chinese 
sensitivities stemming from World War II, Japan was reluctant to make public 
criticisms of human rights abuses in China and preferred to raise any concerns in private 
(Segal 1993: 30; Shambaugh 1996: 93). Even after the Tiananmen crackdown of June 
1989, Japan adopted a ‘soft’ response, in sharp contrast to that of its G7 partners. Japan 
did sign the joint statement agreed at the 1989 Paris Summit imposing sanctions upon 
China, but applied these sanctions very selectively (Shambaugh 1996: 84) and was the 
first country to lift them.  
 
During the 1990s, however, Japanese perceptions of China’s security policies and its 
stance towards China changed profoundly. Of course, the realist logic of power struggle 
would interpret these changes as natural responses to the rise of China and its growing 
assertiveness. As argued earlier, with the rapid rise of its economy, China enhanced its 
military capabilities and displayed renewed firmness over territorial issues – as revealed 
in the purchase of modern military equipment from Russia and in the promulgation of 
the Territorial Waters Law of 1992. Thus it appeared that China was bidding for 
regional hegemony and might well seek to resolve territorial disputes ‘by force or by the 
threat of force’ (Brown 1994). Japan’s more assertive approach to China has also been 
influenced by generational changes in its political and bureaucratic leadership. Younger 
leaders are showing increasing impatience with Chinese criticisms of Japan’s failure to 
come to terms with its past (Drifte 2002: 132; Yahuda 2002). Thus, under growing 
pressure from other G-7 states, coupled with its own rising confidence, Japan is now 
more critical of China’s human rights policies (Segal 1993: 30) and of its general 
assertiveness. In 1995, Japan took the unprecedented step of suspending some of its 
grant aid to China, after China’s nuclear test. Although this affected only a tiny portion 
of Japan’s aid to China, it was a drastic departure from Japan’s earlier policy (Drifte 
2002). That is, Japan has turned from its policy of disconnecting development 
assistance with politics, to making them as part of political disputes (Wakisaka 1998: 
121). Since the mid 1990s, Japan has strengthened its ties with the US – a move widely 
seen as linked to ‘harder’ attitudes to China. 
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Japan’s Links with The US 
In the early 1990s, there were signs that Japan was embarking on a more ‘independent’ 
foreign policy. More recently, however, its growing assertiveness has taken the form of 
closer defence cooperation with the US. In part, the renewal of ties with the US 
reflected a changed view of the international system. In the earlier 1990s, the end of the 
Cold War and the relative decline of US power, led many Japanese to conclude that the 
system was about to enter a multi-polar phase (Matsuda; Shaopu Wang, interviews in 
April and June 2005). Thus it seemed sensible to devise policies that would safeguard 
Japanese interests in the uncertain circumstances likely to follow any US withdrawal 
from East Asia. For example, the International Peace Cooperation Law of 1992 enabled 
Tokyo to dispatch units of the SDF to participate in UN PKOs. Japan also undertook a 
new initiative to pursue security multilateralism in the region (I will examine this issue 
in more detail at the interregional level). All seemed to point toward a more independent 
foreign policy. However, by the mid 1990s, the possibility of US withdrawal had 
receded. Since the US seemed firmly established as the sole superpower and the pre-
eminent country in the world, Japan’s analysis of the international system, and hence its 
policy orientation, changed accordingly. 
 
The Japanese analysis was also influenced by China’s increasing assertiveness, which 
seemed to be leading to greater regional uncertainties. Tensions over the Korean 
peninsula, over the Taiwan Strait and, above all, the Taiwan crisis of 1995-6, induced 
Japan to strive to strengthen its ties with the US. In November 1995, increased 
enthusiasm for cooperation with the US led Japan to make significant changes to its 
1976 National Defence Program Outline. The modifications extended the scope of 
possible Japanese military activity from defence against ‘limited small-scale attack’ to 
something more controversial and ambiguous. Now military activity would be a 
possible response to situations that might arise ‘in the areas surrounding Japan’ (Green 
1999: 155). There was no indication of how extensive these areas might be.  
 
This was followed by the renewal of the US-Japan Joint Security Declaration in 1996, 
followed in 1997 by the revision of the 1978 Guidelines for Japan-US Defence 
Cooperation. The 1997 revised Guidelines certainly worried China, since they further 
and more explicitly expanded the scope of bilateral defence cooperation (Liu 1997). In 
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the past, this had been limited to the defence of Japan’s home islands but now extended 
to cooperation to deal with regional crises18. The 1997 Guidelines, also appeared to 
mark a significant step towards the establishment of a formal alliance structure, by 
moving away from the previous situation in which Japan merely provided facilities and 
the US provided the military personnel. In other words, Japan effectively signified its 
readiness to assume greater military responsibility for the stability of Asian-Pacific 
region. China was apprehensive about the intentional ambiguity in the 1997 Guidelines, 
particularly about their applicability to Taiwan. Shi Yinhong, an expert on China’s 
relations with Japan and America, even described the revised Guidelines as an Asian 
version of NATO, largely designed to prevent (fang fan) China’s rise and to preclude 
the possibility of its using force to resolve the Taiwan issue (Shi 2000: 57). 
 
China’s concerns about Japan’s renewed ties with the US and its growing assertiveness 
were heightened by Japan’s decision to embark on a joint study of Theatre Missile 
Defence Programme (TMD) with the US in 1994. Such fear appears quite well founded; 
Drifte (2000: 455) argues: 
Since the proposed TMD system is navy-based, involving Japan’s AEGIS 
ships (which are now also being considered for sale to Taiwan!), China fears 
that TMD would not only undermine its nuclear deterrent but also 
encourage Taipei’s resistance to reunification on Beijing’s terms. There are 
even some in the USA and in Taiwan who would like to involve Taiwan 
directly in TMD in order to protect it against Chinese missiles. 
Chinese fears were increased when Japan decided to deploy a TMD system in 
December 2003. 
 
11 September 2001 
The ties between the US and Japan became even closer after 11 September 2001. 
Shortly afterwards, the Japanese government, under Prime Minister Koizumi, passed an 
anti-terrorism law and a package of national security laws enabling Japan to send troops 
                                                 
 
18 See the revised Guidelines, particularly Article V, ‘Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan’, on MOFA 
Japan Web: http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/guideline2.html. 
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to Afghanistan and to deploy naval vessels in the Indian Ocean. By 2004, things had 
moved further, so that, on 26 January, Koizumi could give final approval to a plan to 
send a significant SDF contingent to Iraq, involving more than 1,000 ground, air and 
maritime personnel. The first group of ninety core Ground SDF troops left on 4 
February. The next day The Japan Times described this as ‘the first time since World 
War II that Japan has dispatched troops to a country where fighting is taking place’. The 
newspaper noted that ‘The government is sending the troops to what have been deemed 
non-combat areas in Iraq’, yet went on to observe that the confused situation in Iraq 
meant that a ‘non-combat area’ could easily become a ‘combat area’.  
 
Furthermore, as stated earlier, Japan has committed itself to the development of a joint 
programme of regional missile defence with the US. In December 2003 it went so far as 
to decide to deploy a TMD system. Thus, under Bush and Koizumi, the US-Japan 
alliance system has been strengthened and its scope expanded. Beijing clearly regards 
these moves as directed against China. It was particularly alarmed by the US-Japan 
(2+2) talks of February 2005 when, for the first time, the US and Japan publicly 
emphasised the need for dialogue and the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan problem. In 
a decisive break with the previous practice of avoiding all reference to the Taiwan issue, 
Japan now appeared to be prepared to protect the Taiwan Strait in cooperation with the 
US (interviews with Chinese scholars, April and May 2005). Even some Japanese 
scholars, such as Amako (interview, April 2005) admitted that behind the April 2005 
anti-Japanese demonstrations lay the Taiwan issue. On the basis of these developments, 
Taniguchi (2005: 455) argues that Japan is ‘seeking to jointly manage U.S. hegemony in 
the region’. 
 
Conclusion 
These analyses make domestic developments in both China and Japan look increasingly 
alarming, with the two great powers locked into what amounts to a security dilemma. 
The rapid rise of China and its assertiveness in territorial issues has provoked Japan into 
moving away from its previous low political posture and ‘soft’ approach to China. If not 
specifically designed to contain China, Japan’s enhanced defence capabilities, 
particularly its stronger ties with the US, at least seemed to have China in mind. In turn, 
China responded by purchasing more modern military equipment from Russia. Does 
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this escalation mean that peace in Northeast Asia is impossible if there are two great 
powers in the region at the same time? Many commentators regard China and Japan as 
‘natural’ or ‘incipient’ rivals (Roy 1994:162; Yahuda 1996: 249), because both see 
themselves as the rightful leaders of the region. As Waltz (2000: 35-6) points out, the 
fact that Japan and China are both becoming great powers means that, for the first time, 
Northeast Asia will soon contain two great powers. The logic of power transition 
suggests that security competition between China and Japan has already begun and 
could well become sharper.  
 
8.2 The Regional Level 
 
The end of the Cold War and of superpower competition has not removed regional 
tensions or insecurity from Northeast Asia, rather Sino-Japanese relations and Northeast 
Asian regional security face new challenges. These include territorial disputes, crises in 
the Korean peninsula, and growing tension over the Taiwan Strait. In this new security 
environment, regional actors are bound to re-evaluate their security. Faced with an 
uncertain future, they have responded by building up their armed forces and embarking 
on programmes of military modernisation. Thus some analysts claim that the security 
dilemma is still highly relevant and that there is a real danger of spiralling tension 
(Christensen 1999).  
 
8.2.1 Territorial Disputes 
 
In Northeast Asia, there are many unresolved territorial disputes: between China and 
Japan, between Japan and South Korea, and between Japan and Russia. Disputes over 
the Senkaku / Diaoyu Islands came to the forefront at the end of the Cold War. 
Although Japan, P. R. China and Taiwan all claim territorial sovereign rights, Japan 
retained de facto control for more than a century and no serious disputes arose. But the 
issue came into prominence in the 1990s following the collapse of the Soviet Union and 
China’s re-emergence as a power with a stature commensurate with its size and 
geographical location. From the early 1990s, China became more assertive in advancing 
its territorial claims in the South China and the East China Sea. Two disputes involving 
the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands can be highlighted – one in 1992 and the other in 1996.  
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 In February 1992, the Territorial Waters Law stressed China’s long-standing claims to 
sovereignty over many islands in the South China and East China Seas, including the 
Dongsha (Pratas Bank), Xisha (Paracel), Nansha (Spratly), and Daioyu (Senkaku) 
Islands. In October of the same year, President Jiang Zemin unveiled the PLA’s new 
military mission, which included its role in the protection of maritime rights and 
interests in order to guarantee China’s continuing economic progress. Since 1992 the 
Chinese Navy has conducted regular exercises in the waters around the disputed islands 
and there have been many reports of Chinese interference with Japanese fishing boats 
(Shambaugh 1996: 96).  
 
Against this backdrop, in the summer of 1993, Tokyo made official protests to Beijing. 
Japan was deeply concerned by the Chinese Territorial Waters Law; although China’s 
claims to the islands were longstanding, the Law gave them greater significance. The 
law explicitly defined the Senkaku/Diaoyu as lying within China’s territorial waters and 
gave China a specific right repel invaders by military force if its ‘sacred sovereignty’ 
were challenged (Shambaugh 1996: 96; Brown 1994). In 1996, as Japanese anxieties 
over China rises, it responded by publicly claiming the Senkaku Islands for Japan. The 
Chinese authorities then warned the Japanese government of the dangers of raising its 
‘rhetoric’. Soon afterwards, China dispatched an oil exploration vessel to the adjacent 
waters. Chinese (PLAAF) fighters also began regular infringement of Japanese airspace 
near the islands. In response, a right-wing group in Japan built a second lighthouse on 
one of the islands (the Japan Youth Association had set up a lighthouse on the main 
island in 1988). Chinese protestors, including some from Hong Kong and Taiwan, then 
visited the Senkaku Islands, leaving the flags of ROC and PRC on the main island. The 
disputes and their mutual interactions demonstrate the ‘complexities of growing 
nationalism’ in region (Deans 2000: 119). 
 
While these disputes have not escalated into major wars, they have placed additional 
strain on Sino-Japanese relations. There would, perhaps, be less reason for concern if 
the disagreement over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands were simply an isolated case. Since 
there are other more serious territorial disputes and competing sovereign claims in 
Northeast Asia and the 1990s saw major crises involving the Korean Peninsula and the 
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Taiwan Strait. Garrett and Glaser (1997: 399-400) go so far as to describe these crises as 
‘a harbinger of more conflicts to come’.  
 
8.2.2 Crises in the Korean Peninsula 
 
The first post-Cold War crisis in Northeast Asia occurred in the Korean peninsula, when 
North Korea announced its impending withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty (NPT) on 12 March 1993. Tensions over North Korea’s ‘suspected’ nuclear 
weapons program rose further in the course of 1994. On 19 March 1994, during the 
Panmunjom meeting, the North Korean negotiator (Pak Yong-Su) made ‘threatening’ 
remarks to his southern counterpart. He declared, ‘Seoul is not far away from here. If a 
war breaks out, Seoul will turn into a fireball….’, though this remark was subsequently 
retracted by North Korean leader Kim Il Sung (Kihl 1997: 184-85).  
 
The Seoul government responded with strong defensive measures. The Clinton 
administration also reacted by announcing, on 21 March, that Patriot missiles would be 
sent to South Korea, and that work would start on a UN resolution seeking to apply 
economic sanctions against North Korea. Cumings believed that, in this case, the alarms 
were warranted; the United States and North Korea actually came much closer to war 
than was realised by the media (Cumings, 1998: 484). The possibility of war was 
averted through the intervention of the former US President, Jimmy Carter, and the 
subsequent acceptance of an ‘Agreed Framework’ between North Korea and the United 
States, signed on 21 October 1994. However, the turn of events clearly signified the 
emergence of the North Korean crisis as a key factor in the region’s security (Lee and 
Cho 2000: 142).  
 
Since 1994, North Korea has continued with the development of medium-range and 
potentially inter-continental-range missile systems. On 31 August 1998, a North Korean 
Taepodong-I multi-stage space launch vehicle (SLV) / intermediate-range ballistic 
missile (IRBM) was launched, flew over Japanese airspace, and landed in the western 
part of the Pacific Ocean. This newly demonstrated capability greatly alarmed Japan, 
South Korea, and the United States. Moreover, the underlying crisis reached a new level 
of intensity after October 2002, when North Korea admitted it had a secret uranium-
enrichment programme. US intelligence estimated that North Korea had already enough 
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material for two devices and warned that it could soon produce enough for dozens more. 
Today, despite US and regional efforts, tensions in Korean peninsula continue – as 
demonstrated in the July and October missile and nuclear tests. What are the main 
problems beneath these crises? 
 
Victory to Regime Survival 
The Korean problem centres on conflicting claims to legitimacy. The end of Japanese 
occupation in 1945 did not result in an independent Korea. Rather the peninsula was 
divided by the US and Soviet Union along the 38th Parallel, with the two occupying 
powers supporting client regimes. An authoritarian communist government was 
established in the north under Kim Il Sung (supported by Soviet Union), and an 
authoritarian, anti-communist government was established in the south under Syngman 
Rhee (supported by the US). Both Kim and Rhee were intense Korean nationalists, 
anxious to unite the country, and willing to use force to achieve their objectives; their 
rival ambitions resulted in war between 1950 and 1953. The war involved more than the 
forces of North and South Korea; there was also direct military conflict between the US 
and China. Yet war did not bring unification and Korea remained a potential point of 
conflict, between the two Koreas and even between the United States and China (Bell 
2001: 112). 
 
The situation has been worsened because of decisive changes in power distribution, 
generally favouring the South rather than the North. Waltz (1979: 126) argues that ‘in 
anarchy, security is the highest end’; only if survival is assured can states safely seek 
other goals such as power or profit with safety. In the early 1990s, the very survival of 
North Korea began to be called into question. For most of the Cold War period, the two 
Korean regimes were of approximately equal strength and both were supported by their 
superpower patrons. From the early 1960s to the late 1970s, as Victor Cha (2001: 179) 
notes, North Korean GNP per capita and conventional military capabilities rivalled, if 
not surpassed, those of its southern counterpart. However, the 1980s saw a relative 
decline in North Korea’s military capability, a decline that owed much to economic 
boom in the South. The balance in favour of the South became more pronounced after 
South Korea normalised relations with Russia and China in the early 1990s. An 
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asymmetry appeared in which the South was recognised by China and Russia, but the 
North was not recognised by either the US or Japan.  
 
These negative developments forced a change in North Korea’s strategy. Since it could 
no longer win a power game against the South, the over-riding objective of the 
Communist regime moved from ‘victory’ over the South to an increasing preoccupation 
with its own ‘survival’ (Kang 2003: 356). As Waltz argues, in an anarchic self-help 
system, states ‘at a minimum, seek their own preservation’ and, ‘at a maximum, drive 
for universal domination’ (Waltz 1979: 122). Yet for North Korea, even this minimum 
goal of regime survival now seemed doubtful. Thus, the decisive change in distribution 
of power and the regime survival provide the essential context for an understanding of 
the many Korean crises since the mid 1990s.  
 
It is true that, as economic conditions deteriorated from the 1980s, North Korea sold 
missiles to raise foreign exchange, yet this analysis suggests the nuclear weapons 
programme was largely driven by fears for survival and security. In other words, the 
growing political, economic, and military imbalance between the North and South may 
have virtually forced North Korea to produce nuclear weapons. The possession of such 
weapons may appear the only way to ensure the survival of North Korea’s own style of 
socialism and the continuation of Kim Il Sung’s dynasty (Dae-Sook Suh 1998). Thus, 
for neorealists, the ultimate root of the Korean problem lies in the self-help response 
necessarily required in conditions of anarchy. Waltz argues that, in these conditions, the 
only way that states can achieve their objectives is through reliance on ‘the means they 
can generate and the arrangements they can make for themselves’. That is, internally 
increase their economic and military capabilities; and externally strengthen their 
alliance or to weaken opposing one (Waltz 1979: 111, 118).  
 
Having lost much of the support formerly provided by its allies and patrons, North 
Korea’s conventional forces deteriorated sharply and its economy was close to collapse. 
Thus, when faced with extreme power asymmetry, North Korea turned to the ‘only 
means’ available, that is, to the pursuit of a nuclear weapons programme. These 
weapons and their missile delivery systems are now perceived as an alternative to 
conventional forces. In North Korean eyes, their justification is that they go some way 
to redress the otherwise adverse shift in the military balance on the Korean Peninsula. 
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Yet others see things differently. For the region and international community as a 
whole, it is believed that, by developing missiles and nuclear weapons, North Korea is 
delivering a fundamental challenge to regional and international peace and stability. 
Taken alongside the other major flashpoint – the Taiwan Strait – developments in Korea 
suggest that Northeast Asia may experience arms races and even nuclearisation (I will 
come to this point later). 
 
8.2.3 Crises over the Taiwan Strait 
 
In 1995/96 another major crisis occurred over the Taiwanese presidential election. The 
crisis began when Lee Teng-hui, President of Taiwan, referred to ‘The Republic of 
China on Taiwan’ while on a private visit to the US. Beijing took the visit and the 
phrase as signs that Taiwan was raising its international political profile and challenging 
the ‘one China’ principle. In response to Lee Tenghui’s visit and Taiwan’s first general 
election in March 1996, the Chinese held military exercises and missile tests close to 
Taiwan. As Yahuda argues, these were designed to demonstrate China’s military 
strength and thus intimidate those who favoured Taiwanese independence. But by their 
actions, ‘the Chinese have unwittingly provoked a security dilemma with Japan’ 
(Yahuda 2002: 10).  
 
Tensions continued and heightened further when Lee Teng-hui referred to PRC-ROC 
relations as ‘state-to-state or at least nation-to-nation’ in an interview on German radio 
in 1999. In response, Beijing threatened the possible use of force if Taiwan declared 
independence. Subsequent political developments within Taiwan appear to have 
brought a formal declaration of independence even closer. The long dominant KMT was 
defeated in the election of 2000 and Chen Shui-bian, leader of the pro-independence 
DPP, became President. The DPP not only campaigned for greater democracy but was 
also more strongly committed to independence than its rival. Since 2000, DPP policy 
has become clearer. Earlier advocacy of an independent and sovereign Taiwanese state 
has hardened into an explicit adoption of a ‘one China, one Taiwan’ agenda.  
 
In November 2003, shortly before the 2004 election, Chen secured the passing of a 
referendum law. The DPP then conducted an extremely provocative presidential 
campaign, which included proposals for referenda on sensitive cross-Strait issues. These 
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proposals seemed deliberately designed to provoke Beijing (Sutter 2004). Chen was re-
elected to serve a second term as President and announced that a referendum would be 
held on a new constitution in 2006. If the electorate endorsed the constitution, it would 
come into force in May 2008. There is no doubt that China views Chen’s agenda as so 
threatening that military action may be necessary. For Beijing, a new Taiwanese 
constitution symbolises a possible break with the long-standing ‘one-China’ policy of 
the ROC and represents a move towards juridical independence or even a new 
Taiwanese State. This is something Beijing is determined to prevent – by force if 
necessary. Thus, when China passed an anti-secession law early in 2005, the measure 
caused alarm, not only in Taiwan, but in the international community as a whole – 
because the law appeared to provide Beijing with a legal basis for an attack on Taiwan 
if it declared independence. 
 
In the run-up to the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games, international concern about the peace 
and stability of the Taiwan Strait is increasing. The fact that Beijing sees the Olympic 
Games as an opportunity to remove any remaining traces of its former ‘pariah’ status 
and to demonstrate its power and success to the world, may tempt Taipei into a 
dangerous gamble. It may calculate that the PRC’s desire to present a favourable image 
to the rest of the world will provide the Taiwanese government with an opportunity to 
take a dramatic move towards independence with greater impunity than would be 
possible in other circumstances. Possible steps include the abolition of the National 
Unification Guidelines or something even more dramatic (Taniguchi 2005; C. R. 
Hughes Public Lecture, LSE, 1 Feb 2006). But it is dangerous to assume that Beijing’s 
preoccupation with its international image at the time of the Olympic Games would 
mean that the PRC would stay its hand. Indeed, given the deep US involvement in 
Taiwan’s security and Japan’s interests in Taiwan, the possibility of ‘a Sino-American 
war – potentially even nuclear war’ (Romberg 2004) – or a war involving the US, 
China, and even Japan, could not be excluded.   
 
8.2.4 Impacts on Regional Security 
 
Thus, the Korean peninsula and Taiwan Strait remain as flashpoints, which could have 
significantly destabilising effects on the region as a whole. Some analysts (Christensen 
1999; Yahuda 2002) suggest that, combined with many other problems, the tensions 
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associated with Korea and Taiwan could generate an acute security dilemma in 
Northeast Asia. The area is experiencing dramatic and unpredictable changes in the 
distribution of capabilities and is characterised by long-standing territorial disputes, 
competition for energy supplies. There is also a long tradition of historically based 
mistrust and animosity among regional actors. Taken together, these factors are only too 
likely to result in a situation in which ‘even defensive weapons’ appear threatening 
(Christensen 1999: 50) and all military activity is liable to be interpreted as potentially 
offensive (Roy 1994: 162). China and Japan are increasingly suspicious of each other’s 
military activities and the region is experiencing a significant build up of armaments – 
suggesting a troubled future.  
 
China and Japan: Growing Mutual Suspicion 
In the aftermath of the Cold War, there were already concerns about the rise of China 
and its assertiveness, and about Japan’s anticipated remilitarisation. These concerns and 
the mutual suspicion between the two great powers in the region were intensified by the 
events in the Korean peninsula and the Taiwan Strait.   
 
Japan certainly regarded Pyongyang’s nuclear programme and its development of the 
Rodong missile – North Korea’s most advanced intermediate-range missile, capable of 
striking the Japanese home islands – with enormous concern (Umemoto 2003, 2005; 
Shambaugh 1996: 95). The rapid rise of China’s military spending in the early 1990s 
and the acceleration of its nuclear testing programme since 1993 made Japan feel even 
more vulnerable. This feeling was further heightened by the crisis over Taiwan, when 
China responded with missile tests and military exercises close to the Taiwan Strait. To 
address these concerns, Japan not only gave stronger support to a powerful US presence 
in the Pacific – including American bases in Japan – but also made further efforts to 
modernise its own forces. Its commitment to the US led TMD project was hardened by 
the shock of North Korea’s missile test, Taepodong-1 in 1998. 
 
Thus, it seems clear that fears about China and North Korea played a significant role in 
pushing Japan to become more heavily militarised. Umemoto claimed explicitly that the 
main ‘WMD threat’ faced by Japan comes from ‘North Korea and China’. Above all, 
the Taepodong-1 test played ‘a catalytic role in bolstering domestic support for a limited 
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missile defense system in Japan’ (Umemoto 2005; also see Umemoto 2003). Others 
point out that China’s military exercises and missiles and nuclear tests in 1995-96 
certainly contributed to growing anxieties and fears about China among the Japanese 
public (Drifte 2002: 134; Green 1999: 153-56). There can also be little doubt that these 
signs of regional instability also resulted in a strengthened US commitment to the region 
– not least because American military facilities in Japan now appeared vulnerable to 
attack by North Korean missiles. Even more, the Taepodong-1 test was the first 
occasion that a ‘rogue state’ demonstrated its potential capacity to reach the American 
continent with weapons of mass destruction (Lee and Cho 2000: 152). The incident had 
its uses for Japan and Washington, because it provided a justification for their joint 
development of a TMD system in the region – without appearing to threaten China 
directly. 
 
 Security Dilemmas? 
Although the strengthening ties between Japan and the US were presented as a response 
to North Korean weapons programmes, they also caused apprehension in China. Despite 
its rapid economic growth and increased absolute capabilities, Beijing’s assessments of 
its relative power and the security of its position in the international system remain 
pessimistic (Yan 2000). In the rest of the world there may be increasing talk of a ‘China 
threat’, but the Chinese themselves tend to regard their military capability as relatively 
weak and backward. They contend that Western analysts have used the questionable 
concept of ‘purchasing parity’ to exaggerate the true extent of Chinese spending and to 
provide a spurious basis for the idea of a supposed ‘China threat’ (Zhou 1999: 8). 
Above all, Chinese commentators stress the relative weakness of China compared to the 
unmatchable power of the US and the strength of the Japanese economy, still the second 
largest economy in the world. 
 
Although the US reduced its military spending and the number of overseas bases after 
the end of the Cold War, this did not mean that its military capacity was reduced. On the 
contrary, the development of even more sophisticated military technology actually 
increased its ability to intervene speedily and decisively in almost any part of the world 
(Jisi Wang 2005c). The demonstration of overwhelming US military power both in the 
1996 Taiwan Straits crisis and in the Kosovo war of 1996-99 undoubtedly made a deep 
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impression on China. As far as Beijing was concerned, the end of Cold War appeared a 
mixed blessing. While competition between the two superpowers may have ceased, the 
character of international politics as struggle for power and dominance have not 
changed. But, whereas in the Cold War, neither of the super powers had been truly 
dominant, the fact that there was now only one super power – the United States – that 
other great powers could not match (Yan 1999: 2). This post-Cold War US hegemony is 
generally known in China as the ‘yichao duoqiang’ (one super power plus many great 
powers) system, which corresponds to what Buzan and Wæver (2003) call the ‘1+4 
system’. 
 
In the context of ‘yichao duoqiang’ or 1+4 system, Beijing is increasingly concerned 
about the enhanced US-Japan alliance, which it believes is ultimately targeted against 
China. As perceptive Chinese commentators have noted, if the decision taken in 1995 to 
embark on an eastwards expansion of NATO was really directed against Russia, then 
the 1996 US-Japan Joint Security Declaration ‘implicitly’ moved the ‘target’ of US 
strategy away from the former Soviet Union and towards China (Yan 1999: 3). These 
concerns were heightened by the US-Japan joint TMD programme. Given the 
sensitivity of the Taiwan issue, developments in the mid-1990s – notably US 
‘intervention’ in the Taiwan crisis of 1995-6, the 1997 revised Guidelines, and 
especially the US-Japanese joint development of TMD – have touched security nerves 
in Beijing (Liu 1997; Wu 2005). 
 
These fears were closely linked to possible impacts on Beijing’s hopes for national 
reunification. An Aegis-based Japanese NTWD system could easily be used for the 
defence of Taiwan. Even scholars within Japan admit that although Japan’s antimissile 
systems could make only a limited contribution to the defence of Taiwan in the event of 
a Chinese ‘pre-emptive strike’, they can still make the following impacts: 
Japanese BMD could play a major role in countering Beijing’s attempt to 
coerce Tokyo to refrain from assisting U.S. forces operating in the Taiwan 
area by the threat of an MRBM [medium-range ballistic missile] (and IRBM 
[intermediate-rage ballistic missile]) strike. Assuming a nuclear balance 
heavily favoring the United States, it might be presumed that the U.S. 
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“nuclear umbrella” would effectively deter such a strike (Umemoto 2003: 
193). 
 
Thus, many Chinese do not accept the argument that the development of North Korean 
missiles justifies enhanced US-Japan defence cooperation. Beijing fears that the 
cooperation between Japan and the US would mean that the US might use bases in 
Japan to intervene militarily in some future Taiwan crisis or that the Taiwan itself might 
come to possess the TMD system. In other words, TMD could be a stepping-stone to 
further developments in which Japan might acquire ‘a more offensive missile capability, 
or even ultimately to go nuclear’ (Drifte 2003: 100).  
 
These negative interactions have led some analysts (Christensen 1999; Yahuda 2002) to 
argue that security dilemma theory is still highly relevant to Northeast Asia. Of course 
theoretically defensive systems, such as TMD, should not provoke arms races, and 
hence lead to security dilemma and spirals of tension. However, as Christensen (1999) 
claims, this comforting belief may not apply in contemporary Northeast Asia. After all, 
in this region, fear and insecurity stem not only from the possibility that Japan may 
progress from its new found defensive roles into more threatening military build-ups, 
but it is also much affected by the Taiwan factor. 
Beijing’s focus on preventing Taiwan’s permanent separation from China 
means that even defensive weapons in the hands of Taiwan or its potential 
supporters are provocative to China. Given the bitter history of Japanese 
imperialism in China and Taiwan’s status as a Japanese colony from 1895 to 
1945, this certainly holds true for Japan (Christensen 1999: 51). 
 
In response, Beijing is building its ties with Moscow and purchasing sophisticated 
weapons and defence equipment from Russia. In 1996 China also made an agreement of 
a ‘Strategic Partnership’ with Russia. Although China insisted that this partnership was 
not aimed against any third party (Yan 2000), it was bound to arouse suspicions that the 
real purpose was to counter US-Japanese influence in the region. Since 1997 China has 
begun to promote a so-called ‘new security concept (NSC)’ in the region. Officially this 
emphasises the importance of ‘enhancing trust through dialogue and promoting security 
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through cooperation’19. Yet, China makes no secret of its dislike of what it calls the 
outdated ‘Cold war mentality’ (lengzhan siwei) of competing and antagonistic blocks. 
Hu Xiaodi, Chinese Ambassador for Disarmament Affairs, declared in Geneva in 
February 2001: ‘The 21st century needs a new security concept and the old security 
concept, based on military alliance at the expense of other countries’ interests, should be 
discarded’ (People’s Daily 16 February 2001). 
 
The NSC has been increasingly influential in Chinese foreign policy since the mid 
1990s. For instance, Beijing has turned from its previously critical attitude of 
multilateral institutions to become an active and positive participant, it became eager for 
better relations with ASEAN countries, playing a significant role in formation of SCO, 
and becoming a major player in the six-Party Talks. Yet, there are fears that the NSC 
and related foreign policy initiatives are really targeted against the US-Japan alliance. In 
other words, China may be seeking to undermine US leadership as part of its overall 
campaign to establish its own sphere of influence in the region. As early as the 1997 
Defence White Paper, Tokyo identified China as a potential external threat (Defence of 
Japan 1997).  
 
8.2.5 New Millennium: Trouble Ahead?  
 
Many critical security concerns remain in Northeast Asia and some have even become 
more acute in the last five years. In October 2002, North Korea admitted that it actually 
had a secret uranium enrichment programme, which led to a second nuclear crisis in the 
peninsula. The Six Party Talks finally managed to agree to a joint statement of 
principles after the fourth round of the talks on 19 September 2005. There were some 
experts on Korea who praised the joint statement, believing that it would provide 
guidelines for ‘a more specific road map for resolving the second North Korean crisis’ 
(Snyder, Cossa and Glosserman 2005). In reality, however, the Talks soon became 
stalemated and have not yet been able to make further progress towards the 
denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula. The continuing crises suggest the real 
                                                 
 
19 ‘China’s Position Paper on ‘The New Security Concept’, On The Permanent Mission of The PRC to 
The UN, accessible at http://www.china-un.org/eng/xw/t27742.htm. 
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difficulty of the issue. As argued above, tensions over the Taiwan Strait also continued 
and became particularly acute during the Taiwanese general elections of 2000 and 2004. 
In Taiwan itself, movements working towards formal independence are still powerful 
and are actively canvassing the possibility of the abolition of the National Unification 
Guidelines, while Beijing has reaffirmed its determination to prevent Taiwanese 
independence by passing its anti-secession law early in 2005. 
 
In the new millennium, many of the old problems of Northeast Asia have taken on new 
and worrying forms. In particular relations between Japan and China have deteriorated 
sharply since 2005. Early in 2005, the Japanese government approved the adoption of a 
new history text-book – that appeared to minimise or excuse Japanese atrocities in the 
late 1930s and in World War II – for use in schools. In the same year, the Japanese 
Prime Minister, Koizumi insisted again on revisiting the Yasukuni Shrine despite 
furious protests from neighbouring states. Thus tension rose sharply between Tokyo, 
Seoul and Beijing. Anti-Japanese demonstrations soon spread over China and South 
Korea. The demonstrations attracted large crowds, especially in China, and Japanese 
owned buildings were attacked. Neither Beijing nor Seoul would support Tokyo’s bid 
for a permanent seat for UN Security Council. In turn, the Japanese media expressed 
strong disapproval of the demonstrations and alleged that, in China, they had received 
the tacit support or even the active encouragement of the authorities. There can be no 
doubt that the Japanese were dismayed by the demonstrations and gave credence to the 
allegations of official involvement.20 Of course Beijing denied any such involvement, 
but both Beijing and Seoul had been angered by the text-book and shrine issues, which 
had aroused old memories and appeared to have alarming implications for such 
sensitive matters as sovereignty and territorial integrity.   
 
Beijing had an additional cause for concern because, at a 2+2 meeting in February 2005, 
for the first time, a joint US-Japanese statement called for ‘the peaceful resolution of 
issues concerning the Taiwan Strait through dialogue’. While the joint statement did no 
more than hint at Japan’s interest in preventing Chinese military action against Taiwan, 
it still represented a significant departure from the very low profile previously taken by 
                                                 
 
20 I happened to be in Tokyo in April 2005 for the fieldwork of this thesis when the anti Japanese 
demonstrations reached their highest point. 
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Japan on anything connected with Taiwan. Developments in Japan also caused alarm in 
South Korea. Here the issue was the dispute over the Takeshima / Tokto Island. On 9 
March 2005, Japan’s Shimane Prefectural Assembly passed a bill designating 22 
February as ‘Takeshima Day’, thus effectively reasserting Japan’s claim to sovereignty 
over the disputed island. The next day, (10 March 2005) the Korea Times commented 
that the designation of such a special day in Japan was bound to result in the escalation 
of the diplomatic dispute between Seoul and Tokyo over ‘Tokto (Dokto), South Korea’s 
easternmost islets’. 
 
In the face of anti-Japanese sentiment, Japanese public opinion hardened against 
neighbouring states. Extreme right wing views, centring on the supposed ‘China threat’ 
gained a significant following that had been absent previously. The Mayor of Tokyo, 
Ishihara Shintaro, went so far as to argue that the proper response to the demonstrations 
in China would be to send the SDF to occupy the Senkaku Island (Shyukan Bunshyun 5 
May 2005: 24-26). Recently, the already strained relations between the two great 
powers of Northeast Asia have been further inflamed by rising tensions over energy 
resources in a disputed area of the East China Sea.  
 
The gas dispute stems from a long-standing disagreement over Japanese and Chinese 
the claims to gas-rich areas under the East China Sea. According to a UN convention on 
the Law of the Sea 1982, both countries can claim an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) 
extending 200 nautical miles (370 km) from their shores. But China claims a larger EEZ 
on the basis of the 1958 Geneva Convention on Continental Shelves, which would 
extend the Chinese EEZ into areas of the East China Sea claimed by Japan (see, map 
below). The gas fields where China has been test drilling – known as the Chunxiao field 
– actually lie in waters which both sides agree belong to China. But the fields are very 
close to the area claimed by Japan’s, leading to fears that China is preparing to siphon 
off gas buried under the seabed on the Japanese side.  
 
In diplomatic gatherings both countries give theoretical support to the idea that the 
region’s resources should be shared. By May 2006, no less than four rounds of 
negotiations had been held – but no resolution has yet been reached. Japan has made 
formal and informal complaints but China is clearly in no hurry to stop drilling. Every 
step by China is extensively reported in the Japanese media and the public is becoming 
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increasing impatient at what it sees as the Tokyo government’s inability to take 
effective counter measures. In response to this feeling, in the middle of 2005, the 
authorities offered exploration rights in the disputed area to the Japanese company, 
Teikoku Oil (BBC 30 Sep 2005). Of course this dispute is only one part of wider 
tensions – thus hindering its resolution. 
 
 
 
 China and Japan's exclusive economic zones (EEZs) 
overlap 
 Japan claims its EEZ extends 200 nautical miles from its 
shore, while China claims its EEZ extends to the edge of its 
continental shelf 
 The two countries have never agreed a maritime border 
 The UN says it will arbitrate by May 2009 
 Disputed ownership of Senkaku/Diaoyu islands 
 
** Source from BBC News, 8 March 2006. 
 
In addition, since Prime Minister Koizumi took office in April 2001, Japan has taken 
significant steps towards strengthening its alliance with the US. In addition to sending 
troops to Iraq, Japan has also established a quasi-permanent maritime military presence 
in the Indian Ocean and in the Arabian Sea. Taniguchi (2005: 453) notes that such 
things would have been unimaginable in the past – even for the Japanese Imperial Navy 
in World War II. Japan also enhanced its participation in a US-led sea-based missile 
defence build-up, and in December 2003 decided to deploy the TMD system. It was 
within these contexts that the February 2005 US-Japan joint statement calling for ‘the 
peaceful resolution’ of Taiwan issue appears alarming. Wenran Jiang (2005) argues that 
the statement marked ‘a new turn on Asia’s security chessboard’.  
 
Of course, Beijing’s real concern is Taiwan’s growing independence movement and 
possible conflict in Taiwan Strait. Some Chinese analysts argue that, in real terms, 
China’s security position in the first decade of the 21st century and thereafter is less 
assured than it was in the 1990s. It is true that the international environment as a whole 
now suggests that a major war is unlikely for the foreseeable future, yet the Taiwan 
factor could mean that China faces a higher possibility of a series of small-scale 
conflicts and wars (Yan 2000: 51). The eyes of the international community 
increasingly turning towards 2008 – a year that will see elections in both Taiwan and in 
the United States as well as the Beijing Olympic Games. It may well be that the political 
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atmosphere in Taiwan and the United States will give a further boost to the cause of 
Taiwanese independence. Given China’s determination to prevent any such thing, it is 
hard to be optimistic about the future peace and stability of the region. 
 
Regional Arms Build-Up? 
Given the generally tense security environment, a significant regional arms build-up 
must be a source of serious concern. Patterns have been very different from much of the 
rest of the world. After the Cold War, the major world powers reduced their military 
expenditures by at least 30%, yet in Northeast and East Asia, states increased their 
military spending and were especially eager to buy and stockpile modern weapons 
systems. This trend, first visible in the early 1990s, is still continuing.  
 
As in the 1990s, China continues to give priority to military modernisation and 
transformation. The Gulf Wars of 1990-91 and 2003 appear to have had effects on 
Chinese defence thinking. In particular, China has begun to abandon its traditional 
emphasis on large low-technology ground forces and has embarked on a major 
programme of military modernisation. In the aftermath of the second Gulf War China is 
putting even more effort into the development of ‘networked C4SIR systems21 and 
psychological operations’ (IISS, The Military Balance 2004-05: 161). With the launch 
of the Shenzhou-V in October 2003 and Shenzhou-VI two years later, China became the 
third country to achieve a manned space mission. 
 
Meanwhile Taiwan continues to buy sophisticated weapons systems from the US and, 
under the terms of the 15 procurement bill sent to the Legislative Yuan on 2 June 2004, 
it will add PAC-3 – Patriot Advanced Capability – currently under development for the 
US Army to destroy in-coming short-range missiles to its defence system (IISS, The 
Military Balance 2004-05: 163). North Korea, too, is developing advanced weapons 
systems. Having tested the Taepo-dong 1 missile in 1998, it was reported in early June 
2004 that Pyongyang had conducted an engine test for the Taepo-dong 2, a missile with 
an estimated maximum range of 6,000km (IISS, The Military Balance 2004-05: 163). 
                                                 
 
21  C4SIR refers capabilities for Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, 
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance. 
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 South Korea has also been active. It is possible that, in 2011, war-time operational 
control of Korean forces will pass from the US to the South Korean authorities (Chosun 
Ilbo 5 June 2006), a development likely to encourage South Korea to seek to bolster its 
military capability. In 2002 Seoul, purchased forty multi-role aircraft – the F-15K 
advanced derivative of the F-15E Strike Eagle – for its Next Generation Fighter 
program under a $3.6bn contract with Boeing. Recently it was reported (Huaqiu Shibao 
31 May 2006) that, under a $2bn plan, Seoul would buy a further twenty F-15Ks, with 
deliveries beginning in 2009. The plan was approved at a Defence Ministry meeting in 
May 2006 as part of a medium term arms acquisition project running from 2007 to 
2011. Analysts believe that the acquisition of these highly sophisticated aircraft, marks 
a crucial step towards the realisation of South Korea’s ambition to achieve ‘national self 
defence’, and could significantly alter the balance of air power in Northeast Asia 
(People’s Daily 2 June 2006). 
 
Since the mid 1990s, Japan has embarked on a programme of the development of sea-
based missile defence systems in cooperation with the US. The programme began in 
1994 with the joint US-Japanese study of Theatre Missile Defence (TMD), which gave 
rise to the short-range ballistic missile defence systems (BMD). Towards the end of 
1998, Tokyo decided to participate in a technical Navy Theatre Wide project (NTW) 
(Umemoto 2003: 187) – involving upper-tier long-range BMD systems to be deployed 
on Aegis-Equipped cruisers or destroyers. Taniguchi notes that, apart from the US, 
Japan is the only country to possess ‘the Aegis-equipped destroyers needed as platforms 
for sea-based, “mid-course” missile defence weapon systems’ (Taniguchi 2005: 453-4). 
In December 2003, Tokyo decided to continue to proceed with upper-tier and lower-tier 
BMD elements – which will be installed on four Aegis-equipped Kongou-class 
destroyers, and to approve the upgrade of 16 Patriot fire units, delivering a PAC-3 
interception capability (IISS, The Military Balance 2004-05: 163).  
 
Together with the various disputes, conflicts and crises, the military build up in 
Northeast Asia seems to confirm the prediction made by Friedberg in the early 1990s. 
The nuclearisation of North Korea could lead to a similar development in South Korea 
and Japan. In turn this might prompt China to accelerate and expand its own nuclear 
programmes – which would then influence the defence policies of Taiwan. Hence, a 
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‘rapid and multifaceted expansion of nuclear capabilities could increase the dangers of 
misperception, miscalculation, and war’ (Friedberg1993/94: 25). So far war has been 
avoided but competition among the regional actors and balancing behaviour are 
certainly growing. 
 
8.3 The Interregional Level 
 
Almost by definition, Great Powers have interests that extend over large areas; it 
follows, therefore, that rivalries between China and Japan will be similarly wide-
ranging. Indeed, Sino-Japanese rivalry extends beyond Northeast Asia to include 
Southeast Asia as well. Both China and Japan have important interests and possess 
considerable influence in this part of the world. While China’s links have a strong 
historical base, Japan’s presence is a more recent development and stems largely from 
its economic ties. In many ways, the effects of both the reduced influence of the Soviet 
Union/Russia and the expectation of a declining of US presence and commitment in 
East Asia clearly pointed to an increase in the relative importance of China and Japan. 
In this post-Cold War environment, Sino-Japanese relations face new challenges and 
tests. Strategic options between bilateral and multilateral approaches are often exploited 
with considerable skill to serve the national interests of the major protagonists.  
 
8.3.1 Japan’s New Initiatives 
 
With the end of the Cold War and the disappearance of the Russian threat, Japan began 
to focus on China’s strategic ambitions (Yahuda 1996: 248). China is now ‘less 
constrained by outside powers than at any time during the twentieth century’ (Buzan 
and Wæver 2003: 156). Given the perceived ineffectiveness of attempts to bring 
pressure on China through bilateral means alone, Tokyo has developed a new tactic; it 
seeks to achieve its objectives through a combination of bilateral and multilateral 
pressures. 
 
Japan’s bilateral relations with Southeast Asian nations remain important policy tools in 
furthering its search for a favourable political and military balance through the 
establishment of effective deterrence in East Asia. As Drifte (2002: 140-42) observes, 
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since the 1990s, Tokyo has made increasing use of bilateral security dialogues with its 
Southeast Asian partners. In particular, relations with Burma and Vietnam have become 
an important part of Tokyo’s strategic balancing against China. For example, Japan’s 
relatively sympathetic attitude towards the oppressive Rangoon regime stems from a 
desire to prevent Burma falling into the Chinese orbit. Similarly, the rapid improvement 
in Japan’s relations with Vietnam – including high level politico-military talks – also 
seems to be aimed at containing China. The Vietnamese have many grievances against 
China, so much so that the two countries appear natural enemies. Under these 
circumstances, the Japanese approach to Vietnam offers a classic example of the ‘my 
enemy’s enemy is my friend’ scenario, which lies at the core of much realist analysis. In 
turn this indicates that realist assumptions, with their accompanying balance of power 
logic, remain influential in the minds of policy makers in East Asia. 
 
Japan’s approach to security in the post-Cold War era involves another dimension; it 
seeks to act as a facilitator of multilateralism, as evidenced in its role at the ASEAN 
Post-Ministerial Meeting, held in Kuala Lumpur in July 1991. Taro Nakayama, then 
Japanese Foreign Minister, proposed the institutionalisation of an annual forum on 
regional security matters. This initiative – particularly in the light of US opposition and 
negative reactions from ASEAN countries – represented ‘a bold departure’ from the 
essentially ‘reactive policy’ followed by Japan on issues of regional security during the 
Cold-War era (Midford 2000: 368). The 1991 initiative, taken further in Japan’s 
subsequent diplomacy, played an important part in the foundation of an inter-
governmental multilateral security forum – the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) – in 
1994 (see Yuzawa 2005: 71-97).  
 
Tokyo certainly viewed multilateral mechanisms as a means of promoting its strategic 
purposes in the new environment. But Japan’s calculations were probably complex, 
resting on a belief that a multilateral mechanism could serve its interests in a variety of 
scenarios. One crucial variable was the likely future relationship with the United States. 
If the US were to remain a major power in the region, the multilateral mechanism could 
provide a suitable framework for Japanese-American cooperation in terms of broader 
regional security, but yet the same mechanism could also be used to protect Japanese 
interests in the event of US withdrawal (Green 1999: 164).  
 
 232
Secondly, Tokyo saw multilateral mechanisms as useful means to reassure neighbouring 
Asian countries about its own intentions; Midford (2002) calls this Japan’s ‘grand 
strategy’. The end of the Cold War – especially the decline of Soviet power and doubts 
about continued US commitment in the region – had inevitably focussed more attention 
on the actual and potential power of Japan. Given the extreme suspicion with which its 
neighbours view Japan, Tokyo developed its ‘grand strategy’ whereby it would use 
multilateral mechanisms both to ensure continuing US engagement and to dissuade its 
Asian neighbours from balancing against it (for a detailed account, see Midford 2000; 
2002). 
 
Last but by no means least, Japan probably saw multilateral mechanisms as means both 
to engage and constrain China, a power that was not only becoming stronger and more 
assertive but also often fostered historically based hostility to Japan – both in its own 
population and in other neighbouring states. The China factor is certainly one of the 
reasons why the US and ASEAN countries are changing their attitude towards the 
creation of ARF. Thus, the declared purpose of the Forum was to help ASEAN and its 
dialogue partners to work with other regional states to evolve a predictable and 
constructive pattern of relationships in Asia-Pacific. It is also widely believed that ‘the 
key object was to draw China into a pattern of constructive engagement’ (Yahuda 1996: 
248).  
 
Two obvious questions arise. First, will multilateral fora really work as vehicles for 
engaging and constraining China and hence make China a ‘good citizen’? Secondly, 
will these fora bring closer relations between China and Japan? Many neorealists doubt 
whether institutions can ‘tie down’ strong countries like China. Friedberg (2000: 154) 
argues, that unlike small countries, a great power has more opportunity to ‘impose its 
will on the others’, and hence such powers are ‘more likely to defect and to act 
unilaterally when their interests are truly challenged.’ China has shown signs of doing 
precisely that in Southeast Asia, particularly in disputes over the South China Sea. 
 
8.3.2 China’s Responses 
 
China’s response to the creation of multilateral fora has been mixed. Although cautious, 
China did not challenge Japan’s role in launching the ARF, an essentially consultative 
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forum. China’s leaders were pleased to be invited to join, or did not want to be left out, 
believing that membership would bring benefits (Yahuda 2002). Japan, too, was not too 
disappointed with the outcome, not least because, by the mid-1990s, the ARF seemed to 
be providing Japan with a favourable environment for conducting relations with China. 
As Green (1999: 164) observes, Tokyo found the multilateral forum made it easier to 
express concerns over China and to put pressure on Beijing to behave well in future. 
Significantly, Japan also found that, while its bilateral suspension of grant aid to China 
in 1995, by itself, did little to force Beijing to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, 
implicit criticism made by the multilateral ARF had considerably more impact on 
Chinese thinking.  
 
In August 1995, at the ARF Ministerial Meeting in Brunei, Qian Qichen, China’s 
Foreign Minister, declared that China would seek to resolve the South China Sea 
dispute peacefully based on principles embodied in the Law of the Sea Convention – 
though claiming that China’s claim did not contradict the freedom of navigation through 
international waterways in the South China Sea22. In some sense, it can be seen that the 
incident forced China’s acquiescence in allowing the South China Sea dispute onto the 
formal agenda of the ARF (Scott 1996). Yet, the relatively accommodating behaviour 
also indicated that China wanted to avoid ‘a coalition being built against it’ (Segal 
1996: 129). 
 
However, there are limits to what China is prepared to concede. Apparent readiness to 
resolve disputes through multilateral agreement does not extend to all areas. In some, 
the Chinese position is inflexible and confrontational. Beijing refuses to discuss any 
issues related to its military modernisation programme, to its wide-ranging maritime 
claims, or to the Taiwan problem. China considers these matters its own ‘internal 
affairs’ and hence not subject to multilateral discussions or resolutions (Shambaugh 
1996: 96).  
 
Suspicions as well as calculations lay behind China’s confrontational attitude. 
Particularly up to the Asian financial crisis, Beijing often viewed regionalism and 
                                                 
 
22 Winston Lord’s Statement at Department of State, USINFO, Released 11 June 1996; also see, Scott 
1996. 
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multilateralism as covers for the advancement of Japanese interests and hence refused to 
take cooperation beyond a certain point (Deng 1997). As a strong and rising power, it 
may be in China’s interest to deal with its neighbours bilaterally, rather than 
‘internationalise’ issues (Segal 1996: 114). Things are further complicated by the rise of 
Chinese nationalism. With the rapid advance of its economic and military power, China 
seems determined to correct perceived historical injustices, resulting from earlier 
interventions by the major powers. It believes that its increased military capacity will 
allow it to impose settlements on its own terms. 
 
8.3.3 The South China Sea 
 
In the 1990s, attention focused on the Spratly Islands of the South China Sea. For 
strategic, economic, and nationalistic reasons, the Islands are claimed either in whole or 
in part by China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and the Philippines. As China’s 
power increased, regional fears about its intentions intensified. Concern deepened when, 
in February 1992, China promulgated a Territorial Waters Law that reiterated its claim 
to the Spratly Islands and allowed the naval wing of the PLA to use force to protect its 
sovereignty. 
 
In 1994 a dispute between China and Vietnam arose over Spratly Islands. There were a 
number of incidents, including one in which Vietnamese forces chased off Chinese 
boats operating in Vietnamese-controlled waters around the islands. More alarmingly, 
in 1995, China occupied Mischief Reef, also claimed by the Philippines. In January 
1995, the Philippines discovered that China had built installations on Mischief Reef and 
left troops behind to guard them. Southeast Asia as a whole was shocked, as this was 
the first time that China had seized territory claimed by an ASEAN state (Segal 1996: 
121). The occupation raised suspicion that China was in the process of building a naval 
outpost. It also shattered the belief that China would act only against Vietnam in the 
South China Sea (Dobson and Fravel 1997: 259).  
 
At the 1995 ARF meeting, the Chinese did say that they were willing to discuss the 
South China Sea dispute with all ASEAN countries, but in general they have resisted 
regional solutions preferring instead to deal on a bilateral basis. On occasion, they have 
suggested that conflicting sovereign claims could be put aside for the time being – 
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though not abandoned – to allow economic resources to be developed jointly. In the 
absence of a resolution of the dispute, however, Beijing continues its policy of 
incremental occupation, while ASEAN has failed to take a strong stand.  
 
Although Japan was not directly involved in these disputes, the events in the South 
China Sea increased Japanese determination to keep the sea lanes open, and raised fears 
that China might use force in bilateral disputes (Drifte 2002: 134; Segal 1996: 125). 
Thus, Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea reinforced growing doubts about 
long-term Chinese intentions. These concerns brought major changes to Japan’s 
strategic thinking in the mid-1990s – including renewed emphasis on ties with the 
United States and to more explicit and public expressions of reservations about China’s 
aggressive policies. The Spratlys case also reinforced Japan’s recalculation of its 
nascent Asia strategy (Johnstone 1999). In short, Japan’s enthusiasm for regional 
security multilateralism has been waning; in stead it put greater emphasis on the US-
Japan alliance (Yuzawa 2005).  
 
8.3.4 Asian Financial Crisis 
 
The inability of ASEAN and ARF to provide an effective response to the Asian 
financial crisis of 1997-98 revealed serious flaws in these regional institutions. In the 
face of crisis, regional actors were disunited and displayed clear signs of rivalry. The 
viability of the ARF was undermined by the decreased capacity and disunity of 
ASEAN. This was because the ARF itself was largely based upon the experience and 
principles of ASEAN – in short on the so-called ASEAN way. ASEAN also provided 
leadership, which was often described as a ‘driver’ for regional institutions. However, 
ASEAN’s response to the crisis was widely perceived as inadequate, despite the various 
initiatives and measures it undertook (for a detailed account see: Soesastro 1998; 
Funston 1998). Moreover, the domestic turbulence caused by the crisis, and disunity 
about how it should be handled, seriously weakened ASEAN’s leadership role and its 
commitment to the ARF. In turn this undermined the processes, such as the promotion 
of confidence building and preventive diplomatic measures, which the ARF had been 
seeking to foster (Simon 1998).  
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Thus, with the diminished effectiveness of ASEAN in regional institutional building, 
the role of great powers, such as Japan and China, acquired greater prominence. Yet the 
crisis also reinforced the concerns of the great powers – Japan, China and the US – and 
made them more suspicious the others’ intentions. The complexity of the situation was 
revealed in Japan’s failure to carry its proposal for the creation of an Asian Monetary 
Fund (AMF), intended to help regional economies in future currency crises. The 
proposal was rejected by Beijing, ‘a clear indication that China was prepared to blunt 
Japanese efforts to exert regional leadership’ (Johnstone 1999: 377). More decisively, 
the proposal was opposed by Washington. The US – the indispensable co-architect of a 
financial rescue package put together by the IMF, the World Bank and others – feared 
that an AMF would offer loans under less stringent conditions than the IMF, thus 
undercutting the Fund’s authority (Johnstone 1999: 377). Washington also saw the 
AMF as a threat to its influence in Asia. Tokyo was disappointed by and suspicious of 
these negative responses – which even suggested Sino-American cooperation directed 
against Japan. Yet, in reality, relations between Washington and Beijing were not 
improving. China remains highly suspicious of the renewed and more wide-ranging ties 
between Japan and the US. Strikingly, the revision of the Guidelines for US-Japan 
Defence Cooperation was immediately followed by the financial crisis. 
 
While the immediate effects of the financial crisis may have been unfortunate, however, 
its longer-term consequences may have been more salutary. The crisis shocked the 
region into realising that unity among the widely disparate nations was vital. It opened 
the door to the establishment of fora, such as ASEAN plus Three and the East Asia 
summit. Thus in the new millennium there has been much talk about East Asian 
community building. However, regional disagreements remain as to the terms and 
conditions on which a regional community should be built. In February 2006, a 
symposium attended by politicians, researchers and journalists from Japan and ASEAN 
countries even concluded that regional integration was at the ‘midnight’ hour, far from 
‘dawn’ (Asahi Shimbun 8 March 2006). 
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8.4 The Global Level 
 
8.4.1 The United States: a Guarantor of Regional Security 
 
The interplay between regional and global levels is particularly significant in Northeast 
Asia. Taking the power position perspective, since there is no strong alternative security 
mechanism in place, the role of the US is crucial to the maintenance of security and 
stability in Northeast Asia and for preservation of reasonably stable relations between 
China and Japan (Friedberg 1993/94: 31, 32; 2000: 156; Yahuda 1996: 259; 2002; Deng 
1998: 105). Strategically, despite the end of the Cold War, the United States is still by 
far the most dominant power in the region.  
 
The end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the former Soviet Union effectively 
removed Russia as a major player in the region, while US engagement continues 
essentially unchanged. But will this continue? The decision in June 2004 to withdraw 
some of the US forces from South Korea pointed to a change of policy and it is now 
clear that by 2011, South Korea will assume wartime control of its forces (Chosun Ilbo 
5 June 2006). But this does not mean that the US is losing interest in Korea. As General 
Leon Laporte remarked on 31 March 2004, shortly before the June decision, changes in 
US force structure would enhance, rather than reduce, South Korean defence capability. 
In reality the changes would reflect improvements in the combined military capabilities 
of US and South Korean units – through force modernisation and interoperability. He 
emphasised America’s commitment as ‘an enduring United States military presence in 
Korea and a stronger alliance’.23 American commitment to Japan has actually increased 
and its bases in Japan and South Korea with associated naval and air power are 
unrivalled in the region.  
 
The significance of US commitment was evident in periods of difficulty involving both 
Korea and Taiwan. Since the early 1990s, tensions arising from the suspected North 
Korean nuclear weapons programme have given the US new reasons for maintaining its 
                                                 
 
23 Remark delivered on 31 March 2004 to the House Armed Services Committee of the US. Can be 
accessed through USINFO, Department of States, at http://usinfo.state.gov/eap/Archive/2004/Jun/29-
535351.html.  
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commitment to the region. These were made more pressing by the divergence of 
responses and interests among the regional powers when dealing with the Korean crisis 
of 1993-94: the unwillingness of the Chinese to support sanctions against the North 
(Kihl 1997: x); the inability of Japan to take an initiative or to give a proper support to 
the US (Armacost and Pyle 2001); and the unlikelihood of regional actors addressing 
problems in any meaningful multilateral way (Yahuda 1996: 275). At the high point of 
the Korean crisis, it was the US, virtually alone, that managed to secure the ‘Agreed 
Framework’ with North Korea in October 1994.  
 
The 1995-96 Taiwan crisis also demonstrated that the continued US engagement was 
crucial for regional stability. In the event, it was the military superiority of the US and 
its strong response to China’s military threats that seemed to restrain Beijing (Matsuda 
2004: 11). Deng (1998: 107) argues that the US decision to send two aircraft carriers to 
the waters adjacent to the Taiwan Strait in defiance of Beijing ‘was tacitly welcomed by 
many in the region, such as ASEAN and Japan, as it signalled the United States’ 
continued security commitment to this region’. There can be no doubt that there is 
common concern in the region about the instability and arms races that would probably 
follow any significant American withdrawal.  
 
The United States also plays a crucial role in maintaining stable relations between China 
and Japan. Because its security commitment ensures that China’s increasing strength 
can be offset. Conversely, ‘American power is the linchpin that holds Japan in place’ 
(Friedberg 1993/4: 32). Without US protection, Japan would feel compelled to re-arm 
itself rapidly, especially in light of the threat from the Korean Peninsula and China. 
Thus Deng (1998: 105) argues, ‘Anchoring Japan in the U.S. dominated security 
framework is the only way to put a brake on Japanese ambition to acquire military and 
political power commensurate with its economic clout’. Despite all problems in the 
relationship between the US and China, in the last resort Beijing gives tacit 
acquiescence to America’s military role in the Western Pacific – because it restrains 
militaristic tendencies in Japan. Indeed, despite recent arms build ups, it is likely that 
the arms race would have been on an even larger scale had it not been for the stabilising 
role of the United States. Such considerations led Yahuda (2002:10) to conclude that 
currently, stable relations between China and Japan are ‘only possible because of the 
role played by the United States’. In other words, the American alliance with Japan 
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assures the Chinese that ‘the cork remains on the bottle of Japanese “militarism”’. Yet 
there are still areas of uncertainty – will the US remained committed indefinitely and, if 
so, how will it respond to the growing power of China?  
 
8.4.2 Problems of US Commitment 
 
One of the common concerns about Northeast Asian regional security is the credibility 
of US security commitment. Factors that could bring a sudden and dramatic change to 
the present US posture include domestic constraints, trade disputes with key allies, and 
divergences of strategy and interest between America and one or more of those allies. 
Concerns about possible US withdrawal were particularly acute in the aftermath of the 
Cold War, a time of growing US-Japanese trade frictions. Yet the crises over Korea and 
the Taiwan Strait in the mid 1990s gave the US a new interest in the region and seemed 
to raise the level of its commitment. But it is not clear whether this reassertion of 
American involvement will prove short-lived or long lasting; in other words doubts 
about the strength of American commitment remain. Friedberg (2000:156) points out, 
‘As the history of the past decade should suggest, political arrangements that appear 
fixed and unshakeable today can disappear almost overnight’. He is clearly sceptical 
about American assurances of long-term commitment, insisting that continued US 
strategic engagement just cannot be ‘assumed into the indefinite future’ (Friedberg 
2000: 156).  
 
As discussed above, the major fears about a change to American policy centre upon 
Japan’s likely response and upon the possibility of a much-accelerated regional arms 
build up. As the logic of security dilemma suggests, the danger of any sudden American 
withdrawal is that, faced with an increasingly hostile environment, ‘Japan would be 
forced to seek diplomatic reassurance and military self-reliance. These steps, in turn, 
could finalize its estrangement from the United States and further fuel the anxieties of 
its neighbours’ (Friedberg 1993/4:31). But American withdrawal is not the only 
concern; continued American presence could also cause problems. While the US 
commitment to Northeast Asia may help to preserve a measure of long-term regional 
balance, many analysts fear that it could also lead to conflicts and perhaps a series of 
confrontations – particularly in the light of China’s rapid growth (Friedberg 2000; Roy 
2003; Shambaugh 2000). 
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 In the post-Cold War era, with the decline of the Soviet threat, the US role in Northeast 
Asia and its relations with Japan and China have become more complex and difficult. In 
the 1970s and 1980s, the US, Japan and China went through a period of relatively 
‘comfortable trilateral security dynamics’ (Green 1999: 156), in which all three enjoyed 
‘positive relations with one another’. But this happy state of affairs did not last (Vogel 
2002: 1). From the mid 1990s, it became clear that they had fewer shared interests and 
hence elements of suspicion and competition have increased. Two developments are 
especially relevant: the enhancement of the US-Japanese alliance alarms China, while 
the dramatic rise of China challenges the leadership of the US. 
 
The Enhanced US-Japan Alliance 
In the mid 1990s, in order to respond to the changing environment and increasing 
uncertainties, the US and Japan began to redefine and strengthen their alliance structure. 
Steps included revision of the 1976 National Defense Program Outline in 1995; the US-
Japanese Joint Declaration on Security in 1996; and the revision of the 1978 Guidelines 
for US-Japan Defence Cooperation in 1997. These developments have induced Beijing 
to take a different view of Washington-Tokyo security arrangements. In the past, the 
US-Japanese alliance appeared to serve China’s interests well. Above all the alliance 
seemed to offer a guarantee against the return of militarism in Japan. Some Chinese 
likened the American role to a ‘bottle cap’ – keeping the Japanese military genie in the 
bottle (Liu 1998). In the 1970s and 1980s, the alliance also aided China’s strategic 
objectives by containing the Soviet Union. However, with the removal of the 
Soviet/Russian threat, Beijing fears that the enhanced US-Japanese alliance is 
increasingly aimed at containing China.   
 
But the biggest question for China is whether the US-Japanese alliance will continue to 
‘be a force containing Japan as it has been in the past’ (Garret and Glaser 1997: 384, 
390, 401). Beijing would become totally hostile if the real purpose of the concluded 
alliance was now to counter China, that it was no longer performing its ‘bottle stop’ role 
and actually becoming a device for letting the genie of Japanese militarism out of the 
bottle. Beijing does not believe that Japan will emerge as an independent military power 
in its own right in the near future; its concern is that it will play a more active security 
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role in the region in support of the United States (Liu 1998; Xaopu Wang 2005; Yahuda 
2002). It is precisely such concerns that colour China’s suspicions about the revision of 
US-Japanese security arrangements and opposition to Japan’s commitment to TMD 
research.  
 
Thus, a major problem arising from the enhancement of US-Japanese security 
cooperation in the post-Cold War era is the increasing difficulty of persuading China 
that it has nothing to worry about; thus making it harder to maintain the so-called 
triangular relations among the big three. This difficulty further exacerbated by China’s 
rapid growth and its revisionist tendencies. With the ending of bipolarity, particularly 
after George W. Bush became President, Sino-American relations have become 
increasingly characterised by so-called ‘strategic competition’. 
 
The Rise of China: A Strategic Competitor? 
If there were shared interests and limited cooperation between the US and China until 
the early 1990s, thereafter those interests seemed to diverge and hence the previous 
limited co-operation was replaced by increasing competition. At least for the time being, 
there is a paradox about the relationship, one reflecting aspects of power transition 
theory. On the one hand, China is already a rapidly growing, yet dissatisfied power that 
inevitably challenges US leadership. On the other hand, China still lacks ‘the desire, 
political influence, and military power to contest the United States globally’ 
(Shambaugh 2000: 99). Thus, while ‘the two nations are vying for strategic pre-
eminence and leadership in East Asia’ (Shanbaugh 2000: 99), China is not yet a 
‘potential hegemon’ (Mearsheimer 2001) seeking either to challenge US dominance or 
to take over the international system in the immediate future.  
 
Thus, in so far as China challenges the US, it does so in a limited way. The present 
‘strategic competition’ relationship between China and the US is different 
fundamentally from the one between ‘strategic adversaries’, characteristic of Soviet-
American relations during the Cold war period.  The difference cannot be ascribed 
solely to China’s continuing material inferiority to the US, but also stems from the fact 
that, to some extent, China still benefits from the current international system. It is in 
China’s interest to cooperate with the US in certain areas, such as the prevention of 
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nuclear proliferation in the Korean peninsula. However, even if China accepts some 
aspects of the current international system, denying any intention to dominate or extend 
its hegemony over the Asia-Pacific region, it is decidedly uncomfortable with the 
current American-dominated regional-security architecture. Neither will Beijing be 
satisfied until the other major powers and neighbouring countries have sufficient regard 
for its wishes to refrain from implementing any major foreign policy that displeases 
China (Shambaugh 2000: 99; Roy 2003: 74). 
 
Thus, it is often argued that, as China grows stronger, it will become more assertive and 
will expect to be accorded even greater leadership rights. Roy has already claimed that 
‘Beijing is quietly preparing the ground for a future era in which, essentially, Chinese 
international leadership has waxed and American leadership has waned’ (Roy 2003: 
70). Indeed, since the end of the Cold War, Beijing has been expressing its opposition to 
US hegemony and asserting its strong preference for a multi-polar world, where 
American supremacy would be constrained while China’s power and influence would 
roughly equal to that of the other great powers.  
 
As noted earlier, faced with the uncertainties of the post-Cold War environment, 
Washington has been strengthening its alliances and security partnerships in Northeast 
Asia. To counter these developments, Beijing has been building its ties with Moscow. 
Since 1997 Beijing has also been promoting a New Security Concept or NSC (see, the 
regional level section in this chapter) in East Asia. Since the NSC is based on 
opposition to the Cold War mentality of military alliances, it is often seen as having 
been designed ‘to circumvent Washington’s well-established alliance networks’ (Deng 
and Moore 2004: 125). Many events since 2005 suggest that the climate of mutual 
suspicion and rivalry between the US and China has intensified, and there are much 
talks about the ‘emerging US-China conflict’ (Klare 2006). 
 
In the first place, there are signs that Washington is increasingly alarmed by China’s 
speedy military build-up across the Taiwan Strait. On 16 February 2006, the CIA 
Director, Porter Goss, warned a hearing of the Senate Select Committee that ‘Beijing’s 
military modernization and military build-up [are] tilting the balance of power in the 
Taiwan Strait’, and hence threatened US forces in the region. Defense Secretary 
Rumsfeld agreed, adding that China’s increasing military muscle was an issue the 
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Department of Defense ‘thinks about and is concerned about and is attentive to’ 
(USINFO, 18 February 2005). There can be little doubt that this concern lay behind the 
identification of Taiwan as a ‘common strategic object’ in the joint statement issued by 
the US and Japan to the 2+2 talks in February 2005. Wenran Jiang states explicitly: 
Washington has not yet labeled China an “outpost of tyranny,” as North 
Korea, but warnings of a China threat and a recent joint US-Japanese 
statement designating Taiwan as a “common strategic objective” have 
marked a new turn on Asia’s security chessboard. It remains to be seen 
whether the emerging divide will force other countries to choose sides. 
Beijing, however, will likely confront a potential containment with new 
counter-measures (Wenran Jiang 2005).  
 
Of course, Beijing was greatly alarmed by the reference to Taiwan in the joint 
statement. Li Jiaquan, China’s leading expert on Taiwan, argued that while the 
statement ostensibly sought a ‘peaceful resolution of the Taiwan problem’, this was 
merely a device to give the US and Japan an excuse to support Taiwan’s ‘peaceful 
independence’. He went on to define China’s stance in stark terms: US and Japan’s 
objectives risked the stability and security of the Taiwan Strait because ‘Taiwan’s 
independence’ would mean war to China (Huanqiu Shibao 21 February 2005). In wider 
terms, Beijing regarded the statement as an excuse for the military expansion of the US-
Japan alliance, whose real purpose was to contain China (Tatsumi 2005). 
 
Against this backdrop, China not only continues to purchase modern military equipment 
from Russia, but also increases its efforts to expand the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization (SCO) – one of Beijing’s major policy achievements under its NSC. 
Formally established in 2001, and consisting of China, Russia and four Central Asian 
countries – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan – SCO is supposed to 
be dedicated to combating the ‘threats posed by terrorism, separatism and extremism 
and illegal drug trafficking’. Yet, the growing power of China has prompted a rethink in 
Washington, where conservative analysts have concluded that the SCO could have a far 
more ambitious role. They believe that China intends to use it as nothing less than an 
embryonic rival to NATO (Guardian 15 June 2006). These fears have been 
strengthened since 2004 as Mongolia, Iran, Pakistan and India have been accepted as 
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observers and Afghanistan as a guest nation, while the US’s application for observer 
status has been rejected. 
 
The fifth annual summit meeting of the SCO was held in Shanghai on 15 June 2006. 
The presence of the representatives of states strongly opposed to the US – notably Iran – 
must increase concerns about the organisation’s potential role as a counterweight to the 
US (Asia Times 16 June 2006; Guardian 15 June 2006). Although the summit has not 
given Iran full membership of the SCO – as the Iranians wished – the Iranian president, 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, received a warm welcome in Shanghai despite his country's 
problems with international nuclear inspectors over Tehran’s uranium enrichment 
program. It is true that the 2006 summit has not expanded the SCO’s membership and 
its communiqué – with its emphasis on combating terrorism – does not strike a different 
note to communiqués produced after previous summits. Nevertheless, some 
commentators, such as Klare, still see the SCO as a possible ‘mini NATO’ or ‘anti 
NATO’, which could become a counter-bloc to the United States in Central Asia. He 
further argues that ‘the Russians and the Chinese hope that it will help them turn back 
US influence in the energy-rich Islamic territories of the former Soviet Union’ (Klare 
2006). 
 
Thus, regional and global level interplay suggests that lack of an institutionalised 
security structure and the absence of a proper strategic understanding between Japan 
and China, means that Northeast Asian regional security depends heavily on the United 
States as a security guarantor. The US security role has been and will continue to be the 
most important factor in Northeast Asia. However in the post Cold War environment, 
US involvement as an external player appears to be problematic; either its sudden 
withdrawal or its enhanced commitment seem likely to bring destabilising effects.  
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Conclusion to Part III 
 
This part has examined the politico-military dimension of Northeast Asian regional 
security through the neorealist lens. From this perspective, the most decisive change in 
Northeast Asia in the 1990s was the distribution and redistribution of power generated 
by the rise of China and the fall of the Soviet Union. Such a shift in the power balance 
inevitably and decisively changed the strategic context of the region. In particular, the 
historical rivalry between China and Japan has led to increased competition over 
Northeast and Southeast Asia. Many disputes, tensions and crises have heightened Sino-
Japanese competition. Events also revealed that neither China nor Japan could use 
multilateral fora to address regional security problems in a meaningful way.  
 
Thus, the US, an external player, has become the ring holder of Northeast Asian 
regional security. However the problem remains because there are still doubts about the 
certainty of US commitment and fears of possible conflicts between China and the US. 
This is why many realists are so sceptical of the future security outlook in Northeast and 
East Asia. Thus Friedberg (2000: 148) concludes that it is as ‘difficult to achieve a 
stable, lasting peace in a multipolar Asia as it was in Europe in the eighteenth, 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries’. 
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9 Conclusion: Towards an East Asian ‘Security Regime’? 
 
This thesis has analysed Sino-Japanese relations and the Northeast Asian security order 
in the post-Cold War era. It has sought to do this by examining a variety of sectors and 
levels and by investigating material and social variables. The story of Northeast Asia is 
by no means straightforward; it is extremely multi-faceted and answers are rarely clear-
cut. Yet, despite all the complexities of relations between peoples and states – perhaps 
because of them – the region provides an ideal ‘testing ground’ for the application of 
security analysis and for evaluation of contending theoretical approaches. In this 
concluding chapter, I first ask whether a level of ‘security regime’ is in place in the 
Northeast Asian RSC. I conclude that such a regime does exist – while also assessing 
how firmly and deeply it is now established. I then consider the implications of this case 
study for the various theories explored earlier – that is, whether they provide useful 
lenses to assist understanding of Northeast Asian security dynamics or whether entirely 
new theories, more relevant to Asian reality, are needed. 
 
9.1 An East Asian ‘Security Regime’? 
 
Has the Northeast Asian RSC moved or can it move from a level of ‘conflict formation’ 
to one of ‘security regime’, or even ‘security community’? As stated in chapter 2, RSCT 
views RSCs as essentially social constructions. From this perspective, it follows that 
social processes – such as identity building, changes in amity/enmity relations, norm 
settings and their internalisation – are to be seen as more important than forces external 
to these processes in determining whether the structure of the Northeast Asian RSC 
remains in ‘conflict formation’ mode or is transformed into a higher level of interaction.  
 
Drawing on materials from case studies and investigation of both pessimistic and 
optimistic analyses, I believe that Northeast Asia has not yet reached a level of ‘security 
community’. Nevertheless, together with Southeast Asian countries, it has probably 
managed to form what might be called a single ‘East Asian security regime’. This does 
not mean that East Asia no longer faces security challenges or that balance of power 
logic has become irrelevant. Serious security problems could well continue to arise – as 
exemplified by present troubled state of the Korean peninsula. Yet considerable changes 
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have taken place across East Asia in the post-Cold War era, particularly after the Asian 
financial crisis. While changes in the balance of power continue to influence the 
behaviour of states, international society in the East Asian region is now more securely 
established than in the Cold War era, or even in comparison to the early 1990s. 
Regional actors, including the great powers, increasingly appear to be moving towards a 
higher level of what Alagappa (2003) calls ‘rule-governed interaction’, while the role of 
force is becoming more limited. In short, these changes seem to mean that the enlarged 
East Asian RSC now conforms to Jervis’s definition of a security regime. 
 
A ‘Security Regime’: Jervis’ Definition 
There is a fundamental difference between a ‘security regime’ and a ‘security 
community’. A ‘security community’ assumes a long-term habit of peaceful interaction 
and rules out the use of force in settling disputes with other members of the group (see 
Adler and Barnett 1998). Obviously, the use of force remains a possibility in the 
Northeast Asian RSC. However, a ‘security regime’ only involves acceptance of those 
principles, rules, and norms that ‘permit nations to be restrained in their behaviour in 
the belief that others will reciprocate’ (Jervis 1982: 357). Under a security regime, 
relations between members are not always harmonious. They may be harmonious but 
disputes and conflicts are possible. However, when disputes or conflicts do occur, 
Jervis’s definition suggests that members will cooperate to deal with them. There is also 
a belief that ‘war and individualistic pursuit of security’ is costly, and hence an 
expectation of ‘self-constraints on states’ behaviour’ arises when disputes occur (Jervis 
1982: 360-62). But how well does the enlarged East Asian RSC fit Jervis’s definition of 
a security regime? Have its members exhibited any willingness or ability to cooperate in 
dealing with security problems and is there any regional expectation of mutual or 
general self-constraint? To use RSCT terminology, has the degree of amity / enmity 
risen to a more friendly level or descended to one of greater animosity? 
 
In the post-Cold War period, particularly in the early and mid 1990s, it was precisely 
these kinds of security concerns that dominated the East Asian security environment. As 
discussed in chapters 6 and 8, the region faced serious security challenges. Tensions, 
crises, even possible wars, resulted from longstanding territorial disputes, and over 
sovereignty and status rivalries. In addition to these concerns, there were decisive 
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changes in the distribution of power. The rapid rise of China – especially against a 
background of declining Russian influence, an apparently stagnant Japan and the 
seeming uncertainty surrounding continued US commitment – indicated that a 
multipolar system was emerging. These developments pointed to the likelihood of great 
power rivalry and major wars (Friedberg 1993/94). Moreover, the international society 
in Northeast / East Asia was poorly developed; the signs of economic interdependence 
were still weak and there were no meaningful regional multilateral security 
mechanisms. In such circumstances, any temporary peace and stability was attributed to 
the preponderance of US power in the region. This perception appeared vindicated at 
the time of the Korean and Taiwan Strait crises of the mid-1990s – when the US 
certainly demonstrated its power and its capacity to play the role of a ‘ring holder’ in 
Northeast Asian security. 
 
The role of the United States is certainly a key issue when deciding whether there is 
really a security regime in East Asia. It may be inappropriate to speak of such a regime 
if regional security and stability was maintained exclusively by an external power and 
by material factors such as the balance of power. But are these external and material 
factors the only variables that maintain security and stability? I believe that other factors 
are at work and hence I am led to the conclusion that it is appropriate to describe the 
East Asian RSC as a ‘security regime’. Recent developments indicate that a regional 
society has been emerging and developing in East Asia and these provide the main 
rationale for my assertion. 
 
Despite the continuing presence of many critical challenges to regional security – such 
as recurrent crises, continuing shifts in the balance of power, and regional rivalries and 
competitions – it is important to stress that these problems have been contained to a 
certain degree. Regional security mechanisms are finally emerging and regional actors 
appear to be more willing to seek their own solutions to security challenges. In other 
words, although the US remains important, it is no longer the sole factor in maintaining 
regional security and stability. There is now increased regional cooperation and a 
greater degree of self-restraint. Of course, questions remain as to the extent of these 
changes – in other words, whether or not they have become deeply internalised. Here 
we must ask if the changes have really changed actors’ identities and their interests, and 
facilitated the formation of collective identity in the region. If something like this has 
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occurred, what has been the effect on their securitisation practices? These questions 
have emerged strongly from my case studies and the best way to answer them is through 
more detailed investigation of the domestic, regional and global levels. 
 
9.1.1 Domestic Changes 
 
If a security regime already exists in East Asia – however precariously – will it dissolve 
and the region descend into conflict and war or will it become more firmly established 
and perhaps even advance to become a security community? Here, domestic 
developments in both China and Japan are crucial. As two great powers in the same 
region, their relationship has often been considered primarily in terms of power 
projections and rivalries. Up to a point this is legitimate, but evolutions and changes in 
their respective domestic characters also need close attention – a point emphasised by 
social constructivists. They argue that, if the structure is conceptualised in social rather 
than material terms, the identities and interests of the component units acquire greater 
importance than the distribution of power (see chapter 2). Following the constructivists’ 
lines, when I examined the rise of China and its implications for a possible 
remilitarisation of Japan, I also addressed domestic normative developments in both 
countries: that is, changes in perceptions and attitudes towards international society in 
China, and growing social norms of pacifism and antimilitarism in Japan. 
 
The Rise or ‘Peaceful Rise’ of China? 
Since the introduction of the economic reform policy in 1979, China has experienced 
sustained economic growth. Its industrialisation and modernisation has been so 
successful that it seems probable that China will continue to rise through the ranks of 
the great powers, perhaps even to the point of bidding for superpower status (Buzan 
2004b: 113-6). Yet opinions are sharply divided on the likely effects on the regional and 
international order. On the one hand, the ‘China threat’ thesis was particularly popular 
in the early and mid 1990s and still has adherents today; on the other, since the late 
1990s, a growing body of opinion has argued that China can become a responsible great 
power. 
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A Malign Power? 
From the neorealist power position perspective (see chapter 8), the security implications 
of the growth of China’s relative and absolute power in the region and in the world are 
almost entirely negative. Power transition theory postulates that rapidly rising powers 
are generally revisionist or dissatisfied powers, seeking to change the existing 
international order and to assert their influence. It is true that history provides many 
examples of coincidence between rapid internal development and external expansion; 
Imperial Germany and 1930s Japan come to mind. Neorealists see no reason why China 
should depart from this pattern (Huntington 1991:12; Waltz 2000). China has certainly 
displayed strong revisionist tendencies, and in many ways, practices traditional 
realpolitik. This is evident in rapidly increasing arms expenditure; arms sales and export 
of nuclear technology to Pakistan, Iran and elsewhere; assertiveness in territorial claims; 
and stated readiness to use force if necessary over the Taiwan issue. Thus, the dramatic 
rise of China has often led to a ‘China threat’ conclusion (see detailed account, Roy 
1996). 
 
In many respects, the end of the Cold War made the rise of China appear even more 
alarming, As Yahuda (2004: 209) points out, the immediate effects of the end of the 
bipolar system were ‘essentially power related’ in Northeast Asia – in sharp contrast to 
Europe, where ideological change was more obvious. Chinese power increased rapidly 
both absolutely and relatively. Its importance seemed all the greater when set against the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union, the problems of post-Communist Russia, the retreat 
of US hegemony (though soon reasserted) and the economic stagnation of Japan. To 
some extent these factors are still present and commentators believe that this shift in 
power positions will almost inevitably challenge US interests in the region and also 
provoke Japan. Hence, it must follow that Northeast Asia is heading towards power 
competition and instability (Friedberg 1993/93; Roy 1994; Taniguchi 2005), a situation 
in which Sino-Japanese rivalry becomes the most acute factor. Yet, does a rising China 
necessarily pose a threat to the existing international order? Could changes in its 
identity and interests in regional and international society make a difference?  
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China Rejoins the World 
Until the early 1970s, the Communist state of The People’s Republic of China (PRC) 
was extremely isolated. The establishment of the PRC in October 1949 was a hugely 
significant event, which Zhang and Austin see as unique in the history of great powers. 
From its inception, the PRC developed ‘a set of uneasy and unusual social relations with 
global international society’ (Zhang and Austin 2001: 4). Ideologically, identification 
with the Soviet Union and its socialist allies, adherence to Marxism-Leninism, and the 
adoption of a centrally planned economic system, all meant that ‘China was a state that 
appeared to challenge many of the world-order policy goals that the United States and 
its allies had tried to build post-war’ (Foot 1995b: 15). Hence, the creation of the PRC 
represented a major step towards the division of the world into two power blocs 
characterised by mutually opposed ideologies.  
 
The trend to isolation was intensified by the failure of the Great Leap Forward and the 
Cultural Revolution. China became internally chaotic and people lived in fear and 
poverty. Externally, Communist leaders vilified the international system and the 
organisations associated with it. They denounced arms control agreements and the 
international economic system, largely isolating themselves from world affairs. The rare 
contacts that did take place were with socialist and communist states or movements, 
mainly in the form of verbal, material, or military support for revolutions in Asia and 
liberation movements in the Third World. These initiatives challenged the dominant 
interests in the international system, particularly those of America. The result was to 
bring tension to the whole of East Asia. 
 
However, since the early 1970s, particularly in the post-Maoist period and throughout 
the post-Cold War era, China has increasingly ‘integrated into’ and been ‘cooperative 
within’ regional and global political and economic systems (Johnston 2003: 5). Hence 
Oksenberg and Economy (1999) claim that China has ‘rejoined the world’, while 
Samuel Kim argues that China has abandoned its former role of ‘system challenger’ to 
become a ‘system maintainer’ or even a ‘system exploiter’ (Kim 2004b). In any event, 
Foot (2001: 35) concludes that China has at least stepped ‘inside the tent of 
international society’.  
 
 252
But what is the real significance of China’s integration into the global community and 
the adoption of cooperative behaviour within it? Before the mid-1990s, the answer was 
not clear, although China joined an increasing number of regional and international 
institutions. Since the late 1990s, however, the picture has become clearer. There can no 
longer be doubt that China has integrated into the international society. Two questions 
arise. Why has China decided to join so many regional and international multilateral 
organisations and regimes and to comply with their related norms and has its 
participation and practices within them changed its attitudes or even its identity? 
 
Internalisation and Socialisation 
Of the three degrees of internalisation identified by Wendt, the second – that of 
calculation – offers the most obvious explanation of China’s motives for joining 
multilateral institutions and for its subsequent compliance to the various norms 
associated with them. No doubt, positive and negative calculations were at work. 
Beijing did not want to be excluded from regional discussions because exclusion would 
be contrary to its interests. More positively, participation provided a potential 
opportunity to allay the concerns of other states, alarmed by China’s growing strength – 
especially by its defence modernisation programme. Adoption of the multilateral 
approach might also serve to undermine the political and moral bases of US efforts to 
strengthen its bilateral security ties in the region (Wu 1998). Even today, the element of 
calculation remains strong, as evidenced in the ‘peaceful rise’ strategy. Xiaong 
Guangkai, chairman of Chinese Institute for International Strategic Studies, states 
explicitly that ‘China is trying to create a peaceful international environment for the 
benefit of its own growth and is trying to make its due contribution to world peace’.24 In 
other words, China’s engagement policy may be attributed to its desire to continue with 
its extraordinarily successful economic development.  
 
Thus, the lack of genuine belief suggests that there are limitations and shallowness in its 
internalisation. This limitation is often reflected in China’s attitude towards those 
multilateral institutions – that is, China could not and did not want to share its perceived 
                                                 
 
24 See, ‘Peaceful Chinese development conducive to world peace, development, military scholar’, 
People’s Daily 29 December 2005, 
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200512/29/eng20051229_231460.html. 
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sensitive issues in multilateral settings. Yet, it is striking that, regardless of the initial 
reasons for participation, once China joined, the pattern of its involvement soon moved 
from caution to enthusiasm, a change especially striking in attitudes to regional security 
mechanisms. It took China less than five years to overcome its initial scepticism of 
multilateral fora and to become an active participant in the ARF and in many track-two 
processes (Foot 1998; Johnston and Evans 1999). 
 
A more fundamental change in China’s attitude towards regional multilateralism took 
place after the Asian financial crisis and continues in the new millennium. Economic 
development and improved international status may have made China more confident. 
China gradually learned how regional and international institutions worked and, as a 
result, became more comfortable in multilateral gatherings. A prominent Chinese 
scholar and think-tank leader, Jin Chanrong (Interview, May 2005) explained that when 
China first joined multilateral institutions, its delegates felt that they were in a dark 
room, surrounded by enemies. However, once the light was on, they began to realise the 
other delegates might not be enemies after all – because they looked more like ‘us’. It 
seems therefore that China is acclimatising itself to the multilateral way and even 
enjoying it. International appreciation of China’s decision not to devalue the Yuan in 
the crisis increased the feeling of acceptance and confidence. In other words, the new 
psychological mood encouraged China to believe that it would be accepted and 
welcomed if it took positive steps. 
 
Then, how far have the socialisation processes gone? Wendt insists that states’ identities 
and interests can change through inter-subjective processes: ‘States might initially 
engage in pro-social policies for egoistic reasons but if sustained over time such policies 
will erode egoistic identities and create collective ones (Wendt, 1999:342). Does the 
case of China demonstrate such a trend? And what has been the impact of these 
processes of socialisation on regional securitisation practices? Here it is important to 
look more closely at Chinese responses to pressing security issues. Of course, the most 
critical of these is Taiwan – the real ‘litmus test’ of whether China has ‘changed’ or not. 
But the responses of other regional actors to China are also important. These issues will 
be examined later in relation to regional aspects. 
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The Normative Constructions of Japan’s Security Thinking 
One of the most critical questions affecting the security of post-Cold War North East 
Asia is whether Japan will retain its low and dependent politico-military posture or 
become a ‘normal’ country, playing a more active and independent role in regional and 
international affairs. As with the rise of China, two contending views have emerged. 
Neorealists believe that systemic forces, especially the redistribution of power caused 
by the decline of Russia and the rise of China, will compel Japan to become a ‘normal’ 
country. If this does not happen, the situation could only be described as ‘a structural 
anomaly’ (Waltz 2000: 33). By contrast, constructivists, such as Katzenstein and 
Okawara (1993) and Berger (1993; 2004), believe that Japan will remain as a civilian 
power. This would not constitute a structural anomaly, because it would be Japan’s 
deliberate choice not to become a great power in its own right in regional or 
international politics. 
 
Domestic Normative Developments 
Like Germany, Japan is already regarded as a prototype ‘civilian power’ (Maull 
1990/91). Many constructivists (Katzenstein and Okawara 1993; Berger 1993; 2004) 
see this is the result of domestic developments in Japan since 1945. In other words, 
since the end of World War II, Japanese society has developed a strong anti-militarist 
norm, derived from the experience and collective memory of aggression and war in the 
1930s and 40s – and, even more, from subsequent total defeat, for ever associated with 
the horrors of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bombs. Although this social norm or 
culture of anti-militarism originally developed under the aegis of a benevolent US 
hegemon in the 1950s and 1960s, over time it has become institutionalised in the 
Japanese political system. Despite some challenges from traditional nationalists in the 
early years of the Cold War, and again in the changing environment of the post-Cold 
War era, pacifist norms have endured and still constitute constraining forces on 
Japanese security thinking and hence continue to shape foreign policy. This was the 
case even in the early 1990s, after the end of the Cold War. 
 
This constructivist approach to security thinking and behaviour reveals much about 
post-war Japanese domestic normative development and its impact on foreign policy. It 
thus challenges the dominant neorealist approach, which may place too much emphasis 
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on structural forces while paying insufficient attention to domestic and normative 
constraints on states’ behaviour. By looking at factors beyond the purely material – that 
is, by analysing the historical bases of Japan’s perceptions of security and by seeing 
how these perceptions have changed or endured over time – constructivists challenge 
the neorealists’ pessimistic view that Japan has almost no choice but to become an 
independent great power in the traditional sense.  
 
However, while the constructivist case has great merits, its supporters may have gone 
too far. There is some truth in Soeya’s (1998: 199) comment that their analysis ‘does 
not fully capture the realpolitic considerations that also inform Japanese security 
thinking’. Above all, the constructivists underestimate the importance of the US security 
guarantee – arguably the factor that allows Japan the luxury of pacifism. It is striking 
that, since the first Gulf War, Japan’s approach to security has changed considerably, 
particularly after 9/11 – including passing the Peacekeeping Operations Bill of 1992, the 
anti-terrorism law of 2001. Now there is also growing pressure to revise the ‘peace 
Constitution’, including Article 9. Thus, some analysts believe these developments have 
‘potentially radical implications for its [Japan’s] overall security policy trajectory’ (C. 
W. Hughes 2005: 131); and think that Japan has already abandoned its ‘norms-based’ 
defence policy in favour of a ‘realpolitik’ one (Kliman 2006). Others go so far as to 
insist that Japan has now reached the point of no return in the process of becoming and 
acting as a ‘normal’ military power (Miller 2002). 
 
Is a ‘Normal’ Country Necessarily Threatening? 
How should we view neorealist and constructivist interpretations of these phenomena 
and changes? There is a surprising symmetry in the two positions. Both advance what 
are actually two distinct propositions, although they do not seem aware of this. At best 
they run their two propositions together, strongly suggesting that acceptance of the first 
implies acceptance of the second. The neorealist argument is that Japan is moving to 
become a ‘normal’ country and hence will necessarily return to power politics and 
create instability. The constructivist argument is that Japan will remain a ‘civilian 
power’ and hence will not engage in power politics or become the source of instability. 
We cannot tell whether Japan will become a normal power or remain a civilian power. 
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But the crucial thing is whether there is any logical progression from the first to the 
second propositions advanced by either school. 
 
Is it necessarily the case that a ‘normal country’ will always be militaristic and 
threatening? Can we envisage a scenario in which Northeast Asia could live as well – if 
not better – with a ‘normal’ than with a ‘civilian’ Japan? It would be unwise to assume 
that, even if Japan were to become a ‘normal country’, it would necessarily become a 
source of instability or that decision-making would revert to the military, as in the 
1930s. Following the frameworks of RSCT, proper investigation of the un/changing 
nature of Japanese security approaches requires examination of social and material 
factors; exclusive concentration on either will produce a distorted picture. It is probably 
no longer useful to focus discussion on whether Japan is becoming a ‘normal country’. 
Rather it may be better to ask why and how does Japan comply with norms of pacifism 
and antimilitarism? How have Japan’s perceptions of and approaches to security 
developed and changed over time? What are the implications of these developments for 
securitisation and desecuritisation practices in the Northeast Asian RSC? 
 
The Internalisation of Norms 
It is crucial to determine why Japan complies with pacifist norms and why – at least so 
far – chooses not to become an independent great power? While it is tempting to pin 
point a deep internalisation or belief as the key factor in shaping the culture of anti-
militarism, other factors may also have been important. 
 
By Belief 
There can be no doubt that the Japanese culture of anti-militarism is based on belief. 
This belief is largely derived from the experience and collective memory of the Pacific 
War. The lesson is   that ‘the military is a dangerous institution that must be constantly 
restrained and monitored lest it threaten Japan’s post-war democratic order and 
undermine the peace and prosperity that the nation has enjoyed since 1945’ (Berger 
1993: 120). This negative view of the military has become institutionalised in the 
Japanese political system, and is widely held by a high proportion of the public, and by 
large segments of the political and economic elite (Huang 2006). This common outlook 
gave rise to Japan’s deliberate policy of caution and restraint. In other words there has 
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been a considerable degree of internalisation by belief. Even today, progressive 
Japanese academics and groups seek to resist neo-conservative and revisionist trends 
(Rose 2006); and advocates of Constitutional revision are encountering formidable 
opposition (Takahashi 2001; Nakano et al. 2005).  
 
By Calculation 
Of course, instrumental elements also influenced Japanese attitudes and policies after 
1945. Kenneth Pyle (1996: 4) points out that Japan’s stance was also ‘the result of the 
conservative leaders’ opportunistic adaptation to the circumstances of the international 
order’. Pyle supports his argument by a study of the Yoshida Doctrine (named after the 
Prime Minister who formulated Japan’s post-war strategy). Yoshida and his successors 
did more than formulate an ‘economics-first’ policy, coupling this with dependence on 
the US security guarantee. They also chose to interpret the constitution so narrowly as 
to frustrate all attempts to engage Japan in collective security commitments. Thus, since 
World War II, Japan has shunned international political-military commitments while 
concentrating on economic growth. This policy worked brilliantly in the unique 
circumstances of the Cold War. Hence, Pyle argues that we miss the essence of post-war 
Japanese political history if we ignore evidence indicating that the fundamental 
orientation toward economic growth and political passivity was ultimately the ‘product 
of a carefully constructed and brilliantly implemented foreign policy’ (Pyle 1996: 20). 
 
By Coercion 
The first degree of internalisation is by coercion or force. It is true that no gunboat 
forced Japan to adopt a pacifist norm or to take a low political stance. Yet in the 
aftermath of World War II, Japan had few choices in terms of policy options. Two 
constraining factors can be identified: a troubled history and domestic instability. 
 
The troubled history of relations with its neighbours constitutes a major constraint on 
Japanese policy. The problem was particularly acute in the early post-war years, when 
memories of Japanese invasion and occupation were fresh. Even the faintest signs of 
assertiveness were liable to be misinterpreted or even highly securitised by Japan’s 
neighbours. Even today, despite new conditions, the burden of the past and the residual 
suspicion continues to weigh heavily on Japan’s relationship with others. This is why, 
when faced with 2006 July North Korean missile crises, its neighbours’ (South Korea 
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and China) main worry was that Japan would use the crisis as a pretext for its own 
rearmament (Yonhap 11 July 2006; People’s Daily 14 July 2006). 
 
Another major problem for Japan’s security policies – also especially acute after 1945 – 
has been its domestic instability. The trauma of total defeat and destruction, coupled 
with economic devastation, led to popular discontent in the shape of anti-government 
political movements. A good deal of violent protest was instigated by the extreme Left 
and pacifists sought to obstruct and reverse the government’s conservative pro-US 
policies. American troops were used to ‘put down large-scale internal riots and 
disturbances in Japan’ under the terms of the Security Treaty (Soeya 1998: 210). In 
short, a combination of the legacy of the past with internal unrest gave Japan virtually 
no option but to make security arrangements with the US and to keep a low stance in 
foreign policy. 
 
Of course, the low stance of Japanese foreign policy cannot be understood without 
reference to the US security commitment. When examining Japan’s security orientation 
on both the domestic and international levels, Robert Uriu stresses the importance of 
international factors. For Uriu (1998: 83), the ‘abundant security’ guaranteed by the US 
commitment is ‘a prerequisite for pacifist states or civilian powers to exist’. Without 
such protection, ‘it [Japan] long ago would have become what politician Ozawa Ichiro 
has called a “normal country” – an autonomous, militarily self-sufficient nation’. Many 
analysts would agree that, even if it has not been the cause of Japanese constraint, the 
American security guarantee has at least allowed it to continue for so long (Huang 
2006). 
 
Soeya makes the same point but slightly differently. He explores Japan’s dual identity – 
‘a major actor coping with traditional security issues’; yet also ‘a pacifist nation 
committed to a non-threatening security posture’ (Soeya 1998: 213). Soeya argues that 
the US-Japan security relationship remains central to Japan’s ability to maintain this 
dual identity. That is, the US-Japan security arrangement allowed Japan to cope with the 
tension between its ‘security needs and the normative constraints’, thus enabling it to 
become ‘a major actor in international politics’ while still choosing ‘not to act 
independently in the security arena’ (Soeya 1998: 119, 200). In this respect at least, 
things have not changed since the post-war period.   
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 The Securitising Level over Japan 
But have normative developments in Japan brought improved relations with China, or 
indeed significantly reduced historically based regional suspicion of Japanese 
intentions? If they have, the result should have been a marked desecuritising effect on 
the entire RSC. The ways in which Japan and its neighbours deal with the still 
‘unresolved’ history issue are likely to be crucial. It has to be admitted that, to date, the 
processes of desecuritisation have not gone very far and have often experienced 
setbacks.  
 
It is true that, for a long time, the domestic development of anti-militarist norms in 
Japan, together with the US security engagement, did play an important role in reducing 
the Other’s fears of Japan’s remilitarisation. This factor was particularly significant in 
the early post-war years – when the level of securitisation was extremely high and 
Japan’s relations with its neighbours remained largely at the enmity end of the 
spectrum. Liu Jiangyong (2005: 217), a leading Chinese scholar in Japanese studies, 
even argues that, while the American umbrella appeared to contribute most to Japanese 
security, in reality, Japanese pacifism was even more significant – though his purpose is 
to criticise the closer ties between Japan and the US that have developed since the mid-
1990s.  
 
But the security environment was different after the end of the Cold War. Japan’s 
approach to security faced new tests and challenges. The first came with the end of the 
first Gulf war, when Japan sent minesweepers to Iraq and deployed its SDF to serve 
with the UN PKO in Cambodia. While the Western response was to urge Japan to do 
more, its Asian neighbours viewed even these relatively modest efforts with suspicion 
and foreboding, fearing that they presaged a return to more full-fledged militarism. But 
the initial suspicion has showed signs of abating. Although Japan has taken further steps 
to increase its role in international affairs – including the deployment of the SDF in 
logistical support and humanitarian missions – the regional response has been calmer 
and more relaxed. Significantly, China’s leaders did not challenge Japan’s key role in 
launching regional multilateral consultative organisations, notably APEC and the ARF. 
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Thus, from the late 1990s, Japan’s relationship with China, and even more so with 
South Korea, seemed to be improving.  
 
The 1998 summit between Japan and South Korea – which did much to improve their 
relationship – was a bold attempt to address the vexed history issue (Armacost and Pyle 
2001: 143; Berger 2004: 152). Thereafter, South Korea removed its ban on Japanese 
movies and other forms of popular culture. Similarly, South Korean popular culture has 
now become quite fashionable in Japan (FEER 16 September 2004). The Chinese 
President, Jiang Zemin’s visit to Japan in 1998 also produced a joint declaration on 
building a Partnership. Jiang’s visit may have produced a major break-through; it 
seemed to mark the end of the period of serious friction characteristic of the mid 1990s 
and the beginning of a new era of relatively stable relations that promised to set the 
pattern for the future (Jin 2002: 103-13).  
 
Yet there were soon to be setbacks. In March/April 2005, large anti-Japanese 
demonstrations took place, mainly in China but also in South Korea. These disturbances 
created great concerns in both Japan and China. Some even claimed that Sino-Japanese 
relations had fallen to their lowest point since the normalisation of 1972 (Shao-pu 
Wang, interview in June 2005; Okamoto and Tanaka 2005: 10-13). Of course, issues 
relating to history were central to the crisis – notably the new Japanese history textbook 
and Koizumi’s repeated visits to the Yasukuni shrine. But the crisis was precipitated by 
the US-Japan 2+2 statements over Taiwan in February 2005, and by the establishment 
of Takeshima-day by Shimane-Ken (Amako, interviews in May 2005).  
 
Recently, regional suspicion and concerns over Japan’s assertiveness have risen once 
more. This has been a marked feature of the North Korean missile and nuclear crises of 
July and October 2006. In responding to North Korea’s missile tests, Japanese leaders 
insisted that it was entirely natural for Japan to be able to launch a ‘pre-emptive strike’ 
and to have ‘the capacity for attacking enemy bases’ (Asahi Shimbun 9, 10 July 2006). 
These responses have given rise to concerns in Beijing that Japan is simply using the 
supposed threat from North Korea as an excuse to justify its real objective – the 
acceleration of its own externally oriented military build-up (People’s Daily 14 July 
2006). Seoul also sharply criticised Japan, claiming that the statements amounted to an 
‘exposure of the nature of its aggression’ (Yonhap 11 July 2006). These events not only 
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reveal that the issues relating sovereignty and territoriality are still high on security 
agenda in Northeast Asian RSC, but also demonstrate that the burden of history is still 
heavy. They also show that once a ‘role structure’ – enemy, rival or friend – is 
established in the minds of the various actors, it is very difficult to change these 
perceptions. 
 
Yet, it would be wrong to conclude that no serious efforts have been made to improve 
matters or that no progress has been made. Despite the many difficulties, there have 
been some attempts and achievements. These have involved both top-down and bottom-
up approaches (see, detailed account, Rose 2005). The debate about ‘a new thinking on 
Sino-Japanese relations’ in Chinese academic circles in 2002 and 2003 certainly 
suggested that the relationship was now being taken more seriously (see, Ma 2002; Shi 
2003; Jin 2003). Although the ‘new thinking’ was short lived, it was a bold attempt to 
overcome the burden of history and to bring Sino-Japanese relations into a new era. 
 
Some scholars claim that Sino-Japanese relations are now in a ‘transitional’ (tenkanki) 
period – implying a cooler relationship than that of the ‘friendly’ era followed 
normalisation. But the ‘friendly’ period of the 1970s and 80s was not without its 
problems. Then the improvement was essentially superficial, involving little serious 
reflection or strategic thought (sikou teishi), and hence, fundamental problems were 
simply not faced (Mouri 2004: 228). In comparison, since the late 1990s, despite the 
recurrent problems and crises, China, Japan, and South Korea have at least shown some 
willingness to face these problems. They have articulated the issues more clearly and 
openly and have taken the first steps towards resolution. One seemingly small, but 
significant step occurred in June 2005, when a joint (Korea-Japan-China) history book 
was published in the three respective languages. Of course, the future evolution of Sino-
Japanese relations remains uncertain; much will depend on the sincerity and boldness of 
both sides. In this sense, how Abe’s Asian diplomacy unfold, will have important 
implications for their future relations. 
 
9.1.2 Changes in Regional Dynamics 
 
Possible and actual linkages between Northeast and Southeast Asia have led RSC 
theorists to posit the emergence of an East Asian RSC (Buzan and Wæver 2003: 155-
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64). The case study in this thesis demonstrates that this began after the Cold War and 
was reinforced by developments after the Asian financial crisis. With the establishment 
of this wider East Asian context, the relationship between China and Japan and their 
relations with other regional actors changed dramatically. The most important 
developments are growing economic interdependence and the emergence of multilateral 
arrangements, notably the ARF and APT, which have exerted a powerful influence on 
states’ conceptions and behaviour. 
 
Growing Economic Interdependence 
In recent years, particularly since 2000, economic interactions in Northeast / East Asia 
have increased dramatically. In particular, the rapid expansion of China’s economy and 
foreign trade has been a major factor in the creation of much higher levels of regional 
economic interdependence. This phenomenon is sharp contrast to the situation during 
the Cold War and even to the position in the early 1990s. But how has growing 
economic interdependence facilitated better relations between China and Japan and 
influenced securitisation logic among regional actors? The findings of this case study 
suggest that, by itself, economic interdependence did little to create a more friendly 
relationship between China and Japan. The best that could be said was that it was 
characterised by a ‘hot economy but cold politics’ syndrome. In fact, closer economic 
ties had both positive and negative implications.  
 
Some Negative Implications 
As explained in chapter 6, until the early 1990s, economic interdependence and 
multilateral institutions in Northeast / East Asia were weakly developed. Both global 
and regional factors meant that regional economies were more competitive than 
complementary. The various economies were heavily dependent on US markets and 
there was relatively little trade among East Asians. Even the attainment of much higher 
levels of economic interdependence, particularly after the Asian financial crisis, also 
gave rise to additional security concerns. The most serious concern was related to the 
rapid rise of China. Despite China’s insistence that its rise poses no threat but provides 
opportunities to other East Asian countries (Wen Jiabao 2005), acceptance of the 
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Chinese position is by no means universal and there are signs that some powers are 
decidedly alarmed.   
 
First, despite moves towards the creation of an ASEAN-China FTA, the present 
structure of the East Asian economy, particularly as between China and most of the 
ASEAN countries, remains competitive rather than complementary. Thus, Southeast 
Asian countries fear that the economic transformation of China will mean that they face 
stronger competition in vital markets. Secondly, economic relations between China and 
Japan have become so highly developed that, in 2004, China (including Hong Kong) 
finally overtook the US to become Japan’s most important trading partner (Ministry of 
Finance, Japan 2004). Yet, economic ties did not automatically bring greater closeness 
in other areas. On the contrary, it led to worrying tensions and disputes, particularly 
over the gas field under the East China Sea.  
 
But the most serious fear is of a future conflict between China and the US. The rapid 
expansion of China’s influence in many areas in the world, particularly in Southeast 
Asia, may undermine US interests. One major concern is that China has moved from 
energy self-sufficiency to energy dependence (Zha 2006). Thus Beijing may attempt to 
control the South China Sea because of its potential oil and gas reserves. If China goes 
too far it might face US retaliation. Given the depth of Chinese economic dependency 
on the US, any such retaliation would have devastating effects on China. Pessimistic 
analysts such as Copeland (2003) fear that the story of US-Japanese relations in the 
1920s and 40s – burgeoning Japanese exports, followed by US countermeasures, a 
deteriorating relationship and ultimately by war – could repeat itself, with China 
responding to the US much as Japan once did.  
 
Thus, many realists believe that relative gains and losses are more important than 
absolute gains to relationship between economics and security – because they affect the 
distribution of power in the system. Of course, economic interdependence can cause 
cooperation as well as conflict. In East Asia, however, the effects of economic changes 
– above all the rise of China – may have been more to increase security concerns than to 
reduce them. 
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The Emergence of International Society in East Asia 
Despite the negative implications, many of these have not been materialised; it remains 
to be seen whether they will. At least to date, economic interdependence and the 
emergence of regional institutions have brought tangible benefits to the East Asian 
RSC. Above all the emergence of regional society in East Asia certainly owes much to 
economic interactions and the actual and expected benefits from them. Even today 
economic factors are probably the strongest driving force behind East Asian community 
building. 
 
Although regionalism and multilateralism in East Asia and Asia Pacific are largely 
phenomena of the post-Cold War era, their ultimate origins go back to the time of post-
war rivalry and antagonism. Then, the economic role played by Japan – particularly its 
policies of trade, aid, and FDI – was especially important. Before the normalisation of 
Sino-Japanese relations and in a climate where Japan was regarded with so much 
suspicion and antagonism by its immediate neighbours, its relations with Southeast Asia 
were especially important. Japan found it easier to rebuild its regional relations in this 
broader East Asian setting. It was through this process that Northeast Asia gradually re-
linked with Southeast Asia. With US and Japanese support, the links and contacts led to 
the creation of APEC in 1989. In the security realm, the ARF and CSCAP were 
established in 1994 and in 1993 respectively. As mentioned earlier, one of the purposes 
of the ARF was to cope with the rise of China. Three main questions arise: to what 
extent has China been socialised in this emerging multilateral setting; how far did the 
processes facilitate collective identity formation in East Asia; and to what extent has the 
new context contributed to the amelioration of Sino-Japanese relations?  
 
Before the Asian Financial Crisis 
Until the Asian financial crisis, the results were rather mixed. The increasing sense of 
regionalism was an important and positive development, especially when compared to 
the situation after World War II. Then regional identity was largely absent and 
Northeast Asia exhibited a high level of fragmentation and mutual hostility between 
states. Yet the evolution of regionalism in Asia differed from the process elsewhere, 
especially in Europe. It did not result in the immediate emergence of an East Asian 
collective identity. As symbolised by APEC and ARF, the focus of regionalism has 
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been the Asia-Pacific region rather than Northeast Asia or even East Asia. This 
regionalism is open rather than closed, inclusive rather than exclusive. Both material 
conditions and identity factors worked against an exclusive East Asian version of 
regionalism, particularly until the Asian financial crisis. 
 
First, as the two great powers in the region, both China and Japan have problems in 
their regional identity (see chapter 4) and neither finds it easy to accept the other as a 
leader. Here the ASEAN Way and its leadership role have been important. Yet, despite 
their endorsement of ideas, such as ‘Asian values’ and ‘East Asian community’, these 
did not materialise immediately. Instead of EAEG / EAEC, it was APEC and ARF that 
became symbols of regionalism and multilateralism in Asia-pacific. Behind this lies 
East Asia’s dependency on external players, particularly the US, in both the economic 
and security areas. Since Asian economic success stories relied heavily on exports to the 
markets of North America, particularly the United States; even Japan has its structural 
vulnerabilities – extraordinary military and economic dependence on the United States, 
coupled with economic and political links to both rich and poor countries (Katzenstein 
2000: 365).  
 
Thus it seems clear, that the reason why regionalism and multilateralism have not 
developed on an exclusively Northeast or East Asian basis, but rather on a wider Asia-
Pacific one, is that this accords with the preferences of the United States. But why does 
the US prefer Asia-pacific to East Asia? Of course, there is an identity factor at work. 
As in the 1940s and 50s, so in the 1990s, the US still perceived itself as more closely 
linked with ‘Eurocentric Anglo-American culture’ than with any ‘Asian-American 
identity’ (Katzenstein, 2000:358, 359).  
 
Yet the question remains as to why the US supports a specifically Asia-Pacific grouping 
and identity? As the US ‘swing-power’ strategy (see Buzan 2004b: 103-6) suggests it 
was an American conscious choice. It suited American interests to construct Asia-
Pacific as a ‘super-regional’ project, because this would permit the US to institutionalise 
its position inside this ‘super-region’. At the same time, however, the US would not be 
completely locked into these institutions and hence would retain its ability to act as a 
‘swing power’. The creation of Asia-Pacific institutions would also effectively prevent 
any consolidation of East Asia that ‘might either shut the US out’ or, ‘even develop as 
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global power rivals to it’ (Buzan 2004b: 104). Thus, it is argued that if the lack of an 
‘Asian-American identity’ led the US to eschew specific East Asian regionalism, its 
interests as the sole superpower actively drew it to Asia-Pacific regionalism. 
 
In terms of socialisation of China, before the Asian financial crisis, the outcome was 
also limited. Despite initial caution and scepticism, China did become more positive in 
its attitude to the ARF. Among other things the ‘ASEAN way’ approach helped to 
‘ease’ China into deeper participation (Foot 1998). However, there were limitations and 
problems both in the ASEAN way of conducting business (see, Huxley 1996a: 29-39) 
and in the nature of China’s participation. Yet, despite China’s apparent readiness to 
resolve some disputes through multilateral agreement, this did not extend to all areas – 
and still does not today. There are matters, notably the Taiwan issue, where the Chinese 
position remains inflexible and confrontational. In addition, disputes over the Spratly 
Islands in the mid 1990s also not only alarmed ASEAN countries, but also raised fears 
in Japan that China might use force in a variety of their bilateral disputes (Drifte 2002: 
134). 
 
The Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 exposed many of the weakness and shortcomings 
of regional fora, such as ASEAN and ARF. ARF itself was largely based upon the 
experience and principles of ASEAN. Although ASEAN undertook various initiatives 
and measures, these were widely perceived as inadequate (Soesastro 1998; Funston 
1998; Wesley 1999). Thus, with the diminished effectiveness of ASEAN in regional 
institutional building, the role of great powers, such as Japan and China, acquired 
greater prominence. Yet the crisis also reinforced the concerns of the individual great 
powers – Japan, China and the US – and made them more suspicious of the others’ 
intentions. The failure to create an AMF demonstrated the limits of regional 
cooperation. Inevitably, the ineffectiveness of regional multilateral mechanism was 
much criticised in the course of the crisis. 
 
Asian Financial Crisis: The Turning Point 
However, the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 marks a turning point in East Asian 
regional developments. It is true that the crisis revealed many of the limitations of 
regional multilateral institutions in dealing with crises and with conflict management. 
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But while these shortcomings provoked much criticism, the response of the states of 
East Asia was not to abandon attempts to build a multilateral mechanism or to return to 
the balance of power mechanism. On the contrary, they made great efforts to rectify 
defects in the existing arrangements and to find more viable ways of collaboration. The 
new approach is significant in three ways – economic factors become a strong driving 
force for East Asian regionalism; it is more attuned to the East Asian regional identity; 
and both Japan and China play more positive roles. But how far have these led to an 
East Asian regional identity / society? And how effectively have they affected regional 
securitisation practices? 
 
Identity Factors 
Following the crises of 1997-98, proposals for regional collaboration in East Asia 
proliferated at multiple levels. The most important developments have been the ASEAN 
Plus Tree, the ASEAN-China FTA of 2001, the ‘Chiang Mai Initiative’ of May 2000, 
and the East Asian Summit of December 2005. To a great extent, the new regional 
initiatives were direct responses to the crisis – which had ‘exposed the risks of self-
survival’ and hence strengthened the feeling that greater cooperation was needed to 
prevent future crises’ (Han 2001). In other words, a broad understanding emerged that 
an exclusively East Asian association was required to address immediate problems and 
to improve the region’s collective bargaining position in the global economy (Ravenhill 
2000: 211, 212). But there was more to that, and Evans (2005: 200) is right to argue that 
although these post-crisis initiatives are a ‘call for economic cooperation, it is also in 
some minds a search for a new identity or, more precisely, elements of a new identity’.  
 
The increasing role of China is another important factor in the emergence of a new East 
Asian regionalism. Of course, this development also raised question as to the likely 
direction of the new regionalism in East Asia and its compatibility with Asian-Pacific. 
In the earlier days when Japan was the chief source of regional initiatives – though 
careful not to make this too obvious – the interests of the two leading powers (Japan and 
the US) appeared to coincide. Both preferred an Asia-Pacific region to an exclusively 
East Asian one. But has the rhetoric really changed?  
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Some commentators see the post-crisis new regionalism as pointing to a revolutionary 
change, which ‘could reproduce much of the European experience’ (Bergsten 2000), 
thus enhancing its ‘autonomy’ by keeping the US ‘out’ (Bowles 2002). However, the 
cases in this study reveal that the emerging new identity is more overlapping than 
exclusive; East Asia and Asia-pacific are more complementary and less competitive 
than some suppose. Even in the future, material constraints, particularly on how far 
monetary and trade cooperation can proceed, are likely to be crucial. Thus many post-
crisis initiatives, including FTAs are bilateral rather than multilateral and with many 
extra-regional partners (Ravenhill 2002). Even China’s increasing influence operates 
within the existing framework and it does not seem to be adopting a radically new 
approach to regionalism. As Evans (2005: 213) points out, ‘China has neither the 
capacity nor vision at this point to create an independent multilateral framework that 
operates against the interests of the United States, at least in the short term’. Indeed, 
there is general consensus in China that the US must be included in East Asian 
regionalism (interviews, May and June 2005). Thus, even after the post-crisis, the US 
presence and influence in the region continues – and has even grown after 9/11 – and 
the rhetoric of regionalism has changed little.  
 
Of course, the development of ASEAN Plus Three (APT) in the post-crisis has been 
significant. As an East Asian framework, the APT is more attuned to its members’ sense 
of regional identity than previous institutions, such as APEC or the ARF could have 
been. Indeed, APT can be seen as a revival of the failed attempt of the EAEG/EAEC in 
the early 1990s. The important roles of the two great powers – China and Japan – have 
been a major factor behind the success of the APT. In particular, Japan’s support for 
APT is in marked contrast to the hesitation it displayed towards the EAEC project, a 
development which some regard as ‘a milestone for East Asian regionalism’ (Terada 
2003: 267). This change also has political consequences because it provides the three 
main Northeast Asian states with increased opportunities to cooperate despite their 
historical differences. Here it is important to mention that the Japanese Prime Minister 
Obuchi’s proposal at the 1999 APT meeting for a trilateral leaders’ level dialogue has 
now been upgraded to a regular annual summit. 
 
 
 
 269
China Factors 
A more fundamental change in China’s attitude towards regional multilateralism took 
place after the Asian financial crisis and continues under the ‘peaceful rise’ strategy. 
But how significant is this change, and what are its implications for regional 
securitisation practices? In other words, has China’s integration into regional and 
international society reduced the regional securitisation level towards it, and has China 
also shown some self-constraint? 
 
China Alters The East Asian Regional Order? 
There is increasing tendency in East Asia to see the rise of China more in terms of 
opportunities than of threats. It has become fashionable to regard China’s recent ‘charm 
offensive’ in Southeast Asia as a major success. Some analysts argue that, together with 
other factors, China’s engagement policy with the wider region has begun to shape ‘a 
new order in Asia’, in which most nations in the region see China as a good neighbour 
(Shambaugh 2004/05: 64, 65). Some, such as Kang (2003b; 2003c), go so far as to 
contend that the rise of China invites ‘bandwagoning’ rather than balancing behaviour 
from its Asian neighbours. As the record of much earlier history indicates, it could be 
that, once more, a powerful, even dominant China will be the key element in ushering in 
a new period of stability based on a modern version of the ancient principle of 
hierarchy. These claims merit more careful examination because there would be 
profound implications for the East Asian RSC and its future direction – if they are true. 
 
The case studies in this thesis, investigating both pessimistic and optimistic 
interpretations, however, do not show much sign of bandwagoning or of moves towards 
hierarchy. Rather they provide numerous examples of balancing behaviour. On rare 
occasions these have been quite extreme but, for the most part, East Asian states have 
certainly not adopted extreme balancing policies or subscribed to the associated 
‘containment of China’ approach. This has been evident in their willingness to maintain 
and enhance their engagement with China, especially through their relatively low-key 
response to the Tiananmen crackdown and to other human rights issues. There are both 
economic and security reasons for many East Asians to engage with China, but that 
does not mean they have totally abandoned balancing or hedging responses to the rise of 
China. Supporting evidence can be found in regional arms modernisation and alliance 
strengthening. China might not be the sole reason, but, after 11 September, many 
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ASEAN countries, such as the Philippines and Thailand, revitalised their ties with the 
US. Japan is also strengthening its ties with the US, as evident in 1997 revision of 
Guidelines and the 2+2 talks of February 2005. 
 
Moreover, multilateral institutions, such as ARF, CSCAP, and more recently APT, have 
something of a dual role. They work simultaneously both to engage and to constrain 
China; they certainly do not facilitate its domination or unilateralism. Indeed, Beijing 
has also shown that it is willing and comfortable to work within regional frameworks. In 
fact, the ‘peaceful rise’ strategy appears to be more concerned with accepting and 
working within the existing regional and international framework, rather than seeking to 
achieve a radically different new order. Thus, while one of the central tenets of the 
strategy is that China will never seek hegemony, the main theme is more about assuring 
its neighbours and the world that China’s rise presents opportunities – in the shape of 
mutual benefits – rather than threats. 
 
China demonstrated its more cooperative stance by forging a strategic partnership with 
ASEAN and by issuing the Declaration on the code of conduct in the South China Sea. 
Particularly over North Korea, China helped to broker the September 2005 Statement of 
Principles. In international affairs, too, China backed UN Resolution 1637 on Iraq, 
which extended the mandate of the coalition military presence. In short, on matters of 
importance China works within the multilateral frame, alongside Washington and other 
regional parties. In response, while balancing behaviour continues, these steps may have 
made regional actors more relaxed and thus more willing to cooperate with China. As a 
result, some commentators have changed their views. In 1999, Christensen expressed 
deep concern about the security dilemma in East Asia, but ten years later, he had 
become convinced that there were new elements in East Asia that were working to 
‘lower mutual security concerns, prevent spirals of tension, and reduce strategic 
misperceptions’. What had made the difference was the development of deeper 
economic interdependence and multilateral diplomacy, where the key feature had been 
China’s central role in the process of regional integration (Christensen 2006: 82). 
 
China’s moderation seems to have made an impression on the US. Early in 2005, the 
US was still expressing strong concern about the rise of China, yet by the end of the 
year it was articulating a new approach, encouraging China to become a ‘responsible 
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stakeholder’ in international community. Of course, as yet, the US does not regard 
China as an entirely responsible stakeholder, but it does see this as a possibility, perhaps 
a highly desirable one. Some scholars (Jinbo 2006: 26-8; Takahara 2006: 12-5) believe 
that the US is adopting this new stance as the real basis of its policy towards China and 
that this is already reflected in rising levels of communication between the two powers 
at all levels. During the 2006 North Korean missile crisis, while Japan lobbied the US in 
favour of harsh UN sanctions, Washington preferred to give Beijing time to persuade 
Pyongyang to adopt a more moderate posture. Significantly, the end result was strong 
words against North Korea rather than actual sanctions.  
 
In East Asia, too, while Shambaugh’s observation – that ‘most nations in the region 
now see China as a good neighbour, a constructive partner, a careful listener, and a non-
threatening regional power’ – may have gone too far, it is still reasonable to accept his 
view that regional actors are now ‘accommodating themselves’ to China’s rise (see 
Shambaugh 2004/05: 64, 67). In part, the trend of growing accommodation between 
China and its neighbours may be attributed to the success of China’s ‘peaceful rise’ 
strategy. Yet the trend also points to the success of regional multilateralism, and seems 
to vindicate those who thought – against considerable scepticism – that the socialisation 
of China was an achievable goal. But regional multilateralism is one thing; there 
remains the question as to whether China has the ability to demonstrate its self-
restraints. 
 
Self-Restraint 
When identifying master variables that affect the promotion of collective identity, 
Wendt (1999: 357-66) emphasises ‘self-restraint’ as the most important one. Similarly, 
Jervis (1982: 360-62) also identifies ‘self-restraint’ as one of the key indicators of a 
‘security regime’. This means that if socialisation increases China’s self-constraint, then 
the regional securitisation level will be reduced and the possibility of a security regime 
enhanced. Inevitably many analysts see Taiwan as providing the litmus test for Chinese 
self-restraint and hence the key indicator of its future role in global affairs (Medeiros 
2004; Economy 2005). But how far has China really changed? 
 
Although its record is mixed, there are signs that, at the beginning of the twenty-first 
century, China is showing greater self-restraint than in the past – even over its most 
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sensitive issue of Taiwan. In the mid-1990s, when Taiwan challenged the so-called ‘one 
China’ policy and sought to be treated as a separate state, Beijing reacted aggressively 
by conducting military exercises and missile tests close to Taiwan. The international 
community as a whole was greatly alarmed – all the more so because many believed 
that the only reason why China did not go even further and launch an outright invasion 
was because of purely military calculations, notably about US power (Tucker 1998/99; 
Matsuda 2004). If China was only held back by military calculations that could hardly 
be considered as an example of self-constraint. 
 
Of course, subsequent developments caused worries for regional / international society. 
These centred on the likely effects of the growing democratisation in Taiwan and a 
corresponding growth in a distinctly Taiwanese identity. After the turn of the century, 
trends in Taiwan appeared to be gathering pace – the pro-independence DPP became the 
ruling party in 2000 and passed the Referendum Law in November 2003; its leader, 
Chen Shui-bian was re-elected in 2004. Against these developments, China seems to be 
engaged in a struggle to uphold its political principles and maintain its legitimacy, while 
avoiding all out war. Thus, while it maintains its old position when it insists that it 
reserves the right to resort to force, China also maintains that it wants a peaceful re-
unification. Again while passing its anti-secession law, China also looks to the US to 
restrain Taipei. Thus, cautious optimists can at least claim that ‘the Taiwan problem 
does not get more serious than what it has been’, particularly in comparison to the 
situation in the mid-1990s (Zha 2001: 219).  
 
It is important to ask why China has avoided actual war over Taiwan and shown some 
signs of restraint in recent years. Indeed, military calculations remain significant; the 
cost of any armed conflict would be very high, not least because it would almost 
inevitably mean war with the United States (Matsuda 2004). But China has other good 
reasons to be cautious in the new century. Its Fourth Generation leaders are preoccupied 
with consolidating their power and pushing through key reforms (FEER 4 March 2004). 
Beijing is clearly reluctant to do anything that would jeopardise its otherwise excellent 
opportunity to boost its economy further. As emphasised by Wen Jiabao (2005) China 
needs ‘a durable and peaceful international environment’, that is, it needs a window of 
opportunity, free from major conflict, to derive maximum economic advantage. Thus, 
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elements of coercion and calculation are obviously powerful factors in encouraging 
China to show self-restraint.  
 
Besides these material factors, important normative elements are also at work. These 
include at least the partial internalisation of the principles of international law and the 
consequent realisation that the whole question of the legitimacy of war in international 
society is influenced by those principles. Onuma (2003) emphasises the indirect binding 
functions of international law, and the mixture of ideational and material considerations 
upon decision makers. International society now seems to accept that international law 
should play a greater role. There are doubts as to whether war – other than for the 
purposes of self-defence – retains any legitimacy. In this new international environment, 
the freedom of action of states seeking to justify their use of force has become seriously 
restricted.  
 
Perhaps more important, home populations seem less willing to approve of the use of 
force by their governments. This mood has affected China; according to an Horizon 
Research poll taken in Beijing in January 2004, 58 per cent of the 4,000 people 
surveyed believed military action over Taiwan was unnecessary and both sides should 
work toward economic integration. Only 15 per cent supported immediate military 
action (FEER 4 March 2004). It is hard to imagine that the Chinese government would 
ignore such a clear indication of public opinion. In short, it seems that normative 
changes to the structure of the international system, coupled with domestic changes – 
which have facilitated the internalisation of the values of the new system – have been 
quite as important as material factors in the narrow sense. We must now turn to 
relations between the two great powers in this regional context. 
 
Sino-Japanese Rivalry 
As two great powers in the same region, the relationship between China and Japan is 
one of the most important factors for the future evolution of this RSC. Yet their 
relationship has been the least improved and has experienced the greatest fluctuations. 
Even the most recent events – over North Korean missile and nuclear tests – suggest 
that suspicion and possible tensions remain. Since Japan already claims that it is entirely 
reasonable for it to have the capacity to launch ‘preemptive strike’, and the means to 
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attack enemy bases (Asahi Shimbun 9, 10 July 2006), increased tension in Korean 
peninsula may well drive Japan further in that direction. This would certainly increase 
worries in both Beijing and Seoul about Japan’s real intentions. Given that the three 
powers still face unresolved historical problems, including territorial ones, possible 
rivalry and tension cannot be ruled out. Indeed, as realists stress, Sino-Japanese rivalry 
for influence over East Asia constitutes a particularly intractable problem.  
 
Nevertheless, it is also true that there are increasing forces in the East Asian RSC that 
are working to prevent the escalation of rivalry. Growing economic interdependence is 
one such force. As Mouri (2004: 223) points out, the depth of mutual dependence 
between China and Japan has gone beyond the relatively modest level of 
‘interdependence’ (sougo izon) and has now reached a point of ‘inter-reliance’ 
(motareai) – so that in many areas the two Asian great powers have little choice but to 
cooperate. Even Roy, who predicted in 1994 that the rise of China would almost 
inevitably lead to Sino-Japanese cold war, has changed his views. Eleven years later, 
(2005: 205), he came to argue that ‘Sino-Japan relations will not collapse. Neither 
China nor Japan could afford losing the benefits of economic cooperation’. On both 
sides there is belief that things cannot remain in the ‘hot economy, cold politics’ 
situation for long. This was why as soon as Koizumi left his office; both sides seized the 
opportunity to resume their top level meetings. 
 
Moreover, the historical experiences suggest that it is unlikely that most East Asians 
would tolerate either extreme great power competition or single power domination of 
the region. This attitude not only reflects surviving memories of the experience of the 
excesses of the Japanese ‘Co-Prosperity Sphere’ but also the very experiences whereby 
East Asians entered into present global international society. For instance, like 
nationalism, the emergence of sovereign norm was strongly linked to anti-colonialism 
and anti-imperialism. Here East Asians achieved their objectives through their own 
efforts, not just provided by others (see chapter 3 and 4). These historical experiences 
help to explain the ways in which East Asians securitise certain things. South Korea 
would certainly not like to make a stark choice between dependence on Japan or China 
or even the US. As I argued in chapter 3 and 4, because of its pivotal geographic 
position, in the course of the past two centuries and more, Korea has been the main 
victim of great power rivalry. Even today, Koreans remain highly sensitive about the 
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likely effects of great power competition on themselves. As the Korean scholar Moon 
(Moon, Geongyin and Jisi Wang 2006) stresses, real confrontation between the Big 
Three would place South Korea in a most difficult situation. This approach is very 
similar to that of ASEAN, which would certainly not like to choose among the Big 
Three, and would much prefer to remain in the ‘driver’s seat’ in East Asian affairs.  
 
These arguments suggest that while East Asians are enthusiastic for community 
building, their strong preference of sovereignty non-interference norms makes it 
unlikely that the East Asian RSC will develop along the lines of the highly integrated 
EU model. Processes of community building are bound to be slow and incremental. 
However this does not mean that there is no constraining force or that the East Asian 
way is totally ineffective in maintaining regional security and stability. On the contrary, 
the willingness and ability of East Asians to co-manage regional affairs, together with 
their aversion to extreme great power competition or to the dominance of any single 
power, makes the East Asian RSC more viable and stable than in the past. Here, 
Katzenstein (2006: 1-33) is right to assert that regionalism in East Asia is moving 
‘beyond any national model’, and forging a ‘hybrid form of regionalism’. In this 
changing environment, the role of the US in East Asian RSC is also undergoing 
considerable changes. 
 
9.1.3 The Changing US Role in East Asian RSC 
 
As the greatest external power, apparently ready to take responsibility for the regional 
security order, the US is often seen as the ring-holder in Northeast Asia, or even as a de 
facto regional actor. Yet the US role as a security provider has changed in the post-Cold 
War era. During the Cold War, US security policy was driven by anti-communist 
ideology. In Northeast Asia it also pursued an exclusively bilateral alliance strategy – 
the ‘hub and spoke’ system. However, after the Cold War, when the ideological 
dimension diminished to some extent, the US also became involved in some multilateral 
security arrangements in Northeast Asia and Asia-Pacific.  
 
 276
Identity Factors in Cold War Power Competition 
For many years, global influences on the Northeast Asian security landscape were 
deeply coloured by ideological factors. Particularly, after the end of the Korean War, the 
US strengthened its involvement in the region by creating an alliance system. The War 
also strengthened the Sino-Soviet alliance (though this split later). Northeast Asia was 
divided into the Cold War containment and counter-containment camps. Within this 
containment and counter-containment power struggle, the US strategy towards 
Northeast Asia centred on the ‘hub-and-spoke’ system of bilateral alliances. That is, the 
US developed alliances and basing arrangements with each of its anticommunist allies – 
Japan, South Korea and Taiwan – on a one to one basis. This system became the 
‘centrepiece’ of US grand strategy toward Northeast Asian security (Ikenberry and 
Mastanduno 2003: 435). As argued in chapter 4, this bilateralism was in sharp contrast 
to the system operating in Europe, where a multilateral security institution – NATO – 
played a central role (Hemmer and Katzenstein 2002; Ikenberry 2001). Thus, without 
any institutionalised security institutions, the US military presence was the central 
feature of the pattern of regional security. 
 
‘Bilateral Arrangements Plus’ 
Even after the end of the Cold War, continued US commitment to Northeast Asia 
proved indispensable. This was clearly demonstrated in the 1993-94 Korean crisis, the 
1995-96 Taiwan crisis and in relations with the two Asian great powers – balancing 
China and keeping Japan in check. However, US policy towards Northeast Asia and 
Asia-Pacific has changed. While it continues to strengthen its bilateral alliance system, 
the US has begun to commit itself to multilateral or ‘minilateral’ security arrangements, 
most notably the ARF. More recently, the US also committed itself to the Six-Party 
Talks seeking resolution of the North Korean nuclear problems. Washington refuses to 
deal with the problem bilaterally through one-to-one negotiations with North Korea. As 
such in both the Taiwan and Korean cases, the US has been more ready to cooperate 
with regional actors than was the case in the mid-1990s (see chapter 8). In the economic 
dimension, too, behind Japan’s changing approach to East Asian regionalism was 
lessened pressure of the US on Japan (Terada 2003: 268). 
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The War on Terrorism 
In the broader war on terrorism, particularly in the case of Iraq, the US has displayed an 
increasing unilateralism – by criticising and ignoring the UN and asserting its right to 
use pre-emptive force. Yet Washington’s approach to Northeast Asia reveals a mixture 
of the unilateral and multilateral. The war on terrorism has brought Japan, a major US 
ally, into closer cooperation with the US. However, Washington’s relations with Taipei 
and Seoul seem less satisfactory. Chen’s increasingly unpredictable and provocative 
actions have seriously complicated US interests in preserving peace and stability in the 
Taiwan Strait. There is great concern about relations between Washington and Seoul, 
especially following the partial withdrawal of American troops from ROK for service in 
Iraq in 2004 (Strategic Comments 2004), which raise question about the utility, 
relevance, and survivability of the alliance (Snyder and Glosserman 2006). To meet 
these concerns the two initiated US-ROK FTA negotiations and a strategic dialogue 
process in early 2006, yet, there is no doubt that Seoul has certainly taken a more 
independent posture. 
 
Thus, in the post-Cold War era, there have been shifts in the US security approach to 
Northeast Asia – from strong ideological orientation and exclusively bilateral 
arrangement with individual allies to a readiness to embrace some multilateral or 
minilateral approaches to security. Yet, this does not mean that the US has adopted 
security multilateralism in Northeast Asia as alternative to its bilateralism or is 
preparing to abandon its alliance system. Rather its strategy is now what Ikenberry and 
Mastanduno call ‘bilateral arrangements plus’. That is, ‘the maintenance of bilateral 
alliances and special relationships, reinforced by attempts at multilateral or minilateral 
cooperation where practical’ (Ikenberry and Mastanduno 2003: 436). Nevertheless, the 
shift still reflects flexibility in US policy towards Northeast Asia, as well as the 
increased role of regional actors in managing the regional security agenda. Thus, some 
analysts argue that the US hegemonic pathway, though important, is limited in practice 
to providing order in Asia (Alagappa 2003; Mastanduno 2003). 
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9.1.4 An East Asian Security Regime 
 
Having briefly considered the case for a Northeast / East Asian RSC, we now can return 
to Jervis’s conditions for a ‘security regime’. Do regional actors accept those norms and 
rules that restrain their behaviour so that others will reciprocate? In other words, have 
regional expectations for mutual or general self-constraint increased, and hence, the 
level of securitisation decreased? The crucial question is not the continuation of serious 
security challenges; there is no sign that they have or are about to disappear. What really 
matters is, when such challenges arise, whether regional actors show appropriate 
willingness and ability to deal with them.  
 
Developments in the Northeast / East Asian RSC in the post-Cold War era, particularly 
after the Asian financial crisis and in the new millennium have been significant. It is 
true that the region is still not free from disputes, conflicts, crises, and even the 
possibility of wars – as demonstrated in recent crises over North Korean missile and 
nuclear tests – and that many territorial and other disputes remain unresolved. Yet, the 
security outlook today is very different to that of Cold War period, even to the situation 
in the early 1990s. Despite continuing security challenges, it is precisely the growing 
willingness and ability of regional actors to cooperate and deal with those challenges 
that makes the RSC today so different from the early 1990s. 
 
Until the mid 1990s the security outlook remained negative. Without strong economic 
interdependence, no meaningful multilateral security mechanisms, and much historical 
distrust, it was difficult for regional actors to have any general expectation of each 
other’s self-constraint. Rather, it was much easier for them to indulge in mutual 
suspicions, hence leading to the securitisation of the intentions of others. Naturally, 
strategies of balancing mechanisms and self-help characterised security practices. Thus, 
when crises occurred in the Korean peninsula and the Taiwan Strait in early and mid 
1990s, it was mainly the US intervention that defused the crises. The vital US role 
pointed to the inability of regional actors to handle security problems. It may have been 
this lack of trust and the ensuing climate of suspicion that made the rise of China seem 
so threatening. Even China hesitated to join multilateral arrangements in the region 
because it feared that other members would use those bodies against its own interests. 
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But what makes today’s East Asian RSC different to the Northeast Asian RSC of the 
early 1990s? Most important is the emergence and development of regional 
international society in this wider region. Within this RSC, there are growing 
mechanisms that restrain state behaviour and there are increased expectations of others’ 
self-constraint. These expectations and mechanisms derive from domestic normative 
constructions, growing regional economic interdependence, as well as from increasing 
regional multilateral arrangements. For instance, Japan’s adoption of pacifist and anti-
militarist norms and China’s ‘charm offensive’ to ‘sell’ its ‘peaceful rise’ strategy have 
the same objective; both are designed to assure other states in the region that they are 
safe and that they can expect self restraint from the Asian great powers. A combination 
of the two has indeed brought desecuritising effects.  
 
Similarly, such expectations have also been increased by multilateral fora and 
dialogues. For instance, by bringing China into regional frameworks, these bodies could 
restrain it at a time of its rising power. In addition, through their multilateral 
arrangements, regional actors have demonstrated their willingness and ability to deal 
with security issues – as exemplified by China’s signing the code of conduct in the 
South China Sea with ASEAN, and the fact that the Six-Party Talks has become the 
major body to deal with North Korean nuclear issue. Thus, although the US, with its 
preponderant power, continues to play an important role – and although the balance of 
power and great power management are still important institutions in maintaining order 
– there is no doubt that East Asians are now increasingly taking responsibility to 
manage their security issues. The increased ability of East Asians to forward the 
processes of constructing an East Asian community into an institutionalised direction 
must be seen as a positive gain. 
 
9.2 Theoretical Implications 
 
What are the theoretical implications of the empirical findings in this study? Have the 
theories really informed my study and, if so, to what extent? Although the case studies 
investigated in earlier chapters certainly revealed many complexities, they have 
provided an interesting, even ideal, ‘testing ground’ for answering these questions. 
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9.2.1 The Levels and Sectors of Analysis 
 
In the first place, RSCT’s approach of linking security studies with levels and sectors of 
analysis was particularly useful in this study, especially since my overriding purpose 
has been to develop a systematic approach that facilitates a balanced understanding of 
the region’s security dynamics. Hence, I took a holistic approach that attempted to 
examine the security dynamics of the region from the historical perspective and through 
investigations of material and social variables, which might seem beyond the scope of a 
single thesis. However, I believed that an exclusively materialist approach carried a 
danger of oversimplification and could not lead to a balanced picture of Northeast Asian 
security outlook. In this sense, the exploration of levels and sectors of analysis proved 
particularly valuable, because it enabled me to treat apparently highly complicated cases 
in a more systematic way than would otherwise have been impossible. Levels and 
sectors of analysis reflect the overall structure of the thesis and of the chapters within it.  
 
9.2.2 Conceptual Framework: Structural Change 
 
Secondly, a central question addressed in this thesis is whether there is a possibility of a 
‘security regime’ in Northeast Asian, that is, of structural transformation. The answer 
required a proper theoretical and conceptual framework. RSCT’s conceptualisation of 
RSCs as social constructs – and hence the importance of their inter-subjective processes 
– was certainly useful. I believe that social processes will determine whether the 
structure of the Northeast Asian RSC continues unchanged or is transformed. Here, 
RSCT, together with neorealism, constructivism and the English school, led me to 
identify changes not only in the material power balance, but also to examine social 
processes, such as identity building (historically generated amity/enmity relations), 
norm setting and their internalisation. 
 
In addition, the RSCT’s identification of different types of structural changes, both 
external and internal, has been particularly relevant to my case studies. As I show, 
historically Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia have been either conflated into one 
region or separated into different ones. Without the concept of external changes in 
RSCs, this would have caused much confusion. Thus although my main purpose has 
been to examine internal transformation, I have explored external structural change as 
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well. In the process, I have discovered important links between internal and external 
structural change in East Asia. In essence my argument is that the two have been 
mutually reinforcing.  
 
First, ASEAN experiences the ‘ASEAN Way’, and its leadership provided valuable 
examples and principles for other multilateral institutions in East Asia and Asia-Pacific. 
Secondly, for historical reasons, without links with Southeast Asia it would be much 
more difficult to develop exclusively Northeast Asian multilateral arrangement, though 
it has now the Six-Party Talks. For instance, as mentioned in chapter 7, although 
regionalism and multilateralism are largely post-Cold War phenomena, they emerged 
gradually from post-war rivalry. Japan played an important role both in the early period 
and in the post-Cold War era. The inclusion of Southeast Asia made it easier for Japan 
to rebuild its regional relations and to play a more positive role.  
 
Thirdly, the changes in China are also essential to the case of the existence of a security 
regime. Above all, without the socialisation of China within regional multilateral 
institutions, its rise would appear more threatening. In large measure, China’s initial 
scepticism towards multilateral institutions was overcome through the less binding and 
more flexible ‘ASEAN way’. Its characteristic features did much to smooth the path to 
more enthusiastic participation. This can be seen clearly in the success of the ‘charm 
offensive’ that emphasises the positive side of the ‘peaceful rise strategy’ to China’s 
neighbours. In this sense, it can be said that internal transformation – moving into a 
‘security regime’ – has been greatly assisted by the corresponding external 
transformation, that is, the emergence of a new East Asian RSC. 
 
9.2.3 Theoretical Pluralism 
 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, this thesis benefited greatly from RSCT’s 
fundamental postulate – theoretical pluralism. Above all, RSCT conceptualises security 
and its analysis in both material and social terms. Following this eclectic approach, I 
have been able to investigate the strengths and weakness of other theories, such as 
neorealism, constructivism, and the ideas of the English school in conjunction with 
RSCT. These investigations have enabled me to challenge the prevailing security 
analysis in Northeast Asia – one that favours the realist position and focuses mainly on 
 282
material factors. It also provided me an opportunity to shed some light on aspects of 
theoretical debates in IR. 
 
First, this study clearly found that an exclusive focus on material factors and on the 
military-political dimension is not appropriate to the security analysis of Northeast Asia. 
It is theoretically unsound and could even be dangerous in practice. This is especially 
true when considering the likely impacts on regional security of such sensitive issues as 
the rise of China and the possible remilitarisation of Japan. After the end of the Cold 
War, most of the pessimistic (back to the future, or ripe for rivalry) scenarios and 
predictions were derived from examinations of the distribution and redistribution of 
material power and their likely impact on states’ behaviour. The findings in this study 
suggest that, while the security dynamics of the region are indeed affected by purely 
material factors, social constructions may be more important. Thus, I emphasise the 
significance of shared norms and institutions, and how deeply they are internalised.    
 
After the Pacific War, together with the US factor, Japan’s development of pacifist and 
anti-militarist norms did much to assure its neighbours and hence reduced their 
securitisation level. It is the prospect that Japan might abandon these norms – and here 
the crucial development would be the revision of the Peace Constitution – that concerns 
its neighbours. Similarly, the rise of China caused concern in the early 1990s and this is 
still the case today. But despite concerns about China, it must be stressed that relations 
between China and its East Asian neighbours, particularly with ASEAN countries, are 
now very different to what they were in the early 1990s. There is greater cooperation 
and postures are more relaxed. It is hard to imagine that this desecuritisation effect 
would have occurred had it not been for the socialisation processes achieved through 
regional multilateral arrangements. Since the mid 1990s, China has been increasingly 
willing to be integrated into regional multilateral institutions, and to share associated 
norms. But how far have these processes gone? Have they really changed identities and 
perceptions of interests and hence reduced the overall securitisation level? These 
elements, together with distribution of material power, are the crucial variables that 
allow us to identify the character of the East Asian RSC. That is why RSCT treats the 
distribution of power and the patterns of amity and enmity as essentially independent 
variables. It claimed that polarity may ‘dispose’, but ‘not determine’, the character of 
security relations (Buzan and Wæver 2003: 66-9). 
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 By following RSCT precepts, I have sought to explain the reasons for the improved 
relations within the East Asian RSC and to identify the factors that impede the 
development of a closer collective identity. To a considerable extent, both the progress 
that has been achieved and its limitations are closely linked to the degree of China’s 
socialisation. ‘Impeding factors’ include China’s preference for strictly Westphalian 
norms, such as sovereignty and non-interference and its reservations about the norms of 
democracy and human rights. So far, China’s membership of most regional and 
international institutions and its compliance with their associated norms, appears to 
derive more from calculation than from belief. In other words, the internalisation level 
remains instrumental. It follows that there remain limitations on what China can do or 
wants to do in order to assuage the concerns of other members of the RSC. The 
apparently intractable problem of Taiwan points to the relative shallowness of China’s 
internalisation and means that the possibility of future Chinese aggression cannot be 
ruled out. It is perhaps for this reason that, while ASEAN countries welcome China into 
their institutional framework and applaud the signs that it is becoming a more 
constructive player, they have by no means abandoned their balancing behaviour. From 
time to time, they turn to the US and Japan – China’s rival – to improve their bargaining 
position with China, even to constrain and hedge this increasingly powerful element in 
their RSC.  
 
Thus, application of constructivist and the English school formula – such as identity 
building, shared norms and how deeply they are internalised – has proved particularly 
useful in explaining these complexities and even apparent paradoxes. They helped me to 
understand structural change and to demonstrate how far and how deeply or genuinely it 
has progressed. Without the help of these theoretical lenses I would have certainly 
missed many important points that affect security practices.  
 
At this point, it is tempting to suggest that neorealism is outdated and inapplicable to 
security analysis in Northeast / East Asia or elsewhere; and hence that it should be 
replaced with alternative theories, ones better equipped international relations in 
general. The great debates of the past have revealed that, as an academic discipline, IR 
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has had a tendency to treat theoretical approaches in mutually exclusive terms – in other 
words there is an assumption of paradigmatic incommensurability 25 . However, the 
findings of this study rather suggest that the major IR theories explored in this thesis are 
more complementary rather than contradictory, perhaps they focus on different levels of 
analysis. For instance, when considering the likelihood of Japan’s becoming a ‘normal’ 
country, I accounted that neorealists tended to over-emphasise systemic constraints. 
Yet, this over-emphasis could be corrected by drawing on the constructivists’ ideas on 
domestic and normative developments. Yet this does not mean that I think that the 
constructivists are entirely right. They may over-emphasise domestic constraints and 
identity factors and underestimate the importance of international factors – notably the 
US security guarantee – in shaping Japan’s security thinking. Constructivism is also less 
convincing in explaining what appear to be Japan’s recent moves towards a more 
realpolitik position.  
 
In addition to the point about paradigmatic incommensurability, some analysts, such as 
Kang (2003b; 2003c), suggest that present rather Euro-centric IR theories do little to 
assist understanding of international relations in Asia. It may be that cultural and 
historical preferences tend to make Asians more likely to join the bandwagon of a major 
power, such as China, rather than to counterbalance it. Hence, contrary to the neorealist 
notion of a ‘ripe for rivalry’ scenario, (Friedberg 1993/94), the rise of China could lead 
Asia into more stable times. If this is true, then we may have to conclude that a new 
theory is needed to understand the international relations of Asia. Yet my findings 
indicate that balancing behaviour in Northeast Asia and East Asia is actually quite 
widespread, especially in response to the rise of China. While there are signs of some 
modification of acute balancing and growing cooperation between China and its 
neighbours as a result of socialisation processes and economic interdependence, most 
East Asian states keep their balancing options in place.  
 
Thus, on the basis of my case studies of Northeast Asia, I conclude that there would be 
little point in trying to formulate a completely new theory or to dismiss existing theories 
– neorealist, constructivist or any other – in their entireties. All have value and 
                                                 
 
25 Of course there are scholars who try to pursue theoretical pluralism, most notably, Wendt (1999); 
Buzan and Little (2000); Katzenstein and Okawara (2001/02). 
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limitations but their limitations are best overcome by balancing them with other 
approaches. In other words, we arrive at theoretical pluralism as the posture that is most 
appropriate, because it corresponds most closely to the actual situation in East Asia and 
hence provides the surest foundation for further research. The theories explored in this 
thesis are genuinely complementary and I have benefited from them all.  
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